Q&A: Fulfilling a Commandment Without Being Commanded
Fulfilling a Commandment Without Being Commanded
Question
With God’s help
To the honorable
Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham,
Greetings and blessings.
Like many others, I greatly enjoyed the lectures I heard from you, for their honesty and originality.
I would be very grateful if you would address my question:
I heard in one of your lectures, where you spoke about the fact that only when a commandment is performed מתוך awareness that it is God’s commandment does it have religious value.
You cited in this context Maimonides’ words about a resident alien, that if he keeps the commandment because of religious reasoning, he is not among the pious of the nations of the world, “but only among their wise.”
(The obvious conclusion was that there is no value to the laying of tefillin by a Jew who does not believe in the Creator and/or in His commandments.)
I would like to suggest a different understanding of Maimonides’ words, and I would be glad to hear your opinion:
One should distinguish between the object and the subject, between the person performing the commandment and the commandment itself.
That is to say: indeed, there is a requirement that a person fulfill the commandment because it is the will of God. If he performs the commandment for other reasons—moral, social, and the like—then he is not among the pious of the nations of the world. In other words: he is not serving God.
But this does not at all contradict the fact that the very fulfillment of the commandment—which the Creator commanded, and which that person performs—is still a commandment.
In other words: there is divine service here, but there is no servant of God here. And if I am right, then there is definitely religious value in fulfilling the commandment in this form, even though the service of God is lacking in such a commandment.
P.S. You mentioned the correspondence between Rabbi Hutner and the Lubavitcher Rebbe on this matter. I believe that the correspondence—or perhaps only the Rebbe’s side of it—is printed in Likkutei Sichot, vol. 5.
P.P.S. Full disclosure, though it is not relevant, and you probably understood it yourself: the writer is a Chabad chasid.
Answer
Hello,
I should preface that this interpretation follows from reasoning, and Maimonides is only support for it. So even if Maimonides had not written this, this is what I would have thought to say.
In any case, even within Maimonides’ view, I do not understand what you gained with this interpretation. That person still did not perform a commandment. So what practical difference does it make that the commandment was carried out? It is like a monkey putting on tefillin.
In short, even according to your view, that atheist who put on tefillin in the morning at a Chabad stand, and repented at noon, has to go back and put on tefillin again. The tefillin may have been put on, but he did not fulfill the commandment of laying tefillin.
Discussion on Answer
All of this is just words. The question is whether he discharged his obligation of the commandment or not. By simple reasoning it is clear to me that he did not. Maimonides’ wording also indicates this (that is what he wrote, that he is among the wise of the nations of the world and not among their pious. Of course, one can dispute the interpretation here, but the reasoning supports it). One should remember that Maimonides is dealing here with Jewish law, not metaphysics. And his words should be combined with what he wrote in his commentary to the Mishnah at the end of the chapter on the sciatic nerve prohibition.
And of course it is obvious that according to the opinion that commandments require intention, he certainly did not fulfill a commandment. I argue that the same applies even according to the opinion that commandments do not require intention.
Hello,
One can shed light on the question, “Does a Jew discharge his obligation in a commandment or not?” through a passage in the Talmud:
A thoroughly wicked man who betroths a woman on condition that he is thoroughly righteous must give a bill of divorce out of doubt, lest he had thoughts of repentance.
When a Jew puts on tefillin, one small thought is enough for the commandment to count, even if only out of doubt.
In my opinion there is no connection. There too, if it is clear to you that he did not think thoughts of repentance, then she is not betrothed. In reality there is a doubt lest he thought of repentance. That is the situation in our case as well. And indeed here too, if there really is doubt whether he thought of repentance, then there is indeed doubt whether there was a commandment. In short, this is a factual question, not a halakhic one, and therefore proofs from the Talmud neither add nor subtract anything regarding it. One just has to remember that repentance is clear when dealing with a person who believes in the Holy One, blessed be He, and in the giving of the Torah, and who commits transgressions because of his evil inclination. That used to be the situation, and then there is room for doubt that at some moment he repented and is now doing what he himself believes in. But today there are secular people who do not believe in this, and therefore it is not likely that in one moment they repent and begin to believe. I have more than once pointed out the conceptual difference between a penitent and someone who becomes religiously observant again (see column 367).
I was misunderstood, and I will try to sharpen my argument:
For some reason, the Creator of the world has an interest in tefillin being laid. If so, whoever put on tefillin has fulfilled the Creator’s will (and his duty as a Jew). Exactly as you explained regarding civil law. The legislator has an interest in the law being obeyed. The motivation is less relevant. [And not, as I understood from your words, that the Creator’s interest is in my subordinating my will to His through laying tefillin. And if I did not subordinate my will to His, because the motivation was various reasons and not the law itself, then the “decree of the King” was not fulfilled.]
What is different, though, between halakhic law and secular law is that there is also interest and significance in the subjective processes undergone by the one fulfilling the commandment. And that did not happen here. Therefore, in that particular context—the person’s inner state—it is impossible to call the person one who fulfilled a commandment. The inner religious process that is supposed to occur alongside the fulfillment of the commandment is what is missing. But from the standpoint of the halakhic obligation—whether he must put on tefillin again, as you illustrated—surely the act was done.
Something like the figure described by the author of the Tanya (chapter 15, based on the Talmud in Chagigah): someone who fulfills his halakhic obligations completely, and yet “is not called one who serves God at all.” That is: a distinction between the object, which was fully carried out, and the subject, the person, who did not change and cannot be called “a servant of God” or anything of the sort.
I hope I have now made myself clear.
A. In my view this is a possible and logical understanding. I would be glad to hear your opinion.
B. You mentioned an argument of the Lubavitcher Rebbe, according to which a Jew fulfills commandments because they are the King’s command, even if this does not rise to his conscious awareness. Something like that.
This is certainly not an empirical statement, and one can understand why you are not enamored of it (and, if I understand correctly, of the idea of Israel’s special spiritual quality in general).
On the other hand, perhaps the fact that Maimonides’ words were said regarding the commandments of a Noahide (and the analogy to the 613 commandments does not appear explicitly in Maimonides’ words) supports such a statement.