Authority and Change in Halakha, Lesson 3
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- The authority of the Talmud and replacing ordination with agreement
- The rule of their agency and its extension to generations without ordained judges
- Their agency, conversion, and the status of rabbinic acquisitions
- Substantive authority and formal authority, and the Kesef Mishneh’s ruling regarding the sealing of the Mishnah and the Talmud
- Da’at Torah as an example of substantive authority without formal authority
- The scope of formal authority: norms versus facts
- Maimonides, halakhic rulings on matters that are not practical, and the Thirteen Principles
- The microscope, absorption in utensils, and the limits of factual relevance to Jewish law
- The Chazon Ish and “two thousand years of Torah” as a disconnect between facts and norms
- Prayer, miracle, and the laws of nature as a test case for the distinction between norms and facts
Summary
General Overview
The speaker explains how the authority of the Talmud came into being despite the absence of ordained judges, and places this on two levels: a formal level of creating authority from below through agreement, and a historical-practical level in which the canonization of an open-ended text of give-and-take made it possible to create a shared foundation among scattered communities without fixing final rulings. He uses the rule of shlikhuteihu and its expansion to shlikhuteihu dekamai to show a necessary fiction of continuity of authority, and connects this to Maimonides’ view that ordination can be renewed through the agreement of the sages of the Land of Israel. Later he distinguishes between substantive authority and formal authority, cites Maimonides in the Laws of Rebels and the Kesef Mishneh’s explanation of why Amoraim do not dispute Tannaim and why one does not dispute the sealing of the Talmud, and concludes with a principled claim that formal authority can apply only to norms and not to facts, with implications for halakhic and philosophical questions such as lice, the microscope, miracles, and prayer.
The authority of the Talmud and replacing ordination with agreement
The speaker argues that formally, some justification is needed for how agreement from below can replace ordination that is supposed to come from above, and he presents Maimonides’ innovation—that the agreement of all the sages of the Land of Israel can renew ordination—as a mechanism that provides a basis for this. He argues that historically and practically, accepting the Talmud as a binding framework was an astonishingly wise solution in the face of the danger of dispersal, because codification in the style of an abbreviated code of Jewish law would have splintered into local rulings that did not speak to one another, while a lack of closure would also have led to disintegration. He argues that the choice was to canonize an open text whose essence was discussion and negotiation rather than bottom-line rulings, thereby creating a shared basis in modes of argument and evidence even when local conclusions differed. He says that thanks to this there is discourse across places and periods, and thanks to this “we are here today.”
The rule of their agency and its extension to generations without ordained judges
The speaker presents the enactment of shlikhuteihu as a solution to the fact that in Babylonia there were no ordained judges, even though in principle an ordained court is required for judgment, and he describes the assumption that the sages of Babylonia judge as agents of the ordained judges in the Land of Israel. He argues that the enactment was extended to shlikhuteihu dekamai even after ordination had ceased in the Land of Israel as well, and that in terms of the laws of agency this is absurd, because “you can’t be the agent of a dead person.” He mentions the Ketzot, who tried to attribute such a possibility to Maimonides, but “everyone came down on him hard.” The speaker argues that even when the ordained judges were alive, there is no proof that they actually appointed agents, and therefore the justification is not really grounded in appointment, but in a necessary collective decision that society cannot exist without a legal system. He describes this as a fiction that is intensified in Tosafot.
Their agency, conversion, and the status of rabbinic acquisitions
The speaker cites a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) as to whether shlikhuteihu is Torah-level or rabbinic, and argues that Tosafot implies it is Torah-level, as Netivot claims, whereas in Maimonides, Nachmanides, and Rashba it is a rabbinic rule. He explains that Tosafot in Gittin asks how conversions are performed nowadays without ordained judges, given that a conversion without an ordained court is not a valid conversion, and cites Tosafot’s answer that one must say that shlikhuteihu also applies to conversion. From this, Netivot proves that in Tosafot’s view it is Torah-level, in order to avoid the unreasonable state of “a gentile by Torah law and a Jew by rabbinic law.” The speaker compares this to the principle that a rabbinic acquisition is effective even for Torah law, such as “the standing of the three,” so that one does not end up with the unreasonable status of money that is “mine rabbinically and yours by Torah law.” He attributes this capacity to the power of “property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless,” and to discussions such as “the Sages removed the marriage from him” in Ketubot 3.
Substantive authority and formal authority, and the Kesef Mishneh’s ruling regarding the sealing of the Mishnah and the Talmud
The speaker distinguishes between the formal authority of the Great Court and substantive authority that stems from expertise, and stresses that the authority of the Sanhedrin is first and foremost formal, even if in practice the greatest sages sit on it. He cites Rabbi Akiva as an example that the greatest sage of the generation is not necessarily part of the Sanhedrin. He reads Maimonides, Laws of Rebels chapter 2, and explains that in halakhah 1 any great court in its generation may overturn Torah-level interpretations and rulings of its predecessors by virtue of “to the judge who will be in those days,” whereas in halakhah 2, regarding decrees, enactments, and customs that spread throughout Israel, there is no repeal unless the later court is “greater than the earlier one in wisdom and number.” He interprets “number” in Maimonides as the number of sages of the generation who agreed and did not dissent. The speaker cites the Kesef Mishneh, who asks why Amoraim do not dispute Tannaim and why objections from a Mishnah or Baraita are decisive, and gives his answer that “from the day the Mishnah was sealed,” and likewise “at the sealing of the Talmud,” people accepted upon themselves not to dispute them. Therefore, the authority of periods is created by agreement and not by some higher ordination. The speaker stresses that the Kesef Mishneh does not base this on decline of the generations or divine inspiration, and argues that such a reason would at most create substantive authority, not a formal prohibition against dissent. Therefore the basis is public acceptance that generates formal authority “from below.”
Da’at Torah as an example of substantive authority without formal authority
The speaker tells an anecdote from the period when Degel HaTorah was founded: a lecturer in Bnei Brak told him that voting contrary to Rabbi Shach’s position might be a mistake for which one would have “nothing to say” in the heavenly court, but relying on Rabbi Shach is only because “most likely” he hits the truth more accurately. The speaker interprets this as recognition that Rabbi Shach has the substantive authority of an expert, but not formal authority that removes responsibility from the voter. He mentions Benjamin Brown as someone who wrote about interpretations of the concept of Da’at Torah, and shows that usually this does not refer to the status of the Great Court, and certainly not to a sweeping application in non-halakhic domains.
The scope of formal authority: norms versus facts
The speaker makes a categorical claim that formal authority cannot apply to facts, only to norms, because formal authority obligates behavior even when a person thinks otherwise, whereas forcing belief in a fact a person is not convinced of is an oxymoron and not a coherent concept. He illustrates this with lice on the Sabbath, where the biological claim whether “a louse is generated from decay” is a factual claim; if it turns out not to be true, one cannot demand that a person “think” otherwise by force of authority, even though one can still determine a practical norm regarding killing lice on the Sabbath. He states that many questions of faith are factual questions about the future and the present, such as “will there be a messiah or will there not be a messiah,” and cites “Rabbi Hillel said: Israel has no messiah” in Sanhedrin to show that this is a claim about reality and not a norm. He adds that accepting such a claim can come only through persuasion, not command.
Maimonides, halakhic rulings on matters that are not practical, and the Thirteen Principles
The speaker says that Maimonides writes in three places in his Commentary on the Mishnah that there is no halakhic ruling on matters that do not pertain to practice, and cites an article by Hanska claiming that in those same places Maimonides did in fact rule in the Mishneh Torah. He argues that the explanation is not merely that there is no need to decide, but that there is a logical problem in issuing a formal ruling regarding beliefs, because such a ruling seeks to obligate thought and not only action. He presents an internal difficulty in relation to the Thirteen Principles, in which Maimonides defines one who does not accept them as a heretic, and suggests that there he is talking about a determination of truth and substantive authority, not a mechanism of formal authority that forcibly obligates belief. He adds that the very command to believe raises a paradox of “the commandment commands belief in the commandment.”
The microscope, absorption in utensils, and the limits of factual relevance to Jewish law
The speaker mentions claims about testing absorption in utensils and decisors who seek to permit on the basis of measurements showing there is no absorption, and recounts that Rabbi Lior said that if one more person joined him, he would permit most kinds of material for utensils. He offers the possibility that the Sages established formal rules in place of scientific testing because laboratory reality is not accessible to every person, and therefore even if the physics is different, the rules remain in force as binding rules. He describes a decisor’s demand for “consensus” as a substantive concern about error, not as formal authority. He mentions Yitzhak Brand’s argument against the technical-electrical rationales of the Tzomet Institute, and presents it as a position according to which what cannot be seen and is not accessible is not necessarily relevant to defining the prohibited labor.
The Chazon Ish and “two thousand years of Torah” as a disconnect between facts and norms
The speaker cites the Chazon Ish’s claim that “the reality that determines matters of Jewish law” is the reality of “two thousand years of Torah,” namely the period of the Talmud, so that even if today it becomes clear that reality is different, the normative determination remains as it was set then. He says he does not know “where he got that from” and does not agree with it as a halakhic source, but argues that there is no logical contradiction here, because the Chazon Ish leaves authority in the domain of norms and does not claim authority to impose the facts themselves against science. He distinguishes this from approaches that claim science is wrong because the Sages said otherwise, and says that there the logical problem arises of applying authority to facts.
Prayer, miracle, and the laws of nature as a test case for the distinction between norms and facts
The speaker presents the Mishnah and Talmud in Berakhot on “prayer about the past,” such as praying during a fire, “May it be Your will that these not be members of my household,” or praying for a pregnant woman, “May it be Your will that she give birth to a boy,” as a rabbinic claim that such prayer is ineffective and even problematic. He argues that a common view according to which God “intervenes within the laws of nature” by choosing among possible options is mistaken, because in a deterministic physical conception of the macroscopic world, the outcome is dictated by the circumstances. Therefore any intervention is a deviation from the laws of nature, and any prayer seeking a changed result is a prayer for a miracle. He concludes that if one normatively accepts the prohibition against praying for a miracle, but factually recognizes that all intervention is miraculous and that there is no formal authority over the factual question of what counts as a miracle, then the conclusion follows that logically “it is forbidden to pray for anything.” He presents this as a distilled expression of combining authority over norms with lack of authority over facts. He adds that discussion of free will does not solve this, because intervention in free choice cancels its meaning, and he concludes by saying that he is not getting into “what to do in practice,” despite the practical implications of the conclusion.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Last time I spoke about—well, I ended by pointing to the authority of the Talmud. And how did that authority come into being when there are no ordained judges? And I said, I spoke about this on two levels. One level is the formal level—that is, how can such a thing even be done? How can you replace ordination, which in principle is supposed to come from above, with agreement that comes from below? I said that Maimonides, with the mechanism he introduced—that the agreement of all the sages of the Land of Israel can renew ordination—gives some kind of basis for this matter. And the second level of the discussion was why this was justified. Meaning, why use that agreement? In other words, why did they in fact decide to agree that the Talmud would be the binding framework? And there I tried to give the historical perspective to show, at least in hindsight, even if not prospectively. Meaning, I don’t know whether those who made that decision really saw things this way, but it seems to me that in hindsight it was a truly astonishingly wise decision, very impressive in the sense that this was basically the only solution that could have worked, looking back. Though again, I don’t know to what extent they saw that in advance. I talked about the fact that they were facing dispersion. If they had established a system like Kitzur Shulchan Arukh, that wouldn’t have lasted, because those are final rulings, and in every place things are conducted differently. Several abbreviated codes of Jewish law would have emerged, and they would no longer speak to one another, and it all would have completely fragmented. The second possibility was not to close anything at all, and once again we would have fragmented entirely, because then what connection would there have been between the different places? What they chose was to create a kind of canonization of an open text. Meaning, canonization of a text whose essence is discussion and give-and-take rather than bottom line. And then, in effect, to have a shared foundation not in the bottom line at all, but a shared foundation in the modes of argument and the evidence, while in each place people ultimately arrive at bottom lines that may differ. But there is some kind of discourse between the different places, between different periods, and that created, in effect—because of that we are here today, as I said. It seems to me that otherwise we would not be here. Maybe one more remark—I don’t remember—did I talk about the rule of shlikhuteihu? I think I mentioned it, I no longer remember. Because there too you basically see the… if I go back to the first level, there too you see it. There is Tosafot in Gittin—I’ll give an introduction. In principle, you need an ordained court in order to judge. Someone who is not ordained is not fit to serve as a judge in court. But in Babylonia there were no ordained judges, because ordination existed only in the Land of Israel. So what they did there was enact the rule of shlikhuteihu. Meaning, the sages of Babylonia are the agents of the ordained judges in the Land of Israel, and therefore they can judge as those empowered by the ordained judges in the Land of Israel. The enactment of shlikhuteihu was extended. It’s not clear how this happened and… well, how it happened is pretty clear—it didn’t happen. Rather, they simply decided that this is how it is. That now it became shlikhuteihu dekamai avdinan. Meaning, we act as the agents of the early ones. Meaning, in a situation where there are no longer ordained judges even in the Land of Israel—there aren’t, ordination ended. At first, in the original enactment of shlikhuteihu, there were ordained judges in the Land of Israel; only in Babylonia there were no ordained judges, so they acted as the agents of the ordained judges in the Land of Israel, the agents of living people. But at some point there was no longer ordination even in the Land of Israel—the ordained judges had died, that was it, there were no more ordained judges. So now we do shlikhuteihu dekamai, meaning the agency of the previous generations, which in the laws of agency is absurd. Meaning, you can’t be the agent of a dead person. I think I mentioned the Ketzot, right? Who said—he tried to argue that according to Maimonides there is agency for a dead person, but everyone came down on him hard; there is no such thing.
[Speaker C] We didn’t talk about Ra’anana? What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, we didn’t talk about that. Ah, we didn’t talk about it? Then in Ra’anana. Ah yes? And how did it come up there, in what context? I don’t remember. About drops maybe? With conversion, right, that’s it. Yes, sorry, for some reason I was unsure whether I had talked about it here. So the claim is that basically shlikhuteihu dekamai means that we carry out the agency of the ordained judges who were in the Land of Israel, and they no longer exist. In terms of agency, such a thing is hard to justify. Meaning, there’s no…
[Speaker C] But in any case there’s no actual appointment even when they’re alive—they didn’t appoint an agent. So what difference does it make whether they’re dead?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, when they’re alive you can say they appointed one. First of all, you can say they appointed one—why not? They say, a delegation comes to the Land of Israel and says, friends, there’s going to be anarchy, give us authority to judge. It could be that that happened, I don’t know. You can assume it happened.
[Speaker C] And even if it didn’t, you’d still accept that appointment by the living is fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In light of this—meaning, once I know that this happens even when they’re dead, then of course I’ll say it even when they’re alive. But first I had to show that it really does happen. So the claim is that in terms of the laws of agency, this doesn’t really stand. By the way, there’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—I really did mention this there—whether the rule of shlikhuteihu is rabbinic or Torah-level. In Tosafot it sounds like it’s Torah-level, at least that’s what Netivot claims, while in Maimonides, Nachmanides, and Rashba it says that it’s only a rabbinic rule. But whichever it is—if it’s Torah-level, then what’s missing is only the act of appointment, because there probably was no appointment, at least not for the later generations. If it’s rabbinic, then someone would have had to enact this rabbinic enactment, and in my opinion that didn’t happen. At least there is nowhere that we see that there was actually some session of the Great Court or ordained judges who discussed and decided to enact this enactment or appoint agency. And the fact is, as Tosafot in Gittin points out, that for example nowadays we convert converts, when a conversion not performed before an ordained court is not a conversion. If you—if at least some of the stages of the conversion are not performed before an ordained court, it’s not a conversion; it’s an indispensable condition. Now if we now have a court that is not ordained, then how can we accept converts? That’s Tosafot’s question. So Tosafot says that one has to say that the rule of shlikhuteihu applies to conversion as well. And from that, says Netivot, you see that it is Torah-level, because if it were rabbinic then the convert would be a gentile by Torah law and a Jew by rabbinic law. Yes, it’s not reasonable for there to be such a status.
[Speaker D] There is, there is something like that in Kiddushin. No, there is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are marriages that are valid rabbinically and not by Torah law, but there is no gentile who is a Jew rabbinically and a gentile by Torah law. By the way, that’s probably one of the reasons many decisors say that a rabbinic acquisition, for example, is effective even for Torah law. Meaning, if we’re talking about ma’amad sheloshtan—the standing of the three—so that is a rabbinic acquisition by which documents are transferred: I transfer a debt note to someone. By Torah law you can’t transfer it, but the Rabbis enacted that in the presence of the three parties—the buyer, the seller, and the debtor—you can transfer that debt note. Now the question is what can you do with that debt note? Can you use it to betroth a woman? Can you, I don’t know, do things with it that have Torah-level significance? After all, it’s not mine by Torah law, only by rabbinic enactment. According to most views, a rabbinic acquisition is effective even for Torah law. Meaning, even though the acquisition is only rabbinic, it becomes mine by Torah law. And why? For the same reason as with the gentile. Because there’s no such thing as being mine rabbinically and yours by Torah law. Meaning, then in what sense is it mine? I can’t make any use of it. It’s not reasonable that they created such a legal status, that some money or property belongs to me rabbinically and belongs to you by Torah law. Therefore a rabbinic acquisition—the accepted view says—there are some who do want to make such a distinction. But the Rabbis can do such a thing… what? How can it help for Torah law? The Rabbis can make such a thing effective for Torah law? “Property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless.” Or a rabbinic enactment? Yes. “Property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless”; that’s how a rabbinic acquisition helps for Torah law. You can also compare this to marital acquisition.
[Speaker E] That if you say that the court’s power to declare property ownerless—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —is ownerless—
[Speaker C] Then also say: “the Rabbis removed the marriage from him.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And just as a rabbinic acquisition helps for Torah law, so too a rabbinic marriage would help for Torah law—or a divorce. The opposite—what do you mean “the Rabbis removed the marriage from him”? “Removed” means to cancel the marriage, not to create the marriage.
[Speaker C] Yes, meaning just as the court has the power to confiscate property, so too the court has the power to divorce or cancel the marriage.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And how does it cancel the marriage? Only if they nullify the money.
[Speaker C] Ah, not through the marital acquisition itself?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Yes. No, in the Talmud in… the Talmud asks: granted if he betrothed her with money. The Talmud in Ketubot there on page 3 says: granted if he betrothed her with money; if he betrothed her through intercourse or with a document, what can be said? The Talmud says: anyone who betroths does so subject to the Rabbis. And there you see—it’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but there you see that nullifying the money can nullify only money-betrothal. But in fact the Rabbis apply “they removed the marriage from him” also to document-betrothal and intercourse-betrothal. So how does that happen? There perhaps one could invoke this idea of marital acquisition, but there are disputes about that. In any case, where was I? Ah yes, conversion. So Tosafot asks: how can you perform conversion when there are no ordained judges nowadays? And that means that the rule of shlikhuteihu also applies to conversion. But the Talmud says that the rule of shlikhuteihu exists only where there is financial loss and it is common—where there is loss to someone in civil cases between litigants, where there is loss and it is common. Only there did they enact the rule of shlikhuteihu, and conversion doesn’t enter that category. So Tosafot says it is like something common—that conversion is also common. What does that mean? If the enactment was made for certain things, then that’s what it was made for. So now you decide that this too is “like common”? Ask them, those who enacted it, whether they also intended conversion or did not intend conversion. Tosafot says no, no, this too is common. What does that mean? I think the whole idea of shlikhuteihu is—Tosafot only sharpens it. The whole idea of shlikhuteihu is basically—you might call it a fiction. I think fundamentally it is a fiction. But it is a fiction that begins from the fact that it is obvious that we cannot remain without ordained judges. Meaning, it is impossible that there be no legal system; you can’t run a society like that. Since that is so, therefore it is obvious that we are the agents of the early ones. What does “it is obvious that we are the agents of the early ones” mean? You can say, yes, they appointed us as agents—but they didn’t appoint us. We appoint ourselves as the agents of the early ones; if you want, under the rule of beneficial action on behalf of another, but I don’t think that’s just formalism that isn’t really needed. The point is that we are renewing ordination for this purpose.
[Speaker C] Couldn’t you say this is something in everyone’s heart, no? Something in the heart of every person!
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But no—something in one’s heart and in the heart of everyone can’t create something. It can condition something so that it will be nullified. Meaning, if I really want something and it’s clear to everyone that this is what I want, as long as I haven’t transferred ownership, it’s not acquired. If I did transfer ownership and I very much want it to depend on a condition, that if such-and-such happens or doesn’t happen, then yes—it’s as though I stipulated it and the acquisition is void. But something in one’s heart and in the heart of all people cannot create a legal effect; it can cancel it or limit it, through a condition, by conditioning it. Therefore it seems to me that here too we see, also in the rule of shlikhuteihu, in a certain sense, this ability—that once there is agreement of the whole public, we can also renew ordination. After all, according to Maimonides, think about it—according to Maimonides we could renew ordination, so can’t we decide about ourselves that we are the agents of the early ones? What’s the problem? After all, we could even renew ordination and turn ourselves into Torah-level judges, so can’t we say that we determine that we function as the agents of the ancients? As if by the rule of beneficial action on behalf of another, but again, without entering into that formalism, rather simply that we have the power to do this. And where does that come from? It comes from the fact that when the whole public determines something, it is like renewing ordination from below. Only they decided not to do it fully, because they didn’t want to break Torah law, so what they did was say: regarding matters where you have no choice—common cases where there is loss—then yes. Then Tosafot comes and says: what about conversion? And he says: conversion too is like something common. What does that mean? It also is clear that there has to be some avenue for conversion. And therefore, with regard to that too, we decide that the rule of shlikhuteihu applies. We decide—not that they appointed us. They didn’t appoint us; there was no such act of appointment. So there too, it seems to me, you see this idea of the authority of the public to begin a new chain that does not really come from above. That’s the basis for how one can say that the Talmud has authority at all. Now what kind of authority is this? Earlier, in the previous section, before I entered into the question of authority, I spoke about substantive authority and formal authority. I also gave that historical introduction about the king versus the court, where they divided the powers. And now we can ask: in the Great Court, the authority was formal authority—yes, that’s clear. You can say there was also substantive authority, because generally the greatest Torah scholars sat there, so they were also the professionals; that is, it’s also likely that they were more correct than others, though there is no guarantee of anything. But all right, presumably they were wiser in Jewish law than other sages. I gave the example of Rabbi Akiva, who was not in the Sanhedrin because he was the son of converts, but he was the greatest sage of the generation—there was no one like him in all the Land of Israel. So it doesn’t have to be that way, but presumably there is also substantive authority. But it is clear that first and foremost, when we speak about the authority of the Sanhedrin, we are speaking about formal authority, not substantive authority. What happens with the Talmud? The Talmud gave us authority, but it didn’t come from above. Now it’s clear that if I’m talking about the previous mechanism—the mechanism whereby we basically decided that the Talmud would have a status like that of the Great Court—then we are speaking about a renewal of substantive authority, not formal authority, because formal authority we don’t really need to agree to so much. If you are a Torah scholar, there is formal authority there; if they know, then they know—it’s not dependent on a decision. A decision always gives formal authority. A decision always gives formal authority. The moment I grant the authority, now they can function not because they do or don’t know—it’s not an objective fact that they are the greatest sages—but because they received authority from the public.
[Speaker F] So in Maimonides, in the Laws of Rebels…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not really talking about renewal of ordination itself. That’s why I say: it’s like the idea of renewing ordination, but the public can create formal authority from below, not from above. So now, in chapter 2 of the Laws of Rebels, Maimonides speaks—and this is what I intend to discuss later—about the question of change. After we finish the question of authority, we’ll move on to: okay, what do we do vis-à-vis authority? How does one change things, if one can change things, and so on. That’s the next topic. But I still want, within this context, to touch a bit on the question of change, because it brings us back to the question of the nature of authority, the nature of Talmudic authority. So there it says as follows: “If the Great Court interpreted one of the hermeneutical principles according to what seemed correct in their eyes, and judged accordingly, and another court arose after them and saw another reason to overturn that judgment, it overturns it and judges according to what appears correct in its eyes, as it is said, ‘to the judge who will be in those days’—you are obligated to follow only the court of your own generation.” Fine. So any court in any generation can overturn the words of the previous court.
[Speaker C] Now, does it overturn everything, or only the interpretations?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He said: “that they interpreted one of the hermeneutical principles according to what seemed correct in their eyes.” Yes.
[Speaker C] Meaning, does this also include, say, interpretation of the plain meaning of a word?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I assume so. If they have another interpretation, then yes—that is the interpretation. Now in halakhah 2, in contrast to decrees, Maimonides says this: “A court that decreed a decree, enacted an enactment, or instituted a custom, and the matter spread throughout all Israel, and another court arose after them and sought to nullify the words of the earlier ones and uproot that enactment, that decree, or that custom—it cannot do so unless it is greater than the earlier court in wisdom and in number. And even if the reason has been nullified…” We’ll talk about that when we discuss changes. What is the relation between these two halakhot? So the commentators already say here—and this is pretty clear also from Maimonides’ style—that halakhah 1 deals with Torah law and halakhah 2 deals with rabbinic law. I said in advance that especially according to Maimonides—and more on that later—the verse “do not turn aside” gives the sages authority on two levels: authority to interpret and authority to legislate. Authority to interpret is authority to interpret the Torah and create Torah-level law, either by exposition or interpretation. Although for Maimonides exposition is rabbinic, never mind, we won’t get into that now. But to interpret or expound the Torah—that is what we may call Torah-level authority. And there is another authority, which is to legislate new laws, rabbinic enactments. They have authority for that too. According to Maimonides it all derives from “do not turn aside.” But there is a difference in the way a later court can disagree with an earlier court in these two contexts. In halakhah 1, when we are talking about Torah-level laws, any court in any generation can disagree with the previous court. It does not need to be greater in wisdom and number; it does, however, have to be the Great Court. Meaning, something established by count requires another count to permit it. So it must be the Great Court, but the second court does not need to be greater in wisdom and number. By contrast, in rabbinic laws, the second court must be greater in wisdom and number in order to nullify the words of the first court. And later on, when we get to changes and to the implications of this authority, I’ll explain why—what the difference is between them.
[Speaker B] There’s one practical question: how do you know what the number was that enacted the enactment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The later court will have to decide whether it is large enough to do this, and that is obvious. No, that’s about wisdom—what is “number”? So Maimonides says—Maimonides asks: “How can they be greater in number, seeing that every court is seventy-one?” So what is “greater in number”? He says: it is the number of the sages of the generation who agreed with and accepted the thing said by the Great Court and did not dissent from it. Meaning, there is some status to the sages who agree with those sitting on the Great Court.
[Speaker G] Interesting, but I thought there was an explanation that the intent is that you measure the split of the vote within the court. What do I mean? Suppose in one court it was accepted—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —by 30 against 40, and here it’s… I don’t know such a view, because according to that, with every enactment they would have had to write next to it what the majority was that accepted it.
[Speaker G] All the more so with the first court it’s even harder. “The number of the sages of the generation who agreed”—how would they know? Wouldn’t that also have to be recorded?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, you’re saying yes. If that’s the meaning—if it means the agreement of all the sages of the current generation—that is sufficiently great. I assume that’s what happens in practice. So once there is disagreement, it won’t be possible to do it. But if everyone agrees, then everyone agrees. I think, really… all right. In any case, that is what Maimonides says. On this the Kesef Mishneh comments here and says as follows: “And if you say, if so, why do the Amoraim not dispute the Tannaim? For everywhere we object to an Amora from a Mishnah or from a Baraita.” After all, everywhere in the Talmud when they bring a Mishnah or Baraita against one of the Amoraim, that’s a knockout blow. Meaning, his career is over—unless he offers an answer, or brings another Tanna who disagrees. But clearly he cannot disagree. He cannot say: I do not accept this Baraita or this Mishnah. There is no such thing. Once there are Tannaim against him, you’re done. So how can this be? Just a moment ago we said, what’s the problem—after all, a later court can disagree with an earlier court, at least in Torah law. So he says: “And one must say: I say in accordance with that Tanna”—and if he doesn’t say that, then there is a difficulty for him. He has to say, I follow another Tanna and therefore I can say what I say. But if there is no Tanna like him, then he’s finished. “And according to our master’s words, permission is given to them to dispute the words of the Tannaim,” so why are his words rejected if there are Tannaim against him? “And one may say that from the day the Mishnah was sealed, they fulfilled and accepted upon themselves that the later generations would not dispute the earlier ones; and they did the same at the sealing of the Talmud, that from the day it was sealed, no person was given permission to dispute it.” All right? Meaning, the closing of periods in the history of Jewish law is basically, as the Kesef Mishneh says here, a result of agreement. Meaning, the Talmud does not dispute the Mishnah because it itself decided not to dispute the Mishnah. Meaning, because it accepted the authority of the Mishnah and does not dispute it. The medieval authorities (Rishonim) or the Geonim accept the authority of the Talmud because they decided not to dispute the Talmud. Meaning, it turns out that there really is no authority here that comes from above—which of course is obvious, because this is not really the Great Court. Rather, this is authority granted to the earlier generations, or to the earlier period, from below. Meaning, by the later generation that gives authority to the earlier generations and says: okay, from here on we do not dispute you. So what do you see? That basically the authority given to the Talmud is authority that comes from below. And not only that—you have to pay close attention that the Kesef Mishneh does not say what we would have expected him to say. If you asked someone today why we do not dispute the Talmud, what would he say? Usually he wouldn’t say this. What he would say is: yes, they were so great, there is a decline of the generations, and they had divine inspiration, so who are we to disagree with them? Their little finger is thicker than our waists, and all kinds of things of that sort. That is the answer I would generally expect to receive today. The Kesef Mishneh does not say that. Maybe he thought it was true, but he didn’t say it. Meaning, that is not the basis. Why isn’t that the basis? Very simply—because it is a logical mistake to say that. Not because it isn’t true. Maybe it’s true and maybe it isn’t; one can argue. But even if it is true, it doesn’t help. The fact that they possessed divine inspiration and were so wise doesn’t mean it is forbidden to disagree with them. It means that usually one should give them credit. But if I am convinced—sometimes I will disagree even with a great authority if I am convinced he is mistaken. That is not authority. That is what I earlier called substantive authority, not formal authority. Substantive authority means someone is an expert—take a doctor. Someone tells me: he’s a great expert, don’t disagree with him. Fine. Usually, if I don’t have some clear position, I’ll accept what the doctor says. But that is not formal authority. Meaning, if I become very, very convinced that here the doctor made a mistake, then I will disagree with him and I won’t do what he says. Now, if the authority of the Talmud really is based on the idea that it is substantive authority—that they are great Torah scholars and therefore presumably they did not err—then that means it isn’t authority. It is only some kind of evaluation: to the extent that you have that evaluation and to the extent that you are uncertain about what you are saying, then listen to them; but if you are certain, then no. Did you commit a transgression if you didn’t listen to them? No. There is no formal authority. Maybe you were wrong in terms of the substance of the law, but I did not violate something like “do not turn aside”—I did not violate the issue of authority in that respect. Maybe I took a risk and got it wrong. I think I once mentioned my lecturer from Bnei Brak about voting in elections. I didn’t mention it? It was when the Degel HaTorah party was founded. Rabbi Shach founded the Degel HaTorah party, and there was great concern that they wouldn’t pass the electoral threshold. At the time I was learning in a yeshiva in Bnei Brak, in Olam Yeshiva, and of course I informed everyone that I was voting Meretz. So one day one of the yeshiva’s rabbis came to me and said: Rabbi Shach is calling you. What’s this about? We also had some contact with the family there, and my wife worked with his daughter, and we were on very good terms with her. She could have been our grandmother, but never mind—they were friends. So I knew what he was going to say, and of course I didn’t go. Because I knew that if he told me, I would do it. So I didn’t go, and in the end I voted without going to him, but never mind. I went over to my lecturer in the yeshiva and asked him: tell me, if I arrive at the heavenly court and they say to me: you criminal, why did you vote for Degel HaTorah? You should have voted for the National Religious Party—that was the right thing. At first he didn’t even grasp the question, as if—because people don’t even perceive that there’s such an option. And then he says to me: honestly, you wouldn’t have anything to say. Meaning—except that most likely Rabbi Shach is more likely to hit the truth. That’s what he told me. Meaning, nobody knows for certain what the truth is. Since he has Da’at Torah—that was his assumption—more than I do at least, then if you want to know the odds that he is right versus that you are right, most likely he is right. But nevertheless, if you were wrong and relied on him, you have no excuses—just that most likely it won’t happen. I saw in him the willingness to admit that there is no formal authority. Meaning, it’s not that I say: well, he commanded me, what could I do? And if I was wrong, go to him—what do you want from me? No. If you were wrong, the responsibility is on you. But since he is a great Torah scholar, most likely he is right. Again, I’m not trying right now to defend that thesis. I’m trying to illustrate—it’s practical advice. No, exactly—I’m trying to illustrate precisely the difference between relating to substantive authority and to formal authority. Basically what he said, in the language I’m using here, is that Rabbi Shach had substantive authority but not formal authority. Meaning, because he probably understands better, like a doctor—that’s all.
[Speaker I] It’s an expression of integrity on his part, but it’s completely contrary to what Rabbi Shach may have preached as the simple meaning of Da’at Torah in general.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is what you call it, the question is how you interpret the concept of da’at Torah. Meaning, if you interpret the concept of da’at Torah as meaning that they’re right, or you interpret the concept of da’at Torah as meaning that you have to listen to them. It’s not so simple. Benny Brown has written quite a bit about this, and I think he shows there that in most cases, even someone who talks about da’at Torah does not turn it into a ruling of the Great Court.
[Speaker J] It’s that Sefer HaChinukh I brought there, in the distortion of “and you shall do according to what they instruct you,” and these are metaphors of political operatives.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, these are metaphors of political operatives. But when you read what the rabbis themselves write, he shows there that this isn’t true; they didn’t exaggerate to that extent. And by the way, it also doesn’t happen in non-halakhic areas—they don’t apply it to areas that are not halakhic, contrary to what we usually think. He really shows it; he goes through the sources and demonstrates it. He did this in several different articles. In any case, for our purposes, I’m returning to the Kesef Mishneh. What the Kesef Mishneh basically says is that the Talmudic text… the Kesef Mishneh does not bring the Talmud’s rationale for substantive authority rather than formal authority. He doesn’t write that it’s because they were great Torah scholars. On the contrary, he comes to establish that the Talmud has formal authority. Now, there is no… they were not ordained, there is no Great Court. So how do they have formal authority? That’s the novelty. Because we accepted it upon ourselves. Meaning, from below you can create formal authority. Okay? It’s a novelty that you can create formal authority from below, not through the process of ordination that comes from above.
[Speaker C] Why did he say earlier that the Amoraim did not disagree with the Tannaim? After all, they couldn’t disagree anyway, because they didn’t have the Great Court.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Tannaim too—that wasn’t a determination of the Great Court.
[Speaker C] Okay,
[Speaker B] Tannaim are after…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Depends which ones. In Yavneh there was still a Sanhedrin, though not in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, but there was still a Sanhedrin. But yes, it wasn’t a court…
[Speaker B] Rabbi Akiva, when people disagreed with him—no one could disagree with him? He wasn’t a court.
[Speaker C] So then theoretically, we too today could disagree even without the Great Court?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In principle, yes, were it not for the fact that people accepted not disagreeing with the Talmud. Yes. In the Talmud there certainly was no Great Court, so nevertheless he says—he himself brings—that the medieval authorities (Rishonim), or those after the Talmud, did not disagree with the Talmud. The Geonim, yes. So therefore what we basically see here is that agreement from below can create formal authority. Okay? Now later we’ll talk about the question of how this continues after the Talmud, or where it continues, and this tension between substantive authority and formal authority will always accompany us. There is a Rosh in tractate Sanhedrin that we’ll study in chapter four, where he elaborates and brings several views: what happens with the Geonim, what happens afterward, how to relate to the great medieval authorities (Rishonim), to the Rif. Everyone revered the Rif, right? So does that give him formal authority? And the Rosh says no, there is no formal authority. There is substantive authority in the sense that he is a great Torah scholar, but there is no formal authority. And there are some disputes—it doesn’t matter, I’ll talk later about how this continues onward—but those are other topics.
[Speaker B] Didn’t the Shulchan Arukh rule like the Rif? He ruled according to the majority of three.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And people didn’t agree with him about that either, right? That he invented some such mechanism of a majority of three. Okay, but now I want to pause for a moment and go back to the distinction between substantive authority and formal authority. Regarding what can one grant substantive authority, and regarding what can one grant formal authority? So usually, substantive authority obviously depends on the field of expertise. That’s not so much a question of categories. If you’re an expert in a certain field, then you probably have substantive authority there. And the concept of authority in this context is used in a somewhat borrowed sense, because it isn’t really authority; what it means is that there is a great deal of logic in listening to you, or accepting what you say, because you are probably right—most likely, you are right. Formal authority, here of course there is already a categorical question. Meaning: where was the formal authority granted? It depends on what it was granted for. That is no longer an objective question, because substantive authority is, seemingly, easier to prove: just check what he is an expert in, or to whatever extent expertise can be checked—but generally speaking you can check expertise. What is formal authority? Formal authority is determined by the question of what it was granted for, how far it really extends; the mechanism that created it also determines its scope—that is, with respect to what. Now I want to make a principled claim here, a categorical claim: authority, specifically in the formal sense, cannot be granted regarding facts, only regarding norms. This is unlike substantive authority, where there is definitely room to apply it also to facts, like a doctor. A doctor talks to me about scientific facts, medical facts. If he’s an expert, I assume he’s right. So in the borrowed sense, yes, that I call substantive authority, this can definitely also apply to facts. But when I speak about formal authority, formal authority means accepting something from someone not because he is right, but because he is authorized. That’s not the same thing. Okay? Now the question is: with respect to what can such authority be granted? I think we touched on this a bit when we talked about dispute; I made a similar distinction. There is no such thing as formal authority regarding facts. There is no such thing. Categorically, there cannot be such a thing. Not because I disrespect so-and-so, or because someone else didn’t get a mandate—even if he got a mandate, it wouldn’t help him. It can’t be; it isn’t defined. Why not? Let’s say the sages determined some particular fact. Let’s say that a louse is generated from decay, and is not produced from male and female, which is what the Talmud says, and therefore it is permitted to kill it on the Sabbath. Okay? Now suppose we reach the factual, scientific conclusion that this is not true—that a louse is in fact produced from eggs, as other animals are produced. Now what? Suppose the Talmud has formal authority. Okay? Does that mean I have to accept the Talmud’s biology? This is a factual question: is the louse produced this way or that way? Seemingly the Talmud has formal authority. Formal authority is not conditioned on whether they are experts. Let’s say they were not experts in biology, but they have formal authority. Formal authority is not conditioned on your being an expert, even if you are mistaken. And on the level of principle this can be true with respect to norms, but not with respect to facts. Why? If they tell me something with respect to norms, then they tell me: look, you think that actually it is permitted to separate waste from food and prohibited to separate food from waste—the opposite of the Jewish law. Suppose that’s what you think. The Talmud says otherwise. Fine. So the fact that you think otherwise is perfectly okay. You’re allowed to think otherwise, but in practice you will behave like the Talmud. In other words, the difference between norms and facts is that with norms there can be a gap between what you think and what you do. Why? Because one can demand of me that I behave in a way that, in my own view, is incorrect. That is a coherent demand; one can demand that of me. They tell me: the Holy One, blessed be He, expects you to obey the Great Court even though you think they are mistaken, like a rebellious elder, for example. And the rebellious elder is no less wise than they are; he has reached the level of issuing rulings, and he definitely has grounds to say they are mistaken. He is not right, but the Great Court has authority, and therefore you will do what they say even though they are mistaken—not because they are not mistaken; again, this is not substantive authority, it is formal authority. In other words, with respect to norms there is no problem in principle with requiring a person to act in a way he thinks is not correct. That’s fine—think whatever you want, but in practice you will do what the law says, and that’s what the law says. Okay? But if the Knesset says to drive through a red light and stop at a green light, then that’s what I will do even though I think it’s wrong to do that, because that’s what needs to be done. But can the Knesset determine that red is green? I’m talking now factually, not halakhically, not normatively. Then no authority will help here: red is red, it is not green. Meaning, even if the Knesset says a thousand times that it is green, maybe with regard to practical implications—how to behave, one can discuss, like with the louse. But it is clear that as far as the fact is concerned, it won’t help to tell me that the Knesset has authority. I agree, everything is true—it is sovereign, it has authority. But I know that it’s red. What do you want from me—to think something I do not think? To do something I do not think is right—that can be demanded of me. To think something I do not think is right—that’s an oxymoron. Because if that’s what I think, then even if you tell me a thousand times to think otherwise, this is still what I think. So what do you want me to do? I can tell you, no no, red is green, red is green, but inwardly I think red is red, not green. So what would they demand of me? Not to think? But that is what I think. After all, this is a question of truth or falsehood. This is really what I think. How can one make demands of me by virtue of formal authority regarding facts? There is no such thing. Therefore such a demand is not defined on the logical level. It is beyond the question that regarding facts only one side is right and there is no “these and those,” as we discussed in the context of disputes. Here it is something problematic in terms of the demand itself. The concept of authority does not tolerate this application, applying it to facts. Because the concept of authority demands that I do something I do not identify with. So to do something I don’t think is right can be demanded of me. One has to check whether such a demand is made and where it is made, but in principle it passes the test of logic. There is no logical contradiction here. One can make such a demand. But to demand that I think something I do not think—I do not think it. What will you say? Then I demand that you think it anyway. But I do not think it. If someone came to the conclusion that the messiah will not come. Rabbi Hillel said: “Israel has no messiah, for they already enjoyed him in the days of Hezekiah.” That’s in the Talmud in tractate Sanhedrin. He says there is no messiah. The Talmud says: “May his Master forgive Rabbi Hillel”—meaning, may the Holy One, blessed be He, forgive Rabbi Hillel for saying that there is no messiah. What does that mean? Clearly there is a messiah.
[Speaker K] But he thinks there is no messiah, factually.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question whether there will be a messiah or not is a factual question, okay? It’s not certain that it can be examined empirically—probably not—but that doesn’t matter; it’s a fact. If there will be a messiah, then whoever says there is no messiah is mistaken; if there will not be a messiah, then whoever says there is a messiah is mistaken. You say it’s a question of faith—why factually? No, it’s a factual question: will there be a messiah or won’t there be a messiah? What does that mean? It’s a question of faith! No, it’s a question of fact. Factually, something about which it makes sense to speak in past, present, and future. As I said, you can’t check it empirically, but it is a factual question. There is a right and wrong here: either it will happen or it won’t. When we wait and see—when the messiah comes—it will become clear that everyone who said there would be no messiah was mistaken, right? This is a factual question. Today I don’t have the empirical tools to check whether this factual claim is true or false. That’s obvious. It is a factual question in every respect. Questions in Jewish thought are, for the overwhelming most part, completely factual questions. Whether there is a messiah, whether there is such a firmament, whether there is such providence, anything you say—the chosenness of Israel, whatever you want—all these are questions of fact. The only thing is that most of these facts are not facts accessible to empirical examination, I agree. But it is a question of fact. You cannot say about this that both sides are right, for example in the sense of “these and those.” So likewise, if I reached the conclusion for one reason or another—it doesn’t matter what line of reasoning—that there will be no messiah. That is my conclusion: there will be no messiah! Fine? Then you tell me: what do you mean, you’re a heretic? You’re a heretic; after all, the Talmud says there will be a messiah, and Maimonides established this in the Thirteen Principles, and one must listen because there is formal authority—assuming he has formal authority. He doesn’t. But assuming he does, okay? Fine, what do you want me to do? I have reached the conclusion that there isn’t. Do you want me to say there is? I’ll say there is, no problem. But what I think, I think there isn’t. I cannot change that by force of command. Because the question is what I really say, how I really perceive reality. How can commands help me here? If you convince me that Maimonides knows everything, or that this came down from heaven and the Holy One, blessed be He, surely knows whether He will send the messiah or not—fine, no problem. Then I’ll accept it. And I’ll accept it not by virtue of authority; I’ll accept it because I was persuaded. Okay? Because I was persuaded. But so long as I have not been persuaded, even the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself cannot tell me otherwise. Because if I wasn’t persuaded, I wasn’t persuaded. You can tell me, you’re an idiot, don’t you understand that the Holy One, blessed be He, knows reality better than you do. So I’m an idiot—but I’m not a criminal. You cannot demand that I think something I do not think. It simply cannot be. And therefore the claim is this: Maimonides writes in three places in his Commentary on the Mishnah that there is no halakhic ruling on matters that do not pertain to practice. Meaning, on questions of thought. There is an article by Henshke on this, showing that in those same three places, in the Mishneh Torah Maimonides did issue halakhic rulings. In all three places in the Commentary on the Mishnah where he writes that one does not issue a halakhic ruling because it does not pertain to practice, in all three, when you check the Mishneh Torah, he did issue a halakhic ruling there. It’s an interesting article; maybe we’ll look at it sometime. In any event, that’s what Maimonides writes in the Commentary on the Mishnah, and that’s also what is accepted in the Talmudic Encyclopedia under the entry “Jewish law”—they bring it there as Maimonides’ statement. Why is that? Usually people understand it to mean: since it does not pertain to practice, there is no point in issuing a halakhic ruling. Since in any case it doesn’t pertain to practice, it only concerns thoughts. With thoughts we’re willing to allow freedom. In practice we want to achieve some sort of uniformity. If there is a halakhic ruling, then that’s what one should do. I claim that there is something much deeper here. Something much deeper, because the point is not that we have no interest in issuing a halakhic ruling. Because to issue a halakhic ruling here means to force you to think something you do not think. How is that possible? On the logical level, it is impossible to do that. Okay, so they ask this about Maimonides—this is another question asked about Maimonides. If one cannot issue rulings on questions that concern only thought and not practice, then what are the Thirteen Principles? In the Thirteen Principles Maimonides determines that they are binding, and whoever does not accept them is a heretic. So there the claim is that… I think at least, that what Maimonides is talking about there is substantive authority, not formal authority. In other words, because the Thirteen Principles are true, because that is what the tradition says, whoever does not accept them—so true, he doesn’t accept them, I can’t demand that he accept them, but he is a heretic. As Rabbi Chaim writes, yes, in Yiddish—I don’t remember, I don’t know how to say it, I don’t know Yiddish—but that “a heretic by accident is also a heretic,” or something like that. Meaning, factually he is a heretic because he does not accept the correct beliefs.
[Speaker E] What? But there is a command to believe.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The command to believe—that’s something many have already asked about Maimonides. The command to believe is far worse than what I’m speaking about here. Because the command to believe is paradoxical not only in the sense that you are commanded about a fact, but in the sense that as long as there is no commander, there is no command. If I do not accept the existence of the commander, how can he command me to believe in the existence of a commander? Who is the commander as long as I have not accepted him?
[Speaker B] If the commander commands believing in the commander, yes, exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Turtles all the way down, turtles all the way down.
[Speaker C] So you could also work in the direction of saying that it’s a mechanism of mistaken transaction—that if Rabbi Eliezer had really known the reality of the louse, then he would have said the opposite; the sages who disagreed with him would say that they actually agree with Rabbi Eliezer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why can’t you?
[Speaker C] Why not say that their authority is not valid, but rather say that the ruling would simply reverse.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the same thing, it’s the same thing. So if I reach the conclusion that the fact is different, what do I basically say? That Rabbi Eliezer too, if he had known this, would have said otherwise. Logically, that’s what they rely on.
[Speaker B] Right, that’s what happens there. Presumably.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, there too it would be the same thing. There really are all these attempts—in recent years there have been various attempts regarding absorption in utensils, and they see there isn’t really much absorption, and then the question is whether to derive practical conclusions from that. We maybe discussed this, or I mentioned it once, I don’t remember. There’s Rabbi Lior; there was once some article saying that Rabbi Lior—an interesting man, Rabbi Lior, he has original things, he has his political directions, but in the realm of Jewish law he sometimes has very interesting things. And he says that if someone else joins him, he would permit a great deal—most types of materials from which utensils are made—that one wouldn’t need to be stringent about everything in the Shulchan Arukh, all the absorptions and all these things, because they measured and saw that it doesn’t absorb.
[Speaker H] What? He teaches—Rabbi Eliezer, he teaches.
[Speaker G] If someone joins him, right, I read
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] some article by the rabbi where he explains why not, why it can’t be permitted.
[Speaker H] No, first of all he says: I acknowledge the fact.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but you can’t permit it. I once saw some article of his in which he says—I don’t know. In any case, by the way, I didn’t see anything develop from that; I didn’t see anyone join him and say okay, from now on this is permitted. I only saw that he said, in my opinion it ought to be permitted, but I’m waiting for some minimal consensus. Meaning, he apparently didn’t take the practical step. I think; maybe I’m wrong, I don’t know.
[Speaker E] In any case, are there norms that were derived from a fact?
[Speaker B] Why do you need minimal consensus? Why in this case minimal consensus?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because maybe you’re missing something. That’s a concern on the substantive level, not on the formal level. Meaning, after all, you’re going against a long-standing tradition, and the Shulchan Arukh, and all the halakhic decisors, so you want to be completely sure you haven’t missed anything, and I can understand such a thing. I mean, after all, you can miss something; someone can come and say, listen, you didn’t understand the Jewish law correctly. There are such claims. There are claims that say that Jewish law really is not talking about the facts of absorption but rather establishes some formal rules for deciding. Because then there were no laboratories and they didn’t know how to check this, and even today a lab is not accessible to everyone, so how will you determine it? So you establish some formal rules, and therefore even if that doesn’t reflect the physics or chemistry of what is happening there, those are still the formal rules. And if that’s how you understand it, you can’t change it. And that’s already a question of judgment and understanding, and therefore I can understand that a person says, I don’t know, I want others to agree with me too. The request for consensus or for others to agree with me is never on the formal level, because we’re not talking about the Great Court. The Great Court can decide according to the rules by which the Great Court decides, by majority. Once a halakhic decisor decides and wants additional people, it’s clear that this is only on the substantive level. Meaning, he wants to make sure there is no mistake, he wants to see that he hasn’t missed something, he doesn’t want to take a hasty step. It’s not a formal question; it’s simply the question of how sure I am of my ruling and how willing I am to stand behind it.
[Speaker L] Wait, so according to this approach there’s basically no koshering of utensils?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not that there’s no koshering of utensils, but most of the laws of mixtures really are not relevant. Not in most—
[Speaker L] Not on scales. Most things do absorb from the food.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No no, I’m talking about utensils, obviously.
[Speaker L] Regarding insects—
[Speaker E] Regarding insects in food, there is a very accepted opinion that you don’t check them under a microscope because the Torah was not given to ministering angels. Could it be that here too—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the same thing; that’s what I mentioned earlier. Therefore with absorption in utensils too, the claim is that instead of checking in a lab—because a lab is not accessible and one need not check in labs—they established certain rules. Those rules are supposed to replace the scientific factual examination. And since that is so, that’s it—those are the binding rules because they were established, even if they do not meet the scientific test. I also spoke maybe sometime about building on the Sabbath—didn’t I speak about that here at some point? Something from a lecture I gave once in Shoham, whether the microscope is important, relevant for halakhic ruling. Various indirect-action rulings of the Tzomet Institute, and all kinds of things like that, and severe criticisms—justified in my view—by Yitzhak Brand and others, Rabbi Yitzhak Brand and others, not from Bar-Ilan, another Jew. He claims: what’s it to me that inside you’re doing all kinds of tricks and the electrons are flowing this way and not that way? Nobody sees the electrons flowing; that’s not interesting. You have a device—you press a button and it works, that’s all. It’s an electric device in every respect. Why do I care what tricks you do inside, what acrobatics the electrons are doing in there? It’s not relevant to Jewish law. Not a simple claim; I think it’s a strong claim, a correct claim in my opinion. Okay, but not our topic. My claim is basically that formal authority cannot operate with respect to facts. And therefore, perhaps one can establish behavioral rules derived from facts. For example, one could come and say in principle: true, the louse is not generated from decay, as we know today; the louse is generated as other animals are generated. But the sages have authority for some reason—I don’t agree with this, but I’m saying—have authority to establish the norm, even if it does not derive from the correct factual determination. For example, the Chazon Ish makes this strange argument about the two thousand years of Torah, because there is a midrash in the Talmud that the six thousand years of the world are divided into three periods: two thousand years of chaos, two thousand years of Torah, and two thousand years of the messiah. Okay? And the Chazon Ish’s claim is that the reality that determines Jewish law is the reality of the two thousand years of Torah, which is basically the period of the Talmud, more or less, or ending in the period of the Talmud. Okay? And therefore even if today it has become clear to us that reality is different, the binding normative determination is the one established in the Talmud, not the reality of today. And therefore, for example, the louse and all the other things. That’s his claim. Where he got it from, heaven help me, I have no idea.
[Speaker E] But that… the claim is that even then the louse was like that; it’s not that something changed now, it was simply their mistake, even in those two thousand years…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter. But the scientific determination made then is the binding one. That’s his claim. Don’t ask me—I can’t defend what I don’t agree with—but I’m only saying: I don’t agree with him because there’s no source for it, but there is no logical problem here. The logical problem does not exist. Why? Because he disconnects the facts from the norms. He still leaves authority only on the plane of norms. He says the authority is only regarding the permission to kill the louse on the Sabbath; the authority is not that from now on it is forbidden for you, as a religious scientist, to write that a louse is born from eggs because the Talmud says it is born from decay. That is not what the Chazon Ish said. The Chazon Ish said: fine, factually fine, but for purposes of Jewish law, the facts that determine things are the facts as the sages of the Talmud saw them. Again, I do not agree with that, but it is logically consistent.
[Speaker B] But how… I don’t understand logically how it’s consistent. The norms derive from the facts; because the facts are such, therefore the norm is such. It turns out that the fact is not such, so why should the norm remain in force?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s say… I agree with you, which is why I can’t—but… no, logically, no. That’s why I don’t agree that it’s logical. Why? Suppose such a rule had come down from Sinai, say the Holy One, blessed be He, had said to Moses our teacher: the reality that determines Jewish law is reality as it was seen in the middle two thousand years. Fine? That is the determining reality. Would there be some logical problem with that? That’s it. Meaning, there is no logical problem. What are you claiming—that it wasn’t said at Sinai. So that’s why I say, I agree. Therefore I say I have a halakhic dispute with him because I don’t think this principle is correct. But the Chazon Ish does not suffer from a logical contradiction; there is no logical contradiction. He does not demand authority regarding the facts; he demands authority only regarding the norms. If he had demanded authority regarding the facts and had said that science is mistaken because the sages said otherwise—
[Speaker B] otherwise, and there are many who say
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that too—then that’s nonsense. It’s nonsense not because I’m sure science is right and the sages… I’m not going to defend that because I agree with you, but I’m saying it’s not a logical problem—that’s my claim. It’s not a logical problem. This disconnection that he made between facts and norms solved the logical problem. Because if he had made that claim about the facts and had said that science is mistaken because the sages said otherwise, by virtue of the sages’ authority—that is, you cannot apply authority to factual claims. That’s my claim; therefore it’s a logical problem. It’s not a question of our having no interest in deciding Jewish law because it doesn’t pertain to practice, or because perhaps the sages didn’t know or did know. That’s not the point. I’m simply not willing to accept any claim of authority regarding facts.
[Speaker E] Because then with insects too you’d have to check under a microscope.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m saying here, that’s a question. If you accept the Chazon Ish, then no. Okay, I’m saying I do not accept the Chazon Ish.
[Speaker E] It—
[Speaker F] There’s such an idea.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is another question: does microscopic reality obligate us for purposes of Jewish law? That is a completely different question. Here I tend to think not. You don’t need to check with a microscope. Why not? Why yes? The Torah was not given to ministering angels. It did not forbid microscopic insects. What’s the problem? That has nothing to do with what I said earlier. Even if from the time of the sages it did not forbid microscopic insects, I haven’t changed anything. What’s the problem? The claim is that the Torah itself did not forbid this, not that I’m claiming to disconnect facts from Jewish law. The Torah itself did not forbid it. Otherwise, what about bacteria? Is it permitted to eat bacteria? Do bacteria have kosher signs, signs of purity?
[Speaker C] After all, they really do reproduce. They really do reproduce.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if there were something in a bacterium that reproduces, so what? Fine, because the Torah was not given to ministering angels. You cannot breathe without bringing bacteria into your mouth, you cannot drink water. Therefore it is obvious that this was not forbidden. The claim is that the Torah was not given to ministering angels also regarding microscopic creatures that are not bacteria but that you cannot check. Now, true, today already in some very remote way you can. But being able to in some remote way is not enough according to many views, because it has to be accessible to the average person, in the marketplace, so that he can avoid prohibitions and keep the Jewish law. The Jewish law was meant for ordinary people in the fields; it was not meant for people in laboratories in white coats.
[Speaker E] I understand the claim that the Torah was not given to ministering angels, that you can’t check it without a microscope. Fine, but with—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With a microscope you can check it.
[Speaker E] Okay, that’s why I’m saying—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the question is how difficult it is to check. If it is difficult to check and not accessible to the average person—
[Speaker E] But the point is that the louse reproduces. No, but that we already know.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not that you no longer need to check that—when you want to establish a general determination about reality, a law of nature, whether a louse reproduces or does not reproduce, it is enough that one scientist checks it in his microscope and now we all know. We don’t need to check every time. But if you want to check whether there is a living creature in the apple you are eating, it won’t help that a scientist says something general. You need to check whether here there is a creature or there isn’t, so you need a microscope in your own house. It won’t help that he did the test. To discover scientific knowledge, certainly one can do so in a lab; there is no problem with that. That is how scientific knowledge is discovered.
[Speaker G] If it’s in every apple, then that’s something else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then that’s something else. If there were a scientific determination that there are insects in every apple, there would be room to claim that if so, then maybe one should not eat them. Maybe.
[Speaker G] At least regarding certain things, yes. I haven’t checked, but there are such claims.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a majority, there are claims and there is a majority, and therefore each thing has to be checked. And regarding insects in general there is a lot—the Arukh HaShulchan, I think, wants to say that it is altogether an inevitable but unintended consequence, and therefore one need not check at all, he claims. Maybe to look, but nothing more, not even to do any tests. It is an inevitable but unintended consequence. You want to eat, and together with that you eat an insect—you do not want to eat it at all, it is unintended. It’s a doubtful inevitable but unintended consequence, not even an inevitable consequence, a doubtful inevitable but unintended consequence. A doubtful inevitable consequence is a dispute between the Taz and Rabbi Akiva Eiger himself. Okay, in any case, so with insects there are places even to be more lenient, but fine, these are major disputes. In any case, this is connected to the previous dispute, because a doubt that you can check may not be treated as a doubt. The fact that I don’t know something does not make it a doubt. If I can check, then check. Don’t tell me, no, I’m in doubt, so with a rabbinic-level doubt I’ll be lenient or with a Torah-level doubt I’ll be stringent—conduct yourself according to the laws of doubt. If you can check, it’s not a doubt; check. Now the question is: if I can check with a microscope, if I took it to a lab, is that called being able to check? If being able to check by means of a microscope is not called being able to check, then I’m allowed to relate to it at least under the laws of doubt, even if I don’t accept the view that something microscopic is irrelevant to Jewish law. But as long as I haven’t seen it, I’m in doubt. I don’t know whether there is an insect in that thing. So since this is not considered being able to check by means of the microscope, I’m allowed to ignore it under the laws of doubt, for example, or something like that. The laws of doubt in Torah-level prohibitions are stringent, but here this is a doubtful inevitable consequence; that’s the kind of doubt I’m talking about. So I want to bring an example that maybe we discussed once; I no longer remember. We talked about miracles. We had a series about miracles, maybe I spoke about it there, on miracles, as it’s called. I think I spoke there about the subject of providence. I remember I had arguments with Yitzhak, and therefore it reminds me that we spoke about it—about the involvement of the Holy One, blessed be He, in the world. To what extent the Holy One, blessed be He, really causes things here in the world. Now, there is a Talmud in tractate Berakhot, a Mishnah and then a Gemara in tractate Berakhot, which in my view raises a decisive argument in favor of this matter. The Talmud says—the Mishnah talks about a prayer regarding the past. If someone is praying, say he sees a fire in the city and he prays, “May it be Your will that these not be members of my household.” The fire is already raging, right? But I want it not to be my household, let it be the neighbor’s—let him stop causing trouble around here, that’s a double gain. So the question is whether one may pray. They tell him: you may not pray; not because it is forbidden to torment the neighbor, but because it is a prayer regarding the past. It doesn’t help.
[Speaker G] Is it forbidden to pray, or is there simply no point?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, apparently it’s also forbidden, as far as I remember for purposes of the responsum, but I think also in general. It’s a vain prayer. Fine? And the Talmud brings another example: say, for instance, a woman is pregnant and they pray that it be a male. “May it be Your will that my wife give birth to a male and not a female.” That too is forbidden; that too is a prayer regarding the past. Now, that’s the Talmud. Now, a conceptual assumption, a short conceptual analysis. There is a common illusion in the world among those who defend themselves against the claims I raise about providence, and they say that there is a possibility that the Holy One, blessed be He, is involved in the world within the laws of nature. He does not deviate from the laws of nature, but there are several options and He steers things toward the one He wants. So this does not deviate from the laws of nature, and therefore there can be—also if I accept that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not deviate from the laws of nature—not that He cannot; obviously He can, He simply does not do so, that is not His policy. So fine, but there are things that are, I don’t know, in history—who wins a war. These aren’t laws of nature; there are historical rules, but there are miracles; sometimes a small army can win, a small but high-quality army, so to speak, can defeat a large army. Okay, that can happen; there is no law that the stronger army always wins, unless you define the winner as the stronger one, like in evolution. But since that is so, there the Holy One, blessed be He, can intervene. A very common conception, I think, but an incorrect one. Very common, but incorrect. It is incorrect because intervention—at least in the physical picture I know, and I think that is known today in the scientific world—means that given the circumstances, the result is predetermined. There is no situation where under given circumstances several outcomes can occur. There is a situation where we don’t know what the outcome will be because it’s complicated.
[Speaker B] You’re suddenly bringing in free choice here, the phenomenon of—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, I’m not talking about free choice.
[Speaker B] No, but that choice also affects the circumstances.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll get to the question after I present the argument. Okay? So the point is that once there are given laws of nature, and I have existing circumstances, the result is one. Only in quantum mechanics are there all these messes, but in the macroscopic world, victory in war is a collection of human beings; ultimately it is a collection of electrons. That’s all. And ultimately the electrons move, and they have a physical reason to move, and they will move as the physical reason tells them to move. Okay? That is the scientific conception. So what follows? That everywhere the Holy One, blessed be He, intervenes, clearly He basically takes reality and changes the result from what the laws of nature would have produced. According to the laws of nature I was not supposed to recover, fine? But now I prayed, so the Holy One, blessed be He, performs a miracle for me. What will He do? Even though under these circumstances I was supposed to die, He now saves me. What does that mean? That He deviated from the laws of nature. Fine? There is no such thing—you can talk about a hidden miracle, an open miracle, that’s all fine, say what you like—these concepts are epistemic concepts; they don’t change the question, only what I see. But every miracle, every intervention of the Holy One, blessed be He, is a miracle; it is a deviation from the laws of nature. There is no intervention within nature; there is no such creature. That concept is simply based on a mistake. Now, if I accept that assumption—soon we’ll return to quantum mechanics if you want, but not quantum mechanics, okay, to free choice—if I accept that assumption, okay? Then basically it means that every prayer I pray to the Holy One, blessed be He, is a prayer for a miracle. When I pray to the Holy One, blessed be He, to heal me, okay? What am I really saying? According to ordinary nature I should have died from this disease, or suffered, whatever, something like that. I ask You: intervene, change the matter, bring about a different result, and deviate from the laws of nature.
[Speaker B] Is that why they instituted for us to say “Heal us”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, one second. First I’ll say it, and then if there are objections. But now the claim is—the claim is—that every prayer is a prayer for a miracle. Now, is it permitted to pray for a miracle? You tell me. Fine, maybe it is permitted. Then why does the Talmud in Berakhot say not to pray “May it be Your will that these not be members of my household,” or something like that? Suppose we say okay, because that’s an open miracle, that everyone sees. What, the Holy One, blessed be He, will stop the fire here and move it over there? Fine indeed—let the Holy One, blessed be He, revive them; what’s the problem?
[Speaker G] Revive them? That’s something else, a different question. You want to ask that He revive them? A year later.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A miracle, simply a miracle.
[Speaker G] But that’s a different request; that’s not what you asked. “May it be Your will that these not be members of my—”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] household, that request—
[Speaker G] that they not burn, is not a request that they rise from the dead.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but why should I care if they rise from the dead? Why do I care how it happens? Let Him do whatever He wants. And in a moment I’ll get to the second case. Fine? So then what do people say? Fine, we don’t want the Holy One, blessed be He, to overturn the order of the world here—hidden miracles. We pray for hidden miracles, not open miracles. Open miracles take away from our share in the World to Come. Fine, hidden miracles are all okay; those can be done. Okay? Now I say: what about the fetus? Why is it forbidden to pray that the fetus turn from male to female? Even a doctor can do that. So the Holy One, blessed be He, can’t do that? How can a doctor? What’s the problem? Sex-change surgery in the womb. Just as one does sex-change surgery on a living person—you see, it’s only a technological question. He can do it in the womb too. Why not? In principle. I don’t mean to say it can be done today, but it’s only a technological question. In any case, why can’t one pray for that? And now notice: this is a hidden miracle. In a period when there is no ultrasound—there is no ultrasound among the sages. Okay?
[Speaker G] So I ask…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait a second, one second, one second, wait — that’s exactly what I’m talking about. So the Sages basically tell me: don’t pray for the fetus to turn from female to male. Why not? Here this is already a hidden miracle, not an open miracle. And for a hidden miracle, we agreed, you are allowed to pray. Because if you’re not allowed to pray for a hidden miracle, then you can’t pray for anything. Because everything you ask from the Holy One, blessed be He, is basically either a hidden miracle or an open miracle — but a miracle. It’s always a deviation from the laws of nature.
[Speaker B] But isn’t the whole point of prayer that it comes out of heartbreak, right? I didn’t understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Yohanan in… well? So what?
[Speaker B] What’s the claim here?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, so what are you saying?
[Speaker B] That he expects it to happen.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but if you don’t expect it to happen, what’s the point of praying? You pray and you don’t expect it to happen? Yes? Then why are you praying?
[Speaker B] What, because there’s a commandment of prayer?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not relevant. Requests — I’m talking about requests. Leave aside the fixed commandment of prayer; I mean extra requests that you add. There’s no such thing. It’s not just that you aren’t testing the Holy One, blessed be He, on whether it will be fulfilled. But of course you expect it to be fulfilled, otherwise why are you praying? It’s just…
[Speaker G] You hope it will be fulfilled?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. No, you hope, but you’re saying there’s a possibility. That’s enough.
[Speaker B] Wait, what are the chances there won’t be someone here who’ll get tangled up with this and we won’t talk about…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So what now? There’s no choice. The only way out is what Arik said earlier. The Sages thought that what happens in the womb is an open matter. Sorry — that a hidden miracle is an open matter. Meaning, the Sages understood it as intervention within nature, not a deviation from the laws of nature: there are several options, and the Holy One, blessed be He, chooses among them, and that’s why it’s hidden. Why is it hidden? Because the laws of nature do not dictate one outcome. So if a different outcome occurs, I won’t know that the Holy One, blessed be He, intervened here, because nature itself could have led me either to victory or defeat in war, right? So it’s open. That’s what the Sages thought. Therefore the Sages said that one may pray for a miracle. Why? Because it is not a deviation from nature. But to pray regarding the fetus, to turn it from male to female — that is certainly a miracle, even the Sages understood that. If it is already male inside, then it will come out male; there are no changes. To pray for a miracle is forbidden. But if that’s so, notice the implications. What happens when today I understand — unlike the Sages — differently on the factual issue, not the normative one? Not substantive authority; formal authority. Okay? On the factual issue, today I understand that every miracle, even a hidden miracle, is a deviation from the laws of nature. My conception of nature is different from that of the Sages. The Sages thought there are hidden things that the laws of nature do not determine, for example rain. The key to rain was given to the Holy One, blessed be He — that’s what the Sages say. What does that mean? We know there is meteorology; there are laws of nature that determine it. Okay? But the Sages understood otherwise — that it is not determined by nature. Not that the Holy One, blessed be He, intervenes; rather, the key is in the hands of the Holy One, blessed be He. Nature does not determine it. Either there will be rain or there won’t be, because sometimes there is and sometimes there isn’t. So the Sages understood, in the simple sense, that this is apparently an open issue. There you can pray. Pray for rain, because the Holy One, blessed be He, will choose one of the options. But today I arrive at the factual, scientific conclusion — not the halakhic one, the factual-scientific one — that there is no such thing. There aren’t several options, even with respect to rain. So if I now take the Sages’ own instruction, that one may not pray for a deviation from the laws of nature, the conclusion is that one may not pray for anything. It is forbidden to ask the Holy One, blessed be He, for anything, since every involvement of the Holy One, blessed be He, is a deviation from the laws of nature.
[Speaker B] What, a butterfly — I just want someone not to send… what, to send the right butterfly?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the same thing. Sending the right butterfly is a deviation from the laws of nature.
[Speaker G] Couldn’t the butterfly effect be a quantum effect — not an actual butterfly but some…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s already… that too is a kind of law of nature, because at the macro level the quantum gets erased. There’s a scale… what’s it called… I forgot. Nanometers?
[Speaker B] Okay, there’s a whole chapter on that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. I forgot the name, it slipped my mind. The smearing-out of the quantum effect, the law of large numbers. Every molecule is statistical, but a collection of many molecules behaves according to the law of large numbers.
[Speaker G] That’s not true in every kind of system.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s true in every kind of system except one or two that are known today — with liquids and conductors or something like that — where a quantum effect appears at the macro level, and even there it’s at a temperature of minus a hundred or something. Meaning, so far they still haven’t managed to get to…
[Speaker G] No, no, there’s ITC, there’s… but I didn’t say that a mutation that happens in DNA בעקבות cosmic radiation, that’s something that can…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be, I don’t know. But it’s esoteric — meaning it almost never happens.
[Speaker G] It’s recognized as one of the most influential effects on a person, like cancer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Depends on what. So I’m saying, at certain esoteric points there are processes where you simply need coherence of all the quantum degrees of freedom — that they should all operate in parallel and not cancel each other out. Why does the Schrödinger’s cat experiment have to be built in some crazy laboratories, and you can’t do a simple experiment on it? Because it doesn’t usually happen. Schrödinger’s cat is exactly a constellation in which you try to take a quantum effect and have a dead cat or a live-and-dead cat at the same time, and to see that at the macro level. That’s something that doesn’t happen. Never mind that for now — let’s not get into the scientific details. What I’m asking now is: what am I supposed to do in a case like this? If I view the authority of the Sages as binding authority, here we’re talking — I accept the authority of the Sages; on the contrary, I’m going all the way with them. The Sages said that one may not pray for a miracle — that is formal authority, because it speaks about a norm. One may not pray for a miracle. Okay, so I won’t pray. Now the question is: what counts as a miracle? That is a factual question, not a normative question. Here the Sages have no authority. They thought that a miracle is not intervention in nature — or that some hidden miracles are not — but today I think that yes, every intervention is a miracle. On factual matters the Sages have no authority, because there is no formal authority over facts. So the combination of formal authority regarding facts and formal authority regarding norms leads exactly to the conclusion I was talking about there.
[Speaker B] Unless we go like the Hazon Ish. What? Unless we go like the Hazon Ish.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that won’t help. Why? Because you pray that it will happen. Is He intervening or not intervening? That’s what I’m asking you. Here the Hazon Ish won’t help, in my opinion. Now, regarding free choice — regarding free choice, just one comment since you asked that — there too the Holy One, blessed be He, cannot intervene, because then I have no free choice. That is intervention not in the laws of nature — like what you always asked on the website — it’s intervention not in the laws of nature, it’s intervention in my free choice.
[Speaker B] Right, in certain cases He intervenes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem — in certain cases He can also intervene in nature. But if He can do anything, the question is what He does. And if the assumption is that He does not, because the world runs the way it runs, then what difference is there between free choice and laws of nature? He decided that the world would function with free choice and would have laws of nature. The difference is — after all, all the proof you brought was from the Talmud.
[Speaker B] Regarding free choice you have no proof.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so I’m saying: I also have no proof from the Talmud regarding the facts, but I’m saying if—
[Speaker B] You do. The proof from the Talmud you brought about the facts was that if the fact has already been determined — well. That’s a fact, that clearly the fact…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But here too it has been determined. No — it has been determined that I choose.
[Speaker B] What I will choose is determined?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. It has been determined that I am the chooser; it has not been determined what I will choose. But that I am the chooser — that has been determined.
[Speaker B] That’s part of the laws of nature. It is determined that what I choose…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who says? The laws of nature say that I choose. The laws of nature… say that I have free choice, not deterministic laws. The laws say that a human being has free choice; that’s how a person is built. There is… He can do anything. Now what is the difference between intervening in that and intervening in the laws of nature? That’s a question Uri raised on the website, and I think there is no good reason to distinguish between those two things. Now, in distant places it could be that He does intervene also in the laws of nature — I don’t know. I can’t rule out local interventions, or once in a while in distant places; maybe, I don’t know. Then we gain nothing anyway; you can also say that in nature too He intervenes. But at the principled level, if I am forbidden to pray for such a thing, then I am forbidden to pray for such a thing. Period. And this is a distilled expression of that distinction between authority over facts and authority over norms, because here what comes out is that I’m using both sides of the equation: both the fact that there is no authority over facts and the fact that there is authority over norms. And I take those two things: the authority over norms says that one may not pray for a miracle. The authority over facts, after all, does not exist; what determines things is how I understand the facts. The facts say that every involvement is a miracle. The combination of the two says: you may not pray for anything. So this happens when I use both sides of the equation: both the fact that there is no authority over facts and the fact that there is authority over norms. And I take those two things. The authority over norms says one may not pray for a miracle. The authority over facts, after all, does not exist; what determines things is how I understand the facts. The facts say that every intervention is a miracle. The combination of the two says that one may not pray for anything. Okay, now as for what to do in practice — don’t ask me.