Acceptance of the Torah at Mount Sinai is binding because we accepted it in relation to someone else. How can we, as only one side to the contract, “accept” the Talmud upon ourselves when it contradicts the “real” Jewish law? If we made an agreement that I owe you 100 shekels, I can’t just accept upon myself not to give them to you, right?

It also seems strange to me that acceptance at Mount Sinai is similar in force to accepting the Talmud. A few points of difference:

1) Acceptance of the Torah was in response to a demand by the Holy One, blessed be He, whereas acceptance of the Talmud was apparently voluntary, without any legitimate demand from any authority.
2) In the past I remember you saying that acceptance of the Talmud could be replaced by another institution that the people would accept upon themselves. Regarding acceptance of the Torah, it doesn’t seem to me that this acceptance can be revoked.
3) In the lecture series on authority you mentioned that according to some views, the authority of the sages derives from “do not deviate,” whereas according to other views it does not derive from “do not deviate.” But apparently, according to what you wrote above, both views ultimately derive from acceptance by the public, so what is the difference?

Oren, the answer is simple: “According to all that they instruct you” — even if they tell you that right is left — listen to them… That’s why we need a Sanhedrin that will make the acceptance more suited to the “spirit of the Torah” and change whatever is no longer relevant and not at all suited to our times. It’s like a boy grows up and people expect him to stay in his small clothes until “qualified seamstresses, sharp in their wisdom and ability” come and renew his suit and clothes according to his current measurements. And Jewish law sometimes remains old even though the reasons behind things in Jewish law have changed beyond recognition — just as the boy’s body measurements have changed. And the sages of the generation do not pay attention to this, and it casts shame over all of us — and I do not know how much longer.

And if I use A.H.’s example, it comes out like this:
If we made an agreement that I owe you 100 shekels, and under certain conditions I would owe you more — say if more time passed than the time when you were supposed to repay, and the interest went up — can’t I accept upon myself not to give more? We see from this that the agreement changes depending on time. And we set the condition. Meaning, if we made such an agreement and wrote that in any situation I would pay only 100 shekels — then yes, it really has to be 100 shekels. But suppose a “new” law in Jewish law came out during the loan period, determining that someone who borrowed such-and-such an amount must pay according to some condition, say 110 shekels at the end of the term. Now suppose that condition was canceled and time passed — would I still be obligated to pay 110 shekels? Of course not. But in Jewish law they say and wait that in order to change the condition, you have to bring a new greater Sanhedrin in number… Why complicate things? Where have we ever seen such a thing? And this despite the saying, “Each generation and its leaders, each generation and its sages”!

A.H. and Oren,
1. Acceptance of the Torah was with its sages’ understanding in mind (as Nachmanides wrote in several places). After all, the Torah was given to us without interpretation, and the assumption of the Giver of the Torah was that we would interpret it, and whatever we did would be acceptable to Him. Especially if you take into account “It is not in heaven,” which leaves everything to us. Therefore we have the right to accept any interpretation upon ourselves, as long as we do so in good faith.
2. Regarding acceptance of the Torah, the sages say that there is room for the claim of major duress. But it is true that nowadays that is apparently no longer in force (“they reaffirmed it in the days of Ahasuerus”). But there it is a contract signed without conditions and without reservations, at least after they reaffirmed it in the days of Ahasuerus. By contrast, acceptance of the Talmud is our own decision and therefore depends on us. The same mouth that prohibited is the one that permitted. In other words, acceptance of the Talmud is not a contract with the Holy One, blessed be He, but our own decision.
3. That itself is the claim: both things derive from acceptance by the public. Still, when the public accepts something upon itself, it is binding, but it does not thereby become a Torah-level prohibition. But when the public accepted an obligation to the Torah, and the Torah commands “do not deviate,” then it became a Torah-level prohibition. We spoke in the last lecture, or the one before it, about the question of what happens to someone who departs from his community’s custom (for example, a Sephardi who follows the Rema): did he violate “do not forsake” or a Sabbath prohibition? Similarly, one who violates a rabbinic prohibition — did he violate public acceptance, or the prohibition of “do not deviate”?

So acceptance of the Talmud is binding both because it’s like the Knesset and because it is the interpretation we chose for the Torah? If it’s because it’s like the Knesset, most of the Jewish people today do not see themselves as bound by the Talmud, so why keep listening to it? (And obviously there is no need for a “ceremony of removing acceptance,” because there was no special ceremony of acceptance either.) If it’s because this is our interpretation of the Torah, then if we know the Talmud is wrong, that is really not “in good faith.” What is the difference between this and a Sanhedrin, where when it errs one may not listen to it (unless they tell you that right is right and left is left)?

I want to ask a principled follow-up question (please forgive me that I have not yet looked carefully at the sources you sent): this is not clear to me. Why does acceptance of a certain normative source create an obligation that overrides even the value of truth? And if that is the test, why is the Torah more “true” than the American Constitution? And also — why do you stop only at the halakhic side? If the Talmud as a whole was accepted as a binding source, why is only its halakhic part binding and not its aggadic part as well, insofar as it speaks about facts, for example? Also, Knesset laws can be changed in cases of error or when they no longer fit their purpose. Perhaps that is also the reason they are accepted by the public.

Because the Torah itself (in “do not deviate”) says that authority overrides truth. Likewise, the value of autonomy sometimes overrides truth. See here:

האם ההלכה היא פלורליסטית?

The Torah is truer than the American Constitution because it is an expression of God’s will (as stated, God’s will in human interpretation. But that itself is what He wants).
The aggadic part of the Talmud was not accepted as binding, if only because it does not say anything definite (everything is a matter of interpretation).
The laws of the Talmud can also be changed when a Sanhedrin is established. In fact, there are mechanisms that allow change even nowadays (through interpretations, suspensions, or use of general umbrella principles, etc.).

Rabbi,

you once told me that if I know that the sages erred, I am not obligated to listen to them. And now you are saying that the Torah allows, from “do not deviate,” that authority overrides truth — so if that is the case, why am I not obligated to listen in something if I know the sages were mistaken about it?

The Babylonian Talmud was accepted as the primary halakhic source because it is the latest rabbinic source chronologically, summing up all the sages’ reasoning, and the rule is that the law follows the later authorities, on the assumption that they knew all the halakhic sources that preceded them. Also, the Talmud was edited in a way that included all the reasoning needed for future generations and was sealed with the participation of most of the sages of Israel. And because after the sealing of the Talmud, the sages of Israel accepted upon themselves not to disagree with the Amoraim, just as after the sealing of the Mishnah the Amoraim accepted upon themselves not to disagree with the Tannaim, knowing that their own understanding was inadequate and that the truth was not with them in relation to their predecessors.

M80, the question is why we are even *allowed* to decide not to disagree with the Amoraim. Even with a Sanhedrin, one may not listen when one knows they are mistaken, all the more so with the Talmud. Fine according to your approach, that it is because our understanding is inadequate, etc., but the Rabbi argues that there is no decline of the generations and that it is clear that there are many mistakes in the Talmud.

Rabbi Yosef Migash, about whom the Rif said that even in the generation of Moses our teacher there was not found someone as wise and discerning as he, and Maimonides wrote about him that “the heart of that man in the Talmud is terrifying to anyone who looks into his words and the depth of his intellect in analysis,” wrote: “A man who never studied Jewish law with a rabbi and does not know its method, but has merely seen many responsa of the Geonim, is more fit to issue rulings than one who relies on his own opinion and wants to derive law from the Talmud through analysis of the halakhic discussion. And in our times there is no one who can derive laws from the Talmud without relying on the words of the Geonim.” The Amoraim relied on the Tannaim, the Geonim on the Amoraim, the medieval authorities on the Geonim, and the later authorities on the medieval ones. The distinction in titles is not just a result of decline of the generations, but points to different essences in knowledge of Torah and the authority of sages in halakhic ruling. Rabbi Reuven Levin, who was considered the sharp genius of his generation, used to say: “It is not my way to say new ideas, except where compelled by the Talmud or by the words of the medieval authorities.”

A.H.,
I compared acceptance of the Talmud to the Knesset in the sense that acceptance is binding regardless of the question of truth. You are right that if the majority of the public today no longer accepts the authority of the Talmud, then by reason it would seem that its authority has lapsed. I just do not agree that the fact that most of the public is secular is relevant. They do not accept Jewish law upon themselves, nor the Talmud. They are not playing the game at all. When there is a consensus that there is no Talmudic authority, its authority will lapse. But an individual cannot decide this, just as he cannot change the law.
As for the Sanhedrin too, this is not simple at all. As is well known, there are many opinions in the law of “one who errs in the commandment to listen to the words of the sages,” and it also depends on who is able to depart from their ruling (only an elder qualified to rule, or anyone?) and what kinds of mistakes are being discussed (a conceptual dispute? not likely).

Moshe,
I was speaking about factual-scientific mistakes. Halakhic mistakes (that is, mistakes in your view) are binding. Over facts there is no authority.

If the Reform become the majority among the Jewish people, then according to your approach should we move the Talmud from the study shelf to the history shelf?

Of course, for the sake of the discussion I mean the Reform faction that believes in God and in Sinai.

That is not a well-defined question. I do not think there is such a Reform faction that is committed to the Jewish law accepted at Sinai. But if the majority of the sages of Israel who are committed to Jewish law decide that the authority of the Talmud is nullified, then it will indeed be nullified, because the same mouth that prohibited is the one that permitted.

And likewise, if they decide to regret accepting the Torah, then the acceptance will be nullified and only “the mountain held over them like a barrel” and the claim of major duress will remain, because the same mouth that prohibited is the one that permitted. And likewise, if a person took a vow and later decided to cancel it, the vow is canceled, because the same mouth that prohibited is the one that permitted. And likewise with a self-imposed prohibition and with a litigant’s own admission: if he retracts later, his retraction is valid. And likewise a witness who testified can come back and testify the opposite, and we follow the later wording. And a judge in the Sanhedrin can also retract from acquittal to conviction. Simple enough.

Despite the confidence — and perhaps because of it — you have brought here a collection of irrelevant examples. Within the halakhic system, what determines things is the framework of Jewish law. A vow is released through formal annulment of vows. But if a person accepted something upon himself not by way of a vow, then of course he can retract it. Here we are talking about an acceptance that is not part of the framework of Jewish law but something external to it (if it is a vow, it can be annulled, like a public vow made with public consent). What remains from all your examples is only acceptance of the Torah, which is not part of Jewish law but something at its foundation. But that is an agreement with the Holy One, blessed be He, and it has another side. Therefore it cannot simply be canceled unilaterally by one side, and “the same mouth that prohibited” is not relevant here. In the legal world this is called “reliance.” That does not exist with acceptance of the authority of the Talmud. Beyond that, even if we cancel our agreement, the Holy One, blessed be He, can still demand that we fulfill it because it is true and because that is what He wants. The fact that He preferred agreement does not mean there is no obligation without agreement. That does not exist with respect to the authority of the Talmud.