Q&A: A Decisor Who Doesn’t Decide
A Decisor Who Doesn’t Decide
Question
You said that the role of a halakhic decisor is to lay out before me all the possible options, but not actually to “rule.”
1) If so, why are they called a “decisor” and not, say, an “expounder” or something like that?
2) In all the responsa books you see that the author sums up his ruling at the end of the responsum and says, “In light of all the above, it seems to me that one should rule such-and-such, and therefore it is forbidden/permitted.” For example, in Yabia Omer there is a summary at the end of every responsum with a specific ruling, and so too in other responsa works. It seems that the decisor does not only lay out a map but actually decides between the options. In your view, are they mistaken?
3) If he lays out the map before me, what have I gained from that? Even before I asked him, I already knew that some say forbidden, some say permitted, some say it is a custom, and some say it is an obligation, etc. (as always in Judaism). The point is that I came to ask what one should do, not what this one says and that one says.
Answer
1. I did not say that all halakhic decisors agree with me. In my opinion, a decisor is not supposed to do that, certainly not nowadays. Of course, people find it convenient.
2. The decisor can state at the end what his opinion is, if there is one clear conclusion, and even if there is not and it is only his opinion. But the questioner is not obligated to adopt it.
3. If you know, then don’t come ask. People come to ask when they don’t know.
Discussion on Answer
1. I answered completely. I wrote that indeed there are those who add a ruling in that way, but I disagree with them. There are situations of decision by the decisor himself, but not between permitted options; rather between forbidden and permitted.
2. Each person according to his own way. Still, it is not desirable to follow the lenient view of this one and that one. Why should the decisor himself decide between the opinions for me?
4. You mean a problem of taking the lenient view of this one and that one. Indeed, there is such a problem here. Who said there isn’t?
5. We are not talking about a person but about a type of work. A decisor can write a responsa book and a Jewish law book, and each of them will be written according to the rules of its genre.
There are halakhic decisors whom the public has accepted upon itself.
1. I didn’t understand the connection between the answer and my question; maybe you meant it as an answer to #2?
2. 3. On what basis does a person who comes to ask a rabbi decide between the options the rabbi laid out for him? Just on emotional inclination? For example, I like Maimonides more than the Rosh, so my decision will be like Maimonides.
4. I ask a rabbi question A, and he answers that Rabbi X says forbidden and Rabbi Y says permitted. Then I ask him question B, and he answers that the same Rabbi X here holds it is permitted and the same Rabbi Y here holds it is forbidden. If in both of these questions I decide to follow the lenient opinion, isn’t there a problem of acting like this master in one case and that master in another? Why not?
5. You said in a lecture that the Shulchan Arukh’s role is to issue halakhic rulings, because it is a book of normative listing and it needs to tell us what, in its view, the Jewish law is. But responsa books are supposed to lay out a map of the positions and options. What about the responsa of the author of the Shulchan Arukh himself (as is well known, there are such works, Avkat Rokhel, Responsa Beit Yosef, etc.)? There too, should the author have laid out a map of the different approaches in the Talmudic passage, or should he have told us the settled Jewish law as ruled in his code, the Shulchan Arukh?
Sorry for the length. I hope I’m being clear. Thank you, Rabbi.