I didn’t understand what the difference is between an interpretation that removes a law that had previously been practiced, in a way that is *not the plain meaning of the verses* but rather a far-fetched exposition, and simply removing a law. Is that why the Sages ask, “From where is this derived?”

So those medieval authorities read the verse like the Kuzari does—as something directed to ordinary people, but not to the Sanhedrin?

For example, regarding “an eye for an eye,” Maharshal asks why the medieval authorities say that this was a law given to Moses at Sinai, since the Talmud derives it through the rules of exposition; so one could say that one of the courts came up with it.
But monetary compensation is not the plain meaning of the Torah’s verse, and if the law is changed from its literal meaning to money, then it seems easier there to say why this would count as “do not add” or “do not subtract,” because this is not the reasonable interpretation of the verse. So it doesn’t seem plausible to call this Torah interpretation. Certainly if they learned it, for example, through a verbal analogy…

I’m not familiar with the Kuzari. As I said, there are disputes among the medieval authorities on this matter.
There is no such thing as a “far-fetched exposition.” There is exposition. Maybe you think it is far-fetched because you don’t understand it. In the eyes of the Sages, exposition is not a game in which the expositor does whatever he wants with the verse. It is a kind of interpretation. That is different from inventing laws. By the way, even laws that emerge from reasoning can be added in this way (Torah-level reasoning), though here there is much to discuss (see my article on the status of logical reasoning).

I didn’t understand your remark about “an eye for an eye.” There it is a verbal analogy, so there is no question at all from the plain meaning of the verse. On the level of the plain meaning it is an eye, and the exposition says money. Using exposition certainly does not violate “do not add.”

The mode of implementing the law is not subtraction or addition, but only one possible mode of implementation… Therefore, if indeed in the distant past the implementation of the law of one who injures his fellow was practiced literally as “an eye for an eye” (as my heart tells me), and later was converted to monetary compensation, nothing was subtracted and nothing was added—only the mode of implementation changed… It is possible that the moral development of the world influenced this, but in my humble opinion no less, and perhaps even more so, did proper legal and social considerations (moving from revenge on the injurer to benefiting the injured party). The exposition is only the language through which they give the law formal validity…
*) Please comment on Rabbi Michi’s words.

In practice, your claim is the accepted one: that the tools of halakhic exposition are part of interpreting the parameters of the commandment, even though they are not part of the layer of the plain meaning of Scripture. That isn’t so connected to the original question, but if you know of a *worthy* answer as to why there are these two interpretive spaces that sometimes even contradict each other, I’d be glad to hear it. (Or four, if you look at the full Pardes framework.)
But in any case, according to your view that some of the tools of exposition were not accepted as a law given to Moses at Sinai but rather developed over the generations—wouldn’t everything they produced fall under “do not add”? After all, on the one hand they are far from the plain meaning of Scripture, and on the other hand they are not part of the original tools of exposition.

It seems that you know my views very well, so I don’t understand what the discussion is about. I have already explained several times that the Torah is interpreted on several parallel planes. That is how the Holy One chose it. When there is a contradiction between them (and that almost never happens), it is usually not a contradiction but a multiplicity of perspectives that complement one another. I have already mentioned several times Henshke’s articles in HaMa’ayan 5737–8, which deal exactly with this. Recommended.
My view is not that the exegetical principles developed over the generations, but that they were conceptualized and defined over the generations. They are only the conceptualization and definition of the original tools of exposition.

Do you have a better explanation than “that’s how the Holy One chose it”? I’m not familiar with Henshke’s article; I’ll look at it, God willing. If so, then I understand that there is no “do not add” in interpretation that is halakhically permitted through the exegetical principles.

I just wanted to ask another question: how do you understand Torah study before the Second Temple period—in the period of the prophets of the First Temple and before that?
From reading the Hebrew Bible, it doesn’t feel to me that the height of importance in their time was sharp dialectical analysis of the fine points of Abaye and Rava…
I do agree that throughout the Hebrew Bible we see many traditions that do not always fit with the plain meaning of Scripture, or simply traditions like those of the Sages—from Joshua through the period of the Judges (“from a Moabite male but not a Moabite female”), and on to Daniel (kashrut, bread, wine, etc.), Ezra (foreign women), and many others. All the more so in the external books like Jubilees, where we see additional traditions. We also find enactments that were instituted and do not appear in the Torah.
But still, it doesn’t seem that they attributed supreme importance to analyzing the exact legal parameters of whether a bill of divorce was written for its own sake. It may be that when a specific Torah question came up, the prophet resolved it.
What do you think about this? Do you think that the exponential growth in Jewish laws during the Second Temple period was still connected to God’s original will? Didn’t they go a bit “overboard” over the generations with the details of Torah-level commandments and with rabbinic fences and enactments? Especially in the study of the Oral Torah?
One who holds that all the laws in the anonymous Mishnah were given at Sinai—how does he solve the difficulty I raised from a quick look at the Hebrew Bible? Or would he say that it was forbidden to write down the Oral Torah because it was a secret…

I don’t see what sort of explanation you are looking for, or why. Why convey messages on several planes of reference? For example, because you want to convey several aspects of a given topic (like Rabbi Breuer’s “theory of aspects”), and so on.
I agree with your assessment regarding the Torah in the biblical period (and I have even written this in the past). But in my opinion this is a process of maturation and consolidation, until they understood that the essence of Torah is Jewish law. Beyond that, once the world understood and internalized morality and modes of thought, all these became universal ideas, and what remained unique to Judaism and the Torah was Jewish law and its study.

A. Yes—why is the Written Torah different from the Oral Torah? And what is the purpose of the Written Torah? The purpose of the Oral Torah is very clear—it tells us how to act in practice according to Jewish law. But if so, why does the Written Torah need to be written?
Especially since many times the laws of the Oral Torah are much more inflated than the verse in the Written Torah, and sometimes even contradict it…
It sounds to me like here you’re fond of the “mother and father” parable, which symbolizes the practical implementation of Jewish law that emerges from the great values voiced by the Written Torah. I didn’t expect that.

B. It seems hard to say this, because a large part of the Prophets is prophecy, and nothing symbolizes God’s will more than that. And there we did not hear all that much about Torah study. We heard about words of moral rebuke, or love of God that will be revealed in the future (“I will place My Torah in their hearts, and they shall be My people,” etc. etc.).
Regarding the strengthening of modes of thought, that’s interesting and reminds me a bit of the desire of later authorities to define all the concepts that had remained open (like an uncommon minority, or translating the Shema into any language). But on the other hand, the disproportionate growth of the laws, especially the formal definitions in the Second Temple period, still sounds excessive. So much so that in the Mishnah in Ethics of the Fathers, the first ones who said something were the Men of the Great Assembly. And they didn’t just say “something”; they said, “Make a fence for the Torah!” (and about them one would have to say: they preached well and practiced well).

P.S.
I have to be honest and say that there is one chapter in the Hebrew Bible that I know, and it is a big difficulty for the whole approach I asked about here. And that is Psalm 119, which is exceptional both in its content and especially in its length… There more than anywhere else the importance of Torah study and precision in keeping the commandments is expressed—at minimum on a Brisker nerve level. “Open my eyes, that I may behold wonders from Your Torah.” So much so that I wonder whether there isn’t some biblical criticism approach that claims this is a significantly later chapter than the other psalms…

Your question about the Written Torah is Rashi’s question that opens his commentary. And see his answer there, from which you will learn that indeed the importance of the rest declined greatly and today, in my opinion, no longer exists. It was intended for its time, when there was a need to upgrade the world’s level of morality.
I don’t know what the “mother and father” parable is, so I can’t be fond of it. In my opinion, today there is no importance at all to studying the Written Torah.