Q&A: Acceptance by the Many and Torah-Level Doubt
Acceptance by the Many and Torah-Level Doubt
Question
Hello and blessings!
- I saw that in several places you said in the name of Beit Yishai that the Talmud is binding because we accepted it upon ourselves. I understand how communal acceptance can obligate the community in matters beyond the ordinary obligations (similar to a vow, etc.), but when we are discussing a halakhic ruling, isn’t what interests us the halakhic truth? So what does it help me that I accept so-and-so upon myself? Is the idea that we, so to speak, accept the Talmud as the local halakhic authority? If so, how does Rabbi Fischer learn the above law from Nachmanides’ discussion of the ban? How can one compare accepting the local halakhic authority—which is accepting authority—to accepting additional obligations—which is accepting an extra yoke? After all, it would seem that a local halakhic authority can be replaced, and a person can change rabbis, whereas a vow is more complicated….
2. I saw that the later authorities investigated whether the rule that with a Torah-level law we rule stringently in a case of doubt is because of doubt or because of certainty, and I didn’t understand this at all. After all, whichever way you look at it, if the rule of stringency in doubtful cases is a general rule telling you to be careful with doubts, then even if in reality it is revealed before Heaven that there is no transgression here, in the end you still violated the instruction to be careful. And if this is a branch of each and every commandment, then presumably the meaning is that even a doubt is included in the very “scope” of the commandment from the outset (otherwise I do not see the meaning of the matter—why from the perspective of the commandment itself one should be stringent in cases of doubt), and then too this would be a law in the realm of certainty. I would be happy if you could enlighten me.
Answer
1. Truth is only one component in halakhic ruling. Obedience to the Sanhedrin also does not stem from the fact that it is correct, but from the fact that it has authority. The same applies to the Talmud. Since the Torah was given to the Jewish people and not to me personally, the decisions of the Jewish people obligate me. Just like the acceptance of the Torah at Mount Sinai.
2. I don’t see the connection between the things you presented. One can discuss whether the obligation to be stringent in doubtful cases stems from the concern lest you violate a prohibition, or whether the prohibition is the very entering into a state of doubt itself (this is discussed at the beginning of Shev Shma'tata). Independently of that, one can ask whether this is an independent prohibition or a branch of each prohibition separately. The question whether this is by force of certainty or by force of doubt apparently describes the first question.
But all this is only a side remark. I did not understand your question itself. You presented two possibilities, and each has implications. So what exactly is the question?
Discussion on Answer
A. From logic. Just as acceptance of the Torah at Sinai obligates all of us.
B. The difference concerns the following question: when you entered a state of doubt and it turned out that you did not violate the prohibition, did you violate a prohibition of doubt or not? I don’t understand the question. These are two completely different possibilities.
C. Let me begin by saying that Avnei Nezer’s argument itself is not clear to me. What is the connection to Nachmanides? Everyone agrees that the Torah is binding, and that is probably based on logic (after all, no verse in the Torah obligates us toward the Torah). So quite apart from Nachmanides, it is obvious that logical reasoning is binding. And why were the oaths of the Patriarchs binding before the giving of the Torah? And in general, why were any claims made against people before the giving of the Torah?
And as for your question, the Tzelach agrees that logical reasoning binds us, since this is self-evident and proven by all those things I listed above and more. His dispute with Pnei Yehoshua is only over the question of what force such reasoning has (whether it is like Torah law or not).
Regarding question B, I understand that these are two completely different possibilities. What I mean is that concern lest I violate a prohibition is not enough to create a binding rule that forbids me to enter doubtful situations. For how do I know that I am forbidden to place myself in a possible danger? And even if we manage to prove that I indeed may not place myself in possible danger, then the reason I am stringent in doubtful cases in practice is not because of “concern lest I violate,” but because I assume that one must not enter a possible danger.
Chinese.
I’ll try to explain myself one more time, and if I’m still not understood then I won’t trouble you again. Thank you very much for the patience. When I am standing in a situation where I feel like eating a piece of meat and I do not know whether it is kosher or not kosher, I am in a state of doubt, and since we rule that in a Torah-level doubt one must be stringent, I need an explanation. One possibility, adopted by the later authorities in order to explain this rule, is that a person must refrain from eating the doubtful piece lest it turn out retroactively that it really was non-kosher and the person violated the prohibition regarding kashrut. They assume that if after the fact it turns out that the piece was kosher, then by his action the person did not violate any prohibition, because he did not actually violate the doubtful prohibition. I had difficulty understanding this approach—according to them, the rule is based on the concern lest he violate something, but why is that concern binding? Maybe it is not wise to do so and to take the risk because perhaps I will violate something doubtful, but how do we know that this obligates me in practice to refrain from the doubtful act? Doesn’t this prove that they too are implicitly holding that a person may not enter a state of doubt (like the second side of the inquiry)? And if so, why in a situation where it is revealed before Heaven that the piece is kosher do they maintain that he did not violate a prohibition? True, he did not violate the laws of kashrut, but he certainly violated the prohibition against entering a state of doubt.
I really can’t understand. What is the problem with defining the prohibition like this: there is no prohibition at all against entering a state of doubt, but you are taking a risk that you may violate a prohibition. Therefore, know that if you took the risk and in the end it turns out that you violated the prohibition, you will not have the excuse of coercion or mistake. True, if you took the risk and got away with it—that is, in the end you did not violate the prohibition—then nothing happened (halakhically). According to this side, the prohibition is not on entering a state of doubt, but rather the underlying prohibition (this is not a prohibition of doubt but a prohibition of pork). The “prohibition” against eating doubtful items is not a prohibition in its own right, but the removal of the excuse of coercion if in the end it turns out that you ate pork.
Incidentally, as I wrote above, this definition does not necessarily depend on defining the prohibition of doubt as a branch of the prohibition itself (the prohibition of pork). It could be a general halakhic principle regarding excuses of coercion and mistake.
A. Fine regarding the Sanhedrin—the Torah gave them authority to decide. But when we speak about acceptance by the people, when they are not deciding as a “Sanhedrin,” from where do we know that they have such authority?
B. What I mean is this—I do not understand the difference between “concern lest you violate a prohibition” and “the prohibition is the very entering into a state of doubt.” For if I indeed “am concerned lest I violate a prohibition” and therefore refrain from doubtful cases, then I am obviously implicitly assuming that there is a problem with entering doubtful situations—otherwise this is just good advice and nothing more. Therefore I do not understand the difference between the two sides.
C. Sorry that I’m adding yet another point here in passing, but it relates to the foundation of acceptance by the many—Nachmanides says that communal acceptance is binding even for the very acceptance of the Torah itself, and not only regarding the Talmud. The Avnei Nezer proves from there that logical reasoning has binding force even without a verse, for otherwise why would acceptance obligate even before the Sinai revelation? But it is known that the Tzelach disagrees with this—so how would he explain those words of Nachmanides? Should one say that even the Tzelach agrees that before the Sinai revelation, logical reasoning obligated us?