Kiddushin, Chapter 2, 5783, Lesson 14

Table of Contents

• Mechanisms of agency: authorization and an extended hand
• The source of the law of agency in the Talmud: divorce and betrothal
• Agency in terumah and the proposal of agency over an act
• Agency in Passover: the Mishnah in Pesachim and the need for a source for the slaughter of offerings
• The refutation from ordinary slaughter and offerings, and an explanation of levels of holiness
• Betrothal as a realm connected to offerings, and the expansion of the concept of designation
• Tosafot in Bava Kamma, Sotah, and impurity as a derivative of harm to holiness
• The verse “and they shall slaughter it”: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha versus Rabbi Yonatan
• The rejection of deriving agency because of partnership in the body, and the suggestion that a group acts as a group
• “And they shall take for themselves, each man, a lamb”: appointment as an alternative source, and the continuation of the partnership refutation
• Two verses, “if it is not needed for that matter,” and rejections from other derivations
• Agency in the slaughter of offerings: is the owner’s power required, or only attribution of the act
• The Jerusalem Talmud: slaughtering a Passover offering without the owner’s knowledge, and the distinction between slaughter and designation
• Conclusion and planned continuation

Summary

General Overview

The text returns to the distinction between two mechanisms of agency, authorization and an extended hand, and to the dispute between the Tur and Maimonides. It emphasizes a reservation regarding meta-agency, that according to the plain reading Maimonides would not say that the agent can carry out the matter. It then moves on to the Talmudic topic of the source of the law of agency in general at the beginning of the chapter, through sources from divorce, betrothal, terumah, and Passover, and develops the question of how agency is derived in the realm of offerings and in the slaughter of the Passover offering. Within that discussion, it proposes a distinction between agency over power and agency over an act, and shows how that may resolve the course of the Babylonian Talmud as against the Jerusalem Talmud on the question of agency in the slaughter of offerings.

Mechanisms of agency: authorization and an extended hand

The speaker returns to the distinction between two mechanisms of agency, authorization and an extended hand, and to the dispute between the Tur and Maimonides. He raises a reservation in the case of meta-agency and asks whether there too Maimonides would say that the agent can carry out the matter, and in simple terms he answers that he would not. He defines the axis of agency over power versus agency over an act as the framework that will later serve in understanding agency in offerings.

The source of the law of agency in the Talmud: divorce and betrothal

The Talmud opens with the question: from where do we know agency? It looks for a source for the law of agency in general and not only for betrothal. In divorce it derives it from the verses “and he sent” and “and she was sent,” meaning that he appoints an agent and she appoints an agent. From the additional wording of “and she was sent” it is also derived that the agent appoints an agent. It then goes on to ask: we have found it in divorce, from where do we know it in betrothal? It rejects the attempt to derive it from divorce because of the refutation that divorce can take place against her will, and it establishes the source through the juxtaposition “and she left and became,” which compares becoming married to leaving, and just as in leaving she appoints an agent, so too in becoming married she appoints an agent.

Agency in terumah and the proposal of agency over an act

The Talmud brings agency in terumah from the verse “so shall you also set aside,” where “also” comes to include your agent. It explains the law that one who separates terumah does so according to the view of the homeowner, and if he does not know the homeowner’s preference, he separates the standard amount, one-fiftieth. The speaker raises the question whether terumah needs agency at all, since terumah can be viewed as an act that does not depend on any unique power of the owner. He suggests that terumah may be a source for agency over an act and not agency over power, and places that as a proposal for understanding a source of agency over an act.

Agency in Passover: the Mishnah in Pesachim and the need for a source for the slaughter of offerings

The Talmud brings another source from a Mishnah in Pesachim 9b about a group whose Passover offering was lost and who said to one of them, “Go, search, and slaughter on our behalf.” He went and found one and slaughtered it, and they took another and slaughtered it. If his was slaughtered first, he eats from his own and they eat and drink with him. The speaker explains that the Passover offering is eaten only by those registered for it, and that there is a law of appointment to the group. He raises the question of what this appointment means: is it a monetary partnership, or is it the definition of owners as those who receive atonement from the offering, following the Brisker Rav? He suggests that the Mishnah indicates that when he slaughters, he is considered to be slaughtering on their behalf, and so there is room to say that there is agency in the slaughter of the Passover offering. But he also raises a doubt whether in offerings in general the concept of agency is needed at all if the owners are only those who receive atonement while the priest is the one who offers it, as part of the discussion whether priests are agents of Heaven or our agents.

The refutation from ordinary slaughter and offerings, and an explanation of levels of holiness

The Talmud rejects the possibility of deriving agency in the slaughter of offerings from the previous sources by arguing: what is unique to those cases is that they apply to ordinary, non-sacred matters, unlike offerings. The speaker analyzes the idea of even a minimal refutation and emphasizes that a refutation has to be relevant, but it does not have to establish stringency versus leniency; it can point to different categories. He enters a conceptual discussion of holiness versus commandments and argues that these are separate halakhic categories, though there is a dimension of holiness in commandments at different levels. He uses Maimonides’ words in the fourth root regarding “you shall be holy,” interpreting it as: do the commandments and become sanctified through doing them. He proposes understanding holiness as the revealed presence of the Holy One, blessed be He, at different levels, and cites Meshekh Chokhmah on Ki Tisa regarding the breaking of the tablets as conveying that nothing is holy except the Holy One, blessed be He. He explains that things are called holy because of divine presence, not because of themselves.

Betrothal as a realm connected to offerings, and the expansion of the concept of designation

The speaker brings the topic in tractate Kiddushin 6 about one who betroths half a woman, as opposed to one who says, “The leg of this animal shall be a burnt offering,” where holiness spreads to the whole of it. He concludes that medieval and later authorities learn from this that betrothal belongs to the world of offerings and not merely because of some accidental shared terminology. He mentions Tosafot on 6b, which distinguish between the phrase “behold, you are sanctified to me” and the phrase “behold, you are betrothed to me” with regard to situations in which the betrothal would spread to the whole. He develops the idea of something designated and shows that concepts such as misuse in the case of konamot and “she commits a trespass against her husband” in Sotah point to a connection between designation and holiness. He cites the Mishneh LaMelekh, who wonders about misuse in the case of konamot as a result of applying concepts from offerings to areas that seem private.

Tosafot in Bava Kamma, Sotah, and impurity as a derivative of harm to holiness

The speaker cites Tosafot in Bava Kamma 11 about a placenta and the impurity of a woman after childbirth, where Tosafot explain the discussion as concerning making her forbidden to her husband and not the laws of impurity themselves. He presents an inquiry whether a woman’s prohibition to her husband stems from impurity or whether it is a separate law, and cites in the name of the Sochatchover a difficulty: how can one say this does not belong to the laws of doubtful impurity, when the laws of doubtful impurity in the private domain and the public domain are learned from Sotah, which is a prohibition to her husband? He quotes an answer in the name of the Avnei Nezer that the prohibition in Sotah stems from “she has committed a trespass against her husband,” that is, like misuse in betrothal, and therefore it has the parameters of impurity. By contrast, the prohibition of a woman after childbirth, who is forbidden to everyone, is a regular prohibition that does not stem from harm to holiness and therefore is not governed like impurity in the same way.

The verse “and they shall slaughter it”: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha versus Rabbi Yonatan

The Talmud brings Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha’s statement that the source for “a person’s agent is like himself” is the verse “and the entire congregation of the assembly of Israel shall slaughter it at twilight,” since not all of them slaughter, but only one does, and from here we learn that a person’s agent is like himself. It then asks that according to Rabbi Yonatan the verse is expounded for another teaching, and Rabbi Yonatan learns from it that all Israel can fulfill their obligation with one Passover offering, and not the law of agency. The speaker explains that according to the Talmud’s line of thought one can derive agency from the plain implication of the verse itself even if it is also expounded for another teaching, and he connects this to the Tosafot discussion at the beginning of the chapter about what is learned from extra wording and what is learned from the basic implication.

The rejection of deriving agency because of partnership in the body, and the suggestion that a group acts as a group

The Talmud raises the possibility: perhaps it is different there because they have partnership in it, meaning that the ability to slaughter on behalf of the group stems from the fact that the slaughterer is part of the group and not from general agency for any person. The speaker illustrates this from the distinction between an ordinary agent and a slave, a husband, or a hired worker, all of whom have a strong enough connection to perform actions an ordinary agent cannot perform, such as acquiring a found object or seizing property for a creditor. He suggests an even stronger claim: sometimes within a group there is no need for agency at all, but rather “this is how a group slaughters,” through a division of roles. He compares this to the idea of a public recitation, as in “this is how the public says Hallel,” where the communal act is carried out through division of roles and not through mutual discharge of obligation by the law of agency.

“And they shall take for themselves, each man, a lamb”: appointment as an alternative source, and the continuation of the partnership refutation

The Talmud suggests another source from the verse “and they shall take for themselves, each man, a lamb for a father’s house, a lamb for a household,” and interprets the derivation as concerning the taking and the appointment, not necessarily the slaughter. The speaker notes that the Talmud continues to reject this source as well with the claim that there too he has partnership in it, even though here, seemingly, the partnership is created by the act itself. He illustrates this with a parallel question that appears in Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman regarding the emancipation of a Canaanite slave and the question whether we relate to the object of the act as it is before the act or as it is after the act. He compares that to the question whether one who creates partnership through appointment is already considered to have a sufficient connection for the refutation of partnership in it.

Two verses, “if it is not needed for that matter,” and rejections from other derivations

The Talmud concludes that if there are two verses and both fall to the refutation of partnership, then why do I need two verses? It therefore explains that one of them is expounded by the rule, “if it is not needed for the place where it applies, apply it to the place where it does not apply,” in order to teach agency even where partnership does not apply. It objects that the verse is needed for Rabbi Yitzchak’s teaching that a man can acquire on behalf of others but a minor cannot acquire on behalf of others, and rejects that by saying the law is learned from “according to each man’s eating.” It then adds that the verse is needed for the law that one may slaughter the Passover offering for an individual, and finally narrows this by saying that it follows the one who holds that one may not slaughter the Passover offering for an individual, so that there remains an extra verse from which agency is learned.

Agency in the slaughter of offerings: is the owner’s power required, or only attribution of the act

The speaker returns to the basic question whether it is really necessary for the owner to slaughter the offering in order for there to be room for agency, and suggests the possibility that there is no special need for the owner’s slaughter because slaughter is not part of the sacrificial service. He suggests that even so there can be agency over an act even when no unique power of the owner is required, so that agency defines who is considered the slaughterer and to whom the commandment of slaughter is attributed. He compares this to agency for a transgression, where the transgression is attributed to the sender even though no unique power is involved in the act. He proposes that in this way one can view agency in the slaughter of offerings as agency over an act and not agency over power, and connect this to his earlier proposal of terumah as a possible source for agency over an act.

The Jerusalem Talmud: slaughtering a Passover offering without the owner’s knowledge, and the distinction between slaughter and designation

The speaker quotes the Jerusalem Talmud at the beginning of the second chapter of Kiddushin, which brings the two verses “and they shall slaughter it” and “and they shall take for themselves, each man, a lamb” as sources for “a person’s agent is like himself.” The Jerusalem Talmud brings Rabbi Yosi’s statement that this case is different, because a person may slaughter his fellow’s Passover offering without his knowledge, but he may not designate his fellow’s Passover offering without his knowledge. It also brings, in the name of Rabbi Zeira in the name of Rabbi Elazar, that a person may slaughter his fellow’s Passover offering without his knowledge, but may not designate it. The speaker explains that the Jerusalem Talmud rejects deriving agency from slaughter not because of partnership, but because slaughter does not require agency at all, whereas designation does require knowledge or agency or a beneficial acquisition. He proposes that the gap between the Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud may be narrowed if, in the Babylonian Talmud, the discussion is about agency over an act that is not required for the act’s basic validity but does define the attribution of the act.

Conclusion and planned continuation

The speaker stops the learning at this point and announces that he will continue next time, including completing the line of argument and moving on to the topic of an agent for a transgression at the end of the Talmudic passage.

I’m recording now. I went back over the distinction between two mechanisms of agency: authorization and an extended hand, the dispute between the Tur and Maimonides. A reservation in the case of a meta-principal—would Maimonides say there too that the agent can carry out the matter? Simply speaking, no. We spoke about agency over a power and agency over an act. Now I want to move into the next topic. We had gotten as far as agency in the slaughter of sacred offerings. We saw that the Talmudic text at the beginning of the chapter looks for a source for the law of agency. Where do we learn the law of agency from? We discussed whether this is a source for agency in betrothal or a source for agency in general. It seems from the Talmudic text that the intention is a source for agency in general. It brings several sources. At first, agency for divorce: “and he sends” and “and she is sent”—he appoints an agent, she appoints an agent, and the agent appoints an agent. They learn this from the verse, from the inclusive wording of “and she is sent.” After that we spoke about agency in betrothal, which is learned from agency in divorce. The Talmudic text challenges that derivation, and then it says there is an analogy of “and she leaves and becomes.” After that the Talmudic text moves to agency in terumah: “so shall you also set apart,” “you too” includes your agents. From that verse too we see that the concept of agency is included. The Talmudic text makes a necessity argument between the different sources. I’m just reviewing a bit so we stay with the flow. We’ll see it here, and really just in a quick skim, to get back into the topic. I’m sharing—one second, it’ll get bigger. There. The Talmudic text at the beginning of chapter two, after “it is a greater commandment to do it oneself than through one’s agent”—we discussed that at the beginning. Then the Talmudic text says: From where do we know agency? Where do we know agency from? “And he sends” teaches that he appoints an agent, “and she is sent” teaches that she appoints an agent, “and he sends” and “and she is sent” teach that an agent appoints an agent. We spoke about words, about an agent who appoints an agent—all that we discussed, I’m just reminding you. We found it in divorce; from where in betrothal? We found a source for agency in divorce—where do we know agency in betrothal from? And if you say it is learned from divorce—what is special about divorce? It can take place against her will, so there is a challenge. The verse says, “and she leaves and becomes,” it compares becoming to leaving: just as in leaving one can appoint an agent, so too in becoming one can appoint an agent. Betrothal is compared to divorce, and therefore there is an agent in betrothal too. And from that which we learned in the Mishnah: one says to his agent, “Go and set aside terumah,” now we move to terumah. He sets it aside according to the homeowner’s intention, and if he does not know the homeowner’s intention, he gives an average amount, one out of fifty. We discussed that the major question is whether terumah needs agency at all, because maybe in terumah one can separate terumah even if one is not the owner. There is no special power found in the owner, and we discussed that maybe this is agency over an act and not agency over a power. Maybe this is even the source for the notion of agency over an act. That was my suggestion regarding the source for agency over an act. After terumah, the Talmudic text says: and from that which we learned in the Mishnah, a group whose Passover offering was lost—he said to one of them, “Go seek and slaughter on our behalf,” and he went and found and slaughtered, and they took and slaughtered—if his was slaughtered first, he eats from his and they eat and drink with him. This is basically the next, the fourth source for agency. This is where we are. I’m moving to our page. “And from that which we learned in the Mishnah”—we know that, maybe just a short introduction: with the Passover offering, one has to be registered, meaning there is a group. Also, the summary is going up to the model—for anyone who isn’t updated, what you’re seeing before your amazed eyes right now is the summary. It’ll get to the model after the class. Background: with the Passover offering, one has to be registered, meaning there is a group. Is this monetary partnership? Do they all have to be owners of the offering? Or are they those for whom atonement is achieved by the offering, in Rabbi Brisk’s terminology, like in a regular offering? Meaning, there is a definition of owner, but the owner doesn’t have to be the monetary owner; rather, he is the one for whom atonement is achieved through this offering. So the question is what exactly the meaning of registration is. In any case, there is a law called “for those registered for it”—yes, the Passover offering is eaten only by those registered for it. Now in the Mishnah in tractate Pesachim 89b it says this: “And from that which we learned in the Mishnah: a group whose Passover offering was lost, and they said to one of them, ‘Go and seek and slaughter on our behalf,’ and he went and found and slaughtered, and they took and slaughtered—if his was slaughtered first, he eats from his and they eat and drink with him.” So there is a group; the Passover offering was lost to them, it ran away. Okay? So they said to one of the group: go look for some other offering so that we’ll have another offering, and when you find it, slaughter it right away. Apparently there wasn’t much time—slaughter it. And he went and found and slaughtered. Now in the meantime they also searched—they didn’t know whether he would find one or not—so they also searched for an offering and they too slaughtered. Yes, you have to remember: on Passover eve everyone is buying offerings; the offerings market probably has little supply and huge demand. So everyone is under pressure about whether they’ll get an offering or not. True, all Israel can fulfill their obligation with one Passover offering, as the Talmudic text says later, but let’s say deer aren’t going to get you out of this. So in short, he slaughtered the Passover offering he found, and they slaughtered the Passover offering they found. So if his was slaughtered first, then he eats from his and they eat and drink with him. Yes, so if theirs was slaughtered first, then he doesn’t eat—that’s the continuation of the Mishnah, not important for our purposes. In any case, what do we see from here? We see that when he slaughters, he is considered to have slaughtered on their behalf. He is their agent, because the proof is that afterward they can eat from his. Okay. Why not simply bring proof from a priest who slaughters an offering as the owner’s agent? And then there’s the whole issue of whether priests are agents of Heaven or our agents, and that gets us into all sorts of disputes that are not simple in themselves, but in principle there too there is a concept of agency. Although there too one could argue: the question is whether the offering is an agent in the regular sense. That would mean that really it was the owner who was supposed to offer the offering. But it may be that the owner is only the one for whom atonement is achieved, and the priest is the one who offers the offering. The owner is the one for whom atonement is achieved, and then maybe the concept of agency is not needed at all. That may even be the side that says they are agents of Heaven, and therefore we view the priests as agents of Heaven, not as the owners’ agents, because there is no need for the owner to slaughter—or not only slaughter, but to offer. So the whole concept of agency is not even clear there. In any case, we see from there that there is agency in slaughtering the Passover offering. The Talmudic text says: from where? Where do we know there is agency? Yes, this is a Mishnah; the question is where the Mishnah knows it from in terms of a verse—where in the Torah this comes from. And if you say it is learned from those—what are “those”? Divorce, betrothal, and terumah. Right, we saw the necessity argument among them: divorce, betrothal, and terumah. What is special about those? They are ordinary matters as opposed to sacred offerings. Yes, they are non-sacred matters; you don’t learn non-sacred from sacred. The question is whether that is just a distinction, or whether really there is more room in ordinary matters for an agent to be effective than in sacred matters. Sometimes there are such challenges; it depends on the Talmudic text in tractate Hullin whether one makes even a minimal challenge against a paradigm case. A minimal challenge means: this is different. I’m not claiming it’s more severe or less severe, but it is different. Yes, like “we do not derive ritual prohibition from monetary law.” “We do not derive ritual prohibition from monetary law” is not necessarily because monetary law and ritual law are one lighter and one more severe; rather, they are two different categories—you can’t derive one from the other. Fine, even without committing to severity and leniency. Here I claimed—we discussed this a bit on the Talmudic text—I think there is exact logic to it. Why? Because in every challenge there is one more difference I can point to. So then what is a minimal challenge? What does “we do not derive ritual prohibition from monetary law” mean? Why not? What’s the problem? It depends on the logic. So if there is logic, then say it now. Why are you telling me we do not derive ritual prohibition from monetary law? Say: what is special about prohibition? It is prohibition—I don’t know, one witness is believed in matters of prohibition, whereas in monetary law you need two witnesses, I don’t know, just as an example. According to what he’s saying now, he is right, because there is always some minimal challenge if these are two things with a substantive difference between them. Or this is another question, in a sense the opposite. No, you are taking the claim ad absurdum. Fine, so here that is correct, but it isn’t—a concrete relation of severity and leniency. Clearly there has to be relevance. Meaning, you can’t challenge by saying this one is written with one letter and that one with another letter. That is not a relevant challenge. But even if there is relevance, that still doesn’t mean there is a relation of leniency and stringency. And therefore it is still called a minimal challenge. The first one is very strange: “for those apply to ordinary matters as against sacred offerings.” Why not simply say: what is special about those? They are ordinary matters. Interesting, I hadn’t thought of that. I think there is language like that. You’re reminding me—I hadn’t thought of it—but it seems to me that I really dislike these statements that say there is holiness in commandments, that everything is holiness and all kinds of things like that, because categorically it is simply not true. Meaning, commandment and holiness are two separate halakhic categories. “Objects serving holiness” and “objects serving a commandment”—these are discarded and those are put away. There is a halakhic difference too. The concept of holiness is a very clearly distinct category. And it belongs only to the world of sacred things. Commandments are another category. But still we see—there are also medieval authorities and the Talmudic text itself—we see that Maimonides himself writes, for example, in the fourth root, where he discusses “You shall be holy.” So he says why he disagrees with the BaHaG who counted it. He says: why don’t we count “You shall be holy”? Maimonides says there is no need to count it in the list of commandments, because “You shall be holy” means: fulfill the commandments and become holy through fulfilling the commandments. He brings some Sifra, I think, that says that—“become holy.” Meaning, there are sources for this in the Sages and in the medieval authorities, that there is holiness in commandments. So what does that mean? How does it fit with the point that holiness and commandments are two separate categories? The answer is that of course there is a dimension of holiness in a commandment—even in a commandment. Holiness is the presence of the Holy One, blessed be He, it seems to me; that is more or less the definition. To the extent that the presence is revealed, that is holiness. For example, the ten levels of holiness are different levels of the divine presence—the Mishnah in tractate Kelim—different levels of the presence of the Holy One, blessed be He. In the Temple He appears in a relatively revealed way, so it is a very holy place. In the Holy of Holies even more revealed. In Jerusalem less, in the Land of Israel less, and so on. Meaning, the level of presence or manifestation of the Holy One, blessed be He, is probably the measure of holiness in things. That’s a Meshekh Hokhmah on the weekly portion, on Ki Tisa, on the breaking of the tablets. The Meshekh Hokhmah that Leibowitz loved so much—on the breaking of the tablets he says: why did Moses break the tablets? Because the moment he saw that the people of Israel were worshiping the calf, he wanted to teach them that nothing is holy except the Holy One, blessed be He—not even the tablets of the covenant. And he broke them. He simply said: leave it, you see? This too is stone. Meaning, certainly the calf that you made. Meaning, nothing is holy except the Holy One, blessed be He. So what then are all the concepts of holiness in Jewish law? He didn’t know that? The point is that the source of holiness is the Holy One, blessed be He. Holy things are the revealed presence of the Holy One, blessed be He. The more revealed the presence, the holier the thing. But it is holy because there is divinity within it. Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, is the only thing that is holy; there are no things that are holy in and of themselves. And he also accepts this category. Therefore the concept of holiness itself is actually—not that the offering itself is holy, but rather that the Holy One, blessed be He, is present in the offering, in the world of sacred things, in a more explicit, more distinct way. And therefore that thing is called holy. In that sense, then commandments too can be spoken of in terms of holiness. It’s just that there the Holy One, blessed be He, is present in a less revealed way, so it is less holy. Now I return to your comment: what does it mean, “ordinary matters as against sacred offerings”? Mixed? Relative. No—it’s a relative world. The world of commandments, in relation to sacred offerings, is ordinary. It has holiness, but in relation to sacred offerings it is less holy. Fine? So then holiness requires explanation. Yes, no, yes, it does, because if they are two separate categories, then the world of commandments is not holy. No, but enough to answer what you said to Doron—it is enough just to say that holiness comes in degrees. And then, as I said—yes, you don’t have to insist specifically on the definition that it is the presence of the Holy One, blessed be He. The presence of the Holy One, blessed be He, is in parentheses. I’m only claiming that there are ten levels of holiness and so on. I’m only claiming—that’s not enough, because you also have to show that a commandment belongs on the scale of holiness as well. Maybe commandment is an entirely different scale, unrelated. Just as there are impurity and purity, holiness and the ordinary, forbidden and permitted—these are categories that can define completely separate axes. What I wanted to claim is that commandments also belong on this scale of holiness. And all the ten levels of holiness—really there are eleven levels. The ten levels of holiness are all within the world of sacred things, and besides that there are commandments, which are also some level—the lowest level of holiness, the least present, the least distinct presence of the Holy One, blessed be He. Okay? All on one scale. I don’t know, maybe that’s just an answer that popped into my head because you asked. Rashi says there is terumah because of that. Say again? Rashi says this is “ordinary as against sacred” because terumah is in the middle. Right. More than that—I think we even asked this in… I’m remembering now that I said the same thing about betrothal. Does Rashi really say that? Yes, I just saw it now. But I said the same thing about betrothal too. About betrothal—the Talmudic text in tractate Kiddushin on page 6 says that one who betroths half a woman—she is not betrothed. The Talmudic text asks: let it be like sanctifying half an offering. Yes? If one says, “The leg of this animal is a burnt offering,” then holiness spreads through the whole of it, yes? Meaning, the moment I consecrate part of an animal it spreads to the whole animal—later there are distinctions about an organ on which life depends, not important now—but on the principal level, then why don’t we say with a woman that the betrothal spreads through the whole of her? The Talmudic text—never mind—the Talmudic text says there is another will that blocks it, namely the woman’s will. An offering has no will, and so on. So from there both medieval and later authorities learn that the shared term with sacred things is not accidental; betrothal belongs to the world of sacred things. Okay? And therefore they try to apply there this idea that holiness spreads through the whole. And Tosafot there on page 6b draws a practical distinction from this. If he says to a woman, “Behold, you are sanctified to me,” then indeed there are situations in which the betrothal spreads through the whole. But if he says to her, “Behold, you are betrothed to me,” even though it is the same thing—both are formulations of betrothal—then no. Meaning, only if he says, “Behold, you are sanctified to me,” because that belongs to the world of sacred things. And that’s not a practical distinction from a definition that divides into holiness—but why? To say that betrothal is a commandment that in a special way expresses… Obviously, because of the partnership with the Holy One, blessed be He—the partnership in the match itself. Just like the holiness of the Sabbath. No, no—that’s what I’m saying. It could have been just a nice homiletic thought for a Sabbath table, but the Sages apparently saw it as a serious statement, because they understood it as real holiness. I understand. So when you say holy, you mean set apart. Obviously. What does set apart mean? Set apart means—but then it can be set apart even from things that are not significant at all. Look, I can bring you something else that is set apart. A vow too is set apart. Right, and why do they say there is misuse of consecrated property in konamot? Misuse of consecrated property applies to sacred things. Right. The Mishneh LaMelekh is astonished by that. Where did they invent this idea of misuse in konamot? What does that have to do with sacred things? All I did was set this loaf of bread apart from myself. So now if I ate it, do I bring a guilt offering for misuse? Why? What sacred property did I misuse? Right, because it really is about setting apart. No—that proves that setting apart is not an alternative to what I said. Setting apart is the same thing as sacred things. It’s the same idea. When I say “set apart,” it is always to set apart for holiness. It’s not something else. But “one who betroths” and “she is sanctified,” for example—that is not set apart… It is set apart specifically for… That is borrowed language. It’s not really holiness. Instead of saying it is borrowed language, you could say the matter is one of setting apart. No—borrowed language because it is setting apart that has nothing to do with sacred things. Therefore it is borrowed language. Fine. Okay. In any case, there is… This reminds me—today I’m full of associations. There is a Talmudic text in tractate Bava Kamma on page 11. It discusses a woman from whom part of the placenta emerged, and the question is from when she becomes impure. So the Talmudic text says: the placenta came out—then the question is whether she has already become impure with the impurity of childbirth, or whether it depends on when childbirth impurity begins. So the Talmudic text says that it depends on the question whether there can be part of a placenta without a fetus, or whether there cannot be part of a placenta without a fetus. Okay? If there can be part of a placenta without a fetus, then once the placenta came out there is doubt whether the majority or the minority came out, and even if the minority came out there is doubt whether there is a fetus inside it or not. Okay? Whereas if there cannot be part of a placenta without a fetus, then it is only one doubt and not a double doubt. So Tosafot asks there: but we are dealing with impurity—childbirth impurity, okay? With impurity there is no difference between a doubt and a double doubt. In a private domain, both a doubt and a double doubt are treated stringently; in a public domain, both a doubt and a double doubt are treated leniently. So how can there be a difference between a doubt and a double doubt? In what domain is this found? In a neutral area? Where do you distinguish between a doubt and a double doubt? So Tosafot says: they were discussing whether to forbid her to her husband. This is not about the impurity of childbirth, but about her prohibition to her husband. Fine? So all the later authorities learn from here—this is a famous inquiry—the question whether a woman’s prohibition to her husband stems from her impurity, or whether these are two independent laws. In Tosafot it appears that these are two independent laws. But the Avnei Nezer asks—and this is very interesting. Creative stuff, of course all nonsense, but it’s simply a delight—the sharpness and the way he stitches it together there is wonderful. It’s all Purim, one big Purim. In any case, the publisher was the grandson of the brother of the Sochatchover. He was the publisher of the book. He brings in the name of his great-uncle, namely the Sochatchover, the Eglei Tal—yes—he brings in the portion of Hukkat, “and see below,” he brings there a difficulty the Sochatchover asked on this Tosafot in Bava Kamma. The Sochatchover asked: how can you say that because this concerns prohibition to her husband, the laws of doubtful impurity do not apply here? Where do we learn the law of doubtful impurity in public and private domains from? From a sota, whether she became impure or did not become impure. Meaning, the whole idea that doubtful impurity in a private domain and in a public domain is learned from a woman’s prohibition to her husband. So how can you say that here, since we are dealing with a woman’s prohibition to her husband, it does not belong to the laws of doubtful impurity or double doubt? Good question. There is a wonderful answer—again, you could say it’s a nice sermon for a wedding celebration, and I would say so too—but really, when you think about it, maybe it’s true. He argues that in the case of a sota, the reason she becomes forbidden to her husband is because she “committed a trespass against her husband”—that is the Torah’s language. “Committed a trespass against her husband” is misuse of consecrated property. Here is another example that betrothal belongs to the world of sacred things: there is misuse here; the woman misuses her husband. Okay? So her prohibition in the case of a sota is because she committed a trespass against her husband. In the case of a woman after childbirth, therefore, her prohibition to her husband there has the parameters of impurity. A doubt is forbidden, a double doubt is permitted—sorry, there is no difference between a doubt and a double doubt; it depends on whether it is a private domain or a public domain, okay? But in the prohibition of a woman after childbirth, she is forbidden to every man. It isn’t connected specifically to her husband. It’s like impurity, niddah, or something like that. It’s not a prohibition of a woman to her husband; it doesn’t relate to betrothal, to misuse within the betrothal bond between them. It is just a prohibition. Okay? There it really is a prohibition that does not operate by the parameters of impurity; it is a regular prohibition. Because it is not a prohibition that stems from harm to holiness. The prohibition of a sota stems from harm to holiness, and therefore it is impurity. It has the parameters of impurity because the opposite of holiness is impurity. But the prohibition of a woman after childbirth is just an ordinary prohibition; it is not connected to harm to holiness. Therefore there Tosafot can say that it is a prohibition unrelated to impurity. Meaning, the prohibition of a woman to her husband depends on whether it is a prohibition specifically to her husband, or whether it is a prohibition to the world, to all men in the world, not specifically to her husband. And the practical difference is whether this operates by the parameters of impurity or by the parameters of prohibition. Okay? Fine, all associations. Maybe it sounds like Purim, but on second thought it definitely goes to the heart of the learning. How can one learn the law of sota—sorry, of doubtful impurity—from sota? Why not? It is the same thing. In the case of sota it is doubtful impurity because her prohibition to her husband stems from the harm to holiness, to the betrothal. So it is like impurity, and therefore we learn from there all the laws of impurity. How can you learn childbirth from there? In fact, we don’t learn childbirth from there. What do you mean? You started by saying that the law of doubtful impurity in a public domain and a private domain is learned from sota. It is learned from sota, yes. Okay, so “for those are ordinary matters as against sacred offerings”—okay, that’s your fault, Doron, with all this timeout. So the Talmudic text says: we see from here that the slaughter of sacred offerings requires the owner to slaughter, right? Otherwise there is no significance to the question of agency. If it were obvious that anyone can slaughter because I don’t need to slaughter, then you couldn’t learn the concept of agency from there. You can learn the concept of agency from there only because we assume that in principle the owner has to slaughter, and if he didn’t slaughter then the one who does slaughter has to be his agent. And if that works, it is a sign that there is agency in the slaughter of sacred offerings. The Talmudic text continues: it is derived from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha said: From where do we know that a person’s agent is like the person himself? As it says: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it at twilight.” Can it be that the whole congregation all slaughter? Surely only one slaughters. Rather, from here we learn that a person’s agent is like the person himself. Yes—“And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it at twilight.” Not everyone slaughters; only one slaughters. What does “only one slaughters” mean? One from each group, right? Because later we’ll see that it means literally one for all of Israel. Rather, from here we learn that a person’s agent is like the person himself. Okay? So the claim is that once the agent slaughtered, it is considered as though the whole congregation slaughtered. So we see that there is agency in sacred offerings. Now in truth these things are a bit puzzling, because once I am talking about the law of “for those registered for it,” that itself says there is agency in sacred offerings. Because you don’t need the verse of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha, “From where do we know that a person’s agent is like the person himself? As it says: ‘And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it.’” Even without that verse. Is there a verse? The verse didn’t appear in the Mishnah. No, not in the Mishnah—in the Torah there is “for those registered for it.” The Passover offering is eaten by those registered for it. Yes, but he really said that the law of “for those registered for it” does not have to be based on agency. Ah, exactly—so “from where” means from where? “From where” means where do we learn it in the Torah from, right? From the verse of “for those registered for it,” from the verse that requires registration, yes? And how is it considered that they all slaughtered? What happens in “for those registered for it”? Say there is a group of one hundred people registered for one Passover offering. They don’t all need to slaughter. And what? Who slaughtered it? All of them together? One slaughtered. Right—so there you are: one slaughtered it, and all of them fulfilled their obligation, so there is agency. Yes, he is saying what you said before—that registration doesn’t necessarily work through agency. No, not the registration—I’m now talking about the slaughter, not the registration. Only one slaughtered. So? So there: one slaughtered, then how can the others eat? How did the others fulfill their obligation? Because there is no commandment to slaughter. If there is no commandment to slaughter, then here too you can’t prove anything. No! It says, “And the whole congregation of Israel shall slaughter it.” So you’re saying that’s just the language of the verse. That’s already an interesting suggestion. You are basically arguing that the source brought here from the verse does not prove at all that the slaughter of the owner is truly required. In principle, simply because the verse attributes the slaughter to all Israel as a matter of language. Maybe from the language of the verse itself you learn that maybe it needs that, maybe later—but on the principal level, maybe I am not assuming at all that the owner has to slaughter. And therefore from the law of “for those registered for it” itself you cannot derive the law of agency. Because true, there is a group of one hundred registered members and one slaughters, but in itself I would say: one slaughters because the owners do not need to slaughter. It is enough that one person slaughters. If the Passover offering was slaughtered properly, everyone can eat if they were registered for it. He does not need to function as my agent. Therefore I would not derive from the law of “for those registered for it” the idea that a person’s agent is like the person himself with respect to the slaughter of sacred offerings. We’re talking about slaughter, not about registration. Registration we’ll see later, but now about slaughter. Okay? The Talmudic text says, yes, but there is a verse—Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha brings it—that says, “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it.” That verse says that clearly not the whole congregation slaughters; rather, only one slaughters, or one from each group. And if that is considered that the whole congregation slaughtered, then we see there is agency for the slaughter of sacred offerings. There is still room to discuss how there is agency in the slaughter of sacred offerings if the owner does not need to slaughter—and at this point I assumed that the owner does not need to slaughter, because otherwise you could have derived it from the law of “for those registered for it.” Okay? So if the owner does not need to slaughter, then in what sense is the slaughterer considered the agent of all those registered? He doesn’t need to be their agent. So one might say that if the Torah taught us that it is considered as though they slaughtered, then it teaches two things. First, that the owners really do need to slaughter. But I would not have known that without this verse; I would not have known it from the law of “for those registered for it.” That is why they brought this verse. And once it taught that the owners need to slaughter, now incidentally you can indeed learn it from the law of “for those registered for it.” But you don’t need to, because this verse has already done all the work. Okay? And therefore this verse also teaches me that the owners need to slaughter, but the agent is considered like him. Fine? The slaughter of the agent will also work in such a case. Later in the Talmudic text—this is lower down, I’m skipping a bit—it says: This works out according to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha. Put there the necessity argument between all the sources, not important right now; I spoke a little about that last semester. So now I want to start here—this is the part we’re focusing on now. “This works out according to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha; but according to Rabbi Yonatan, who derives this verse for another exposition, from where does he know it?” The source we brought above for agency in slaughtering sacred offerings is good according to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha. But Rabbi Yonatan disagrees with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha. He learns something else from the verse “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it.” Then according to his view, the question returns: where do we know the law of agency in slaughtering sacred offerings from? What is the dispute? As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yonatan says, From where do we know that all Israel can fulfill their obligation with one Passover offering? As it says: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it at twilight.” Can the whole congregation all slaughter? Surely only one slaughters. Rather, from here we learn that all Israel can fulfill their obligation with one Passover offering. From where does he derive agency in sacred offerings? So he learns something else from that verse—namely that all Israel can be registered in one group, or in other words, one does not need an olive’s bulk in the offering for each person. For the group registration, you don’t need there to be an olive’s bulk. In principle they do need to eat from the offering, but eating an olive’s bulk is not indispensable. Okay, so all Israel fulfill their obligation with one Passover offering. So if he learns something else from the verse “And the whole assembly of Israel shall slaughter it,” then where is the source for the law of agency in slaughtering sacred offerings according to him? Does that contradict what we explained before, that the derivation was from the plain meaning? If it’s from the plain meaning, then he can learn it too. No, no—it doesn’t contradict; you’ll see in a second. What does the Talmudic text say? Here, do you see? “From it itself.” That is exactly the answer. You are right that there is nothing extra in the verse; it teaches something else. But the verse says this. What does it say? It says that all Israel are considered as though they slaughtered. So the verse itself says there is agency in slaughtering sacred offerings. This is not a derivation from the verse; this is a derivation from the verse itself. There is Tosafot at the beginning of the chapter on “and he sends” and “and he sent” that discusses at great length the question of the husband’s agency, the woman’s agency, and the agent’s agency—what of these is learned through exposition or redundancy, and what is learned from the plain meaning, from the verse itself, as it is called here. Okay? There are sometimes situations where the question doesn’t even arise: if they are learning something else from the verse, then how can they learn this thing too? You can say that only if you derive from the verse through some exposition. You say: if it is extra, then there is a basis for the exposition. The verse comes to teach something only if it is extra; then I can expound it for our matter. But if you learn something from the plain meaning of the verse, it has nothing to do with whether it is extra or not. That is what the verse says. The verse simply says there is agency. “But perhaps it is different there, because they have partnership in it.” The Talmudic text rejects it. Why? It says that maybe the reason the agent can slaughter the Passover offering for everyone is because he is part of the group. So maybe in sacred offerings, agency works—but the Talmudic text does not retract from the idea that agency is needed for slaughtering sacred offerings. On the contrary, throughout the whole discussion that seems to be the assumption: that in principle the owner has to slaughter, and if someone else slaughters, he has to be the owner’s agent. The Talmudic text says: in our case, you cannot learn that any agent can slaughter for the registered members, because here the agent is part of the registered group. So he has some closer connection to the principals. In such a case one could say that perhaps only such a person can slaughter for them. But just some other person by the regular law of agency—who says he too can slaughter for them? We find things like this, for example, with a slave. The Talmudic text says in several places—we’ll see it too; I mentioned it last semester—that a slave, or a husband for his wife, or a hired worker of a person, a day laborer of a person—there are things he can do for me that a regular agent cannot do for me. For example, acquire a found object for me, or seize property for a creditor where it causes a loss to others—an agent can’t do that. There is a dispute among the medieval authorities whether a formally appointed agent can, but by the law of beneficial acquisition, certainly not. Okay? But if he is my day laborer or my slave, then he can. Why? Because the stronger the bond between us, the easier it is to view my agent as someone who acts for me. Therefore you cannot derive from someone who has a strong bond to me, that he can act for me, the general law of agency whereby any Jew can act for me. So here, since he is part of the group, one can say that the group is divided in some way so that one person slaughters on their behalf—but that is someone from the group. Fine. The law of agency is supposed to tell us that anyone can slaughter for this group, not specifically someone from the group itself. Okay? I would even say more than that. There are all kinds of discussions, for example, with reciting Hallel. When Hallel is recited, and the congregation joins into the singing or various things like that, there are people who object to it. They used to object to it because then you disconnect it from the blessing. If you do things beyond the recitation of Hallel itself—sing or something—that is not part of the recitation of Hallel, then the blessing does not apply to that. You recited a blessing to say Hallel. That is a mistake. Why is it a mistake? There is tractate Sukkah. What? No, this is beyond being occupied with the same matter; it’s much more than that. This is the Talmudic text in Sukkah in the chapter HaHalil, if I’m not mistaken. The Talmudic text there discusses “this is how one says Hallel.” Right—one says and the others answer. Exactly—one says and the others answer; right, the Talmudic text discusses that there. What does that mean? If one says and the others answer, then does he need to intend to discharge them of their obligation? No. I think not. That is how a congregation says Hallel. Hallel. Meaning, the communal recitation of Hallel is done in such a way that there is a division of roles. You say a verse and they answer. That is how the whole congregation said Hallel. It’s not that he needs to intend to discharge me of my obligation with the verse he says, and I need to discharge him of his obligation with the verse I say. Repeating words twice is also part of that? Yes, that too is part of it. That’s how one says Hallel—that’s not the point; just go out and see. Right, the Lithuanian synagogue developed this pattern because it didn’t understand that the Hasidim were right. So it developed another pattern. That happens sometimes. It can happen that the Hasidim are right too. Ask historians whether they always repeated. No, it doesn’t matter; that has nothing to do with historians at all. Even if it was invented today, so what? That’s how a congregation says Hallel. What difference does it make? What the Talmudic text says is that Hallel is a communal act. Now how does a congregation say Hallel? I’m not sure I need to stick to exactly what appears in the Talmudic text; if we have a different custom, we’ll act differently. But the conceptual point is found in the Talmudic text: this is a communal recitation. As with Torah reading, there are discussions of this kind too—whether it is an obligation on the individuals or an obligation on the congregation. Meaning, if it is an obligation on the congregation, then the reader does not need to intend to discharge the congregation of its obligation. That is how a congregation reads the Torah. There had to be a beginning. Say it wasn’t originally that they repeated words twice. The first one who did it could not have said, as you are saying now, “that’s how one says Hallel.” Every custom is like that. So what? Then the first one was a transgressor. There are optional customs, and then it’s fine. But if it’s optional, then what about adding to the commandments? A great many of these things began as deviations from the halakhic rules. But never mind—even if the first one was a transgressor, then the first one was a transgressor. Not only the first one—Rabbi Blumentzweig, the head of the yeshiva in Yeruham, always used to say that there is a certain absurdity regarding customs, because we are supposed to cling to custom. Right—“Do not abandon your mother’s teaching.” The whole idea of custom is deviation from what had been practiced until then. How did the custom begin? The custom began because someone acted not as people had acted until that time—he did something else—and now suddenly all of us have to cling to that and not abandon our mother’s teaching. This reminds me of… Today I’m really with a lot of associations. There were six weeks of war and I’ve accumulated them, so I’m unloading a lot on you. I once saw a memorial book for Rabbi Ra’anan, who was murdered in the terror attack in Hebron. The central rabbi, some rabbi there, published the book, and there was a section called “Treasures of the Early Authorities.” As in many such memorial books, there is a section where they publish manuscripts, articles of great later authorities, and call it “Treasures of the Early Authorities.” Maybe early authorities in manuscript, things like that. Now the “Treasures of the Early Authorities” there were Rabbi Kook, Rabbi Harlap, Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda, and so on. Let’s say we have found early authorities who were a bit earlier than that—but apparently for them the thought is that there is nothing before them. Meaning, Moses received the Torah at Sinai and transmitted it to Rabbi Kook, and Rabbi Kook to Rabbi Harlap, and from their standpoint that is more or less the chain. Kuzari and Maharal? Yes, right—but in Jewish law. So there is often this claim—this reminds me of all kinds of statements by zealous hardal people who come out against, I don’t know, rabbis who don’t belong to that camp: where is your tradition? Aren’t you innovating? And it’s so ridiculous, because the world they live in is a world made entirely of innovation, much more than the liberal world in my opinion, much more innovative. But because you are following a charismatic person like Rabbi Kook, there is some sense that this is the Torah from time immemorial, this descended from Sinai, and therefore ours is a Torah that has an established lineage. And everyone else, who are simply following the regular path that existed from time immemorial, theirs is a Torah with no established lineage. Who invented this Torah? Like the Briskers. The Briskers are always talking about tradition. Anyone who knows the Briskers a bit knows: everything, everything is only “we have no tradition about this.” And anyone who talks about tekhelet—of course that already began with the Beit HaLevi saying, “we have no tradition about this,” a bizarre statement. But that statement, “we have no tradition about this,” is the most common statement in the house of Brisk. And it is so strange, because the Brisker method of learning is an innovation of innovations from the land of innovations, and all the time they speak in the name of tradition, which one may not depart from. They are unwilling to depart one iota from the tradition that was innovated thirty years earlier by Rabbi Chaim. Meaning, the more zealous you are for tradition, the more it only means that your tradition is newer. You have to anchor it and relate to it as tradition, because otherwise everyone will understand that there is no tradition here at all. Like today—you know, in the conflicts we have today, again without getting into all the politics—in the conflicts today, ninety percent of the public agrees on ninety percent of the things. The smaller the distance, the hotter the flames. It’s a known rule. Why do religious people hate Reform Jews more than secular Jews? Because Reform is closer, right? Whoever is closer to you, the war against him is harder. Why do Haredim fight more against Religious Zionists than against, I don’t know, secular Jews or Reform Jews? Because the closer someone is, the harder you fight him. That’s how it works. So many times it goes in the form of the reverse being more plausible. Because the one who talks about tradition is usually someone who doesn’t have tradition. And whoever doesn’t have tradition keeps shouting at everyone else: how can you function without tradition? Only tradition, and the tradition, and the mesoiras—yes, like Fiddler on the Roof. Tradition, yes. Haim Topol just died. A wonderful performance of his in that “Tradition” scene. Dead on, really. Okay, in any case—how did we get to all this? Ah, yes. Because we were talking about saying Hallel, etc. So what I want to say here is this: pay attention, I want to make a stronger claim. What does “they have partnership in it” mean? Therefore it is more reasonable that he be their agent, because he has a closer connection to the principals, like a slave, like a husband. Now I want to make a different claim. If “they have partnership in it” and he is part of the group, then he does not need to slaughter for them. Since the group slaughters. Once the group slaughters, then the agent does not need to intend to discharge them of their obligation, or to be an agent and slaughter for them. Rather, this is how a group slaughters. Because when a group slaughters, then naturally one person is appointed to slaughter, the others eat—there is a division of roles. One prepares the salt, one the oil, one slaughters, one gets the grill ready—that’s just how a group works. So you don’t need someone to discharge others of their obligation. Pay attention: according to this understanding, I want to claim that “they have partnership in it” does not mean that because of that he can be more of their agent. Rather, because of that, maybe the concept of agency is not needed at all. Not because slaughtering sacred offerings does not require agency—it does. But because within the group, it is considered that the group slaughtered. This is not by the law of agency, but because the group itself slaughtered. Not because someone else slaughtered for me as my agent. It’s not that the owner’s slaughter isn’t required—it is. Since every partner is also, in a certain sense—yes, this is the approach I said before. Now I want to suggest another approach. And by “approach” I mean another model of agency that is special. I may have discussed this last semester too: two people with a joint bank account, and one of them performs an act—is he the agent of the other to perform the act? The Ran at the beginning of the chapter about partners, I think, discusses this—partners in tractate Nedarim. And there, regarding how to define partnership in a courtyard: whether each one has a part in every grain, or whether it is divided because there is retroactive clarification. Meaning, the question is whether it becomes clarified retroactively which half was mine from the start. Then, for example, the question is what happens when you use it—I am forbidden to derive benefit from you, and the Mishnah there deals with forbidden benefit. What happens if I am forbidden to derive benefit from you and I enter the courtyard that belongs jointly to both of us? Then apparently it should be forbidden to me. So the Ran says: no, because I am entering the part that becomes clarified retroactively as mine alone and not yours. Yes? So that’s fine. In any case, this question is difficult also for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha. Both of them. Exactly, right. Seemingly as I understand it, this question is clearly difficult also for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha—the same thing. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha too learns it from “and.” So the Talmudic text says: rather, from here—“And they shall take for themselves, each man a lamb according to his fathers’ houses, a lamb for a household.” And perhaps “a lamb according to his fathers’ houses, a lamb for a household”—this, by the way, is the verse from which we learn “for those registered for it.” Here we learn “for those registered for it.” A verse in the plural, and basically what am I saying the derivation is? That it is in the plural and nevertheless one person takes it. No, no, no. What? “And they shall take for themselves”—that’s the designation of the Passover offering. Right, that’s the registration. No—but “a lamb according to his fathers’ houses,” “a lamb for a household.” So what? So you see there is… No, I thought it was from “and they shall take” in the plural. After all, one person does it, so why is it considered “they shall take”? Just like with slaughter, the same thing. One could have said that “And they shall take for themselves, each man a lamb according to his fathers’ houses, a lamb for a household” is exactly what I said above—you said with divine inspiration what I was about to say. That once there is a registered group—for surely they do not all slaughter together—so one slaughters, and therefore we are still talking about slaughter, not registration. But once there is the law of “for those registered for it,” that there is a group of registered people, then clearly only one slaughters. So how can that help all of them? Apparently there is agency in the slaughter of sacred offerings. But from the Talmudic text later it seems this is not what is being discussed. Why not about the taking? Exactly. From the Talmudic text it appears that the Talmudic text does not… that is what I asked above: why didn’t they learn it from the law of “for those registered for it” itself? Now the Talmudic text does bring the law of “for those registered for it.” But it doesn’t say what I suggested above: that from the law of “for those registered for it,” once you slaughter—and after all only one slaughters out of the whole group—how can it be that they all fulfill their obligation? No, it doesn’t derive it from the law of slaughter; it derives it from the law of registration. Meaning, how can one person take the lamb for all of us and thereby make all of us registered? And this is talking about registration, not slaughter. Now that is an interesting point. Why? Because if in fact we learn it from the law of registration, then I can now return and claim that for slaughter agency may not be needed at all. Maybe the owner does not need to slaughter, so there is no need for the slaughterer to be my agent—something the Talmudic text had assumed until now, because otherwise you can’t bring a source from there. But now in the conclusion, if it is really talking about registration and not slaughter, then one can go back and say perhaps—and we’ll see later that there are such views—that indeed one does not need an agent in the slaughter of sacred offerings. There is no law that specifically the owner must slaughter, especially since slaughter is not itself a Temple service. So the Talmudic text says: “There too, because he has partnership in it.” From there too you can’t bring a source because he has partnership. One could have distinguished here. Why? Because if I’m talking about the slaughter, then he is a partner because they were registered together, and now he goes to slaughter. When he goes to slaughter, he is already a partner in the group, and therefore you cannot learn the general law of agency from there. But if I’m talking about the registration itself, the registration is done when we are not yet partners. The registration is what turns us into partners. The moment all of us are registered for the lamb, now we become partners in the lamb. Again—not necessarily monetary partners—but partners in that same sense that requires registration; the exact meaning doesn’t matter now. Therefore one might have said that here it should not help to say he has partnership in it. But the Talmudic text says yes—the Talmudic text sees it as the same. Apparently because it understands that even if in this very act I create the partnership of which I am part, that is still—I don’t know whether it is exactly the same as an action of a partner—but it is still better than someone who even after the act is not a partner. So therefore you still cannot learn from there the ordinary law of agency. I don’t know if it is exactly the same in the eyes of the Talmudic text, or at least even that is still better than just an outsider. This also reminds me of Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman. He discusses—there is a Nachmanides, brought by the Rashba; several medieval authorities bring it—that Nachmanides discusses the emancipation of a Canaanite slave. Nachmanides says that emancipation of a Canaanite slave is forbidden by the law of “do not show them favor,” meaning do not give them free gifts. It is forbidden to give non-Jews free gifts. “Do not show them favor” is one of the three interpretations of that phrase: it is forbidden to give a gratuitous gift. And the emancipation of a Canaanite slave, which is seemingly learned from “you shall work them forever,” is the nullification of a positive commandment of “you shall work them forever.” But Nachmanides argues that it is really a matter of “do not show them favor.” It is forbidden to give a free gift. I don’t think they are right; that is not what Nachmanides says. Nachmanides means to say that it is like “do not show them favor,” not that it actually derives from that verse. It derives from “you shall work them forever,” but it is like “do not show them favor” in the sense that, say, if I free him in order to complete a quorum, as Rabbi Eliezer freed his slave to complete a quorum, I have not violated “you shall work them forever,” because in that way I am still using him. Meaning, I need him in order to complete my quorum—that is my use of the slave. I may not free him when it is a gift for him. But if it is done as part of my own needs, that counts as using the slave. So in that sense it is similar to “do not show them favor.” When I give them a gift that is not gratuitous, but in my own interest, then I haven’t violated “do not show them favor.” Nachmanides says likewise, I haven’t violated “you shall work them forever.” He does not mean that it is literally forbidden because of “do not show them favor.” I don’t think Rabbi Elchanan is right, but that is how he understood it. And then he asks: wait a second, but after I free him, he is a Jew. So I gave a gift to a Jew, not to a non-Jew. As a result of the emancipation, the slave becomes Jewish. So what is the problem? How can you say it is because of “do not show them favor”? He says the question is whether you view the object of the action as it stands before you at the time of performance, before the action, or as what it becomes as a result of the action. Yes, exactly like here. When you create the partnership through registration, you create the partnership—does that count as already having partnership in it, so that this helps you create the partnership, or not? When you approached to do this, you still were not a partner. The action itself is what turned you into a partner. But if that’s so, then you are just a regular agent. In the Talmudic text it appears not that way. The Talmudic text shows that even here this counts as having partnership in it, and therefore you cannot learn from there the ordinary law of agency. Fine, so I’m returning to the Talmudic text: if so, why do I need two verses? If one is not needed where it applies, apply it where it does not apply. The Talmudic text says: so we basically have two verses, both the slaughter of the Passover offering and the registration, and both teach me that a person’s agent is like the person himself. Regarding both of them there is the challenge that there is partnership, fine? So the Talmudic text says: okay, true, from neither one individually could you have learned it, but with both together one of them is extra. Because from one of them you can learn that someone who has partnership in it can be an agent. So why do I need the second? In the second too he has partnership, so learn it from the first. Rather, it comes to teach us the case where there is no partnership in it—that even then I can be an agent. This is what is called “if it is not needed for its own context.” Okay? That is the conclusion of the Talmudic text. Then the Talmudic text says: “This is needed for the teaching of Rabbi Yitzhak, for Rabbi Yitzhak said: a man can acquire, but a minor cannot acquire.” We’ll see later regarding the law of beneficial acquisition, that from here we learn the law of beneficial acquisition. Therefore it is not a separate source, and if it is not separate then one cannot use it for “if it is not needed.” “That one is derived from ‘according to each man’s eating,’ and still it is needed to teach that the Passover offering may be slaughtered for an individual.” Fine, so there is another law learned from here. “He holds like the one who says one may not slaughter the Passover offering for an individual.” In short, after this whole discussion, there remains here basically one extra verse. If we assume all sorts of other assumptions, then from that extra verse we learn that a person’s agent is like the person himself also regarding the slaughter of sacred offerings. By the way, maybe one more note: even if I learn it—the first source teaches me from slaughter. The second source teaches me from registration. Now regarding slaughter, I raised the question whether the owner’s slaughter is required at all. So accordingly there is also no need to assume that the one who slaughtered is the owner’s agent if someone else slaughtered. One could say the same thing about registration. Even with registration—who says I need to register myself? Maybe someone else can register me. Maybe with my consent, but not necessarily through my own act. We discussed this regarding terumah, if you remember, at the end of last semester: when I separate terumah for someone else, do I act as his agent, or is his mere agreement enough—that he doesn’t object to my doing it? Obviously if he doesn’t agree, I cannot do it. But the assumption is that concerning registration, the verse already speaks of taking. “Taking” is usually understood as registration. Why? What is registration other than that? Taking means taking—“And they shall take for themselves, each man a lamb according to his fathers’ houses, a lamb for a household.” The registration is the fathers’ house. No—what does taking mean? Taking means buying. Consecrating. Consecrating—that is how it is usually understood. The Brisker Rav discusses this here—if it is the Brisker Rav there on Pesachim, he discusses the question whether we are really speaking here about consecration, or whether there is something a bit… But how can a person consecrate something that doesn’t belong to him? What do you mean? You are saying there is one person who buys a lamb and consecrates it for the whole group. Yes. How can I consecrate something for you? You need “a person’s agent is like the person himself.” No, but there is no problem if I am your agent. But it also has to be yours. Can I consecrate a burnt offering on your behalf? First of all, it’s not at all clear that I cannot. Apparently I can. There is no concept of ownership—that is what the Brisker Rav discusses in that very place. He discusses the fact that the person for whom atonement is achieved need not be the owner of the offering. He is defined as the person for whom atonement is achieved. I can consecrate this offering and he will gain atonement through it. And that is in the case of a Nazirite. Regarding the Passover offering there is a question, which he himself discusses there: does the law of “for those registered for it” mean that with the Passover offering I also need to be an actual owner? Or not—that even with the Passover offering, I do not. The question is what this registration means—that is exactly what he discusses. But beyond that, even if I need to be the owner, an agent who buys an object for me—that is not even under discussion. It is obvious that he can be my agent. I’m discussing the question of agency for slaughtering sacred offerings, or agency in sacred offerings generally. But if we are speaking here about the very act of buying, then I can understand that about that… But then I ask again: then it is superfluous. It is absolutely obvious that one can appoint an agent in a monetary matter. Yes, that is obvious. Fine—but our whole discussion here is only about agency for slaughtering sacred offerings. After all, we already have sources for divorce, for betrothal, for terumah, and all that—we already have sources. Because those are ordinary matters. Yes. As for monetary matters, no one here even brings a source for agency in monetary matters. It seems obvious to the Talmudic text that this is simple. Maybe they learn it from divorce, never mind—but not here. Once we already have divorce, betrothal, and terumah, then certainly this too is included. Okay? It’s doubtful whether this even needs a source for that. But I didn’t understand something. There has to be some act that says this is the group and not some other person from outside it. They agree among themselves. They agree among themselves—the group forms. Yes, verbally. Then that is not the registration here, if so. You’re right. This is the designation of the Passover offering. The registration is their speaking among themselves. No—that is just an invitation. It is like an invitation regarding whether mere designation has legal force. It is not—what are we talking about? There is not yet an offering. How can we become a group without there being an offering that we are the group for? We can only plan, or decide among ourselves that we want to be a group. But the group becomes a group from the moment that it has an offering, that it is registered for it, that it has been registered for it. Now, once the person registers all the others, the Talmudic text says: from here we learn that a person’s agent is like the person himself. But perhaps it is because he has partnership in it. But again I ask what I asked about slaughter: maybe with registration too there is no need for the owner’s own act. Maybe consent is enough. Meaning: I cannot do it against his will, but maybe consent is enough and his own act is not required. Again, the Talmudic text assumes that apparently the person has to register himself. That is the assumption of the Talmudic text here, because otherwise it would not belong to the concept of agency. Okay? Of course, as I said before, once I say “he has partnership in it,” maybe the meaning is really completely different: that as a group, maybe we can indeed act as a group, not in the sense that you are my agent, but that this is how a group becomes a group, how it is registered. Okay? Still, since it is extra, I can learn from it the law of agency through “if it is not needed for its own context.” Okay? Now regarding agency in the slaughter of sacred offerings, as I said before, the assumption of the Talmudic text is that the owner’s slaughter is needed, and therefore if someone else slaughters then he has to be the owner’s agent. Okay? But this question is not simple. Not everyone agrees that the owner has to slaughter the offering, that the one for whom atonement is achieved has to slaughter the offering. And what that means—what I noted also about the verse—is that if that is really so, then maybe the owner does not need to slaughter the offering. And the derivation from the verse “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it” is only a derivation from the wording. Since it is considered that all Israel are the ones who slaughtered, then apparently a person’s agent is like the person himself, even though the owner’s slaughter is not really required. Meaning, from the mere fact that the agent works, one cannot learn that a person’s agent is like the person himself, because maybe agency simply isn’t needed. But from the fact that the verse says, “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it,” we learn that if one person slaughters, it is considered that everyone slaughtered, and from here the law of agency emerges. Now the question is: after I learned that from the wording of the verse, do I return and say, okay—but from here it also follows that agency is required, that the owner’s slaughter is required, and agency is required? Because otherwise there would be no room even to speak of the existence of agency. Agency is not relevant where it is not required. That is how the later authorities generally understand it. The later authorities understand that where agency is not required, there is no agency. The concept of agency was innovated only where it is needed; otherwise it is just monkey business. And that goes against what we said about terumah—what there? There too it says “you too.” Yes, and I spoke about that there in exactly the same way, and there I made a distinction that I’ll make here too. Meaning, there may be a situation where in principle the owner’s slaughter is not needed. We’ll see views like that. In the Jerusalem Talmud there is such a view, and in the Talmudic discussion itself too—that the owner’s own slaughter is not needed. But still agency is defined. Why? Agency is defined for the question of who counts as the slaughterer. For example, will the commandment of slaughter be credited to me or not? True, even without this I have fulfilled my obligation and I can eat the Passover offering—I am registered and everything is fine, there is no barrier to my eating the Passover offering. But in order for me to count as the one who performed the act of slaughter, let’s call it the commandment of slaughter, then one needs the concept of agency. And that brings us back to what I said at the beginning of the class, when I recalled the distinction between agency over a power and agency over an act. Here it is not agency over a power, because there is no power of mine that is required, that I specifically be the one who slaughters and I can delegate it to the agent and give him the power to slaughter in my place, because I do not need to slaughter, so there is no unique power of mine here. But one can still speak of agency over an act, like agency for a transgression, as I said. Agency over an act means that if I sent someone to murder, it is as though I murdered, even though I have no unique power of my own to murder—he can murder too. This is not like betrothal, where only I can betroth the woman to myself, or divorce, okay? Or perhaps separating terumah according to one view. But with murder, that does not apply. I am only claiming that from there the concept of agency applies because this is a transgression. Because it is a transgression, there is significance to the fact of who murdered—the question of who murdered—and there, at least according to Shammai the Elder, there is a concept of agency. That I can send someone to murder, and I count as the murderer. So it is not that the legal consequences are attributed to me—there are no legal consequences here. I did not create a legal status, there is nothing here. It is simply a physical act: I murdered someone. But the transgression is like the result—the transgression is attributed to me, or I performed the act of murder. That is what I called agency over an act. Here too it may be the same thing. In truth agency is not needed at all, and I fulfill my obligation even if I did not slaughter the animal, or even if the one who slaughtered was not my agent, because I do not need to slaughter. But if the Torah says that all Israel are considered to have slaughtered the Passover offering, then the Torah is really saying that the act of slaughter is considered as though it was done by them. Like the result itself, so to speak. I do not need to slaughter in order to be allowed to eat from it. But still, obviously if I appointed him as my agent, or if he is registered and therefore “he has partnership in it,” then it is considered that I slaughtered. Then beyond my being allowed to eat—which would be true even without this—I also count as the one who performed the act of slaughter; I have a commandment. Okay? Then it may be that one can indeed reconcile our Talmudic text, through all its stages, even with the view that the owner’s slaughter is not needed and the slaughterer need not be the owner’s agent for that reason. It is not needed, but that still does not mean that agency is not defined. There can be agency over an act and not agency over a power. And if I am right about this, then I return to the suggestion I made at the end of last semester regarding terumah: if this is correct, then here we have a source for what Rabbi Shimon Shkop was looking for—agency over an act. Here the agency is agency over an act, not agency over a power, and this is the source for that law. And maybe that itself is what the Talmudic text is looking for: from where do we know there is agency for slaughtering sacred offerings? Why should slaughtering sacred offerings be any different? Because slaughtering sacred offerings is agency over an act. From where do we know there is such agency too? Answer: from everything we have seen until now. So we see there is agency over an act—agency for slaughtering sacred offerings. Okay? Now let’s see this a bit in the sources. Did someone comment something before? No—maybe, maybe one can distinguish between the case where there is partnership, say, and an individual offering, where maybe there one does need an agent. There it is a little less relevant, because the one who slaughters is the priest. Although in principle slaughter by a non-priest is valid—one can slaughter not as a priest. The question is how one does it, because it has to be done in the Temple courtyard. But yes, in principle it is possible, with some long knife or something. But in the normal way the priest slaughters, so that doesn’t arise, because whether priests are agents of Heaven or our agents—that’s another discussion. The Jerusalem Talmud at the beginning of chapter two of tractate Kiddushin says this: From where do we know that a person’s agent is like the person himself? Rabbi Elazar said: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it at twilight.” Can they all slaughter it? Surely only one slaughters on behalf of all of them. Rather, from here we learn that a person’s agent is like the person himself. And another said: “And they shall take for themselves, each man a lamb according to his fathers’ houses, a lamb for a household.” Can they all have been taking? Surely only one takes on behalf of all of them. Here it is more explicit that this is talking about taking and not slaughter. In our text it is a bit more ambiguous. Yes—rather, from here we learn that a person’s agent is like the person himself. Rabbi Yosi said: there it is different, because a person may slaughter his fellow’s Passover offering without his knowledge. But if you would say a person may designate his fellow’s Passover offering without his knowledge—he cannot. Why are these two sources needed? There is one source about slaughter and one source about designation. So he says: they are different, not the same, because regarding slaughter there is no need for me to slaughter, and therefore a person can slaughter it without my knowledge. So the concept of agency is not needed here; one cannot learn the law of agency from there. The question is whether we invoke the law of beneficial acquisition here or not—the same discussion we had with terumah. When someone slaughters without my knowledge, is that by the law of beneficial acquisition, or is my slaughter simply unnecessary? Then one need not appeal either to the law of beneficial acquisition or to the law of agency. All the discussions we had with terumah can come up here too. What? Exactly, that’s why I brought the more severe chapter there in that context of terumah. Maybe not, fine—but “without his knowledge.” “Without his knowledge” does not mean against his will; it means he does not know. Yes, so that does not mean that if he does not consent, it also works. The assumption is probably that a person will agree, I assume. In any event, what Rabbi Yosi says, unlike our Talmudic text—which says that maybe he has partnership in it and therefore one cannot learn from there—the Jerusalem Talmud says one cannot learn from there not because of partnership, but because slaughter does not require agency at all. Therefore I need the source from designation. Okay? And what about designation? With designation, apparently one cannot designate me without my knowledge. There yes, it has to be done with my knowledge, or through my agency, or by the law of beneficial acquisition, or something like that. That’s it. And that is what Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: a person may slaughter his fellow’s Passover offering without his knowledge, but he may not designate it without his knowledge. Therefore the Jerusalem Talmud takes a different route from the Babylonian Talmud. It says that the source from slaughter is rejected not because it is extra, or because he has partnership in it, or things like that, but because there is no source there: slaughter is not needed. And apparently, on the face of it, that is a dispute between the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds. Only, as I said above, I’m not sure. Perhaps yes, but the dispute is less extreme than we thought. Meaning, it may be that even the Babylonian Talmud agrees that agency over a power is not required in slaughter, because I do not need to slaughter. But agency over an act is relevant—not required, but relevant. And that is learned from the wording of the verse, “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it.” Okay? Then the dispute between the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds is much narrower. The Babylonian Talmud says that at least agency over an act can be learned from there. The Jerusalem Talmud either does not make a distinction between agency over an act and agency over a power—I don’t know—or it is unwilling to learn the matter from there, or perhaps in its view too there is no agency over an act in such a case. I don’t know. So there is some difference between the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds, but it is not that extreme. It is definitely possible that even the Babylonian Talmud does not require the owners themselves, or the registered members themselves, to slaughter. Fine, we’ll stop here. We’ll continue next time. Thank you, thank you very much. And afterward we’ll talk about—I’ll still complete this next time—I think I’ll then already be able to move on to agency for a transgression, at the end of the Talmudic discussion later on. Thank you very much.