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Q&A: Two Laws

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This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

Two Laws

Question

Rabbi Chaim sometimes distinguishes between two separate laws in Jewish law that are two parallel reasons for one result. For example, in the case of a married woman who is also a designated maidservant, there is no liability of karet, and betrothal does not take effect with her because she is a married woman.
According to the principle of what counts as an explanation—namely, a sufficient explanation—does it follow that there is one reason behind Rabbi Chaim’s two laws?
By the way, in your opinion, what is the basis for this claim? Is it due to a preference for rational neatness, or is there from the outset some metaphysical view that everything begins from unity, and therefore as long as there is no direct unity, it gets labeled as “not an explanation”?

Answer

It’s not Rabbi Chaim but the Pnei Yehoshua.
Two reasons for one result are possible. Two results from one reason are not possible. A reason is sufficient but not necessarily necessary.

Discussion on Answer

Jonathan bar Rabbi (2024-09-27)

Right. The Rabbi pointed out early signs of Rabbi Chaim’s style of learning in the Pnei Yehoshua.
In any case, I seem to remember that there are two schools of thought, and one of them defined an explanation as having to be both necessary and sufficient.
You gave the example of lighting a fire with a lighter and by some other means. From that it would seem that there must be something common to both that is the necessary cause.
So in this case we’re talking about one result with two different causes. That’s why I don’t understand why you changed your claim.

Michi (2024-09-27)

One result from two causes is certainly possible from the standpoint of the concept of cause. In Jewish law there is an argument that it is preferable to find one cause (and the proof is from the common denominator). A cause is a sufficient condition, not a necessary one. Some argue that it must also be necessary, but in my opinion they are mistaken.

Jonathan bar Rabbi (2024-09-29)

So according to the approach that an explanation must also be necessary, if there are two laws then there is one reason for both of them. Did I understand correctly?

Michi (2024-09-29)

Indeed, according to that incorrect approach, that is what follows. That is one of the indications that it is incorrect.

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