Q&A: Doubts
Doubts
Question
Hello, honored Rabbi. I recently studied tractate Horayot, and from it I reached far-reaching conclusions that have completely changed my halakhic outlook on the one hand, but in my view could also increase tolerance toward different opinions within the Jewish people, and I would like to hear the Rabbi’s opinion on the matter.
As the Rabbi surely knows, the tractate deals with the obligation to obey and the degree of responsibility of one who obeys the Sanhedrin when they err. According to the rulings of Maimonides and Rabbenu Hananel on this matter (I have not seen anyone disagree) who rule in accordance with the Sages, it emerges that in order to be exempt from a sin-offering, several conditions must be met simultaneously, including, among other things, that the Sanhedrin be an ordained Sanhedrin of 71, that the majority of the public act in accordance with their mistaken ruling, that there not be anyone there who told them they were mistaken, etc. If I obeyed the court when at least one of the conditions was not fulfilled, I am liable for a sin-offering according to the transgression I committed.
From this I learned several things by an a fortiori argument:
A. Certainly, if my rabbi is mistaken and I obey him, that does not exempt me in the World to Come. (The power of a rabbi should not be greater than the power of the Sanhedrin.)
B. Even if I follow the majority of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), etc., that does not exempt me in the World to Come if the minority is correct. (As above; all the more so since they were not sitting in one place, so “follow the majority” does not apply here either.)
C. Since there is not necessarily a connection between the commandment of “do not deviate” and exemption from a sin-offering (after all, I am liable for a sin-offering even if I obeyed a valid Sanhedrin if the majority of the public did not follow their ruling), then even according to the one who says that with respect to the local halakhic authority there is a Torah-level “do not deviate,” that does not exempt me from anything. In any case, when I know he is mistaken I am allowed not to listen to him, and generally it seems that I may be stringent against his ruling for myself without publicizing it, in order to avoid a sin-offering.
D. Even custom / the acceptance of Israel does not exempt me from a sin-offering if it is an error. After all, an ordained Sanhedrin are the exclusive representatives of the Jewish people with almost unlimited authority, and even so they do not exempt me. (The fact that the majority of the public are exempt from a sin-offering is only under the ruling of a valid Sanhedrin. If merely the majority of the public made a mistake, there is no communal bull for an erroneous ruling, and each individual brings a sin-offering: “the act depends on the community, but the ruling depends on the court.”)
E. Even a double doubt among the halakhic decisors—whether or not one accepts that there is a double doubt within a single category against the Shakh, whether or not one accepts that there is a double doubt in a dispute among great authorities against the Shev Shma’teta—does not mean that if the conclusion is mistaken I will be exempt from a sin-offering. The power of doubt should not be greater than the power of a definite legal ruling of the Sanhedrin, which does not exempt.
So on the one hand it turns out that it is very, very worthwhile to be stringent in Torah-level matters even against the majority of decisors / a double doubt and the like if there is a reasonable concern, in order to avoid serious transgressions. (And if you would say: who says that a sin-offering indicates a grievance in Heaven against the person? Then see Maimonides, Laws of Errors 5:6, and Nachmanides’ Sha’ar HaGemul. And what about “My children have defeated Me”? That apparently speaks only about a situation where one is not supposed to decide by means above human reason, which is not relevant to an ordinary Torah dispute, especially a dispute about interpretation of the Babylonian Talmud. And what about “these and those are the words of the living God”? See Maharal, Rashi, and Nachmanides there.)
On the other hand, I think that adopting such an approach could increase pluralism in the religious world. In a certain sense, it is דווקא the excessive authority that society (and the rabbis themselves) attribute to rabbis that leads to personal attacks on a rabbi whom other rabbis think “changes Jewish law” or is harmful or “does not obey the leading sages of the generation,” and the like. If such an approach is adopted, this becomes a simple question of fear of Heaven. Whoever wants to listen to a rabbi with dubious leniencies, for example, is welcome to do so; he is simply taking the risk of serious transgressions. There is no need to attack rabbis personally and so on. Each person will decide whom to follow and on whom to rely regarding his own World to Come, and just as each person manages to choose the doctor who suits him and whom he trusts more not to bring him to death—so too each person will choose the rabbi (who is a physician of souls, as Maimonides says) whom he is confident will bring him to as many commandments and as few transgressions as possible.
What is the Rabbi’s response to the above? Does the Rabbi agree? Does the Rabbi think that most halakhic decisors nowadays conduct their rulings while taking this into account?
Thank you very much
Answer
A. Indeed, I wrote here in the past that a rabbi’s ruling does not exempt you. But one must remember that there it is talking about sages who acted on a court ruling (that is, there are other sages in the public besides the Sanhedrin). When you listen to your rabbi, if you are not a Torah scholar you can be considered coerced. That is, there is no essential exemption here, but there may still be an exemption on the basis of coercion.
B. You’re pushing on an open door. I argue not only that you are not exempt, but that you are forbidden to follow the majority of the medieval authorities. You need to follow your own view. If you have no position, then there are the laws of doubts (and there perhaps it is permitted to follow the majority of the medieval authorities).
C. In my opinion, the local halakhic authority has no authority regarding private questions, and certainly “do not deviate” does not apply to him. His authority comes from below, not from above (through ordination).
D. Custom too is a basis only if you yourself have no position. And certainly there is no “do not deviate,” nor any essential exemption from a sin-offering. But there may still be an exemption on the basis of coercion.
E. A double doubt is different, because when there is a sin-offering prohibition that you may have violated out of doubt, you are liable for a provisional guilt-offering. But with a double doubt there is no provisional guilt-offering (according to the Pri Chadash. I seem to recall there is a dispute about this).
If you have no position of your own, there is definitely reason—and even an obligation—to be stringent in Torah-level matters. This is true even apart from liability for a sin-offering, and even in transgressions for which there is no sin-offering. There is support for this from the law of something that will become permitted: “Instead of eating it in a prohibited state, eat it in a permitted state.”
You’re pushing on an open door. I have written about all these questions in several places, especially about the duty of autonomy in halakhic ruling, about tolerance and pluralism, and more.
Discussion on Answer
I wasn’t pushing through any door; I just wanted to know what you think about the matter.
I didn’t understand why listening to one’s personal rabbi, for someone who does not know the passage, is considered coercion. Do you mean only in a case where the questioner does not know that there are rabbis who disagree? For if he knows that there are rabbis who disagree, then he knows there is something here to clarify in the first place.
Regarding “do not deviate” in relation to the local halakhic authority, see Ritva on Sabbath 130a. (If I remember correctly, it is on the case of those who acted like Rabbi Eliezer regarding preparations for circumcision on the Sabbath, and he brings in the name of the Raavad that “do not deviate” applies there, and therefore they were permitted to act like Rabbi Eliezer even though many disagreed with him.)
It is not only about sages who acted on a court ruling. See Maimonides on errors on this topic and his commentary to the Mishnah at the beginning of Horayot. Even a single complete ignoramus is not exempt from a sin-offering unless the majority of the public acted on the basis of the ruling.
You probably don’t understand the meaning of the expression “you’re pushing on an open door.” It means that the position you expressed is one I have been expressing for quite some time.
If a person is not a Torah scholar, he is not capable of deciding between sages, and therefore when he listens to his rabbi he is coerced.
As for “do not deviate,” it was said only about the Great Court, as is explicit in the verses themselves. The exception to this is the Sefer HaChinukh, who writes this about the sages of later generations, but his words are very puzzling. In the Ritva you cited there is no conclusive proof against this, because it is possible that he is using halakhic terminology to speak about listening to a sage, and that there is not necessarily an actual prohibition of “do not deviate” here. Beyond that, the Ritva there writes that the fact that they died in their proper time comes to teach the reward for “do not deviate,” not that listening to Rabbi Eliezer involved “do not deviate.” And in general, it may be that the lesson is specifically because with respect to Rabbi Eliezer there was no “do not deviate,” and the fact that they died in their proper time was only because the Jewish law had not yet been decided. If the Jewish law had been decided, then listening to him would have brought death before its time.
I did not write that it is talking about sages who acted on court rulings, but rather that when the Great Court issues a ruling, it is directed to the entire public, and within that public there are sages. So if an ordinary person listens to the court in such a situation, he can hear the views of the other sages and therefore is not coerced. That is not the case with the ruling of a private sage to a private individual.
As a side note, let me clarify what I wrote in the previous message: in my opinion you are mixing up two types of exemption from a sin-offering: 1. You are exempt because it is not considered that you sinned at all (since you acted according to the ruling of the court). 2. You are exempt because you were coerced and not merely acting in error.
With the ruling of a private sage to a private individual, he certainly can listen to the other sages. I did not understand what it means that he is not capable of it; of course he is not capable of it. So let him be stringent! In Torah matters, follow the stringent view; in rabbinic matters, follow the lenient one, as Maimonides says in Rebels. Or at least, let him become capable of it.
That is also what the Ritva comes to explain, for obviously the Jewish law had not yet been decided at that stage. The whole point of the Ritva is to explain how they could act according to his view and not follow the stringent one, since this was a Torah-level matter. There is certainly “do not deviate” here if the whole point is to teach the reward of the prohibition of “do not deviate”; I really did not understand the point. Is there a commandment to listen to just any private sage?
If you were coerced, you ought to be exempt from a sin-offering, and as long as you are not exempt, that means you are not coerced. See Maimonides, Laws of Errors, chapter 5, law 6. Since my rabbi does not exempt me from a sin-offering (even if I am an ignoramus), it follows that in this situation I am not coerced, and that makes perfect sense.
We’re repeating ourselves. Even someone capable of deciding must obey the Sanhedrin. When there is no Sanhedrin, if he is capable of deciding then he need not obey anyone, and someone who is not capable of deciding may rely on a sage who gives him rulings and is not obligated to go by the laws of doubts. Of course, if he knows there are several opinions, then indeed it is reasonable that he should follow the laws of doubts.
As for the Ritva, I explained it. He is not coming to explain obedience to Rabbi Eliezer, but the long life. The claim is that the fact that he listened to Rabbi Eliezer and acted contrary to Jewish law should have made him liable for premature death, and only because the Jewish law had not yet been decided did he live a normal span. And this teaches the reward/punishment of “do not deviate.”
I will repeat again: in my view there are two types of exemption from a sin-offering in the context of Horayot: 1. If you acted lawfully under a ruling, then you did not sin, and in any event there is no sin-offering. 2. You acted unlawfully, but you were coerced. In the Maimonides you cited there is no hint of this distinction, and it does not say there that there is no exemption from a sin-offering when you are not coerced.
I’ve exhausted this.
Someone capable of deciding does not have to obey the Sanhedrin if he knows they are mistaken; that is on page 2b. Someone who thinks he must obey the Sanhedrin when they err is called “one who errs regarding the commandment to heed the words of the sages.” However, he is forbidden to rule the opposite.
Regarding the Ritva, I really need to check the matter. Thanks for now.
It is written in Maimonides that you are considered an “unintentional sinner” only when you could have checked and examined carefully and not come to error, and one who is exempt is someone who does not have that ability. From here it seems that the laws of doubts—which plainly do not exempt from a sin-offering, especially in a situation of “the majority of decisors,” as we do nowadays—do not bring a person to a state in which there will be no grievance against him from Heaven. That is what interests me.
But it may be that in practice we really agree.
I’ll just note that regarding one who errs concerning the commandment to obey the words of the sages, a great many views were said, and this is not the place.
In the room with the open door, Nadav Shnerb is also sitting: https://woland.ph.biu.ac.il/?download=611