Q&A: Innovation, Conservatism, and Tradition
Innovation, Conservatism, and Tradition
Question
Hello Rabbi, first of all thank you for the series; it was very interesting (I listened to it while doing the dishes on Friday). Two questions:
A. I couldn’t understand where the authority of the Sages comes from to add laws that are not based on exegetical derivations from the verses; I’d be glad if you could expand on that. B. Regarding the intuition of earlier generations—where does that intuition stop? Is it only in the hermeneutical principles? And why shouldn’t we say that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) also had better intuition than we do, and therefore one may not disagree with their words for that reason?
By the way, regarding the book that put up the sign instructing people not to circle the head, etc.—if I’m not mistaken, the source for that is somewhere in the words of the Ari. I assume the intention is not that one literally has to fulfill a commandment the way one takes the lulav, but rather that it is a way of living with the consciousness of doing God’s will (my guess).
Answer
A. Are you talking about rabbinic laws? The authority comes from the Torah (according to Maimonides). Torah-level laws they really cannot add. They can add laws based on reasoning, but that is not really Torah-level.
B. Why should we say that? Regarding the hermeneutical principles, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) did not have intuition, as they themselves say. Perhaps you mean the Tannaim (and to some extent the Amoraim). The basis for that is apparently proximity to the source (Mount Sinai). Even if someone has better intuition, that does not mean one may not disagree with him. What connection is there between the two? It might mean that it is not advisable to disagree with him (substantive rather than formal authority). And even that ignores the value of autonomy.
Did you listen to the whole series? In one dishwashing session on Friday that doesn’t seem likely. If not, it’s worth continuing.
Discussion on Answer
A. Rabbinic laws are binding only if they were established by formal vote (a religious court, the Sanhedrin). Laws established in the Talmud were accepted as binding by virtue of public acceptance. Anything after that, or not in those forums, is not binding (not like the Chazon Ish, who wrote that the Sanhedrin and the sages of the Talmud gave authority to the sages of later generations according to their judgment).
B. Definitely a consideration. In order to change a Jewish law that has become widespread among the public (something like the commonly accepted practice), you need a justification.
Unfortunately I don’t have time for that.
A. I mean rabbinic laws that are not within the framework of a decree of a religious court, but rather as an innovation of an individual Amora (if there are such cases).
B. I’ll revise the question. One can disagree in any case, but is that a consideration in your view when you analyze the words of the medieval authorities (Rishonim)? That is, in cases where they prohibited something based on reasoning and not on proof, can one say that they had an intuition to prohibit that is stronger than ours?
I listened to the whole series, over quite a few Fridays…
P.S. What do you think about giving a Zoom class on Sha'arei Yosher? Something serious, where you have to learn passages in advance, etc…
Thank you very much