Q&A: Rules of Doubt and Methods of Halakhic Ruling
Rules of Doubt and Methods of Halakhic Ruling
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to ask you about the methods of ruling in Jewish law:
There is a well-known rule: in a case of rabbinic-level doubt, one rules leniently, and in a case of Torah-level doubt, stringently.
In addition, there is the rule: incline after the majority.
But the Beit Yosef, in his halakhic rulings, goes against both of the above rules. The Beit Yosef does not take the majority of halakhic decisors into account, but considers only the three pillars of instruction (the Rif, the Rosh, and Maimonides). In addition, when he has an even doubt among these three pillars (say, one permits, one forbids, and one did not rule), usually (from what I have seen) he does not use the rules of Torah-level doubt/stringency and rabbinic-level doubt/leniency, but brings in the views of other decisors and sometimes even his own judgment. So the question is: how and when is it correct to use the two rules above, and why didn’t the Beit Yosef use them?
In addition, is it correct to take into account the greatness of a given halakhic decisor when ruling Jewish law among several approaches, and if so, how should that be expressed in practice?
Answer
In general, one should be careful with rules. The rules in the Talmud and in Jewish law are only recommendations. Moreover, rules for deciding cases of doubt apply only when you are actually in a state of doubt. The mere fact that there is a dispute does not mean that this is a case of doubt.
The Beit Yosef chose to write his code in a precedent-based way following three decisors, because he thought they were the greatest. Even in this he is not entirely consistent.
In my opinion, the greatness of a decisor has no significance. Every view is legitimate, and if anything, what determines it is the number, not the greatness.
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Questioner:
But Maimonides wrote:
If two sages or two religious courts disagreed at a time when the Sanhedrin no longer existed, then before the matter was decided before them—whether at the same time or one after the other—if one declared impure and one declared pure, one forbade and one permitted: if you do not know which way the law inclines, then in matters of Torah law follow the stringent view, and in matters of the words of the Sages follow the lenient view.
That is, Maimonides presents a situation in which, when there is a dispute between halakhic decisors, in rabbinic matters one should be lenient, and in Torah-level matters one should be stringent.
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Rabbi:
“If you do not know which way the law inclines.”