Q&A: An Object of Prohibition
An Object of Prohibition
Question
Have a good week!
Why is there no law requiring us to prevent a minor from prohibited acts (except that it is forbidden to feed them prohibited food directly)? After all, Rabbi Shimon Shkop taught us that beyond the warning of the prohibition, there is also an actual prohibited object/entity, and it makes no difference whether we define it like Maimonides, that it is like poison, or like the Maharal, that the Torah’s command created this reality. If so, why shouldn’t we prevent him from coming into contact with that prohibited object?
Can one infer from this that the law of separating someone from prohibition applies to the warning or the rebellious act, and not to the damage done to the prohibited object itself?
And especially according to Rabbi Akiva Eiger, who says that one must separate someone from an inadvertent act even though he is not actually violating a prohibition, because in practice he is affecting the prohibited object (aside from Sabbath prohibitions, whose whole essence is intentional constructive labor)?
True, one could challenge this from the words of the Shakh and Sha”A, that it is preferable to prevent infants from nursing from non-Jewish women because it is “a mouth that is destined to speak with the Divine Presence”; if so, why is there not an actual obligation to separate them from it?
Thank you
Answer
First, if the command creates the problem, then a minor who is not commanded will not be affected by those problems. Second, perhaps there is reason to separate him from it, but that does not necessarily mean there is an obligation to do so. Not everything that is proper to do is commanded by Jewish law, and vice versa.
Discussion on Answer
Who said anything about awareness? A minor is not commanded.
Thank you for the answer.
It is not correct that if the command creates it, then there is no prohibited-object status for one who was not commanded, because the Maharal’s intent is that the cause of the prohibition is not reality itself, but that the Torah introduced the cause.
But he does not mean that the prohibition relates to awareness/knowledge (which is Rabbi Y. Schreiber’s approach)