Q&A: Infecting Another Person with a Disease for Their Benefit
Infecting Another Person with a Disease for Their Benefit
Question
1) If someone harms another person, but in his view the harm is for that person’s benefit—for example, he sees his friend running past a cliff, assuming there is a guardrail there, while he knows there is no guardrail, and therefore he rushes over and breaks his friend’s leg in order to save him—and it is not known whether there really was danger. In a case where the friend certainly agrees that if there had been danger, then it would have been good that you broke my leg, but in fact there was no danger at all: is he obligated to pay, or do we say, “the burden of proof rests on the one seeking to extract money from another”?
2) And what about a case where the liability is only in the heavenly court, such as someone who deliberately infects his friend with a disease in order to prevent him from going to a dangerous place, in his view as above. Does the one who infected him have an obligation in the heavenly court to pay, or according to his own view heaven knows the truth—that he is not liable—whereas in a human court he too agrees that human judges would obligate him?
3) If a person was ruled by a religious court to pay his fellow, but he knows that he is exempt—the witnesses are false witnesses, his fellow is a liar, and the whole thing never happened—may he hide his assets?
Answer
1. At first glance, this appears to be damage caused under compulsion, and with regard to a person who causes damage, he is liable in all cases (a person is always considered forewarned).
However, one could argue that if that person had known, he too would have wanted me to break his leg. But that is not correct, because the true information is that there was no need for it. So the only possible argument is that if that person had thought—mistakenly—that there was such a need, he would have agreed. But it makes no sense to claim there was consent if that person had been mistaken. He was not mistaken, and there is no point discussing what he would have thought had he been mistaken.
2. As for liability in the heavenly court, this requires some discussion. The question is what liability in the heavenly court means. Simply speaking, it seems to mean punishment for a transgression. Here the intention was good, and it seems obvious that he deserves no punishment. But Meiri, in the chapter “HaKones,” cites Ba’al HaHashlama that the obligation to satisfy one’s duty in the heavenly court is a compensatory obligation for damages, except that it is not collected by a religious court. He writes there that if he did not pay, he is a robber. According to this, there is room to argue that there would be liability in the heavenly court, as we saw in the previous section regarding human court liability. However, a litigant could dispute this, since it may be that the reason there is payment liability in the heavenly court is because it is a punitive obligation, and here he does not deserve punishment.
3. Good question. Seemingly the categorical imperative says no, but there is logic in saying yes. What claim could be made against him in the heavenly court? After all, he merely prevented theft. They might argue against him that he undermined the authority of the religious court, but that is not correct. He hid assets and therefore did not pay; it is not as though he said, “I refuse to pay,” by force, against the authority of the religious court. If so, the authority of the religious court was not harmed, nor was the truth. Therefore it seems to me that it is permitted. This is a major practical difference with regard to a definite claim against an uncertain claim in extracting money. As a matter of Jewish law, the ruling is that a definite claim does not extract money from an uncertain claim. Now the question arises whether the plaintiff, who cannot extract on the basis of a definite claim, may take the law into his own hands. Of course, if he does so through the authority of the religious court, they will take it from him and return it to the defendant, but if he does it quietly (steals from the defendant), that is essentially the same question.
Still, this requires further study.
Discussion on Answer
In my opinion, one should ask the injured party or examine what a reasonable person would think. If even on the assumption that it is uncertain he would want someone to trip him up, then the person who tripped him is exempt.
Thank you!
1) What if the true situation is not known: the injured party claims with certainty that there was no danger, and the damager claims with certainty that there was. Do we say that the burden of proof rests on the one seeking to extract money, and the damager is exempt? Or on the contrary, the damager is the one seeking to extract, like the view of the Chazon Ish that you cited regarding a custodian where there is doubt whether he was negligent. We do not know whether there was some hidden danger, and the damage is before us.