Thank you!
B. Just to make sure, with your permission, one more time — he is about to rely on the majority, and I know that he took from the minority. I’m not obligated to tell him, right? (Assume it takes effort.)

He is permitted to rely on the majority. More than that, even without any effort you are not obligated to update him. There is even a side to say that it is forbidden, because you would be causing him to lose the forbidden piece.

Wow, many thanks.

So if he can, he is obligated to clarify the matter himself, right? And nevertheless I am not allowed to clarify it for him. Maybe this is a wild association, but it reminds me of a view you once presented that a person may not save himself using another person’s money unless the owner of the money is aware of the danger, and therefore the obligation falls on him. Can you confirm whether there is any connection?

One more final request for clarification: you wrote that (perhaps) he is not obligated to pay because he can claim that he wanted to transgress or that he wouldn’t have transgressed anyway. Does this apply only if he actually makes those claims, or is even an honest, righteous, transparent person legally exempt in all cases (and the ability to make the claim is just an indication that no obligation takes effect? Why?)

What is the source that the commandment of “you shall surely rebuke” also includes spending money?!

And regarding returning a lost object, we find that if he loses money in the process he can stipulate in advance that the owner of the lost object will pay him [if while returning the lost object he loses money], which implies that there is no obligation to spend money even on returning a lost object.

I’m not sure he is obligated to clarify it. That is the view of many halakhic decisors, but it is not clear whether that is rabbinic or Torah-level. And even if so, it’s not clear that you are obligated to clarify it for him.
There is some connection.
The ability to make the claim exempts him. The very fact that he can do so means there is no clear benefit for him here, and therefore under the laws of one who goes down into another’s field, I am exempt.

Nur, how is this different from any prohibition? The whole question is whether the person saved has to reimburse him.
As for returning a lost object, there is an obligation to return the money to him, but initially he does have to spend it. Like taking care of animals he found, and so on.

If I understood correctly, then in terms of the command-component there is none both in the case of an unintentional violation and in the case of one who relies on the majority and encounters the minority (from the standpoint of his state of knowledge, what he is told is that he is fully permitted to eat), and the difference is that the component of metaphysical sinful essence does exist in the unintentional case, but does not exist in the case of someone who ate a piece of forbidden fat that separated from the majority of pieces of permitted fat.

Roughly. In an unintentional violation a person does not violate the command because he does not know about it. But there is a command regarding the prohibition.

Actually that was what I really came to clarify, but I swallowed it because I assumed that was indeed the case. So unfortunately I didn’t understand.

What does it mean that there is a command regarding the prohibition? What does the command say to this person? “You may think you know that this piece is permitted fat, but my friend, I command you not to eat it because it is forbidden fat”? I thought the difference between command and essence was that a command requires human awareness that is capable of receiving that command, and it can’t just float around somewhere in space.
In general there is a command not to eat pieces of forbidden fat. But now I ask the Holy One, blessed be He: “Tell me, am I allowed to eat this piece according to my state of knowledge?” And He answers me “yes,” exactly as He answers in the case of majority. That would seemingly mean there is no command. I’m probably missing something basic here.

As for an absolute heretic, I understand from things you’ve said here and there that according to your view, in his case too there is no sinful essence. Meaning he is in between the unintentional case and the case of relying on the majority. There is a command and he does not violate it (like the unintentional case), but there is no sinful essence in his case (like majority or just an act that is permitted).

I’m not following this pilpul. There is no prohibition without a command. But when I act unintentionally, I do not know about the command. That’s all. There is no point continuing this semantic discussion.

That is not plausible, and think it through carefully.

Regarding spending money on returning a lost object, Shulchan Arukh HaRav, Lost Objects and Deposits, section 33, writes: “But he is not obligated to spend money on this unless it is clearly known to him that his fellow will reimburse him on his own.” So in our case we would not obligate him to spend money when the other party is exempt from reimbursing him.
Regarding “you shall surely rebuke,” apparently one must pay like for any positive commandment, but we do not find an obligation to prevent another person’s unintentional violation.
As for “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” I was not able to understand the connection.
There is an innovative view that under “do not place a stumbling block” there is also a prohibition against causing another person to sin, but we do not find an obligation to prevent it.
And in general I would be happy for further explanation of the distinction between the unintentional case and majority [perhaps Shmulik already asked this]. And if you say that in the case of majority this is not lack of knowledge but rather the Torah’s permission in a doubtful situation, still, that permission exists only in a state of lack of knowledge, and there is also permission that in a state of lack of knowledge you may do what seems right to you [though perhaps one can distinguish, but it is forced].

Regarding money, one can distinguish: if the commandment is to save money, it makes no sense to impose the obligation on him. Why should the other person’s money be preferable to his own? This is somewhat like the reasoning for why in the case of charity, even though there is also a prohibition involved, one does not spend all of one’s money (Maharil Diskin).
What is the difference between causing another person to stumble unintentionally and preventing another person’s unintentional transgression? There is no difference at all, even if the names of the obligations are different. An unintentional transgression is still a transgression. And this is also the distinction between the unintentional case and majority. In the case of majority, so long as he has not clarified the matter there is no prohibition. In the unintentional case there is a prohibition regardless.

But the commandment was said regarding money, so “dayyo” — that’s enough — and one cannot obligate payment by the laws of returning a lost object.
Is there an obligation to remove stumbling blocks from before the blind? And even to spend money on that?!
Right, my mistake. There is a difference between majority and unintentional violation, but we do not find an obligation to prevent another person from an unintentional violation.

Nur, is the difference you identify between majority and unintentional violation also in the command-component (that in the unintentional case it exists but one does not violate it, while in majority it does not exist), or only in the essence-component?

Only in the command-component.
As for the essence-component, if it exists [see the discussion by Rabbi Weiss and Rabbi Menachem Nabet] [if you mean the distinction that God only “revealed” to us that this is forbidden], it exists both in the unintentional case and in majority. See also the dispute among the medieval authorities as to whether with forbidden food that became nullified in sixty there is still “and you shall be defiled by them,” though one can distinguish that eating is different, just as the Holy One, blessed be He, does not bring a mishap through the righteous except in matters of eating; and conversely one could say that there they were speaking under the law of “nullification.”

From Rabbi Michi’s answers above, I understood that in his view, in majority there is no essence-component (and therefore also no sacrifice), while in the unintentional case there is.

“…and you shall be defiled by them” is a different issue. As I know it, the dispute applies even to a dangerously ill person who eats carrion with full permission, so I think it has no connection here.

Then I’m not with you. What does “essence-component” mean?

The essence-component is some metaphysical thing that damages the upper worlds or the soul in a way that may be impossible to feel.

There are four things: command and essence in the cases of majority and unintentional violation. In the message above that begins “If I understood correctly,” I suggested that in majority there is neither command nor essence, and in the unintentional case there is no command but there is essence. Rabbi Michi corrected only one part (out of the four): that in the unintentional case there is a command, except that he did not violate it. That implies that indeed in majority there is no essence. But maybe it is better to learn from explicit statements than from “if he was silent, that implies agreement.”

I don’t understand enough.
The “metaphysical thing” you are talking about cannot be separate from the command, because whatever is damaged is damaged due to his violating the command, and if there is command there is essence, and if there is no essence there is no command. And I don’t know whether Rabbi Michi even agrees that there is any such thing that is damaged as a result of violating the command.

Who said it is separate? I personally do think it is separate (because a command is defined only with respect to an addressee who asks the Holy One, blessed be He, a question and receives the answer, “It is forbidden to you according to your current state of knowledge”), but in the discussion with you I did not present my own view at all. What I presented to you (according to what I understood from the answers above in Rabbi Michi’s view) is that essence and command really do go together — in majority neither exists, and in the unintentional case both exist (except that he does not violate the command). But the formulation “what is damaged is damaged because he violated the command” is not necessarily correct (in my opinion). They are simply two components.

It seems to me that we are repeating ourselves.
The commandment was stated regarding money, but its parameters change between money and prohibition according to the matter at hand (derive from it and from itself, and set it in its place).

There is an obligation to remove stumbling blocks from before the blind, of course, on the basis of “love your fellow as yourself,” and also on the basis of “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” and on the basis of returning his bodily loss. How is this different from someone who sees a river about to sweep away his fellow’s standing grain?!