“There is no justification for legislation that forces people to do things they do not believe in, unless it prevents demonstrable harm to the public.”
A. What is defined as “demonstrable harm to the public”? That is very subjective: one person will define something as harm and another will not. Could one say that there is justification for legislation on matters of religion because it causes harm to the public, because it is spiritual harm (and seemingly spiritual harm is also harm), or because it harms the national culture, which is also called harm, and therefore there is justification for legislation?
B. Another argument I’ve heard for justifying legislation on matters of religion: after all, our entire right to conquer the Land and settle it is because of the divine promise (Rashi’s very first comment on the Torah). So perhaps there is justification for religious legislation, because without that we have no right to the Land?

A. In religious legislation there is no demonstrable harm. It is harm in your view. Harm to human life is not disputed, and that is called demonstrable harm. But of course there is no end to this, and no sharp boundary.
B. On that very point, there is a dispute. Many do not see the divine promise as the basis, but rather the historical right (simply from the fact that our forefathers lived here).

A. We are talking about legislation that “forces people to do things they do not believe in,” which according to the Rabbi is justified only if it causes demonstrable harm, and demonstrable harm according to the Rabbi’s definition is harm that everyone agrees about (such as bodily injury). So does everyone agree about it, or are there people “who do not believe in it”? If the harm is “not disputed,” then isn’t that not a case of “forcing people to do things they do not believe in”?
B. “Many see.” What is the Rabbi’s own opinion? If the Rabbi’s view is like those who see the divine promise as the basis of our right to the Land—then does that mean the Rabbi should support religious legislation because there is a justification for legislation and because the argument I raised in the previous comment is correct? If the Rabbi does not see the divine promise as the basis, why not? (After all, the very existence of the divine promise is true, for those who believe in the Torah.)

A. According to your approach, anyone who thinks something is harmful to the state can impose it on all the rest of the residents. I do not agree with that. Beyond that, I do not see value in performing acts in accordance with Jewish law by coercion, at least when the person doing them does not believe in it. The fact that the majority would agree that there is harm is not a criterion that the harm is real (a majority is not a criterion for truth), but rather that over this harm coercion can be imposed.
B. See section A and my previous reply.