Q&A: The Limits of the Obligation of “Do Not Stand Idly By Your Neighbor’s Blood”
The Limits of the Obligation of “Do Not Stand Idly By Your Neighbor’s Blood”
Question
Have a good week, Rabbi,
Regarding the commandment “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” is one obligated to spend all of one’s money, or a fifth of one’s money, in order to save another person? And is there an obligation to save when this involves a large loss of profit—for example, when someone developed a cancer drug and sells it for one million dollars to each patient. Then a poor patient comes and asks him to give the drug for free under the rule of “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.” Seemingly there is no actual loss here, since the production cost of the drug is negligible; this is only prevented profit. Is he obligated to give the drug for free in such a situation?
I thought perhaps one should distinguish between a case of illness and a case of an external threat to the person, like a predatory animal. The commandment of “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood” refers only to an external threat, and not to a situation of illness, which is essentially different (in the recent series on dilemmas involving human life, I seem to remember that you suggested a distinction between illness and an external threat).
Best regards,
Answer
All of one’s money. This is a prohibition. According to the Rashba in a responsum, it appears that there is even a monetary lien in favor of the person being saved (that is, he has the right to take that money).
But in most practical cases this is only theoretical, because this obligation rests on all people and on the public in general. Therefore it is not reasonable to make this demand specifically of one particular person.
The distinction between illness and an external threat is that of Maimonides, and several later authorities explained it. But that is only regarding the question of how far one may save oneself through a transgression (whether it is considered duress). As for the obligation to save, I do not think there is any distinction.
Discussion on Answer
Indeed, correct—if he is the only person with money in the world. If not, I wrote that this cannot be demanded specifically of him.
This is talking about one of the three cardinal transgressions. See Maimonides, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, ch. 5, halakha 6, and the commentaries there.
What about the public treasury—does the public as a whole have an obligation to spend all of its money in order to save poor patients? Here too, people do not in practice spend vast sums in order to save.
In my opinion, yes. It is unreasonable that the public would let a person die because of budget considerations. At least in our current situation, that should not happen.
It would be more correct to warn the doctor that if he does not perform the surgery, the blood is on his head.
And more correct still would be to go study medicine.
Threatening the doctor like that is equivalent to imposing one person’s monetary obligation on someone else. Instead of threatening him, why don’t you give him all your money?
According to what you say, it follows that a person is obligated to pay for an expensive surgery that will save the life of his poor friend, but that is not how the world behaves. As for the distinction between illness and an external threat, you wrote that “this is only regarding the question of how far one may save oneself through a transgression (whether it is considered duress)”—what did you mean by that? After all, in any case one is allowed to save oneself through a transgression because of saving a life, so how is that connected to this distinction?