Tractate Shabbat, Chapter One – Lesson 31

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, in our passage we’re basically dealing with a situation where a person did an act that is considered, in halakhic terms, a placement without a lifting. Exactly why—that we’ll still need to discuss. It’s probably, or at least that’s how it seems from the medieval authorities (Rishonim), somehow connected to his intentions. And that introduces a parameter into the discussion that up to now we haven’t encountered, and that is the definition of intentions at the time one performs the labor of carrying out. Until now we’ve dealt with the technical or physical definitions of the labor of carrying out. What has to be done, on what one has to place, how to place, who is holding it, two forces in a person, all those things we discussed, a four-by-four place, and so on, what counts as placement—but all of that is measured according to an objective eye. When you look at the situation, from the observation itself you’re supposed to understand whether there was carrying out here or not. In our passage, suddenly an element enters that you won’t see just by looking. Meaning, when you see what the person is doing, apparently he did an act of carrying out and bringing in—or at least that’s what it seems; in a moment we’ll see. But at least that’s how it seems from the Talmudic text. And what matters here is the intentions in his heart. Meaning, the form of the act is the same form of act. The whole question is what he intended, okay? And that’s apparently something new. We saw something a bit like this in Maimonides’ formulation—I mentioned this on the page—regarding two forces by two people in the passage above on the page. Two forces by two people, not in one person.

[Speaker A] Where there—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There Maimonides formulates it as basically the object not reaching the place to which it had originally been intended, right? But even there it’s not exactly our case, and we’ll still get to the connection between the passages, but it’s not exactly our case. Because there, at the end of the day, we do see a physical expression of the issue. Meaning, the fact is that the object does not reach the place it had been planned to reach. But “planned” there doesn’t mean in the thrower’s intention, but in calculating the trajectory. Meaning, look at his initial throw. If you do the calculation, you’ll see where the object will get to, meaning where it will land. Suddenly somebody comes, approaches the object, and catches it on the way. Meaning, the object didn’t get to the place it was supposed to get to, but “supposed to” here isn’t only according to the thrower’s intention, but according to the trajectory that really existed at the beginning. Meaning, if we had just waited a moment at the beginning, we could have seen where it was going to get. Suddenly we see that it doesn’t get there. So that’s something visible to the eye.

[Speaker C] But why is that considered relevant anyway? That’s not melekhet machshevet. What matters to me is only the thrower, not the trajectory where the object was supposed to be.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So Maimonides—exactly—that whole connection to melekhet machshevet we haven’t yet discussed; we still will. It’s a very problematic connection. But there, Maimonides doesn’t present it as part of melekhet machshevet. Rather, it’s part of the definition of the labor of carrying out: for some reason, that’s how it’s defined—maybe because that’s how it was in the Tabernacle, or whatever—that the labor of carrying out is defined so that you throw the object and it is supposed to come to rest in the place where you intended it to be placed, or in the place toward which it was directed in the initial throw. That’s not a definition of melekhet machshevet, at least not the way Maimonides presents it there. It’s a definition within the category of the labor of carrying out, independently. That’s why I’m saying—and this is exactly the novelty I’m making here—that there too, even if it’s worded very similarly, it actually isn’t speaking about the thrower’s intention. It’s like what we said about cooking, about the anticipated result of his first action—the expected physical result—not his intentions, not what he wanted to happen, but what he caused. Meaning, where his throw was supposed to take the object. So there too we don’t arrive at the law of melekhet machshevet. Now the question is whether in our case we do. We’ll still see that. Rashi brings it in—we’ll discuss it—but I want to sharpen what the novelty is that may come up in this passage. In this passage, this is really the first time that in our context we encounter the significance of a person’s intentions. We’ve already talked a bit about whether he intended and so on, but in defining the labor of carrying out we encounter here a new parameter, and it’s not a physical parameter. You won’t catch it on camera or video or by objective observation of what’s happening in the world. What’s happening in the world is the same thing, but if the person’s intention was such-and-such, then there is no prohibition of carrying out here. So it already depends on the person’s subjective dimension and not on the act he physically performs in practice. That’s really the novelty. So let’s start looking at the Talmudic text. Maybe I’ll share it for a moment, okay. Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Ila’a said that Rabbi Yochanan said: If one was loaded with food and drink and went in and out all day long, he is not liable until he stops. Right, so although the wording itself isn’t all that easy to understand, it’s fairly clear; the medieval authorities explain it. “Until he stops” means while still in the private domain, of course. Meaning, a person was loaded with food and drink—we’ll soon see what that means—he walks around in the private domain, goes out into the public domain, comes back into the private domain, places it in the public domain, lifts it in the public domain, returns to the private domain, walks around there, goes back out. Meaning, there can be placements and liftings in the public domain as much as you want. Not just going out and in. Because if he only goes out and in from the public domain, then he won’t be liable because there was no placement in the public domain. You don’t need to get to the issue of lifting from the private domain for that. So here we’re talking about a case where there was placement in the public domain. There were many placements, even. Meaning, the person moves around in the private domain, goes out into the public domain, places it there, goes to rest, talks to somebody, finishes, takes the object from the public domain, goes into the private domain, walks around there—there he doesn’t stop—goes back out into the public domain, and can place it again. None of that matters. Okay? Meaning, what happens in the public domain is not just walking around; there there is also placement. Otherwise, the walking around in the private domain isn’t relevant. Even if he had fully lifted it in the private domain, if he didn’t place it in the public domain, there is no labor of carrying out here. So we’re talking about a case where in the public domain he may well have placed it down. Our focus is on what happens in the private domain. And in the private domain he was only moving around. He didn’t stop, he didn’t lift, he didn’t come to rest—he was just moving around. In the public domain he does various other things. So the Talmud says that basically he is exempt—this is not carrying out, at least not at the Torah level—until he stops. What does “until he stops” mean? If he stops in the private domain and then starts walking and carries it out into the public domain, in that situation there is lifting, and if there is also placement, then he has performed the Torah-level labor of carrying out. Now what does it mean—why is he exempt if he didn’t stop? If he didn’t stop, then he is exempt because there is no lifting. What does it mean, no lifting?

[Speaker C] He lifted it permissibly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, exactly. So here we need to discuss this. You could say there was no lifting because in fact there really was no lifting. For example, somebody placed it on him while he was walking.

[Speaker A] He was loaded. The Talmud begins when he’s already loaded.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, he was loaded. No—but the question is, he wasn’t born loaded with it. How did it get onto him?

[Speaker A] Right, okay, fine, doesn’t matter.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if it got to him because, say, somebody placed it on him while he was walking, okay? Then maybe that other person did the lifting. That’s exactly the previous passage, if you remember, with the flask of oil, with the homeowner who placed it in the pauper’s hand. So here too, maybe somebody else lifted it, but I didn’t do the lifting. And I’m the one taking it to the public domain and placing it there, so since I didn’t do the lifting, I’m not liable. Somebody else lifted it and placed it on me while I was walking. If he placed it on me while I was standing, that doesn’t help. Because then when I begin walking, that is called lifting of the body, right? And we learned that lifting of the body is considered lifting. So the first possibility has to be that he placed it on me while I was walking, in the middle of walking. A second possibility is that I myself lifted it and placed it on myself, but while it was still day. Friday, not on the Sabbath. And when the Sabbath began I was already in the middle of moving around. Meaning, on the Sabbath itself I didn’t stop before going out to the public domain. After I went out to the public domain, I placed it there and went to sleep.

[Speaker C] We saw that on page 3, the case of while it was still day.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Fine, before I get there—

[Speaker C] Yes, but do we really have to say here that it was while it was still day? That’s like Rashi with the Bach. Why say while it was still day? If it’s during the Sabbath itself—what? I didn’t understand. That’s the Bach’s correction in Rashi, isn’t it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are those who raise the possibility that it means while it was still day.

[Speaker C] Right, I’m saying—if I’m in the middle of the Sabbath and I load it on myself and then I walk with my own intention and go out, why do I need that whole “while it was still day”? I was loaded—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait a second, we’ll get there. You’re getting ahead of things. I want to explain that there are three possibilities here for understanding why there was no lifting. One possibility is that somebody else lifted it, and it got to me while I was walking. And once I’m already in motion, at no point is it considered that I lifted it. Maybe he lifted it, but I didn’t. So at most, he lifted and I placed; there’s no Torah prohibition here. That’s the first possibility. And then we’re talking about him placing it on me on the Sabbath itself, only I was walking while he placed it on me, not standing. Because if I was standing, then it’s lifting of the body when I start walking; that’s a new lifting by me. He lifted and placed in the private domain, and I begin lifting again. That’s the first possibility. The second possibility is that I myself lifted it, but that happened on a weekday, on Friday. When the Sabbath comes in, I’m already walking, so there is no point at which I lifted on the Sabbath. The third possibility is that I myself lifted it, and I was standing, and it was on the Sabbath. But when I lifted it, I didn’t intend to go out with the object into the public domain. I only took it in order to move it somewhere else within the private domain—I don’t know exactly where. Then I changed my mind, changed direction, and decided that I did want to carry it out into the public domain. I carried it out and placed it there. Okay? That’s the third possibility for explaining why I’m exempt. There was no valid lifting. That’s Rashi’s possibility—we’ll get to it in a moment—but those are the three possibilities. Now the possibility I called the second one—that he loaded it while it was still day—is what appears in parentheses in Rashi. Let’s see Rashi. Every so often I’ll stop sharing the page because I want to see you; when I share the page I only see myself, which overall isn’t so bad, but… okay. “He was loaded with food and drink”—which implies that he was not loaded for this purpose, but rather he was loaded in the private domain in order to carry it from corner to corner, in parentheses: “or while it was still day,” and once he lifted his feet—that is, after he had already started walking—he changed his mind and went in and out all day long. Okay? So Rashi explains it according to the third possibility, right? Basically, when he loaded it, he loaded it himself, only when he loaded it he did so in order to carry it from corner to corner within the private domain. He wasn’t planning to take it from the private domain to the public domain. So Rashi chooses the third explanation: he is exempt because his intention at the time of lifting—even physically there was a lifting here—his intention at the time of lifting was not to take it out into the public domain. He changed his mind afterward and decided to take it out, but at the stage of lifting that wasn’t the case. By the way, what is the stage at which he lifted? Of course it isn’t necessarily the stage where he took it in his hand and put it on himself, because if now he changes his mind and starts walking out, that too is a lifting. I mean: he lifted it, placed it on himself on the Sabbath, began walking in order to put it somewhere else in the private domain, and now he changed his mind. Because from this point onward there is no lifting at all—not lifting by hand and not lifting by body. There is no lifting anymore. So when he did the lifting, it was still with the intention of transferring the object to another place within the private domain, not to take it into the public domain. Okay, so that’s Rashi’s explanation. Now why does the Bach really delete this explanation?

[Speaker E] What does the Bach delete? Which explanation? He deletes “while it was still day.”

[Speaker C] Why does he delete what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He deletes the second explanation I mentioned, yes—“or while it was still day.” Why does he delete it? I think he deletes it because of the continuation of the Talmudic passage.

[Speaker C] Maybe also because of what I said earlier—that on page 3 there’s no novelty here at all. Why do we need the “while it was still day”? So what is the passage teaching us? If we’re talking here about while it was still day, then what is the passage teaching us? We already learned that on page 3.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And more than that—not only did we already learn it on page 3, but what difference does it make whether he changed his mind or not?

[Speaker C] Exactly, changing one’s mind has no significance.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There simply was no lifting. What does changing one’s mind have to do with it? Exactly. I’ll sharpen it further. The Talmud—I've marked the continuation for you here—asks: What is this teaching us? The continuation explicitly says: what is the novelty in Rabbi Avin’s statement in the name of Rabbi Yochanan? The Talmud says: didn’t Rabbi Yochanan already say this once? Why? Where? For Rav Safra said that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yochanan said: one who transfers objects from corner to corner and then changes his mind about them and carries them out is exempt, because the initial lifting was not from the outset for that purpose. Here it is almost explicit in the Talmud itself. Meaning: why is he exempt if he merely changed his mind? Because the initial lifting was not for that purpose, and only afterward did he change his mind. So that’s explicit. That’s Rashi’s third explanation—the explanation Rashi brings. Therefore I think that’s the reason the Bach deletes “loaded while it was still day” from Rashi. What Idit said is also very correct; I just wanted to show it from the Talmud itself. Meaning that if we were to say he loaded it while it was still day, then what does changing his mind have to do with anything? It just isn’t relevant. Now just notice that in the Talmud itself, in the first statement, it does not say that he changed his mind. It says: he goes in and out all day long and is not liable until he stops. It doesn’t say he changed his mind. So it could very well be that what the Talmud means is, for example—and now I’m answering Idit—what Idit said earlier, that “loaded while it was still day” doesn’t fit with changing one’s mind and there’s no novelty in it because obviously there was no lifting. That’s not entirely precise. First, because the Talmudic statement itself doesn’t mention changing one’s mind. It says “until he stops,” not whether he changed his mind or not. What does it mean that he stops? It could mean that in order for there to be a lifting—no?—when he stops, then he changes course and goes out. It’s not talking about changing his mind. That’s one point. But the question still arises: what is the novelty? Meaning, if he lifted it while it was still day, do you need to tell me that he isn’t liable? Obviously not—the lifting was while it was still day. So first, that’s not entirely simple. We already discussed this, and we’ll come back to it—that’s the inquiry of Afikei Yam that I referred you to. If we understand that lifting is only a condition, while the labor itself—the labor of carrying out—really centers on the placement, and lifting is only a condition, there has to be lifting in order for the labor to be significant, then one could perhaps say that even if the lifting was on a weekday, you would still be liable, because after all you carried it from the private domain to the public domain and placed it in the public domain, and all of that you did on the Sabbath. So what—you tell me there was no lifting? There was lifting. The lifting happened on Friday, true, but I don’t care, because lifting is not part of the labor of carrying out. Lifting is only a condition that before I carry out, I also have to lift. I lifted. So what if it was on Friday? But the action itself that I did on the Sabbath certainly was an action that came after a stage of lifting. So if I view it that way, there would be room to say that I would be liable, and then the Talmud teaches us that I’m not. That’s the novelty. Idit asked earlier what the novelty is. That’s the novelty. The novelty is that lifting is not just a condition, but part of the definition of the labor of carrying out itself, and therefore it too has to be done on the Sabbath. That’s one possibility. A second way to answer what the novelty is might be that my walking during the Sabbath itself also counts as lifting. After all, I’m walking with the object loaded on me, okay? True, I put it on my back on Friday, but I’m walking with the object loaded on me, and every step I take, I’m basically lifting the object from where I was to another place. So why should I care that the original lifting was on Friday? The walking I do on the Sabbath itself could count as lifting. The Talmud teaches us that it does not; that is not lifting. The lifting is the lifting that happened on Friday, and therefore he is exempt. Meaning, there really is room to understand that there is a novelty in this statement even if we do not delete what the Bach deletes. Meaning, even if I understand that the reason he isn’t liable here until he stops is only because he loaded it on himself on Friday, that’s not something with no novelty at all.

[Speaker C] Right. I understand, but regarding the second possible novelty you mentioned—if he loaded himself on Friday, then with every single step he’s doing a lifting and a placement. Why should I care when he loaded himself?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, that’s the novelty—that’s what I would have thought. That even if he loaded himself on Friday he would still be liable, because why should I care when he loaded himself? Every step. And the Talmud teaches us that no, I do care when he loaded himself, and therefore if he loaded himself on Friday he is exempt. But I’m only arguing that there is something being taught here. Meaning, it’s not trivial. Okay, that’s one possibility. A second possibility, as I said before, is that lifting is just a condition. So even if every single step is not lifting, still you don’t need there to be lifting on the Sabbath; you just need there to be lifting in general for the action to be a significant action. But the action itself is only the transfer from the private domain to the public domain and the placement in the public domain. Lifting is only a condition. If that’s the way you understand it, then there would be room to say that if I lifted on Friday, I’m liable. Remember I talked about this when I discussed sticking bread in the oven? We talked there about planting or cooking. Right—someone who places a pot on Friday and it cooks on the Sabbath. Obviously, if I put it on the fire, I won’t be liable—that’s obvious. But on the other hand, if I placed it there on Friday and it cooks on the Sabbath, there is room to say that I would be liable, even though the only action I did was placing it there. The fire cooks, not me. I only placed it on the fire, and I did that placing on Friday. True—but the fact that the fire cooks is acting through my force if I did the act of placing it there. So the cooking is what the fire does, but only if I placed it there. I placed it there, so what the fire does is attributed to me. If that’s so, then maybe even placing it there on Friday would make me liable.

[Speaker C] And isn’t that Beit Shammai’s position, that it is liable?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to the accepted Jewish law that’s not correct. I’m only explaining why, in principle, one could understand it that way. Okay? Why in principle one could understand it that way. Even Beit Shammai don’t think exactly that; rather, they claim there is a prohibition here, but not a labor prohibition punishable by stoning like cooking. It’s more like resting of utensils or things that began while it was still day and which there is a prohibition to let continue on the Sabbath for other reasons. The point is—we also discussed this in planting, for example—someone who planted on the Sabbath but it only began to grow during the following weekdays. So the planting itself wasn’t significant; I only put it in place, while the growth is the significant thing, and that happens on a weekday. True. But if I put it there—and here there really are such views among the halakhic decisors—that I am liable. If I place the seed on the Sabbath, even though ordinary seeds don’t do anything over the course of a few hours, obviously their growth will happen after the Sabbath. But the fact that I put it there is like placing the pot on the fire.

[Speaker A] Placement? Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The fact that I put it in place attributes the act of growth to me, but the act of growth took place on a weekday.

[Speaker A] Right, but the fact that I put—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that I put it in place attributes the act of growth to me, and therefore I can be liable even though it happened on a weekday. So we saw various conceptions like that, and therefore with carrying out too there would be room to say that if lifting is just a condition, maybe one can do it on Friday and still become liable. So the Talmud teaches me that no. Okay? So in principle, that’s why I’m saying that the explanation that he is exempt unless he stopped because he loaded it onto himself on Friday is not an absurd explanation on its face. It’s not obvious, and as I said, the phrase “he changed his mind” is not mentioned here, so that also isn’t difficult—neither linguistically nor conceptually. What is difficult is the continuation of the Talmud. Because there it does explicitly say he changed his mind, right? That he did not lift it with that intention. What the Talmud says there is explicit. And the Talmud says that Rav Safra’s statement, which is brought there, is the same novelty Rabbi Avin is saying here in the name of Rabbi Yochanan. Because otherwise we could say: fine, there that’s the novelty, but here it’s a different novelty. But the Talmud says no—“didn’t we already learn this once?” Rabbi Yochanan already said the same novelty elsewhere. Meaning, we see that the Talmud understands it as the same novelty. If so, then it was already apparently clear that our case too is one where he changed his mind—that he lifted it on the Sabbath, not on a weekday, but when he lifted it he did not intend to carry it out into the public domain, and then at some point he changed his mind and decided yes, to carry it out. And the novelty is that such a lifting is not a lifting. And therefore the Bach deletes from Rashi the possibility that he lifted while it was still day, because it’s not reasonable that the exemption is because he lifted while it was still day; rather, the exemption is because he did not lift it in order to carry it out. Okay, so that is Rashi’s approach. Let’s look now for a moment at the Meiri—the Meiri’s approach. “One who was loaded with food and drink while it was still day and lifted his feet while it was still day, or who loaded them with the intention of moving them from corner to corner and lifted his feet with that intention”—that is, with the intention of moving them from corner to corner—“and once he had lifted his feet he changed his mind and went in and out all day long or walked some distance, he is not liable, for there is no lifting here for that purpose, and he is not liable until he stops and then lifts himself with the intention of going out, because the lifting of one’s body is like the lifting of an object, as we wrote above.” The continuation is less important right now. So what does the Meiri say? The Meiri is actually giving two explanations here. What the Bach deleted from Rashi appears in the Meiri. The Meiri also gives Rashi’s usual explanation, but the first explanation the Meiri gives is that he was loaded with food and drink while it was still day and lifted his feet while it was still day. Or another explanation: he loaded them with the intention of moving them from corner to corner and lifted his feet with that intention. So here the Meiri gives two explanations.

[Speaker A] But earlier we learned a different passage from the Meiri, not this one—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I can’t hear.

[Speaker A] I mean that’s why we kept hesitating the whole time, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The later passage deals with the continuation of the Talmud—that’s less important here.

[Speaker A] So that’s why we kept hesitating the whole time, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what comes out here in the Meiri is that the Meiri brings both explanations: also the explanation the Bach deleted from Rashi. How can that be? That explanation is contradicted by the continuation of the Talmud. What I explained as the reason the Bach deleted it from Rashi is a difficulty on what the Meiri writes. Okay? So maybe I’ll jump ahead a bit, but perhaps the matter works like this. Suppose that according to Rashi we’re talking about a case where he changed his mind, okay? Then I explained that according to Rashi this means he loaded it on the Sabbath itself and began walking, and throughout those stages he still thought he was just moving it from corner to corner, and only after he had begun walking did he suddenly change his mind. Okay? That’s Rashi’s explanation. But perhaps the Meiri understands that if he loaded it on the Sabbath—maybe Rashi too, in the parentheses, if we don’t delete them like the Bach—that if he loaded it on the Sabbath, then even if he loaded it not in order to take it outside, he would still be liable. The whole exemption based on intention—that he didn’t intend, when loading, to take it outside—applies only to lifting of the body, not to lifting by hand. Do you understand what I’m saying? Again. I want to make the following claim, and this would also explain Rashi’s “while it was still day,” which the Bach deletes, and also the Meiri. And notice: both in the Meiri and in Rashi this doesn’t really appear as two alternative explanations. It appears more like one flowing sentence—either this way or that way. In a moment I’ll read you the sentence, but I first want to explain what I want to derive from it. It could be that the Meiri is making the following claim: if I lifted the object on the Sabbath and put it on myself, okay? And now—and this wasn’t for the sake of going from place to place. Okay? And now I suddenly decided to carry it out—sorry, one second, no—and then I began walking, okay? And I decided to carry it out into the public domain only after I had begun walking. It could be that the Meiri and Rashi would say that in such a case I would be liable. Because of the lifting?

[Speaker A] Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even though the lifting was not done in order to carry it out?

[Speaker A] Because it was done on the Sabbath?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but I’m saying—even though it wasn’t done—

[Speaker D] For the sake of—

[Speaker A] Carrying it out into the public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the very lifting that was done on the Sabbath. But we do require intention in the lifting to carry it out into the public domain, so why here would he be liable? My claim

[Speaker A] is

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that what requires intention to carry it out into the public domain is when we’re talking about lifting of the body. If the object is already on the person and he begins walking,

[Speaker A] then—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then the beginning of the walk has to be with the intention of carrying it out into the public domain. Why? Because basically the beginning of walking isn’t really lifting. The ordinary lifting is taking it with the hand, and if you took it with the hand and really performed a proper lifting, then I don’t care what your intentions were, because that is a full-fledged lifting. But in lifting of the body—meaning, if the object is lying on me and now I begin walking—if the beginning of the walk wasn’t done in order to carry it into the public domain, then you can’t see the beginning of the walk as a lifting at all. It isn’t a lifting; I just started walking. So there, intention is required: when I begin walking, I must begin with the intention of carrying it out into the public domain. If so, then the start of the walking—the lifting of the body—can count as lifting. But lifting by hand, ordinary lifting with the hand, is lifting even without intention. And therefore the Meiri and Rashi would say this: if he lifted it while it was still day, or if he lifted it on the Sabbath and began walking, and all of that he did not do—sorry—if—

[Speaker D] No, if he lifted it by hand while it was still day, but on the Sabbath he was already loaded.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. He was already loaded, and the beginning of the walking was not done with the intention of going out into the public domain, so he is exempt. Why? Because the lifting by hand was on a weekday—there, really, I don’t care what his intention was, but it was on a weekday. The lifting that happened on the Sabbath was the beginning of the walking, and the beginning of the walking was not done in order to go out into the public domain, and therefore he is exempt. But if he had lifted it on the Sabbath itself, then even if at the beginning of the walking he still did not intend to take it out into the public domain and only afterward changed his mind, there it could be that he would be liable.

[Speaker C] Wait, you’re requiring two conditions here in order to exempt him—you’re narrowing the possibility of exemption a lot. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Now look, I want to read again—

[Speaker E] Wait, but just a second—the Meiri writes that there was no lifting for that purpose. Right, so?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That—

[Speaker E] means there was no lifting for that purpose,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the lifting of his body wasn’t for that purpose.

[Speaker E] He doesn’t write “his body.” But he writes that there was no lifting for that purpose, so from that I did infer that the intention is that the lifting was not for the sake of carrying out.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m bringing back the wording of the Meiri now. Let’s read it again, now in light of what I just said to you. “One who was loaded with food and drink while it was still day,” okay? “And lifted his feet while it was still day, or who loaded them with the intention of moving them from corner to corner and lifted his feet with that intention.” Meaning: “or who loaded them with the intention of moving them from corner to corner”—what does that mean?

[Speaker A] Not to carry it out, just to move it around inside the house.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the Sabbath or on a weekday?

[Speaker A] On the Sabbath.

[Speaker E] On a weekday. That’s the question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? If we’re talking about the Sabbath, then you see that even lifting up directly with one’s hands requires intent in order to count as an act of lifting. Or he loaded them on a weekday with the intention of moving them from corner to corner, and he lifted his feet with that intention. The “or” here doesn’t mean… the “or” refers only to “he lifted his feet while it was still day.” Meaning, he was loaded with food and drink while it was still day according to all views. Now there are two possibilities for how it continues. Either the lifting of his feet itself was while it was still day, and then I don’t care even if he intended to carry it out into the public domain, because the lifting was on a weekday. Or the lifting was on the Sabbath, but when he lifted his foot it wasn’t in order to carry it out into the public domain. That’s the “or.” The “or” is not an alternative to being loaded with food and drink while it was still day. That is agreed on in all cases. In both cases. Exactly, in both cases, but in both of them he was loaded while it was still day. The “or” deals with the question of when he lifted his feet. So there are two possibilities. Either he lifted his feet while it was still day, and then it doesn’t matter what his intention was at the time he lifted his feet, right?

[Speaker A] Because it was… I don’t think so, wait, sorry, I don’t think like you that it was a weekday. I think the “or” refers to the Sabbath. Otherwise, why do I care?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The “or” refers to the Sabbath, but the loading was on a weekday. The walking, the lifting of his feet, was on the Sabbath. Again, look, I’ll read it now, I’ll add here…

[Speaker A] Meaning, wait, sorry, does “he loaded them while it was still day” mean that he has two intentions, or… wait, the first intention I still don’t know. The second is to move it from corner to corner; actually, I do know that. And the first is to carry it from one domain to another.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m going to read the Meiri now. Let me read the Meiri, and I’ll explain it as I go. “One who was loaded with food and drink while it was still day”—a general introduction that applies to all the cases. Now like this: “and he lifted his feet while it was still day, even in order to carry it out to the public domain.” Here we’re talking about a case where from the outset the intention already was to carry it out to the public domain. What is the deficiency? What is the deficiency in the fact that it was on a weekday? That this was not considered an act of lifting, even though the intention was to carry it out to the public domain.

[Speaker C] It wasn’t an act of lifting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Second possibility: “or he loaded them with the intention of moving them from corner to corner.” It could be that when he was loaded on a weekday and lifted his feet with that intention, but he lifted his feet on the Sabbath. Right? “And once he lifted his feet, he changed his mind and went out and came in all day long, he is not liable, because there was no lifting for that purpose.” Do you understand what I’m saying? Meaning, we’re talking here about a case where he was loaded with food and drink while it was still day according to both possibilities. The question is, the difference between the two possibilities is how it continues. The first possibility says that he was loaded with food and drink and lifted his feet, and all this happened on Friday. But again, notice: at this stage all this is already happening with the plan to carry it out to the public domain, but it happens on Friday. Exempt. Or, no: the loading was on Friday, but the lifting of the feet—and the loading—was in order to move it from corner to corner, not to carry it out into the public domain, and the lifting of the feet too was with that intention. And suddenly after he lifted his feet, he changed his mind and decided to carry it out into the public domain. There too he will be exempt. Why will he be exempt? After all, here there was already a lifting on the Sabbath itself. Because the lifting on the Sabbath was not with the intention of carrying it out into the public domain. Those are the two possibilities. But the Meiri is not talking about a case where someone lifts with his hand on the Sabbath and then lifts his feet intending to move it from corner to corner, and then changes his mind. Because in such a case it could be that he would be liable, even though he changed his mind only afterward. Why? Because the initial lifting was with his hand, and it was done on the Sabbath.

[Speaker E] Why does it matter that it was his hand? We’re talking about the fact that he was standing and then moved. It has nothing to do with the hand; it could also be the shoulder.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, but when he moves—if he moves not with the intention of carrying it out to the public domain, that is not considered a lifting, because that is lifting of his body. In lifting with his hand, the intention doesn’t matter.

[Speaker E] But what he says here in the second case is that he lifted his foot on the Sabbath in order to move it from corner to corner, and afterward he—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Changed his mind.

[Speaker E] So what I understand from here is that in both cases, what they share is that the loading was not done on a weekday—sorry, the loading was done on a weekday, and on the Sabbath he walked.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. The only question is what the intention was at the time he lifted and began to walk. That’s the difference between the two possibilities. The first possibility talks about a case where the initial lifting by hand and the start of the walking were done from the outset in order to carry it out into the public domain. That was the plan. But since it was on Friday, he is exempt. The second possibility says no: the lifting that was done on Friday and the start of the walking that was done on the Sabbath were both done with the intention of moving it from corner to corner. Only afterward did he change his mind. Here too he is exempt, but for a different reason. For here there was a lifting on the Sabbath; the start of the walking was on the Sabbath. The loading was on a weekday, but the start of the walking was on the Sabbath, and that is lifting of his body. Right. But in lifting of his body, intention matters, unlike lifting with his hand. In lifting of his body, if he intends to carry it out into the public domain, that is considered a lifting. But if in lifting his body he simply intends to start walking from place to place, that is not called lifting. I’m just walking from place to place in the private domain.

[Speaker E] Because lifting with the hand is always considered as having intention even if it’s not that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Basically an act.

[Speaker E] Something voluntary, it’s not involuntary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, it’s all voluntary. What I mean is not that it’s always considered to have intention, but rather that it is certainly a lifting even without intention. But lifting of the body—think about it in the simple way—when you lift with your body, that’s not really a lifting. A lifting is taking the object with your hand and carrying it. When I begin to walk, it takes a philosophical perspective to see that as a lifting. So what do I say? If I started walking with the intention of carrying it out to the public domain, I’m willing to see the beginning of the walking as a lifting. I was in fact intending to take the object from here and transfer it to the public domain. But if I started walking with the intention of moving the object to the other side of the room, I’m not willing to treat that as a lifting. I’m simply moving the object from place to place within the private domain.

[Speaker C] Like what we’d be doing all the time on the Sabbath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, right. So then my claim is that lifting of the body is determined by intention. But if it was lifting with the hand, if it had been done on the Sabbath, even with a different intention you would still be liable for it. Here the intention wouldn’t change anything.

[Speaker C] But I have another question about what you said regarding the citations and the two possibilities. Why do we need to say that he was loaded while it was still day and lifted on the Sabbath in order not to carry it out? Why do I care whether he loaded it on the Sabbath or while it was still day?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what do you mean? He says that if it was—if he had lifted it on the Sabbath in order to carry it out—

[Speaker C] No, no, when we’re talking about the case where it was not in order to carry it out.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter; he would still be liable.

[Speaker C] No, he changed his mind. Why if he loaded it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He would still be liable, because lifting with his hand, even if he doesn’t intend to carry it out, is still a lifting.

[Speaker C] We’re talking about lifting of his body in this case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re saying that the lifting with his hand was also on the Sabbath. What? You’re saying that the lifting with his hand was also on the Sabbath.

[Speaker C] No, no, I’m talking about the explanation you gave for the two cases that can follow from “he was loaded while it was still day.” So the first case I understand: he lifted while it was still day in order indeed to carry it out. But in the second case you gave, where he loaded while it was still day, lifted on the Sabbath not in order to carry it out, and afterward he changed his mind. Right. Why do I care when he loaded it? It could also be that he loaded it on the Sabbath and still be exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because if he loaded it on the Sabbath, then he is liable.

[Speaker C] No, loaded it, but not for the purpose of—not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why should I care? He is still liable.

[Speaker C] Why? Because that’s lifting with his hand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because if he loaded it on the Sabbath, that is lifting with his hand.

[Speaker C] Ah, okay, I understand, I understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In lifting with his hand, I don’t care about the intention; that’s exactly what I’m explaining here.

[Speaker C] Ah, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It seems to me that this is the plain meaning of the Meiri, and if that’s the plain meaning of the Meiri, then the same can be said for Rashi, and there’s no need to delete anything.

[Speaker E] But wait, the Meiri could also be explained differently. Sorry to be difficult. You explained it this way, but just as you explained it this way, one could also explain it exactly the other way: that his second option after the “or” is something done after the Sabbath, and yes, he says that even if a person lifted—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it isn’t clear—again—then the first possibility isn’t clear, so our difficulty was a strong one on the first possibility.

[Speaker E] Why did they bring it? The question is why he brought the first possibility at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Just as the Bach deleted it in Rashi.

[Speaker E] But still, then why—what difference does it make? Even if I explain it this way, the first question is still problematic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? The claim is exactly this: the novelty here is the novelty of changing one’s mind, but what they want to tell me is that the novelty about changing one’s mind is said only regarding lifting of the body, not lifting with the hand. For lifting with the hand there is no novelty regarding changing one’s mind.

[Speaker E] Then why do they need to bring the first case, where he lifted his feet while it was still day?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In order to say that in lifting of the body, in lifting with the hand, the timing has no significance. Meaning, if that lifting with his hand was on the Sabbath, I don’t care if it wasn’t done in order to carry it out. Again, I’m not at all sure that what Rashi and the Meiri write here is being written as an explanation of the Talmudic text. In the Talmudic text we’re talking about a case where he lifted on the Sabbath—sorry—where he lifted while it was still day, and on the Sabbath he began to walk while intending not to carry it out. Right? That’s the case in the Talmudic text. Why does the Talmudic text speak about his being loaded while it was still day? Because if it had been talking about his being loaded on the Sabbath, then he would be liable even if he didn’t stop.

[Speaker A] Wait, a question. Meaning, the wording of the Talmudic text, “loaded with food and drink,” for us means while it was still day? Yes. Okay. Second question: what if someone else loaded me on the Sabbath? Again? If someone else loaded me on the Sabbath, loaded me, yes, put it in my mouth?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, then there is no loading; he is exempt. That’s not a lifting at all. It doesn’t even depend on intentions; it’s not a lifting at all. It’s like when the homeowner places it in the hand of the poor person; then the homeowner is considered the one who lifted it, not the poor person.

[Speaker A] Isn’t this a case of two people doing it together?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, two people doing it together, and therefore exempt.

[Speaker A] Ah, okay.

[Speaker E] Again, I didn’t understand why they need to bring the first case at all. What’s the novelty in it? There’s no novelty at all in the first case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, again, obviously there’s no novelty. The Talmudic text itself is talking about the second case. In the Talmudic text itself we’re talking about a case where he was loaded while it was still day, and afterward lifted his feet; all this was done with the intention not to carry it out into the public domain. He lifted his feet and then changed his mind—that’s the Talmudic text. They say that you have to notice carefully that this has to be a case where the lifting with his hand was while it was still day, because if it had been on the Sabbath then he would not be exempt even if he did not stop. And what they add is this: if he lifted while it was still day, then even if he intended to carry it out and started walking while it was still day, he would also be exempt, because there the lifting was done while it was still day, and that is not the novelty of our Talmudic passage; it’s a law they bring to complete the picture.

[Speaker E] So the first law they brought is seemingly just unnecessary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not unnecessary; it completes the picture, but it is—

[Speaker A] Not the actual subject of the Talmudic text.

[Speaker E] What does it complete for me? I can ignore it; the second is enough for me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you can’t ignore it if you want to understand the Talmudic text. You can, but not if you want to understand what the Jewish law is. They want to tell you: see the law in its full form. What you basically need are two conditions: there has to be a lifting on the Sabbath, and if it is lifting of the body then it also has to be with the intention of carrying it out.

[Speaker E] So that’s what they want. But that’s what I understood from Rashi from the beginning, that Rashi brought the “while it was still day” even though perhaps there’s no novelty in it, in order to complete the halakhic picture. And that’s why I didn’t make a big deal out of the fact that he brought it even though there’s no novelty in it, because he was completing the picture here that the lifting also has to be on the Sabbath itself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I’m saying.

[Speaker E] So—

[Speaker A] As if—

[Speaker E] Did the Bach just delete Rashi for no reason?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not for no reason. The Bach thought it was a problem.

[Speaker E] In his approach he deleted it, but seemingly we could have kept Rashi even if there’s no novelty here, just in order to complete the halakhic picture.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m going back to what I told you in the previous class, Hani. You’re taking the difficulty and seeing it as an argument, and that’s exactly what I’m saying. All I said here is that what the Bach deleted was unnecessary. The Bach thought these were two alternatives, and I’m saying these are not two alternatives. In every case here the loading was while it was still day. The two alternatives are what the Meiri says happened on the Sabbath. Understood, so—

[Speaker E] The novelty of the Meiri is that these are not two possibilities for what the Talmudic text is apparently saying, but one thing, and this is what was done in the Talmudic text.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not two interpretations of the Talmudic text; it’s two possibilities for being exempt.

[Speaker E] Whereas Rashi is either while it was still day or it was not while it was still day; meaning, Rashi’s second possibility does not fit the Meiri.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he says “he was loaded in the private domain,” meaning apparently someone else loaded him; that is, he was loaded, he did not load himself. Or he loaded himself while it was still day.

[Speaker C] So if I understand correctly according to the Meiri, if he loaded himself on the Sabbath, started walking, and then changed his mind and carried it out, then he is liable. Right.

[Speaker E] But you can see that Rashi doesn’t fit with the Meiri.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That—

[Speaker C] That’s a big novelty; I haven’t seen that in anyone else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in my opinion that is what is written in the Meiri and in Rashi.

[Speaker E] Because in the matter of lifting—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With his hand, the intention doesn’t matter; if it was on the Sabbath, he is liable.

[Speaker E] One could say that Rashi and the Meiri differ. In what way? Because Rashi speaks either of while it was still day or of the case where he was loaded on the Sabbath. Meaning, not that someone else loaded him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How was he loaded? It could be that someone else loaded him or something like that; it doesn’t matter. Okay. In principle it’s the same thing. You’re right that there’s a slight difference, but it’s not—

[Speaker E] It could be, but it could be that Rashi is indeed talking about a case where the option is that he actually lifted with his hand and then changed his mind.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be. That—

[Speaker E] After all, that’s the third possibility we brought today. So it could be that Rashi differs from the Meiri.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but if Rashi differs from the Meiri, then the parenthetical words really are unnecessary. Right. Because if Rashi—

[Speaker E] Agrees—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If Rashi agrees that lifting with his hand does depend on intention, unlike what I said in the Meiri, then what does “while it was still day” matter? It’s irrelevant.

[Speaker E] Right, and that’s why Rabbeinu Chananel deleted it—two possibilities in Rashi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not Chananel, it’s the Bach.

[Speaker E] Sorry, the Bach. So there are two possibilities in Rashi: one is to understand it like the Meiri, and one is to understand it like the Bach.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. The Bach certainly understood Rashi not the way I’m suggesting here; that’s why he deleted the words. What I’m suggesting is another possible way to understand Rashi, and then there is no need to delete the words. Those are two ways to read Rashi. But again, what do you mean two possibilities? Because of his approach, the Bach was forced to delete words. You understand that once I suggest a possibility that makes that unnecessary, that lets me retain those words, then obviously my possibility is preferable. The Bach simply didn’t think of that option, so it seemed to him that it didn’t work, and he deleted it. Now, if I’m right about this, it has a major practical consequence. I say “consequence,” a halakhic consequence. If someone loads himself on the Sabbath in order to move something from corner to corner, then starts walking, and then changes his mind and decides to carry it out into the public domain, he is liable. I haven’t found this anywhere. But I claim that this is what is written in Rashi and in the Meiri. Okay? That’s what the Bach did not accept, and therefore he says that these words in Rashi must be deleted.

[Speaker C] You’re right that we have a difficulty on the Bach here. On the other hand, there’s an even stronger difficulty on Rashi and the Meiri, who are introducing here something that apparently has no basis.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they are arguing from logic. They are arguing from logic that intentions cannot make a difference when you are talking about lifting with the hand. Intentions are relevant only when you are talking about lifting of the body. Now the Talmud—well, not the Talmud—the Talmud on page 3, I’ll bring page 3. The Talmud on page 3b: “As it was taught: if one was loaded with food and drink while it was still day and carried them outside after dark, he is liable, because it is not comparable to his hand.” Right? So Tosafot says: this contradicts our Talmudic passage, doesn’t it? Because he didn’t stop. He lifted while it was still day and carried it outside after dark, so why is he liable? Tosafot says: it is speaking of a case where he stopped to rest after dark. Right? We’re talking here about a case where after he lifted while it was still day, he stopped when it became dark, to rest. For without stopping he would not be liable, since if he did not stop he is not liable. Why? “Even though lifting of the body is like lifting of an object, the first lifting is not nullified.” What does that mean? Tosafot says: if he didn’t stop, then even though we say that lifting of the body is like lifting of an object—and therefore everything I said to Idit earlier, and therefore seemingly every single step I take is a lifting—Tosafot says yes, but if there was lifting with the hand at the beginning, when I loaded the object onto myself, then you cannot say that afterward every single step is also a lifting. Everything follows the first lifting.

[Speaker A] And therefore—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot says that we are dealing here with a case where he lifted while it was still day and then stopped to rest after dark. Okay? And his proof is from our passage: “If he moved his objects from corner to corner and then changed his mind about them to carry them out, he is exempt, because there was no initial lifting for that purpose.” Sorry—and it mentions “while it was still day” to teach us that lifting of the body is like lifting of an object, because if it had spoken of one loading himself after dark and stopping to rest, it would teach nothing, for even the lifting and placing of the body would not be considered lifting and placing; he would be liable because of the first lifting. Here I get the sense from Tosafot that he does not agree with what I said earlier about Rashi and the Meiri. Why? Because I have a different explanation for why it says here that he loaded while it was still day. Because if it were speaking about his loading after dark, then he would be liable regardless of intention, because lifting with the hand does not depend on intention. Tosafot does not seem to say that. Tosafot gives a different explanation for why it mentions that he loaded while it was still day—because otherwise it wouldn’t succeed in teaching me the novelty that lifting of the body is a lifting. A technical matter in that Talmudic passage there. I’m claiming that there is importance to establishing that the lifting was done while it was still day not only in order to explain to me that lifting of the body is a lifting, but because if the lifting with the hand had been done on the Sabbath itself, not while it was still day, then I wouldn’t care whether he stopped to rest or didn’t stop to rest, whether he regretted it or changed his mind; once the lifting was on the Sabbath, he is liable. I’m not one hundred percent sure, by the way, that Tosafot is against me, because it may be that Tosafot is right that even according to my view, one could not have established here that lifting of the body is a lifting—we wouldn’t have succeeded in learning the novelty that lifting of the body is a lifting—but from his omission, from the fact that he doesn’t address this point, I get the sense that he learned like the Bach, unlike what I suggested in Rashi and the Meiri: that “while it was still day” does not play a role in the context of our passage on page 5, but only in the context of the passage on page 3. Do you understand? According to what I’m saying—that he loaded while it was still day—this is required not only for the considerations of the passage on page 3, so that they can successfully teach me this rule that lifting of the body is a lifting, but also for the law on page 5. Because if he had lifted on the Sabbath and not on a weekday, then even if he changed his mind, he would be liable. The lifting has to be on a weekday also in terms of the considerations of changing one’s mind, not only in terms of how best to convey to me the novelty that lifting of the body is a lifting.

[Speaker C] So how can you say that he learned like the Bach? “While it was still day” is important to him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but “while it was still day” is important to him for a different reason. It’s important to him because without it—if it were on the Sabbath—then one could not learn from here that lifting of the body is a lifting, because he would be liable due to the lifting with the hand that took place on the Sabbath—

[Speaker A] And not because of lifting of his body.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So how can they teach me that lifting of the body is a lifting? So he says like this: if the lifting with the hand was on a weekday, then why is he liable on the Sabbath if he stopped? Because lifting of the body is a lifting. But if he had lifted on the Sabbath itself, then even if he stopped in the middle, that would not prove that lifting of the body is a lifting, because the reason he is liable is because of the lifting with the hand that happened at the beginning, since that too was on the Sabbath. So Tosafot needs to explain why they established the case as one of lifting while it was still day, not for the reason I gave, but because of considerations of how the novelty of the passage on page 3 is formulated. It sounds like he does not accept what I said—that in our passage he would not require that he loaded while it was still day, but even if he loaded on the Sabbath, if he did not stop to rest—that is, if he regretted it, as it were, and changed his mind—then he is exempt, even though there was lifting with his hand on the Sabbath. That’s how it seems to me. I’m saying it’s not absolutely forced in Tosafot, but from his ignoring this point, I get the sense that he goes like the Bach and not like my explanation in Rashi and the Meiri. But here we really do see this point. What does Tosafot say? That when a person lifts something and afterward walks, then every single step he takes is in fact lifting of his body. But if he only—if he did not stop to rest—then true, it is lifting of his body, but lifting of his body counts only if there was no lifting with the hand at the beginning. But if there was lifting with the hand at the beginning, what determines things is the initial moment. And therefore the fact that afterward you walk on the Sabbath is not called lifting of his body. Only if you stopped on the Sabbath—that stopping nullified the significance of the lifting that had occurred at the beginning, and now if you begin to walk, that will be considered the lifting for our purposes. That will count as the first moment. The first moment is always the one that determines matters, even though every single step contains an element of lifting. If we say that lifting of the body is a lifting, then every step I take is in fact a lifting—that’s what bothers Tosafot.

[Speaker E] I don’t understand where you get this from—that every step he takes is a lifting. He requires that there first be a stop. Where do you see that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why does he require that there be a stop? Because otherwise—

[Speaker E] Because every single step he takes is not a lifting. Only if he stopped and then started walking is that considered the lifting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what you’re saying, but that’s not what Tosafot says. Let’s read.

[Speaker E] So I want to understand where you see this in Tosafot.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m explaining now. When I read Tosafot from the beginning: “It is speaking of a case where he stopped to rest after dark”—we’re talking about a case where he stopped to rest. Why? “For without having stopped after dark he would not be liable, even though lifting of the body is like lifting of an object, the first lifting is not nullified.” What does that mean? He says that in principle lifting of the body is like lifting of an object, and therefore every single step is a lifting. Except that in a case where the lifting with the hand was on Friday and then I began to walk and the walking continued into the Sabbath, in such a situation the steps taken on the Sabbath are not considered a lifting. Why? Because they do not nullify the first lifting, which happened on Friday—the lifting with the hand. But in principle, if there had been no lifting with the hand—say someone placed something on me while I was walking—Tosafot claims that I am considered to be lifting it, because every single step I take is a lifting.

[Speaker A] Fine, that’s according to Tosafot, because in principle if I’m walking, I’m not performing a lifting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying that’s Tosafot. That’s what Tosafot says here. So I’m saying that what I’m inferring here from Tosafot is not absolutely necessary, but his ignoring the aspect that the case had to be established as “while it was still day” also for the reasons of page 5 and not only for the reasons of page 3 gives me the sense that he learned like the Bach and not like what I suggested in Rashi and the Meiri. Now that also actually tells us—but notice—it really also shows us the dominance of the lifting with the hand that happened at the beginning. After all, every person who is walking with a load placed upon him—Tosafot says that that is the stage at which the lifting is considered to have occurred. From that point onward, even though lifting of the body is a lifting, since there was a lifting at the first moment, that is the lifting relevant for our purposes. If there was no lifting with the hand at the beginning, then it could be that every single step would count as a lifting, but the first moment always determines matters. So it is either that I stopped and began to walk—that is the first moment—or that I lifted with my hand and only afterward began to walk, in which case the lifting with the hand is the first moment. But always the first moment in which I began the movement is the determining moment. That is what counts as the lifting for our purposes. Okay? And in that sense it’s a bit—he does not agree with what I said in Rashi and the Meiri, but still there is a hint here in that direction, because what I was claiming, basically, is that if I lifted with my hand on the Sabbath, then it could be that even without any intention I would be liable. What happens now? Let me ask you: I lifted with my hand, okay? I put it on my shoulder—

[Speaker C] I stopped—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then—sorry—I decided to carry it out into the public domain, sorry, wait, how does it go there?

[Speaker A] No, I was fooling around and then decided to carry it out into the public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, just a second. I lifted with my hand on the Sabbath—yes, I lifted with my hand—

[Speaker A] On the Sabbath—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not with the intention of carrying it out into the public domain. Fine? Now I changed my mind after it was already on me; I changed my mind and wanted to carry it out into the public domain, and now I started walking. What would the law be in such a situation?

[Speaker C] Until now we said exempt. Now according to Tosafot it turns out he might be liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. Why? And notice this is an important point.

[Speaker C] No—why? But why?

[Speaker A] He performed a lifting; in any case he’s liable. I’ll explain, I’ll explain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What I said until now was that the moment I performed the lifting with the hand, I already performed a lifting. What happens afterward is no longer interesting. And with regard to lifting with the hand, the intention doesn’t matter. So even if I didn’t intend. What Tosafot says is: no, the lifting with the hand is considered the lifting because it is the first moment, but that’s only if immediately after the lifting with the hand I began to walk. But if after lifting with the hand I placed it on myself, stopped, and now began to walk, then the beginning of the walking is the determining moment. And if so, the relevant lifting is the beginning of the walking and not the lifting with the hand. But if the beginning of the walking is the relevant lifting, then this is lifting of his body, and in lifting of his body intention does matter.

[Speaker A] Meaning, in any event I would be liable in this doubtful case. That’s what I’m saying. Meaning, if it’s lifting with the hand, I would be liable, and also—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If not, it’s lifting of his body. Now let’s apply Tosafot to the novelty that I said. I wanted to claim that if I lift on the Sabbath, by lifting with the hand, and not with the intention of carrying it out into the public domain, and now I turned around—I immediately started turning around right after the lifting with the hand; there’s no lifting of the body, okay? I immediately started moving around—and suddenly I changed my mind and went out into the public domain. What’s the law in that case? I claimed that he is liable, since in lifting with the hand I don’t care that he didn’t intend to carry it out; in lifting with the hand, the intention is not of interest. Okay? That’s what I claimed earlier. According to what Tosafot writes here, what happens now—what happens now—if I lifted with my hand, stopped, and now began to walk, began to walk—wait.

[Speaker E] What if I changed my mind after I started walking?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He changed his mind—yes, changed his mind.

[Speaker C] Then here you’re exempt because you need intention. Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even though the lifting with the hand was on the Sabbath. Why? Because if I stopped after the lifting with the hand and then began to walk, the first moment with respect to the act of carrying out is the beginning of the walking and not the lifting with the hand. So the beginning of the walking is the relevant lifting that we need to discuss, because the lifting with the hand was already nullified once I stopped afterward, and then it starts being reckoned anew. And then I say: when I begin to walk, that is the lifting. But that lifting is lifting of his body, and in lifting of his body intention does matter. Do you understand what emerges from Tosafot? Even if you accept what I’m saying, that in lifting with the hand the intention is not relevant, that’s only—Tosafot says, at least according to Tosafot—not that everyone has to agree—but at least according to Tosafot, that is only if there was no stop afterward. But if there was a stop afterward and then he changed his mind, then he will be exempt. Why? Because the beginning of the walking is considered the lifting, but that is lifting of his body, and in lifting of his body intention does matter.

[Speaker E] But everyone says that, not only Tosafot. Why is this Tosafot? Everyone says that if he stopped and afterward walked, the lifting of his body is the lifting. Obviously. But I’m claiming: what is special in Tosafot?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s special is that this happens even if I lifted on the Sabbath. I lifted on the Sabbath, stopped, and began to walk, and all this was done—

[Speaker E] Why, why is he exempt? That’s not what it says in the Talmudic text.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The explanation is that he changed his mind after he walked.

[Speaker E] He walked, but he didn’t stop first.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again: he lifted, put it on his back, stopped, and then began to walk. All along he had no intention of carrying it out. Now, after he began to walk, he changed his mind. What’s the law?

[Speaker E] The law is that he is exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exempt. That’s what it says in the Talmudic text, right? Unless he stopped. But if he didn’t stop, then he is exempt, right?

[Speaker E] The question is when the change of mind occurred. Did he change his mind after he stopped, or did he change his mind before he stopped?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He changed his mind after he stopped. Fine, so he is exempt, okay? But according to what I said earlier, seemingly it should not come out that way. Because I said earlier that even if he—if there was lifting with the hand on the Sabbath, not on a weekday—therefore they established it as a weekday case—because if the lifting with the hand were on the Sabbath, then I wouldn’t care if he changed his mind after the walking. To the extent that lifting with the hand doesn’t depend on intention, the lifting would be considered the lifting with the hand, not the beginning of the walking.

[Speaker E] But you didn’t relate at all to the stopping.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s what I’m adding now: that everything I said earlier is when there is lifting with the hand and immediately afterward I change my mind and go to the public domain. But if there was a stop in the middle, this is what emerges from Tosafot here: if there was a stop in the middle, then the first lifting with the hand is nullified, and the beginning of the walking is now considered the moment of lifting. But if that is the moment of lifting, then the lifting we are discussing is lifting of his body, not lifting with his hand. And in lifting of his body the intention does matter, and therefore even according to my view he would be exempt, despite the fact that there was lifting with the hand on the Sabbath. And according to my view, seemingly he ought to be liable in such a case? The answer is no: according to Tosafot here, even according to my view he comes out exempt, because the lifting with the hand is nullified. The lifting with the hand remains in force the whole time as long as you are walking, but if you stop in the middle, then I forget that there was lifting with the hand, and the walking and the stop are what determine matters.

[Speaker A] But according to Tosafot, the walking after the stop turns it into a lifting, and then he is liable?

[Speaker C] No, he is exempt, because here he needs intention.

[Speaker A] No, fine, he changed his mind—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He changed his mind after he began walking, but when he began walking—that was the moment of lifting—he did not intend to carry it out into the public domain. Only afterward did he change his mind.

[Speaker A] Only if there was intention? Yes, yes, fine, and therefore he is exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But this exemption exists only for a lifting that is lifting of his body—the start of walking. The practical difference from what I said, in short, will be the following, and to this the Bach and his camp will not agree. What happens if I performed lifting with the hand on the Sabbath and did not intend to carry it out into the public domain, changed my mind, and meanwhile did not stop; I changed my mind and carried it out into the public domain? The halakhic decisors will say he is exempt, and the Bach will also say he is exempt, and I claim that he is liable.

[Speaker C] According to Tosafot?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I claim that he is liable according to Rashi and the Meiri.

[Speaker C] Right, and that’s what we said.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And also according to Tosafot, also according to Tosafot on page 3, because Tosafot on page 3 also agrees that lifting with the hand is nullified if you stopped afterward. But if you did not stop afterward, then even if you walk afterward and every step is supposedly a lifting, still the initial lifting with the hand is the determining moment with respect to lifting. Right. And then if you accept my novelty in Tosafot as well—Tosafot doesn’t say this—if you accept the novelty I said earlier in Tosafot, then Tosafot will say that in such a case he really is liable.

[Speaker C] So what is common to Tosafot and also to Rashi—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the Meiri—if there is no stop in the middle.

[Speaker C] Okay, but according to Rashi and the Meiri it doesn’t have to be that there is a stop in the middle.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. At least, nothing like that is written there. I don’t know whether they really say that, but it’s not—okay, now I want to discuss the second Rashi.

[Speaker A] Wait, did we talk about the Meiri? Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I can’t hear.

[Speaker A] I’m saying, we talked about the Meiri, yes, yes, okay, fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now look at the next Rashi; I highlighted it here on the screen. “He is not liable until he stops”—here “purposeful labor” comes in—“and afterward lifts himself in order to go out, for the stopping of his body is certainly like the stopping of an object. Therefore, when he stopped and lifted himself with the intention of going out, he is liable. But without stopping there is no lifting except the first lifting, and that was not in order to go out.” What does it mean that “the first lifting was not in order to go out”?

[Speaker A] Maybe the lifting with the hand or something like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe that on the Sabbath he did it not in order to go out, or on a weekday. “And the Torah imposed liability only for purposeful labor, and we derive from the Tabernacle that one intended to perform the labor. But if he did not know it was the Sabbath, or thought this labor was permitted”—permitted, yes—then he is exempt. So Rashi says that the exemption is rooted in the rule of purposeful labor. The exemption here. Because the person has to intend now to carry it out, regardless of everything I said earlier. Whether this is said only about lifting of his body or also about lifting with his hand, let’s leave that for now; that discussion is behind us, I’m done with it. Now I’ve moved on to the next chapter of the lesson. Okay. Now whatever we say—lifting of his body, lifting with his hand—the intention determines matters. The accepted view is that this applies to everything. I claim it applies only to lifting of the body, but it doesn’t matter. Wherever intention plays a role—why does it play a role? Rashi says because of the rule of purposeful labor. Okay. Now the question is: what does purposeful labor mean? How does purposeful labor explain the exemption here? Suppose I lifted not in order to carry it out into the public domain, then changed my mind and carried it out into the public domain. So why—this is also what I asked you on the page—which aspect of purposeful labor is there here? What is it? Is this an unintentional act? Is it mere preoccupation?

[Speaker A] No, it’s that he changed his mind. I think it’s changing one’s mind. Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But under which heading of purposeful labor does it fall? “Changed his mind” is the case in our Talmudic passage. Now I’m asking: under what title does it come? Is it an unintentional act? After all, from purposeful labor many things are derived. From purposeful labor we derive exemption for an unintentional act. From purposeful labor we derive exemption for a labor not needed for its own purpose. From purposeful labor we derive exemption for destructive action, for mere preoccupation, for two people doing it together—many, many exemptions are learned from purposeful labor. Now I’m asking: which of those exemptions is the exemption Rashi means in our passage? Is it an unintentional act? A labor not needed for its own purpose? Mere preoccupation? What is it?

[Speaker C] It sounds like mere preoccupation, because he’s not thinking about the prohibited labor at all, he doesn’t even have it in mind.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in the end, when he carries the object out and places it in the public domain, he is intending to do that.

[Speaker C] Yes, we’re talking about the lifting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But even in the lifting itself, it’s not that he isn’t thinking about the labor. In a case of mere preoccupation, he intended something else entirely.

[Speaker C] Suppose I’m walking down the street, okay?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And while doing so, with my hand I knock some fruit off a tree. That is called mere preoccupation. Why? Because I’m in fact doing some prohibited act, but I’m not even aware that I’m doing it. I’m occupied with walking, not with knocking down the fruit. Here it’s not that I’m not aware that I’m doing it. I didn’t do a prohibited act. Lifting in order to move from corner to corner is not a prohibited act at all. It’s a permitted act. It’s not that I did a prohibited act here but didn’t notice that I was doing something forbidden. At the stage where I lifted, I did something entirely permitted.

[Speaker F] I uprooted it in order to move it from one corner to another.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? Why is that relevant? This isn’t unintentional action, it isn’t mere involvement without intent, it’s nothing of that sort. Even in unintentional action, I drag a bench and make a groove, right? So what does that mean? I drag a bench, I do a prohibited act, I make a groove in the ground. I just intend the permitted act. I’m doing it in order to move the bench. But here it’s not that I’m doing two things and only intending the permitted one. I’m doing only a permitted act. Afterward I changed my mind and did something else. Now the question is whether that other thing that I did retroactively reveals that what I did before was a prohibited act. Why? What I did before was permitted. I uprooted it in order to move it from one corner to another.

[Speaker A] No, but now this change of mind says that now I intend to do something else.

[Speaker C] But at the time I uprooted it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At the stage of the uprooting, I didn’t intend that.

[Speaker A] But after all—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In order to transfer, you need an uprooting and a placement. So at the uprooting stage, am I called someone who unintentionally uprooted? No, I’m called someone who didn’t uproot at all. Because uprooting from private domain to private domain is not an uprooting. Do you understand what I’m saying?

[Speaker A] Right. No, it is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If anything, it’s a little similar to labor not needed for its own purpose. Okay. Why? Because labor not needed for its own purpose is someone who digs a pit and only needs the dirt. We talked about this. What happens there? The person digs the pit, so he makes a hole in the ground, which is prohibited because of plowing, say, or building in a house, or something like that. But he doesn’t need the hole at all; he wants to take the dirt. Taking the dirt is permitted. Muktzeh is not important right now, but there’s no Torah-level prohibition here. There’s no prohibition of labor here. So he wants to take the dirt. Maybe that’s a bit more similar. Even that is not exactly the same, because in the end he is doing a prohibited act here—he’s digging. He’s just not doing it for the sake of the pit but for the dirt. But one could say that the law of labor not needed for its own purpose teaches me that this is not considered doing a prohibited labor at all. Because I’m only taking dirt. So a pit gets formed here—fine, a pit gets formed—what does that have to do with anything? I didn’t dig a pit; I only took dirt. If that’s how I understand labor not needed for its own purpose, then maybe it’s somewhat similar to our case. Because here too, I uproot in order to move from private domain to private domain, to another place in private domain, and that’s not considered doing a prohibited act at all. Because I did it for the purpose of transferring within private domain, not for the purpose of carrying out into public domain. So that is similar to labor not needed for its own purpose.

[Speaker A] But that’s only the first part of the action.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, but without the first part there is no action. Because if I didn’t do an uprooting that counts as an uprooting, then even if the placement would obligate me, without an uprooting you can’t obligate me. So it’s enough that half of the action is not considered a prohibited act in order to say that I didn’t do the full prohibited act here.

[Speaker E] There’s something here that I don’t really understand. First of all, if in a case of unintentional action, where it’s an inevitable result, one is liable, that means that apparently intention has no significance. Second thing… I didn’t understand. If we… we learned the rule that when it’s unintentional, but it’s an inevitable result—okay, I dragged the bench and grooves were made—I didn’t intend to make grooves, and still I’m liable. That means, what difference does it make what I intended? And second…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what’s the question? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker E] No, about this whole issue here of purposeful labor with Rashi, with this matter of intention—that intention is purposeful labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly what I’m saying. I’m saying that here we are not dealing with unintentional action.

[Speaker E] Wait, and also what you’re saying about half an action: uprooting by itself is permitted, placement by itself is permitted, so obviously whenever I do an uprooting, I’m not violating anything if I’m in the same domain,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And when I—

[Speaker E] do a placement in the same domain, I’m not violating anything.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not true. When you uproot in private domain and carry it out to public domain, the end of the action teaches about its beginning. But Rashi says: all that is only when from the outset you intended to finish it with placement in public domain. But if at the uprooting stage you have no intention at all to finish in public domain, then that’s something separate. Then that uprooting is not a prohibited act at all. And then when you change your mind, you’ve done only half a labor. I’ll give you an example. Suppose you eat half a measure of pork, half an olive-bulk of pork. So half a measure means that there isn’t a full prohibition of pork here—Torah-level, rabbinic-level, we talked about that—but there isn’t a full prohibition here. Now I ate another half. Can they flog me? Of course they can. Why? Because the moment I completed the whole olive-bulk, the first half too is now considered part of the act of eating. The entire olive-bulk combines.

[Speaker E] I understand, I understand that. But basically, according to this, it doesn’t fit any of those categories—not mere involvement without intent, not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right.

[Speaker E] It doesn’t fit any of them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Labor not needed for its own purpose fits better. And if you pay attention, in labor not needed for its own purpose there too it’s always an inevitable result, and that doesn’t stop me from exempting. Someone digs a pit and only needs the dirt. When I remove the dirt, it’s an inevitable result that there will be a pit, and nevertheless I am exempt. It’s not like unintentional action. And therefore here too, therefore here too…

[Speaker E] But there I did a prohibited labor, and here we said I didn’t do a prohibited labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so I’m saying: maybe one can say that when I dig the pit for the dirt, not for the pit, then the law of labor not needed for its own purpose teaches me that such a thing is not considered a prohibited act at all, because I didn’t dig at all—I only removed dirt, and as a result something got dug here. And if so, then maybe that can be similar to our case. Meaning: I did the uprooting for a purpose that was not carrying out into public domain but for another purpose, and therefore this really is not a prohibited act. That is exactly the law of labor not needed for its own purpose. Fine. But the strange thing is that when Rashi brings purposeful labor here, what example does he choose to bring? Someone who intended to do the labor but didn’t know it was the Sabbath, or thought this labor was permitted, so he is exempt.

[Speaker C] Which is not labor… right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Those are the two laws of an unwitting violation: either he doesn’t know that today is the Sabbath, or he doesn’t know that it is prohibited to carry out on the Sabbath. Those are the two types of unwitting violation. And he brings the law of unwitting violation as an example. What does unwitting violation have to do with this? Why bring the example of unwitting violation specifically? Bring me labor not needed for its own purpose. I have no answer to that. I don’t know. This thing seems strange to me. Apparently Rashi, if I understand correctly, probably wants to argue that this also isn’t entirely labor not needed for its own purpose. So therefore he brings only one example of purposeful labor, like unwitting violation, for example, and then says: but from the general category of purposeful labor also emerges the exemption in this case of carrying out. Not that he is comparing it to unwitting violation—you are not unwitting here. But still, it is puzzling. More than that, I’ll tell you: the exemption of unwitting violation doesn’t really belong to purposeful labor at all. After all, an unwitting violator is exempt throughout the Torah, not only on the Sabbath. Purposeful labor is a special exemption in the laws of the Sabbath. Someone who commits a transgression unwittingly that is not a Sabbath transgression is also exempt.

[Speaker E] No, but the unwitting case he brings here—true, he brings the second one, that he didn’t know that… what they have in common is the issue of intention here, and from unwitting violation he learns that intention is significant.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that has nothing to do with purposeful labor; that’s true throughout the Torah. Someone who eats pork unwittingly is also exempt. With pork there is no requirement that it specifically be purposeful labor; that exists only in the laws of the Sabbath. So this whole business here is strange; I don’t know what to say about it. It may be that he holds—so I have two questions. Questions. First, why is unwitting violation treated by him as an example of the laws of purposeful labor? Unwitting violation exists throughout the Torah, not only on the Sabbath. To that I can perhaps answer, as we saw in unintentional action, if you remember: I want to claim that perhaps even with unwitting violation on the Sabbath there is a double exemption for unwitting violation. There is the exemption that exists throughout the Torah, that someone who acts unwittingly is exempt, but on the Sabbath beyond that there is also an exemption of purposeful labor. Like with unintentional action—you remember—we talked about the fact that there is unintentional action that exempts throughout the Torah, but also specifically in the laws of the Sabbath there is an additional exemption of purposeful labor. There was Rabbi Chaim—we talked about this—Rabbi Chaim at length, in chapter 14 or 17, where he spoke about these two laws in unintentional action. From Rashi here it appears, apparently, that in the law of unwitting violation too there are those same two laws that Rabbi Chaim sees in unintentional action.

[Speaker E] Wait, but according to the second law he brings—that he doesn’t know that today is the Sabbath—the exemption is because he didn’t know that today is the Sabbath, but he did intend to do the labor. Meaning that intention is important, and therefore we—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] bring it here. That’s—

[Speaker C] That’s not intention. It’s awareness, maybe.

[Speaker E] No, the question is what “intention” means. Does the intention in unwitting violation mean to do it deliberately in order to desecrate the Sabbath? Or does the intention mean that I truly intended to do the labor? Those are two different kinds of intention.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What we’re bringing here: if you didn’t intend to do the labor, that’s mere involvement without intent. If you didn’t intend to desecrate the Sabbath, that’s unintentional action. What? But, but the point is, that’s not important for our purposes here. The unwitting case here—Rashi brings the example of unwitting violation. So first I asked why unwitting violation is an example of the laws of purposeful labor. I say: perhaps Rashi understands that on the Sabbath there is an additional exemption for unwitting violation. Beyond the ordinary exemption of unwitting violation in Jewish law, there is also an exemption because it is not purposeful labor. All in all, there’s logic to that. If mental focus is required in order to violate a Sabbath prohibition—so much so that intention is needed, and it has to be needed for its own purpose, and it must not be mere involvement without intent, and it must not be destructive action—meaning a very carefully planned act is needed, like in the Tabernacle, where Betzalel planned and executed what he planned. We talked about that, okay? So if that really is required, then it is very reasonable that awareness is also required. That’s the ABC of purposeful labor. True, in the rest of the Torah, where there is no requirement of purposeful labor, the unwitting violator is exempt because there is a general law that an unwitting violator is exempt. But on the Sabbath there is another exemption beyond the ordinary exemption of unwitting violation that exists throughout the Torah: there is also an exemption of purposeful labor. Still, it remains difficult why Rashi chose specifically the example of unwitting violation to bring here as an example of exemption due to purposeful labor, when here, if anything, this is perhaps similar to labor not needed for its own purpose, and not to unwitting violation, nor to unintentional action, nor to mere involvement without intent, nor to anything else. If you look here in Birkat Avraham, he keeps discussing the law of mere involvement without intent. He is sure that we are dealing here with mere involvement without intent, and the question is whether there is such involvement here or not. In my view he is simply wrong. This has nothing to do with the law of mere involvement without intent. This is a law of purposeful labor that has nothing to do with that. There is nothing to discuss here at all. Right. So why Rashi brought specifically the example of unwitting violation—I really don’t know. Maybe because Rashi wants to show us that from the law of purposeful labor other things branch out as well, even though they do not appear explicitly in the Talmud, such as unintentional action or labor not needed for its own purpose. So he says, for example, with unwitting violation, look: besides the exemption for unwitting violation that exists throughout the Torah, there is also an exemption of purposeful labor. If so, then in our case too, someone who uprooted not in order to carry out into public domain—even though this does not fall under one of the familiar categories of purposeful labor, like unintentional action and labor not needed for its own purpose, mere involvement without intent, destructive action, and so on—still, this is not purposeful labor, and therefore I exempt him. Maybe that is what he meant to say; I don’t know. In any case, he understands that the foundation of the exemption is purposeful labor. In Maimonides it does not seem that way. I asked you about Maimonides, right.

[Speaker C] I’m already—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] skipping the Chazon Ish because we won’t have time to get into him. No, too bad.

[Speaker C] Maimonides—no, Maimonides doesn’t say that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides argues—by the way, just one more point—in Shitah Mekubetzet on Ketubot, which I referred you to, the Shitah Mekubetzet there wants to argue that maybe here we are dealing with a case where, when he uprooted the object, he intended to place it somewhere—either in private domain or in public domain—not that he intended specifically for private domain. Somewhere. And then maybe this really is already more similar to unintentional action or to mere involvement without intent. And what happens is that he is indeed doing both things. He uproots in order to transfer it to another place, which at that point he has still not decided whether it is private domain or public domain. In the end he decided to continue with it into public domain. So here one could see it as two actions, one of which is indeed a prohibited action; the question is whether he intended it or not, and that is the definition of unintentional action.

[Speaker F] I said earlier that that’s not correct.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I thought it was the opposite.

[Speaker F] If he doesn’t care where to put it down.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not that he doesn’t care.

[Speaker F] He didn’t know—

[Speaker C] where he would put it down, whatever opportunity came up.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is exactly the claim. Since one of the possibilities was also public domain, then what I said earlier is not correct. The uprooting is an act that is possibly prohibited and possibly permitted, depending on where you ultimately bring it. Then there would be room to say that in principle you should be liable, but because there is a law of purposeful labor you are nevertheless exempt, because this is called unintentional action—like someone who drags a bench and makes a groove. There, you are doing two actions: both making a groove and moving the bench. Here too, you are doing an act of uprooting for the sake of public domain or for the sake of private domain; in the end you will decide which of the two. So that is already more similar to unintentional action. So maybe that could emerge from the Shitah Mekubetzet. But look at Maimonides. If one uprooted an object from this corner to place it in another corner, then this uprooting is found to be a permitted uprooting.

[Speaker E] Can you share your screen with us for a moment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sorry, I didn’t notice it wasn’t shared. Sorry, I got carried away and didn’t share. If one uprooted an object from this corner to place it in another corner, then this uprooting is found to be a permitted uprooting, and he changed his mind on the way and carried it out into a second domain, he is exempt, because the first uprooting was not for that purpose, and thus there is here a placement without an uprooting. Like Rashi: the first uprooting was not planned for that. And similarly, one who uproots an object and places it on his fellow while he is walking—notice?

[Speaker C] Here’s the third interpretation, the first—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] while he is walking—and at the time his fellow wanted to stop, he took it off his fellow, he is exempt, because there is here an uprooting without a placement. Now, in Maimonides, the exemption here, on the face of it, contains no hint that this comes from the laws of purposeful labor. Maimonides says that in the parameters of uprooting, in the definition of carrying out, this is not called uprooting. Why, really? So look at Kiryat Sefer. The reference in Kiryat Sefer—because he was bothered by this—he says it is indeed because of purposeful labor. That’s what he says: if one uprooted an object from this corner to place it in another corner, which is permitted, and changed his mind on the way and carried it out into a second domain, since the first uprooting was not for that purpose, the Torah obligated only purposeful labor, which we derive from the Tabernacle: that he intended to do the labor. But if he does not know it is the Sabbath, or thinks this labor is permitted—like Rashi, copied from Rashi, it is literally Rashi’s language. And similarly one who uproots an object—it doesn’t matter. So he ties this to the law of purposeful labor. Why? Because he does not understand what—remember how I opened the class? A novel idea emerges in this passage: that the definition of the labor of carrying out is not only according to what I see with my eyes, what I photograph in the objective picture, but it depends on intentions. Kiryat Sefer refuses to accept that. It cannot be. Carrying out is defined as a certain type of act. Therefore there is no choice: if the Talmud says here that he is exempt, then apparently it is because of the laws of purposeful labor, not because of the definition of the labor of carrying out, but because of the general law that on the Sabbath there must be purposeful labor, and if he did not intend it, then it is not purposeful labor. He has no choice, he says, because otherwise one cannot understand Maimonides. But Maimonides does not sound like that. Maimonides sounds like there is a definition here within the labor of carrying out. The labor of carrying out is supposed to be one that is planned in advance toward the final destination, and not because of the laws of purposeful labor. And here I return to the two halakhot I mentioned earlier, law 13 and law 15. These are the halakhot where we talked about two forces, remember? In the previous classes. One who throws an object from domain to domain, or from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits in public domain, and before it came to rest another caught it in his hand, or a dog caught it, or it was burned, he is exempt. Why? Because this is not the placement he intended. Therefore, if he intended this at the time of throwing, he is liable. Law 15: one who throws and it comes to rest—that is the law we learned.

[Speaker C] Can one say that it’s not only what he intended, but what you said at the beginning of the class?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Law 15: if one throws and it comes to rest in his fellow’s hand, if the fellow stood in his place and received it, the thrower is liable, for he uprooted and placed. But if his fellow moved from his place and received it, he is exempt. If the thrower himself threw and ran after it and received it in his hand in another domain or beyond four cubits, he is exempt, as if another had moved and received it, because the placement is not complete. Now this is the rule: the placement is not complete until the object comes to rest in the place where it was supposed to come to rest at the time of uprooting. This certainly has nothing to do with purposeful labor, because here we are not talking about intentions. That’s what I said at the beginning of the class, right? Here the question is: what was the object’s original course, where was it supposed to come to rest—not what the thrower intended, but what determines the object’s initial trajectory when it set out.

[Speaker A] Isn’t that part of intention? If I throw to a certain place?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It has nothing to do with intentions. It doesn’t matter what I intended. It has to do with the question of what the planned trajectory is. Now, what happens if I threw an object to my friend and I intended that he should run and catch it?

[Speaker C] Exactly what I was about to ask, that’s exactly what I was thinking.

[Speaker E] What would the law be?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Would he be liable or exempt?

[Speaker C] Seemingly—

[Speaker E] he would be—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] liable.

[Speaker C] According to Maimonides he is exempt. No!

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I claim that he is exempt. Why is he exempt?

[Speaker C] Because if he hadn’t moved, the ball would have fallen somewhere else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. The fact that I intended it to reach the person’s hand is true—that is required—but it is not enough. It is a necessary condition, but not sufficient. The object also has to land in the place where it was originally planned to land. Two requirements are needed in order for him to be liable. Law 13 speaks about the first requirement: did you intend it? If you did not intend it, you are exempt, even if it landed in the place where it was meant to land, but you didn’t intend that. Law 15 speaks about the second requirement. I did intend it—that has nothing to do with intention. The question is what happened in practice versus what was supposed to happen at the beginning of the route, what the trajectory was. And we see in Maimonides that there are these two dimensions. That is, Maimonides understands that in the definition of the labor of carrying out there is a condition that the object must land in the same place I intended when I uprooted it, and in the same place it was also supposed to land in terms of its trajectory.

[Speaker E] If so—wait, wait, I didn’t understand, I didn’t understand the distinction again. Maimonides has two conditions: one, that it land in the place he planned—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in advance. One is in terms of the person’s intention, and the second is that the object land in the place toward which it set out in the first moment—not the person’s intention, the trajectory.

[Speaker C] That’s according to gravity and all kinds of physical laws? Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And in law 13 he speaks about the first condition; in law 15 he speaks about the second condition. And now I’m claiming that according to Maimonides these two conditions both come from—the same law, 12, 13, and 15, are in sequence, because Maimonides is defining here the labor of carrying out. According to Maimonides, the intention of the carrying out is like the situation in which the object does not land in the place where from the outset it was meant to land. But this is not because of the laws of purposeful labor. It is not unintentional action, it is not labor not needed for its own purpose, not unwitting violation and not anything like that. It is a definition, part of the definitions of the labor of carrying out. The labor of carrying out is defined in such a way that the uprooting must be directed in advance toward some place, and there indeed it must end—both in the intention of the person uprooting it and in terms of the trajectory with which it set out. If that is so, then Maimonides is not like Kiryat Sefer. Maimonides is not speaking here in terms of the laws of purposeful labor, unlike Rashi; rather, for him this is part of the definitions of the labor of uprooting. Okay? Good. I think I’ve exhausted the main points. Look in the summary if you want; there are still various details, and the Chazon Ish for example, but that’s the main thing. There are a few more details. Thank you. Thank you very much.

[Speaker C] Thank you very much.

[Speaker A] Have a good holiday.