Q&A: Practical Difference in the Topic of "Do Not Stand Idly By Your Neighbor's Blood"
Practical Difference in the Topic of "Do Not Stand Idly By Your Neighbor's Blood"
Question
Regarding the commandment, "Do not stand idly by your neighbor's blood," we see many discussions among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) about the precise parameters under which one becomes liable for violating the prohibition of "do not stand idly by"—for example, the obligation to spend money, to take risks, to save someone without the rescued person's consent, and so on. From the halakhic side, the prohibition of "do not stand idly by" is defined as a prohibition that involves no action, and therefore there is no liability for lashes for failing to fulfill it (i.e., for violating it). Accordingly, it seems that on the technical level there is no practical difference at all regarding whether the commandment was fulfilled or not. I thought that perhaps with respect to disqualification from testimony there would be a practical difference, but I saw in Tumim (section 34, subsection 1) that according to Maimonides at least, there is no disqualification from testimony for a prohibition that has no action. The only technical practical difference I managed to find is lashes according to Rabbi Yehuda, who administers lashes for a prohibition that has no action.
It is clear to me that morally, none of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) disputed that there is an obligation in each case according to its circumstances. Obviously, if a person can save someone else at minimal cost to himself (say, one shekel for us), he has absolutely no moral justification not to save him. It is not likely that in Heaven they will first check whether, according to the dry formal criteria, a transgression was committed or not, and therefore it is not so clear to me what the role of all this detailed discussion is, and the attempt to clarify when there is an obligation and when there is not. Even if we say that the whole purpose of these definitions is to determine what to do in gray areas, it does not seem that this is what the halakhic decisors are trying to do. Is there some other practical difference / significance that I missed?
Answer
I don't understand why there is no practical difference. You violated a prohibition. Why do you need a punishment in order for there to be a practical difference?
It is agreed by everyone that there is no disqualification from testimony for a prohibition for which there are no lashes (that's a Talmudic text). One who is disqualified is a wicked person, and a wicked person is someone liable for lashes: "Then the judge shall cause him to lie down and strike him… according to his wickedness."
You definitely missed something. The question is whether one transgresses a prohibition. I don't understand your whole discussion. That is a practical difference in the fullest sense.
Discussion on Answer
The Talmud, Sanhedrin 26b: "Forty lashes on his shoulders, and he is still valid?" True, it is not absolutely necessary to read it this way (because maybe it is only an expression meant to show that he violated a prohibition), but that is certainly the reasonable interpretation. The Vilna Gaon writes that this is the source. It seems to me that no one disagrees with this.
I don't understand: if in Heaven I am considered wicked to the same degree either way—whether I violated a prohibition or did not violate a prohibition—then why should the fact that I met the criteria of some formal transgression make any difference to me? It doesn't seem reasonable to me that a case where one violates a prohibition is necessarily worse than a case where one does not violate a prohibition.
That is already a matter of your personal taste. But to say that there is no practical difference is simply a mistake. There is also a practical difference regarding whether one is obligated to spend all his money (as with a prohibition) or not.
Plainly speaking, that is not a Talmudic text.