Q&A: Authority of the Sages
Authority of the Sages
Question
Hello Rabbi,
1 – According to your view, why do the Sages have halakhic authority? Wouldn’t it be more correct for us to think independently (using the given interpretive rules) as the Sages themselves did, and draw the conclusions that emerge for us from the texts?
2 – And assuming they do have halakhic authority, why shouldn’t we extend that authority (not only by taking their words into account) to the words of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) as well?
If your answer is that the authority of the words of the Sages stems from acceptance by the people, I would be glad if you would explain the reasoning behind that, and why that is different from the de facto acceptance by the public of the medieval and later authorities.
Thank you very much.
Answer
1. The question why they were given authority and the question whether it is proper to give them authority are two different questions. As a matter of fact, they were given authority. The Torah itself says, “Do not turn aside.” You can of course ask what the logic of this is, but that is really a strange question. Why, under Israeli law, shouldn’t each person act however he wants? Why do we need a Knesset or courts?
2. Maybe there is logic in extending it. But what can we do if it was not extended? The public did not accept the medieval and later authorities. What does it even mean to “accept the medieval and later authorities”?
Discussion on Answer
That’s not correct. Later authorities disagree with medieval authorities even without finding a different position among the medieval authorities. True, they do so sparingly, because their words carry weight. I give them weight too.
I am indeed familiar with later authorities who disagreed with certain medieval authorities (the Hazon Ish in his rulings, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, Ketzot, etc.), but what about a case of consensus among the medieval and later authorities? Is it possible to depart from them even there? How is that different from departing from the words of the Talmud?
Even if you are right about that (and I’m not at all sure you are), it is different because of the flexibility. What does “consensus” mean? If there is only one medieval authority who expressed himself on the matter, is that a consensus? And three? And maybe there are other medieval authorities that escaped our notice? But that flexibility reflects something deeper. There really is no acceptance here. In legal terminology, this is a consideration of weight, but it is not binding.
You can ask yourself: from where did those later authorities you mentioned learn that they could do this? Why shouldn’t they apply there the laws of doubts (a doubt among great authorities)? Because they themselves understood that it was in their hands, and they could decide according to their own understanding.
I’ll expand on the second question, or maybe sharpen it: as I understand the Rabbi’s position, the Rabbi does not extend the authority of the Sages to the later authorities, and not even to the medieval authorities, and the argument that the public did not accept the medieval authorities is incorrect. The public did not accept one particular medieval authority when there is another medieval authority who contradicts him, just as the medieval authorities themselves decided which opinion to rule like in the Talmud. But from where comes the authority to disagree with a medieval authority without an earlier source?