Q&A: A Fortiori Argument. Kiddushin 10b
A Fortiori Argument. Kiddushin 10b
Question
“Ravina said: By Torah law, etc. And just as a Canaanite maidservant, whose sexual relations do not entitle her to eat terumah, nevertheless her acquisition by money does entitle her to eat terumah, and we are not concerned about a simpon, then in this case, where sexual relations do entitle her to eat terumah, is it not all the more so that her acquisition by money entitles her to eat terumah, and we should not be concerned about a simpon?”
It is difficult for me, because seemingly there is no a fortiori argument here, only an analogy from a comparable case. a0
After all, the very definition of the maidservant as the less weighty case, as opposed to the woman as the more weighty one, is with respect to the reason for obligation. a0But the question being discussed is about negation. Is there a concern because of which we would cancel her eating terumah on account of a simpon? And with respect to the reason to negate the Torah law, the two cases are equal. For in both of them the starting point is that they do in fact eat terumah (in the case of the woman also through intercourse, and in the case of the maidservant only when she is acquired by money), and the question is whether we should prohibit them. And the reason we would introduce a prohibition is the concern of simpon, which is equal in both.
If so, then seemingly this is not an a fortiori argument but merely a comparison.
Thank you very much!
Answer
The discussion is not about negation but about the permission to eat terumah. The question is: what is the power that grants a maidservant and a regular woman the right to eat terumah? The power granting a woman that right is greater, and therefore the concern about a simpon will not prevent it and deprive her of eating terumah. This is similar to the principle of “all this I will include in the a fortiori argument” in Tosafot, Bava Kamma 25.
Discussion on Answer
Exactly. And I would add that the simpon is not the issue; the issue is the strength of the right. And if the strength of right X is not stopped because of a concern about a simpon, then a greater strength certainly will not be stopped by it.
Again I want to say—thank you very much!
To my mind this is brilliant. And like any good insight, the more you think about it, the more its truth intensifies and the beauty of its logical simplicity emerges.
More power to you.
Just to make sure I understood.
The Rabbi is basically assuming that the initial permission for the woman to eat is not the lifting of the prohibition against eating terumah, but rather that she has a right, as the wife of a priest, to eat from his property, and by virtue of that the prohibition of being a non-priest with respect to eating terumah is lifted for her?