Q&A: General Questions
General Questions
Question
I have a few questions.
- What do you have against the Kuzari? (I’ve seen in things you write that you often go against it.)
- I’ve seen in several places that you ignore what the Shulchan Arukh says on the grounds that you don’t need to listen to it. But all of Israel accepted the Shulchan Arukh (together with the glosses of the Rema), and it was accepted as Jewish law, so why cast it aside so lightly?
- Your position regarding divine providence is basically based on observation of reality, right? Meaning, if I see divine providence from my own observation of reality, can I reach the conclusion that there is divine providence? Or is it a philosophical conclusion?
- I sense in your words a disgust toward the rabbis of Eli. I saw that you read a booklet by Rabbi Yigal Levinstein and said you agreed with most of it. Doesn’t that make you think that what the media says about the rabbis of Eli was taken out of context and doesn’t really express their views? Have you spoken with them in real life about their views? Maybe it would be worthwhile actually trying to speak with them in order to clarify their position, and not know their views through the media?
- Do you think that all the Zionist yeshivas are at a lower level than the Haredi yeshivas? (You yourself started in Yeshivat Har Etzion with Rabbi Lichtenstein, who is a great Torah scholar and not inferior to Haredi Torah scholars.)
Answer
- I have nothing against it, nor all that much in favor of it. It just doesn’t particularly speak to me. What I do object to is treating it as a foundational, binding, authoritative text, as is common in our circles today. In my view, there is no authority in matters of thought, as I’ve explained several times.
- This has already been discussed several times in the past. In general, I don’t cast it aside, and certainly not lightly; I only argue that its words are not necessarily binding. There is definitely room to take its words into account, but again, not to see them as a binding halakhic ruling. It’s not true that the entire Jewish people accepted it. Even its commentators disagree with it. And even those who did accept it are, in my opinion, mistaken in their approach, because there is no place for accepting any text in that way, since it only proposes conclusions that emerge from the Talmud and the medieval authorities (Rishonim). If I think the conclusion is different, then why should I cling to its conclusions when I think they are incorrect? If Jewish law is shaky in your hands, then follow the custom. If it isn’t shaky, then you do not follow it. See my article on authority and autonomy in halakhic ruling here on the site.
- Observation of reality and a scientific understanding of it. If someone sees providence here, then of course he disagrees with me. That’s a tautology, and I don’t understand what it adds. In my opinion he is mistaken, because providence cannot be seen as long as there are natural explanations. Countless arguments about this have taken place here on the site.
- I have no disgust, since I don’t know them. What I do feel disgust toward is the spirit that comes out of there and some of the values they project and convey. I have no interest in clarifying their position, because it isn’t important in my eyes, just as I don’t clarify the position of every other person unless I have a special interest in what he thinks. My familiarity with some of their positions is not only through the media.
- That’s far too sweeping a generalization. But there is definitely some truth to it, as anyone who knows these two worlds is aware. I hope you understand on your own the logical leap from Rabbi Lichtenstein to all Zionist yeshivas. The difference in level is not in depth but mainly in breadth and in Talmudic analytical skill. On the level of depth, the damned Zionists, Heaven forbid, actually have advantages.
Discussion on Answer
3. (?) I don’t know what the conditions are.
1. Yes. But I don’t think anyone’s decision is purely philosophical.
2. No. But I have seen feminists who understand that Jewish law is chauvinistic and do not reconcile it with their own view, and those among them who are committed to Jewish law also observe it. That is exactly the difference.
3. I didn’t understand the question.
4. What’s wrong with listening to tradition? The question is what is in the tradition, and whether you are critical of it.
3a. The three conditions are: 1. That the prophet’s words come true. 2. That it be against nature—not necessarily in a physical sense, but also in a probabilistic sense. Like the fact that the livestock of the people of Israel did not die in the plague, or that the locusts in Egypt came in an unusual way. 3. When a certain condition happens many times—for example, a curse or a blessing. (That’s how I understood it. These are Maimonides’ words: “The continuation of that newly arisen possibility and its persistence, like blessings and curses. For if it were one sign or two, it would not be a proof and one could say it happened by chance. And the Torah already explained this and said, ‘If you walk with Me by chance,’ meaning that you should regard these blows that come upon you as chance and not as punishment; He said that He, may He be exalted, would continue in the fury of His anger that very thing which you thought was chance. He said, ‘And if you walk with Me by chance, I will walk with you in a fury of chance.’” Maybe the explanation is actually different and I understood it incorrectly.)
It’s important to clarify that according to Maimonides only one of the conditions has to be fulfilled. Do you think these conditions are good parameters for checking whether a case is a miracle?
3b. “If a matter of judgment is hidden from you—between blood and blood, between claim and claim, and between plague and plague—matters of dispute in your gates, then you shall arise and go up to the place that the Lord your God will choose.
And you shall come to the Levitical priests and to the judge who will be in those days, and you shall inquire, and they shall tell you the matter of judgment.
And you shall act according to the word that they tell you from that place that the Lord will choose, and you shall be careful to do according to all that they instruct you.
According to the Torah that they instruct you and according to the judgment that they tell you, you shall do; you shall not turn aside from the word that they tell you, right or left.”
You proved from here that the Sanhedrin has the authority to decide Jewish law. But the plain meaning is not speaking about the Sanhedrin, but about the priests. Isn’t this actually proof for the Sadducees? After all, the Sadducees were the priests who seemingly should have known the Torah.
P.S. I was at your class on Hoshana Rabbah for the Torah nucleus in Lod. It was really powerful.
I lost track of your numbering.
3a. I agree in principle. The question is what “against nature” means in a probabilistic sense. As is known, probability is a very confusing business.
As for the strange question about the priests: 1. Tradition and midrashic interpretation also carry weight. In many matters we do not follow the plain meaning. 2. The verse says priest, Levite, and judge, and indeed priests also sat on the Sanhedrin. And the fact that the Sadducees were priests is really not relevant to the discussion. The question is not what they know but what their outlook is.
Why is the fact that the priests were Sadducees not relevant to the discussion? They are the source of authority in matters of Jewish law. So are you basically claiming that the judge with authority in the generation after prophecy is the Sanhedrin?
To say that the priests were Sadducees is a wild generalization. Were there no Pharisaic priests?
Besides, it’s not relevant. If today there were a secular priest, would he be the authority? What does that have to do with anything?
It says, “And you shall come to the priests who will be in those days.” It’s talking about priests who serve in the Temple—which means secular priests are not an authority. The priests are the ones who teach Torah to the people. How can it be that they do not know about the Oral Torah?
I’ve answered everything. I’ll just add that priests are those who serve in holiness, and the members of the Sanhedrin are also priests in that sense. A priest is a function and not necessarily an origin. See, for example, on Wikipedia here in the section on biblical criticism: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%9B%D7%94%D7%9F#%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%99_%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%AA_%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%90
We’ve exhausted the discussion.
3. Do you accept the conditions Maimonides lists as defining a miracle in his Essay on the Resurrection as correct?
A few more questions occurred to me: 1. Did you really consider being non-religious, or did you first assume that it was preferable to be religious and then find the philosophical proof for that?
2. You argue that a person has not changed his views following studying the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). But the same is true regarding the Oral Torah. Have you ever seen a feminist stop believing in her values because the Talmud says chauvinistic things? Or a non-racist who changed his position because of the saying “The best of the gentiles—kill him”?
3. In response to the IGOD videos, you showed that the Sages have authority to determine Jewish law. But apparently the plain meaning of the verse is speaking about the priests. So how did it come out that specifically the priests were Sadducees?
4. In my humble opinion, the Sadducees obviously knew there was a tradition, but they did not see it as a source of authority. (I infer this from Josephus, who says that the Sadducees do not listen to things received by tradition and not written in the Torah.) Aren’t the Pharisees actually the conservatives you object to so strongly? After all, they listened to tradition.