Q&A: Actualism and Informativeness — Aristotelianism and Platonism?
Actualism and Informativeness — Aristotelianism and Platonism?
Question
Have a good and blessed week, Rabbi Michi,
I would like to ask three questions about Aristotelianism and Platonism in the context of the theory of ideas:
A) In your book God Plays Dice, Appendix B, you discuss a proof in favor of the informativeness camp in its debate with the actualists.
I wanted to ask you (following the fact that you didn’t address this point in the book):
Do you think there is a clear connection between the actualist position and the Aristotelian position, and between the informativeness position and the Platonic position?
That is, Aristotelianism assumes that things cannot really be grouped together, and any grouping whatsoever in the world depends on the opinion, imagination, and usefulness of the person doing the grouping.
And Platonism holds that: 1) things can be grouped together, and 2) from that grouping one can infer the existence of some spiritual entity (a law of nature) underlying the particulars (this apart from the main question you raise there — that grouping seeks to organize the world according to our patterns of thought. Still, it seems to me that the first level of the informativeness position must rest on the Platonic possibility of grouping.)
B) Another question:
Is the Aristotelian-Platonic dispute connected to the debate over the existence of God, in the context of the argument from complexity?
That is, the argument from complexity requires proving the existence of a spiritual being from a generalization about reality in the world, which according to Aristotelianism might perhaps not be relevant.
C) In your understanding, what is the relation between the Platonic idea and its representation in the world?
That is, assuming the idea of horseness were to be nullified, what would happen to the horse I have on the farm — would it disappear?
With blessings and great appreciation
Answer
A) In my view, only a weak connection. Aristotle is willing to accept generalizations; he just doesn’t see them as entities. And someone who makes generalizations does not necessarily regard them as entities. \
B) No. God is not the idea of complexity. Complexity proves His existence. That is not the same thing.
C) I don’t know. I assume not.
Discussion on Answer
No, that’s not correct. Aristotle does accept generalizations and makes a lot of use of them. He only argues that the generalization describes the law that governs the behavior of things in our world, and does not reflect an idea that exists somewhere else. Horseness is a generalization we make about horses, and it is true in the sense that it describes what is common to all horses. But there is no idea of horseness. The law of gravity too is true according to Aristotle, except that there is no idea of gravity in another world.
It seems to me that what is confusing you is my claim that if the generalizations are indeed true, then it is reasonable that they also have an ontic root (= Platonism). But Aristotle does not think so, and in his view the generalizations are true without having such a root.
Thank you very much
Regarding 1 —
From the example you bring from Borges’s story about that planet, (as I’ve understood it until now) in order to understand the Aristotelian method, I understood that according to the Aristotelian method there is no real significance to generalization in the world, and it is only a function of the one doing the generalizing.
After all, if the generalization of horseness and the generalization of all animals over one meter seventy are equally valid in the Aristotelian method (according to your explanation in the lectures), then generalization in general is in the head of the person doing the generalizing, and not something real in the world.
If so, then seemingly this should apply to the generalization of laws of nature as well.
What am I missing?