Q&A: Sanhedrin, the Source of the Oral Torah
Sanhedrin, the Source of the Oral Torah
Question
Hello Rabbi Michi (it’s Or again from the group),
I wanted to ask something I haven’t managed to understand despite looking for information about it. a0
Did the Sages interpret all the commandments as novel derivations, drawing them out of the verses, or did they already have a practical tradition of the commandments and simply look in the verses for support for them? a0
And if they innovated them—why should we listen specifically to them and not to our own personal opinion? After all, from the standpoint of “do not deviate,” that applies not to the Sages but to the Sanhedrin sitting in the Chamber of Hewn Stone.
Another thing: can the Sages uproot a Torah-level commandment? And if so, where does that authority come from? Fine, for the Sanhedrin one could say it comes from the obligation toward them, though even there it is not clear where the authority comes from, since it says “do not add and do not detract.” That itself is a separate question regarding the additions and subtractions the Sages made to a Torah commandment, such as 39 lashes instead of 40.
Answer
Hello,
It is clear that the Sages did both kinds of things: they both found an anchor in the text for existing Jewish laws and also created new Jewish laws through interpretation and exposition of the verses.
There is no dispute that they have authority to do this by virtue of “do not deviate.” Nachmanides disagrees with Maimonides (see his glosses to the first shoresh) regarding enactments and decrees, but both agree regarding interpretation and exposition of the Torah.
As for which sages have halakhic authority by virtue of “do not deviate”: strictly speaking, only the Sanhedrin sitting in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. But all the sages of Israel agreed to grant similar authority to the Talmud (the Tannaim and Amoraim), and it is accepted that this is valid. Does someone who disagrees with them violate “do not deviate”? That is not clear to me. But he does violate the public consensus (as at Mount Sinai). It is quite clear that according to Maimonides’ innovative principle, that ordination can be renewed “from below” by agreement of all the sages of the Land of Israel, it is reasonable that this agreement also has validity. But here even those who disagree with him agree. The validity of this agreement is either by virtue of public acceptance (see Beit Yishai, Derashot no. 15, which discusses this at length), and perhaps by virtue of the enactment of “they act as our agents,” meaning that the ordained sages in the Land of Israel saw the sages of Babylonia as their agents.
Regarding uprooting something from the Torah, the Talmud says that one may uproot it through passive omission. But several medieval authorities (the Raavad in Tamim De’im, Rabbi Isaac the Tosafist, and others) wrote that when the times require it, there is permission to uproot even through positive action. And in fact this is explicit in Maimonides, Laws of Rebels 2:4 (temporary uprooting). He ties this to the authority to punish outside the strict law, and that authority certainly exists even nowadays (see Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat, sec. 2. And as is known, the Shulchan Arukh brings only laws that apply nowadays).
How this fits with “do not add” and “do not detract” was already discussed by the medieval authorities. See Tosafot and Rashba on Rosh Hashanah 16b. And Maimonides, Laws of Rebels 2:9, disagrees with the Raavad about this:
Because the court has authority to decree and forbid something that is permitted, and its prohibition may stand for generations, and likewise they may permit Torah prohibitions temporarily, what then is the meaning of the Torah’s warning, “Do not add to it and do not detract from it”? It means not to add to the words of the Torah or detract from them and establish the matter forever as something that is from the Torah, whether in the Written Torah or the Oral Torah. How so? It is written in the Torah, “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” By oral tradition they learned that this verse forbids cooking and eating meat with milk, whether the meat of domesticated animals or wild animals, but poultry with milk is permitted by Torah law. If a court were to come and permit wild animal meat with milk, this would be a detracting. And if it were to forbid poultry and say that it is included in “kid” and is forbidden by Torah law, this would be adding. But if it says: poultry is permitted by Torah law, and we will forbid it and inform the people that this is a decree, lest a mandatory prohibition emerge from the matter and they say: poultry is permitted because it is not explicit, so too wild animal meat is permitted since it too is not explicit; then another may come and say: even domesticated animal meat is permitted except for goat; and another may come and say: even goat meat is permitted in the milk of a cow or sheep, since only “its mother” was said, meaning its own species; and another may come and say: even in goat’s milk that is not its mother it is permitted, since only “its mother” was said. Therefore we will forbid all meat with milk, even poultry meat. This is not adding, but making a fence for the Torah, and so too in every similar case.
+/Gloss of the Raavad/ Because the court has authority to decree and forbid, etc. Abraham says: All this is hot air, for anything they decreed and forbade as a fence and safeguard for the Torah does not involve “do not add,” even if they established it for generations and made it like Torah law and attached it to a verse, as we find in many places where something is rabbinic and the verse is merely a support. And if they detracted due to temporary need, as Elijah did on Mount Carmel, this too is itself a matter of Torah, “It is a time to act for the Lord; they have violated Your Torah.” You will find that the prohibition of adding applies only to positive commandments, such as lulav, tefillin, tzitzit, and the like, whether temporarily or permanently, whether he established it as part of Torah law or not.+ a0
Discussion on Answer
Sorry, this is the letter:
From here it follows that the aspiration for this exaltedness is indeed proper, but when it comes at an inappropriate time, it destroys and ruins. The attitude toward sacrifices is only one subsection of the broader question of our attitude toward animals. As long as we see them as serving human beings—for riding, entertainment, or food—we cannot claim in the name of morality that we should refrain from using them specifically in the service of God. Only when human cruelty is reduced to such a great extent, and we return to the pre-Flood state in which it was forbidden to eat living creatures, will the time also come for the abolition of sacrifices. The Great Court of that period will have to decide this, and not in a way where each person does what is right in his own eyes. An attempt to bring that time forward is nothing but a disruption and distortion of the proper order and a corruption of the path by which to advance in it (Igrot HaRa’ayah I, 44, Chazon HaTzimchonut VeHaShalom, ch. 6).
If people accept idolatry upon themselves, that would indeed be binding from the standpoint of public acceptance, but there would be an opposing value—the prohibition of idolatry—and that would override the contractual obligation. But when we are dealing with an act that is proper and not invalid, the contract binds. It is no accident that “we will do and we will hear” was needed, that is, that they accepted the matter upon themselves. And indeed the Sinai event is the father of all public acceptances.
As for abolishing sacrifices, I hadn’t thought about the connection to uprooting a Torah law through passive omission. Maybe. I don’t think Rabbi Kook meant this as a halakhic statement. After all, in the future even the commandments are abolished and even the appointed times are abolished. So why couldn’t sacrifices be abolished too? In the future there will be fulfilled: yes, it is in heaven.
True, Maimonides’ innovation about renewing ordination rests on the fact that in the future there will be no new halakhic developments, because his proof is that in order to establish a Sanhedrin, ordination must return, and he rejects a return of ordination from above (because we require one ordained person from another ordained person). But according to my approach, there is no need for that.
And perhaps the abolition of sacrifices would be done through interpretation. The sections dealing with sacrifices would be interpreted or expounded in another way and removed from their plain meaning. That is not treated as uprooting something from the Torah (and therefore that can be done even through positive action).
By the way, freezing Jewish laws because of harm (whether moral or practical) can be done even nowadays without ordained scholars and without a Sanhedrin. And as is well known, a temporary freeze can continue forever (nothing is more permanent than the temporary). The proof is from Maimonides’ wording in Laws of Rebels 2:4, where he associates the freezing of laws when the times require it with the law that the court may strike and punish not according to the strict law—and this law applies even nowadays (see Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat, sec. 2. And as is known, the Shulchan Arukh brings only laws that apply nowadays).
“If people accept idolatry upon themselves, that would indeed be binding from the standpoint of public acceptance, but there would be an opposing value—the prohibition of idolatry—and that would override the contractual obligation.”
But adding to or detracting from a commandment too—even through passive omission—is still contrary to the Written Torah, no?
As for Sinai as a binding mass acceptance—I agree, that sounds very correct.
The commandments apparently are not abolished in the future according to Maimonides’ principle. Or would you say that is his own innovation?
Is a new interpretation of the commandment not considered uprooting it? After all, the commandment preceded the interpretation seemingly, and the interpretation only gives support according to Maimonides.
And what is the source for freezing commandments for the sake of a value? The Torah is the value. Where do we learn this from in the Torah?
Sorry for all the questions; the subject is just unclear. If the Rabbi has an article on the topic, I’d be happy to read it.
I already answered in the first message about “do not add” and “do not detract.”
The Talmud says that they are abolished. I didn’t understand the comment about interpretations of commandments. Interpretation reveals what is in the commandment. Why on earth see that as uprooting? Does a verse have any meaning without interpretation?
First, there are values outside the Torah. When it says, “And you shall do what is upright and good,” and does not spell it out, it assumes we understand on our own. Beyond that, there are values whose source is in the Torah and whose fulfillment justifies uprooting (even where pure halakhah itself does not allow it), such as “It is a time to act for the Lord; they have violated Your Torah,” or a transgression for the sake of Heaven, or a court striking and punishing not according to the Torah.
“The Talmud says that they are abolished”—and everyone understood that not literally, but as referring to a change in the world, not that the world continues in its usual way and then the people simply decide to abolish them; rather, because reality changes to a metaphysical spiritual level, it will no longer make sense for the commandments to continue to be fulfilled in the natural material way.
“Interpretation reveals what is in the commandment. Why on earth see that as uprooting? Does a verse have any meaning without interpretation?”—to interpret a commandment in a way that is not accepted in the regular tradition over the years is literally to uproot it. If I interpret “You shall not murder” to mean that the word “murder” actually refers only to not killing animals and not human beings, so murder is permitted—is that not uprooting?
First, there are values outside the Torah. When it says “And you shall do what is upright and good”—that is the word of God commanding. Not just whatever seems good and upright in the eyes of any person, right?
Thank you very much
I don’t know what everyone understood and who exactly “everyone” is. You can’t build objections on that. Besides, here too we are talking about a change in reality (a spiritual ascent).
Interpretation is not uprooting. See Maimonides at the beginning of chapter 2 of Laws of Rebels. The interpretation accepted in the tradition itself was created at some point. So is that too uprooting? And Rabbi Akiva’s exposition that I mentioned regarding “the woman in her menstrual impurity” — is that also uprooting?
I explained that “the upright and the good” means what is upright and good in the eyes of any person. The Torah does not spell out what that upright and good is. According to your approach, is this a command to keep halakhah? Nachmanides and the other commentators did not explain it that way, but rather as referring to what goes beyond halakhah.
Rabbi,
I do not understand how one can infer from the Talmud that it holds that the commandments will be abolished in the future. True, that phrase appears there, but anyone who studies the sugya (Niddah 61b) will see that the Talmud probably does not mean it literally (I am aware that there were medieval authorities who explained the Talmud literally; the question stands regarding their words too).
According to your view that the Talmud means it literally, how do you explain the Talmud’s comparison there to Rabbi Yohanan’s statement, “Among the dead one is free—once a person dies, he becomes free of the commandments”? What is the connection? “In the future” refers to the resurrection of the dead, so how then does the Talmud connect this to the life of the dead in the World to Come? One can of course explain Rabbi Yohanan’s words this way: once a person dies one time, even when he returns in resurrection he is free of the commandments. But aside from the fact that this interpretation is strained, it is also not clear according to this how Rabbi Yohanan supports himself with the verse.
Additionally, according to the Rabbi, that the Talmud means it literally, it is not clear to me how Rav Yosef proved that the commandments will be abolished in the future from the fact that one may bury a dead person in kilayim. His proof is built on two assumptions that are far from self-evident: (a) that the dead will rise in resurrection from the grave itself; (b) that the dead person will rise with the clothes in which he was buried—that is, that the Holy One, blessed be He, will also restore the garment itself.
It is much clearer to understand the Talmud if we learn that it is talking about the World to Come or something like that. The give-and-take in the Talmud would still be a bit strange, but much less strained. So to draw conclusions from this Talmud at all seems to me very childish.
I assume you yourself realize that you have just fulfilled the yeshiva joke: “one may ask with great strain.”
Beyond that, I am not relying on that Talmudic passage, but only bringing it as an illustration. I explained that there is no need for this Talmudic text or for the principle expressed in it, so why all this pilpul?
Rabbi Michi,
I’m sorry, but your assumption is mistaken, because apparently you haven’t opened this sugya recently. Quite simply, anyone who even glances at the sugya understands that taking the Talmudic statement literally is mistaken.
And for that reason you did not understand what I wrote. There was no pilpul here. And it was not a strained question; on the contrary, I said that one could answer only with great strain.
Well, regarding the matter itself, I didn’t know that you were not relying on the Talmud, and you didn’t write that. In any case, now I know.
I didn’t understand what you meant when you said, “I explained that there is no need for this Talmudic text or for the principle expressed in it.” Why is there no need for the principle expressed there? It seems that you hold the principle is correct, that there will be a great spiritual ascent and significant changes.
About you it was said, “In all their distress, He is distressed.” 🙂 I’m sorry too, but I don’t agree.
To see that I wasn’t relying on the Talmud, all you have to do is read what I wrote. I suggested a possibility of interpreting the Talmud that way, and I explained in several unrelated ways the possibility of abolishing sacrifices even without that.
As for resurrection of the dead and the issue of the clothes… maybe it was because of the possibility that the person would be buried and then the resurrection would happen at that exact time. And also that at the resurrection there will be a spiritual ascent that will raise even the garment from its regular state to a spiritual one, and then it would automatically be corrected from the state of its sin.
Thank you very much Rabbi Michi for the answers, I really appreciate it
Maimonides’ innovation about renewing ordination seems to me itself to require a source for his position that would allow us to accept it. And in fact I find it hard to accept.
The idea that everyone accepted the Sages upon themselves as the source of their authority does not seem logical to me. If the people accept idolatry as an authority, would that also be okay? Or the Sadducees?
I always understood that we listen to the Sages because they teach the tradition known to them from the Sanhedrin, and not because of their own authority. Meaning, the Sanhedrin innovated rabbinic prohibitions, etc., and transmitted the Torah-level material by tradition, etc. Therefore, since the Sages arranged the subject in discussions, we accept their words—but not because of the authority of the Sages themselves.
As for “passive omission,” I understood that the Sages can instruct people not to fulfill a positive commandment so that they will not come to violate another prohibition.
Does that apply to sacrifices in the future?
And if not, how did Rabbi Kook write the following:
And regarding the sacrifices as well, it is more correct to believe that everything will return to its proper state, and with God’s help we will fulfill, when salvation comes and prophecy and the holy spirit return to Israel, all that is stated in its destined future, as the saying goes. And we should not be overly affected by the ideas of European culture, for the word of God that is with us is destined to elevate all the foundations of culture to a higher level than any human reasoning could achieve. And it is not fitting for us to think that the sacrifices contain only the crude idea of coarse worship; rather, they possess an inner sacred naturalness, which cannot be revealed in its splendor except when the light of God is revealed upon His people, and a sanctified life returns to Israel—and all the nations too will then recognize it.
— Igrot HaRa’ayah, letter 594
Thank you very much