Q&A: Authority in Jewish Law
Authority in Jewish Law
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I listened to your series of lectures on authority and changes in Jewish law. I enjoyed it very much. Thank you.
I have a few questions that came up for me בעקבות that: when a person is not qualified to issue a halakhic ruling on his own, can he in rabbinic matters always follow the lenient opinion? From what you said it sounded like not, and as proof you brought the Talmudic passage about someone who follows the leniencies of both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel being wicked. But Rashi explains there that this is specifically when it is in the same matter, where the two positions contradict one another, like the purity laws regarding most of the spine that are brought there.
Was that your intention? Or does one always need to act in accordance with one rabbi? (“Make for yourself a rabbi” according to the majority of the medieval and later authorities means a rabbi who teaches how to learn, not a rabbi who issues halakhic rulings.)
2. The Rabbi brought the words of the Shar in Kuntres HaSefeikot as proof that one may disagree with medieval authorities (Rishonim), etc. But there he was speaking about monetary matters, where one can say "I hold like so-and-so" even if it is a lone opinion. And that was said only in order to retain money, not to extract it. And also not regarding prohibition and permission. Certainly one cannot take lone opinions and act in accordance with them if that was not the accepted ruling.
3. In conclusion, do things that the whole public practices nowadays count as something they have accepted upon themselves? When does this force of custom begin? If all the Jewish people begin practicing something new, will it become binding? Take as an example the practice of kapparot. The medieval authorities opposed it, and even the Shulchan Arukh wrote not to do it, yet today all Israel, without exception, practice it. Has this become a binding custom that one may not dispute, just as one does not dispute the Talmud?
Thank you very much
Answer
- No. In my opinion, he should follow a particular halakhic decisor, and perhaps one could even choose by lot or select a decisor without regard to his leniencies. In the Babylonian Talmud, Eruvin 6b, they discuss this, and there they explain that following the stringencies of both this one and that one is only in a case where they contradict each other, which implies that following the leniencies of both is forbidden in any case. I also did not see anything different in Rashi there. When the issue is not to act in a self-contradictory way, this means not relying on opposing lines of reasoning. But simply being stringent in accordance with two opinions is possible. That is a limitation on stringencies, not on leniencies. Leniencies according to both sides, in my opinion, are forbidden even where there is no contradiction, and that seems to be the straightforward meaning of the Talmudic passage. In any case, quite apart from that Talmudic passage, on logical grounds it seems problematic always to follow the lenient view.
- The whole issue of "I hold like" is an unclear puzzle. In any case, there is a lot of evidence for this (as was brought there), and really no evidence is needed. It is simply obvious.
- When the public practices something, that is custom, not acceptance. Acceptance means accepting some ruling as binding. It is not true that everyone does kapparot. And in general, if there is something that in your view is invalid or just nonsense, then certainly you should not do it because the custom has spread. In the Jerusalem Talmud it says in several places that if the halakhah is shaky in your hands, go after the custom, implying that if you have a position, there is no need to follow it. This can be learned from the verse, "If you do not know, O fairest among women, go your way in the footsteps of the flock, and pasture your young goats beside the shepherds' dwellings." Only if you do not know.