Conceptual Analysis – Lesson 19
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
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Table of Contents
- [0:00] Opening clarification and apology
- [2:59] Explaining the concept of “driving away a lion” in the context of a loan
- [11:53] The connection between a loan, betrothal, and “a loan was given to be spent”
- [29:35] The Mishnah on remission of debts in the Sabbatical year and obligation
- [31:44] The difference between store credit and a loan
- [33:05] Rabbi Amar’s story about the Mishnah
- [36:09] The money in the buyer’s possession — ownership
- [40:26] What it means to convert something into a loan — “to enter it as a loan”
- [47:46] Remission of debts — what it means
- [52:02] Purchase money and acquisition according to Maimonides
- [56:50] The difference between a deposit and a loan
- [59:18] Summary and ending the lecture
- [??:??] Debate over acquisition by money between the Sma and the Taz (NONE)
Summary
General Overview
The speaker apologizes for a last-minute delay and continues a line of thought from previous lectures on Choshen Mishpat, obligations and rights, focusing the discussion on the definition of a loan according to Maimonides’ view: a loan is not money belonging to the lender that is sitting with the borrower, but rather a giving similar to a gift, and only the Torah imposes a commandment on the borrower to repay the debt. He bases this on the Talmudic passage about one forbidden to derive benefit and the image of “driving away a lion,” and explains that the benefit of debt repayment is considered preventing a loss, not receiving monetary gain from the one who repaid. From there he distinguishes between money as payment and money as an act of acquisition, and arrives at the Mishnah in Shevi’it on remission of debts in order to argue that store credit is different from a loan because it is more like a deposit or purchase money, where “the seller has money with the buyer,” and therefore it is not remitted. From this he also explains Maimonides’ innovation in the laws of sale, distinguishing between acquisition through purchase money and acquisition through a loan.
Opening and Apology
The speaker apologizes for a notice that caused a late start due to a gathering that spilled into the schedule. He notes that he left early, but the gathering still had not ended, and apologizes for the last-minute delay.
A Loan as a Gift and the Commandment to Repay a Debt
The speaker argues that contrary to the usual understanding, in a loan the borrower does not have money that belongs to the lender, and according to Maimonides the idea is that when the lender gives money, he has “essentially given you a gift.” He stresses that the phrase “to return the loan” is incorrect, because “to return” implies returning an object to its owner, whereas in a loan the borrower does not have the lender’s money but rather bears a future obligation to repay — that is, to give a “gift back.” He explains that this commandment is translated into a legal lien, and therefore belongs in Choshen Mishpat, even though in principle it might have seemed to belong in Yoreh De’ah as a matter of commandment.
One Forbidden to Derive Benefit, “Driving Away a Lion,” and Debt Repayment
The speaker cites a passage in tractate Nedarim about someone forbidden to derive benefit from Eliav’s property, where Eliav is still allowed to donate the half-shekel on his behalf and may also repay a debt he owes to someone else, despite the prohibition on benefit. He explains the Talmud’s reason: repaying the debt is considered “driving away a lion,” meaning removing harm and preventing loss rather than creating a new gain. He sharpens the point by saying that just as when one drives away a lion, “the lamb was mine and remained mine,” so too with debt repayment according to his understanding: Eliav merely prevented a future loss in which the borrower would have had to spend money, but did not give him new money. He adds that even after the repayment date has passed, the borrower still does not have money belonging to the lender; rather, the time has arrived to fulfill the obligation to repay, so even then repayment is considered prevention of loss rather than transfer of money belonging to the lender.
Intention in the Commandment to Repay Debt and the Lien Enforceable by a Religious Court
The speaker responds to a question about “commandments require intention,” saying that presumably intention is indeed required in order to fulfill the commandment, but even without fulfillment of the commandment, the debt can still be removed in practice, such as when someone else repays on one’s behalf. He distinguishes between failure to fulfill the commandment of charity, which gives no claim in religious court, and failure to fulfill the commandment of repaying debt, where the lender can sue in religious court, because the Torah “translates” the commandment into a legal lien. He mentions the principle that “orphans are not subject to performing the commandment” as one implication of the idea that the lien depends on the commandment at its root. He adds that after a court ruling, the standard halakhic view is that the debt “stops being a debt and becomes a deposit,” and the court ruling “turns the debt into money.”
“A Loan Was Given to Be Spent,” Betrothal, and Acquisitions Through a Loan
The speaker explains that the meaning of “a loan was given to be spent” is not merely that no particular note or coin of the lender remains with the borrower, but that according to Maimonides, “there isn’t even the abstract sum — there’s nothing.” He explains that therefore “you cannot betroth with a loan and you cannot acquire with a loan,” because betrothal and acquisition by money require an actual giving of money, whereas forgiving a debt involves no transfer of money, but at most “driving away a lion.” He mentions the concept of “the benefit of debt-forgiveness” as the measure of benefit, and cites a difficulty raised by Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman in the case where the debt is worth a perutah and the benefit of forgiveness is worth less than a perutah. He stresses that the problem is not that the payment is not worth enough, but that when one wishes to effect an acquisition through money, one needs an act of transferring money, and in a loan there is no such act.
Money as Payment Versus Money as Acquisition, and the Dispute Between the Sma and the Taz
The speaker develops a distinction between money as payment, which creates willingness and final intent, and money as the act of acquisition itself in acquisition by money. He describes how in a sale one can acquire through pulling or lifting while the money serves only as payment, whereas in acquisition by money the money itself is also the act of acquisition. He cites the dispute between the Sma and the Taz at the beginning of siman 194 in Choshen Mishpat about whether, when buying a field by acquisition through money for 1,000 shekels, one must add another perutah because one perutah serves as “acquisition money,” and is therefore missing from the payment. He uses this to sharpen the point that forgiving a loan can serve as payment for a transaction if the acquisition is carried out through pulling or lifting, but it cannot serve as acquisition money, because no money was transferred from the one forgiving the debt to the seller.
Remission of Debts, Store Credit, and Purchase Money in the Mishnah of Shevi’it
The speaker cites the Mishnah in Shevi’it at the beginning of chapter ten: “The Sabbatical year remits a loan whether documented or undocumented,” but “store credit is not remitted, and if he made it into a loan, then it is remitted,” and similarly “a hired worker’s wages are not remitted, but if he made them into a loan, then they are remitted.” He quotes the Bartenura, who explains, “for this is not a debt and this is not the manner of a loan,” and points out the ambiguity, since seemingly store credit is also a monetary obligation. He tells of a lecture by Rabbi Amar in which this puzzle was raised, and cites Maimonides’ commentary on the Mishnah defining store credit as an arrangement in which one takes necessities until a sum accumulates and then pays, and nevertheless “that accumulated amount is not remitted in the Sabbatical year because it is not in the manner of debts.” He points to the phrase “and he takes what is his” as a key sentence, and argues that the meaning is that in store credit the seller has “a hundred shekels with me,” and therefore it resembles a deposit or purchase money rather than a loan.
“Entering It as a Loan” and Turning Purchase Money into a Loan
The speaker explains that the expression “and if he made it into a loan” and “to enter the matter against him as a loan” means that a debt which had the status of purchase money, where the seller has money with the buyer, becomes an act of lending in which the seller “lends” the buyer the money already in his possession, and from that point on the seller no longer has money with the buyer, but only a future obligation of repayment. He argues that this is the meaning of the phrase people “rattle off” without understanding, and in that framework it becomes clear why once the matter is turned into a loan, it is remitted in the Sabbatical year.
The Kesef Mishneh Versus the Speaker’s Reading of Maimonides and the Meaning of Debt Remission
The speaker cites the Kesef Mishneh, which offers a different reason: since the normal way of store credit is for it to continue and there is no “usual way to press for collection,” it resembles someone who lent until after the Sabbatical year, and therefore the Sabbatical year does not remit it. He rejects that as the main explanation and proposes that the core issue is monetary essence: remission of debts does not turn money belonging to the lender into the borrower’s money, but cancels the commandment imposed on the borrower to repay a future gift. He explains that there is no remission in a deposit because the money belongs to the depositor, and the same is true of purchase money and store credit, where the seller has “money with me,” and therefore there is nothing to remit. In contrast, in a loan, where the lender has no money with the borrower but only a commandment to repay, the Torah cancels that commandment in the Sabbatical year.
A Loan as an Act of Kindness and Its Connection to “If You Lend Money”
The speaker affirms that the verse “If you lend money to My people” is a commandment, and that the one giving the loan performs an act similar to charity, meaning he gives of his money as a gift. He stresses that the difference on the borrower’s side is that the Torah imposes on him a commandment to give a gift back, and in the Sabbatical year “that is canceled.”
Proof from Maimonides in the Laws of Sale: Purchase Money Versus a Debt Not Arising from a Sale
The speaker cites Maimonides in the Laws of Sale, chapter 5, halakhah 4, which rules that if Reuven sold movable property to Shimon for fifty zuz and Shimon became obligated for the money, and afterward Reuven wants to buy other movable property from Shimon “with the fifty zuz of sale-money that I have in your possession,” Reuven acquires it “wherever it is,” even without pulling or lifting, because this is “an uncommon case” and they did not require pulling. He quotes the continuation of the halakhah: if it is “a debt he owes him not arising from the sale,” and one seeks to acquire “with a debt that I have with you,” there is no acquisition until he lifts, pulls, or acquires in the ordinary ways, and he cites the Raavad’s objection that this “has no basis regarding acquisition.” He presents this as decisive proof for his approach that Maimonides distinguishes essentially between purchase money, where the seller has money with the buyer and therefore forgiving the purchase money is a giving of money, and a loan, where the lender has no money with the borrower and therefore there is no act of money transfer for acquisition.
The Source of the Innovation in the Ri Migash and in the Mishnah of Shevi’it, and the End of the Lecture
The speaker notes that the Maggid Mishneh cites this law in the name of the Ri Migash, and he argues that the source of the distinction in the Ri Migash and Maimonides is the Mishnah in Shevi’it that distinguishes between store credit and a loan. He explains that Maimonides does not bring in the laws of betrothal a parallel law about betrothal through purchase money because it does not appear explicitly in the Talmud, and adds a rule according to which Maimonides brings laws that appear in the Talmud, so his omissions are only significant when the matter appears in the Talmud. He concludes by saying that he will stop here and end the session.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, first of all I apologize for the notice. There was some gathering today, and suddenly I saw on the schedule that it was spilling over into the lecture, so I had to send a message that we’d start later. I even left earlier, and it still wasn’t over. So I apologize for the last-minute delay. Okay, in previous sessions we talked about — at first I spoke about what Choshen Mishpat is: obligations, rights, acquisitions, ownership, and so on. Then I moved on to talking about what a loan is; that was last time. And I said that contrary to what people usually think — that if I lend you money, then you have money that is mine sitting by you — that’s not so. At least in several places in Maimonides’ approach it seems quite clear that that is not the understanding. Rather, when I give you a loan, I have essentially given you a gift. It’s just that there is a law whereby the Torah says that you have a commandment to repay the loan. By the way, it’s not correct to say “return the loan.” People often say “return the loan.” That expression is incorrect. “Return the loan” would mean that I have something of yours in my possession and I’m giving it back to you. But in a loan, when I owe you money, I do not have money that belongs to you. I don’t. I have a future obligation to pay you, just as you lent to me or gave to me — you gave me a gift first, a debt was created, and that debt means that I have a commandment to give you a gift back. That’s essentially the point I made: that this commandment is ultimately translated into a legal lien. But still, at root, we’re dealing here with an infrastructure that is a commandment, and the fact that it is located in Choshen Mishpat is itself not so obvious. Really it should have been in Yoreh De’ah. But because it is ultimately translated into liens and obligations and rights, it nevertheless enters Choshen Mishpat. I brought an example of this from the passage in tractate Sanhedrin regarding — in tractate Nedarim, sorry — regarding one forbidden to derive benefit. If I am forbidden to derive benefit from Eliav’s property, okay? then basically I’m not allowed to benefit from his property. The Talmud says: but he may donate my half-shekel in my name, and that’s not considered that I benefited from him. And he can also repay a debt that I owe someone else — I owe someone money, Eliav comes and gives him the money, repays my debt. That too is permitted even though I’m forbidden to benefit from his money. So the Talmud asks why. Because he is “driving away a lion.” What does that mean, driving away a lion? So I said: if a lion comes to tear apart a lamb from your flock and I drove the lion away, then I saved the lamb for you — I’ve basically gained you a lamb. But the Talmud doesn’t see it that way. The Talmud says: I didn’t gain you a lamb; I prevented you from losing a lamb. In other words, because I removed the lion, the lion didn’t tear apart your lamb. You could have ended up with one lamb less, but you remained with this lamb. So in fact I didn’t add anything to you — you had a lamb and now you have a lamb. You could have lost, and I prevented that. That’s called “driving away a lion.” And “driving away a lion” means that if you think about this lamb, I actually didn’t give you anything. Say I’m forbidden to derive benefit from Eliav, and now a lion comes to tear apart my lamb, and Eliav comes and removes the lion, drives the lion away. So I gained my lamb — is that considered that I benefited from Eliav’s property, that I received something from him? The answer is no. That lamb was mine and remained mine; I didn’t receive it from Eliav. What Eliav did was prevent damage that might have happened to me; he prevented me from losing something, but he did not give me a gain. So in fact I received nothing from him, and therefore I didn’t violate the principle even though I’m forbidden to derive benefit.
[Speaker C] That’s the other side of the same coin, what do you mean? I can’t hear. I’m saying it’s the other side of the same coin, because if Eliav hadn’t repaid the debt, then you would have had to spend money and repay the debt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, wait, that’s about repaying his debt. Now the claim is that repaying his debt is like driving away a lion. What does that mean? If he hadn’t gone and repaid… my debt, what would have happened? In another month I would have had to take money out of my pocket and give it to my lender.
[Speaker C] Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud says that’s like driving away a lion. Basically what Eliav did was prevent me from losing a hundred shekels, not that he gave me a hundred shekels. He prevented me from a future loss of a hundred shekels. I could have lost, and he saved me that loss. But those hundred shekels were mine and remained mine; I didn’t receive them from him. I just could have lost them, and he prevented me from that loss.
[Speaker C] That’s not a loss — what are you talking about? You have a commandment to give, to repay the debt, and with his money he left you with money that maybe you no longer had right now.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. So that’s exactly “driving away a lion.”
[Speaker C] Fine, so how is that driving away a lion?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because he drove away the lion. If he hadn’t driven away the lion, I would now be without my lamb. So he drove away the lion, and I remained with the lamb and didn’t lose it. Exactly like the money. In principle, I was supposed to lose money in another month, to pay a hundred shekels, and he prevented that from me, so I didn’t lose those hundred shekels — just like driving away a lion. Why does that bother you? I’ll tell you why. Because the standard perception of a loan is not like that. The standard perception of a loan is that the lender has a hundred shekels with me that are his, lying by me. Now if Eliav repaid the debt, then the hundred shekels that were with me but weren’t mine — they belonged to the lender — now suddenly become mine. So I received a new hundred shekels. That really is not called driving away a lion. According to that perception of a loan, repaying the debt is not driving away a lion. But if the Mishnah says that someone forbidden to derive benefit may repay my debt, even though I’m forbidden to derive benefit — why? Because it’s like driving away a lion. What is basically written in that Mishnah? What is written there is that a loan does not mean that I have your money by me. The money that is by me is mine; only in another month I’ll have to give you a gift of a hundred shekels. A loss is expected for me; a lion will come and tear away a hundred shekels from me in another month. He has now prevented that future damage. Now I don’t have to pay those hundred shekels in another month. So I didn’t gain anything; rather, he prevented me from a loss. Therefore it’s called driving away a lion.
[Speaker C] And if the repayment date has already passed, and I was already supposed to give him the money, is that also driving away a lion? I don’t think so.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That too is driving away a lion, yes. Because still — the month has passed — that still doesn’t mean, even after the month, that the money I have is his. It means that now the time has come when I have to pay. But I have to pay — I have to give him a gift from my own money. It’s still mine as long as I haven’t given it to him. To lend someone money is to give him a gift — that’s what I want to argue. And when he repays the loan, he is not returning the money, as people say in everyday speech. That’s not called returning money, because to return something means returning it to its owner, but I am not the owner of the money. It’s repaying the debt, repaying the loan, not returning the loan. It’s not the same thing. Repaying the debt means, basically — after all, we say it in another way too — we say “remove the debt.” Why do we call it removing the debt, do you know why? Because first you had a debt, and when you pay me those hundred shekels, the debt is removed. It disappears; the debt disappears. You’re not paying me a hundred shekels that are mine; rather, when you give me those hundred shekels, your debt evaporates, disappears. Because you fulfilled your commandment to give me the gift of a hundred shekels. Therefore that is really the literal meaning of the term “remove the debt.”
[Speaker C] But a gift isn’t a gift if it has to be returned. A gift is a gift.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Exactly. A loan is a gift. It’s just that the Torah imposes on you a commandment to give a gift back. It’s not a regular gift. A regular gift you don’t have to give back. I mentioned yesterday Marcel Mauss, the book by that French philosopher, who argues that basically a gift is also a kind of transaction, and when you receive a gift you have to give back. Yes, those feelings at weddings where people always do the calculations — how much money did I get from him as a gift, that’s how much I need to bring him as a gift. So he says those feelings aren’t random. A gift is a kind of transaction, even if it isn’t said explicitly, but it’s a sort of social agreement to conduct a transaction. But fine, here I want to say that no, that’s not so. A gift is — a loan is basically receiving a gift.
[Speaker C] It also reminds me a little of the law—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tax.
[Speaker C] Capital gains. Giving a gift has to be reported and is subject to purchase tax, because it’s basically a transaction; they call the transaction a gift. Okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Interesting.
[Speaker B] In any case, so in your opinion, when I repay the debt, according to the view that commandments require intention, do I need to have that intention?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? Presumably yes. I don’t remember seeing anything on this, but presumably yes. Again, in the end, once you gave the money, the debt has been removed. That means it could be that you won’t have fulfillment of the commandment, but you no longer owe the money. After all, it’s no worse than if someone else came and gave him money on my behalf — my debt is still removed, yes, that’s clear.
[Speaker B] But he didn’t fulfill the commandment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. The point is valid, that in order for me to have the commandment as well, I need intention.
[Speaker D] But if I don’t repay the debt, then all in all I just didn’t fulfill — not all in all, but I didn’t fulfill a commandment — but that poor guy won’t get his money back because there’s no commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he can sue me in a religious court. That’s what I explained in the previous lecture: this starts as a commandment, but the Torah determined that this commandment is translated into a legal lien; that’s why it’s in Choshen Mishpat. So on the one hand, for example, “orphans are not subject to performing the commandment,” meaning minors don’t have to repay their father’s debt because they are not obligated in commandments, but adults, who do have a commandment upon them, that commandment is translated into a legal debt. Now if I don’t fulfill that commandment, unlike a poor person to whom I don’t give charity — I haven’t fulfilled the commandment, but he can’t go to religious court and sue me. But a lender, if I don’t fulfill the commandment to repay his debt, he can go to religious court and sue me. And by the way, after the court rules that I owe him the money, the standard halakhic perception is that then he already has money by me. It stops being a debt; it becomes a deposit. I have money by me that belongs to him. A court ruling turns the debt into money. We may see that in a moment. In any case, that’s about how to view the concept of a loan, and really everything starts from the question of how one explains the Talmud in Kiddushin and elsewhere that says: a loan was given to be spent. Usually, “a loan was given to be spent” is understood to mean that there isn’t a specific sum of money by me. You can’t point to some hundred-shekel bill that belongs to you, the lender. But there is some one of my hundred shekels that does belong to you; there just isn’t a particular one. Any one of them I can spend. So I explained there that even that simple perception is in any case not precise, even without what I’m saying. Because as I said, in principle I can spend all my hundred shekels and be left with nothing, even though I owe you a hundred shekels. That’s not okay, of course, but there’s no prohibition. You can’t say, wait, wait, wait — the last hundred shekel after you spent all the rest, the last bill left to you, that one is mine, and now you can’t spend it. No, the lender can’t say that. That money is mine. Okay? And therefore Maimonides says: let’s go one step further. Basically what Maimonides says — I’m already saying this is Maimonides, we’ll soon see why, but I claim this is Maimonides’ conception — that really, “a loan was given to be spent” does not mean that you have an abstract amount with me, but it isn’t embodied in a specific bill or coin. No, that’s not the conception of a loan; that’s the usual conception. But Maimonides says that’s incorrect. There isn’t even the abstract amount; there is nothing. You have nothing with me. There is an obligation on me to give you a gift in another month; that’s all there is. You have nothing with me. And therefore, for example, the Talmud there in Kiddushin that talks about “a loan was given to be spent” says that one cannot betroth with a loan and one cannot acquire with a loan. Meaning, as I mentioned: if I owe someone money, to this lender, and now he says to me: look, I have a hundred shekels with you. He says yes. He says: there is my money by you, and now he says: take it, sell me the chair, and that will be the money. You can’t. You can’t buy the chair with that money — and why not? Because you didn’t give me anything. There is no money of yours that is sitting with me and that you have now given me. All you did for me was, at most, drive away a lion. You basically prevented a future gift that I was supposed to give you. You didn’t give me money. You can’t buy like that. To buy, you have to give money.
[Speaker C] So also because a loan is a loan, it’s a debt, it isn’t a benefit of value with which one can become betrothed.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I’m saying; it’s the same law, the same topic. Therefore, one who betroths with a loan — she is not betrothed. And one who acquires with a loan as well — and the Talmud says so also regarding a purchase — just as one who betroths with a loan, she is not betrothed, so too one who acquires with a loan has not acquired. Because when, in order to betroth a woman, you have to give her money. She received no money. The money — how do we measure that benefit? How much would you pay someone to persuade the other party to waive the debt for you? That’s called the benefit of debt-forgiveness. It’s not the hundred shekels. What she is betrothed with is not the hundred shekels of the loan that she gained; she didn’t gain that — it was hers and remained hers. What she gained was the benefit represented by what she would have had to pay someone to persuade me to waive it for her. Suppose she would have had to pay him ten shekels; then she is betrothed with ten shekels, not with a hundred. How does one do… Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman argues this — or at least raises it as a difficulty: what happens if the debt was worth a perutah? Seemingly, one who betroths with a loan — she is not betrothed; but with the benefit of debt-forgiveness she is betrothed, and there’s no limitation. But with the benefit of debt-forgiveness, when the loan is a perutah, then obviously you won’t pay someone a perutah to persuade me to waive a perutah for you; you’d pay him half a perutah. Right? So basically I betrothed her with half a perutah; she shouldn’t be betrothed. Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman asks this there in the passage. But it doesn’t matter right now how to explain it; I’m bringing it just so you’ll see that even though it’s clear that the borrower would be willing to pay the lender so that he would waive the debt for him, so that the debt would be forgiven — because obviously he benefits from not losing a hundred shekels, like driving away a lion. After all, I’d be willing to pay someone to drive away the lion for me. Fine? But that benefit that I gained is itself not what I gained from the person. At most, what I gained from the person is what I would pay him to drive away the lion for me, to persuade someone to drive away…
[Speaker G] What’s the meaning of creating a lien to secure repayment of a loan? How do you create a lien? Is the lien basically for fulfillment of a commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I said, that’s exactly the Torah’s innovation — that although it starts as a commandment…
[Speaker E] I understand, but in the meantime, when I create the lien, there still isn’t yet a debt in Choshen Mishpat? I only have a commandment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what am I creating a lien on? No, you have a commandment, and the Torah creates from the force of that commandment a lien. A lien on the person and perhaps also on the property, depending on whether a lien is Torah-level or rabbinic. But it creates a lien, and now it becomes a legal debt. He can sue me in religious court if I don’t give him that gift back. Where is the implication? What happens with minor orphans? Since they don’t have the commandment upon them, the lien also can’t apply to them. Because it begins with the fact that it’s a commandment. Once the commandment exists, the Torah also turns it into a lien. Okay? So that is basically the conception of “a loan was given only to be spent.” Just one more sentence that I’ll need for what follows as well: when I want to betroth a woman with a loan or acquire with a loan, obviously I can use that loan as the payment. When I buy a chair from you — say Eliyahu borrowed money from me, a hundred shekels. Now he has a chair that I want to buy from him. I say: I forgive you the debt, and with that I’ll buy the chair. With those hundred shekels that I’m giving you, I’ll buy the chair with that. So the Talmud says you can’t do that. But obviously what the problem is here is that I want to buy the chair through acquisition by money. Here the money is acquisition money. If I acquire the chair by pulling it, and only pay the price by forgiving you the debt, that is possible. If that’s worthwhile to you, you decide. If it’s worth the value of the chair to you, everything is fine. Because in the end, obviously you did gain something from it. The problem here is not that you gained nothing. The problem is that no money passed from me to you. I’m speaking for a moment…
[Speaker C] A defect in the acquisition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. So let me sharpen this a little more, because it’s a subtle point. Say I buy a chair from you and pay you a hundred shekels. In a regular acquisition, not a loan, nothing like that — I pay you a hundred shekels. This acquisition can be done in several ways. I can acquire the chair by pulling it. How does this chair become mine? By pulling it or lifting it. I acquire the chair. But the person is not willing to transfer the chair to me unless I pay him a hundred shekels — that’s the value of the chair. So the money doesn’t acquire… the chair. The money is the payment by virtue of which the person is willing to transfer the chair to me. And if he doesn’t receive the money, he won’t agree to the transaction. But the transfer of the money does not acquire the chair. What acquires the chair is the lifting. Money as payment — that’s called payment-money. As payment-money, even debt-forgiveness can be payment-money. If from your point of view that’s worth it to you, then fine, good for you; you consent, and now if I lift the chair, I will certainly acquire it. What happens with a woman is that the money doesn’t function as payment-money but as acquisition money. The transfer of the money itself is the act of acquisition. It’s not only that the money — after all, for a woman there isn’t even — in Achiezer he brings this in Afikei Yam, the book Afikei Yam, by Rabbi Chaim Ozer’s brother-in-law. And in siman 16, I think, he discusses there the sugya of returning money, a very complicated and intricate passage concerning money, and there he brings from Rabbi Chaim Ozer, his brother-in-law, that Rabbi Chaim Ozer said: there is a dispute between the Sma and the Taz about what happens with acquisition by money. I buy a chair from you, pay you a hundred shekels. And suppose I made the acquisition by money, I acquired through money. You know what — let’s say I bought a field, because movable items at least rabbinically are not acquired by money; you need pulling, perhaps Torah-wise yes, that’s the dispute of Resh Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan. But I bought a field, and a field is acquired by money, by document, and by taking possession. Now I’m buying your field from you for 1,000 shekels. I gave you 1,000 shekels, and the act of acquisition I performed on the field was the transfer of the money. I didn’t take possession, I didn’t do some other act of acquisition; rather, the transfer of the money is the act of acquisition, and it is also the transfer of the payment. Right? For example, I could have performed the act of acquisition by giving you a perutah. Transferring a perutah is an act of acquisition. After that I’d pay you the 1,000 shekels as payment, because you aren’t willing for me to buy the field if you don’t receive payment. But as far as the act of acquisition is concerned, it’s enough for me to transfer a perutah’s worth. Now usually, of course, one does it together. If we agreed that the payment for the field is 1,000 shekels, I take the 1,000 shekels and give it to you, and that will also be the acquisition money. It’s the payment and it will also effect the acquisition; that’s just simpler. Okay? Now the Sma and the Taz ask in siman 194, at the beginning of siman 194 in Choshen Mishpat. They disagree over whether, after I gave you the 1,000 shekels, I need to add another perutah. Because after all, one perutah out of the 1,000 shekels is not payment — it’s acquisition money; that’s how I performed the act of acquisition. If so, one perutah is missing from the payment. You received 1,000 shekels minus a perutah as payment, so you demand: please give me the missing perutah. So the Sma, I think, says that it’s payment-money and one need not add a perutah. And the Taz argues that out of the 1,000 shekels, the perutah really is acquisition money and one must add another perutah. If I buy the field through acquisition by money — the act of acquisition is by money, not that I pay the price of the field and acquire it by possession, but that the act of acquisition of the field is the transfer of money — then one has to give 1,000 shekels plus a perutah. That’s what the Taz says. Which sharpens the issue even more. The Sma says that you don’t need to add another perutah, but it’s not a fundamental disagreement. The Sma is simply saying that transferring the payment is the act of acquisition. So once I transferred the payment to you, that is also considered an act of acquisition, that’s all. Therefore you don’t need to add another perutah. The payment is 1,000 shekels, and the transfer of the payment is the act of acquisition. That’s called acquisition by money. But for our purposes, what I want to emphasize here is that in acquisition by money, the money functions on two levels. It also constitutes the payment that creates the seller’s consent to sell, the seller’s final intent to sell. And if I choose acquisition by money, then the transfer of the money is also the act of acquisition. I could have done an act of acquisition through possession as well, but if I choose to do acquisition by money, then here the money functions not only as payment but also as an act of acquisition. And the Sma and the Taz argue whether it can do both things together or whether each must be done separately; hence the practical difference whether one must add another perutah or not. Okay? So when I say — let me come back to this little introduction concerning acquisition by money — when I say that you cannot perform acquisition by money by means of a loan, what I really mean is that the loan cannot function as acquisition money. It can be payment-money. If from your point of view it’s worth your chair that I forgive you the hundred shekels, good for you. But I cannot perform the act of acquisition on the chair by deleting the loan. Because I need to transfer money to you. That is the definition. But no money was transferred to you, so there was no act of acquisition here. Okay, that’s the problem here — people don’t understand it; it’s an important point. After all, everyone asks himself: wait, what do you mean? But it’s obvious that I’d pay a person to forgive me the debt, for him to arrange it so that I won’t have to pay 1,000 shekels in another month. Obviously I’d pay a person for such a thing; it’s worth money to me. So why can’t one betroth with that? The answer is: no problem — as payment, it’s good payment. But there is no act here of money being transferred from me to you. The act of acquisition didn’t happen here, not because you didn’t gain something from me. You did receive the payment.
[Speaker B] Even according to the one who says money effects acquisition? I understand. And that’s also according to the one who says money effects acquisition? Why—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? There’s no difference between them. Yes, do you understand? Even according to the one who says — even according to the one who says pulling effects acquisition and money does not effect acquisition, still by Torah law money does effect acquisition. There’s just the issue lest he say to him, “Your wheat was burned in the attic.” By Torah law, money effects acquisition. So I’m speaking now — let’s assume I’m buying through acquisition by money. Or I’m buying a field, which according to everyone can be acquired through acquisition by money.
[Speaker B] So even if there’s no transfer of money, then if money effects acquisition, then there is yes acquisition-money?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, because here you received payment, but there was no act of transferring money. Because in a loan, the money you received was yours. I only drove away a lion from you, spared you a future payment that you would have had to make.
[Speaker B] Fine, but in other words, according to the one who says money effects acquisition, one must also distinguish between payment-money and acquisition-money?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re always talking when the money is money that acquires; otherwise there’s nothing to talk about. The whole discussion is that when you acquire by means of the money, do you need to add another perutah? According to the one who says pulling acquires and money does not, the question doesn’t arise, because you’re not acquiring with money. The money is only payment. The money is not acquisition money. But of course a field is acquired by money according to everyone; the dispute is only over movable items. A field is acquired by money according to everyone. More than that: even with movable items, by Torah law everyone agrees that money effects acquisition; it’s only a rabbinic rule because of “lest he say to him, your wheat was burned in the attic.” Fine, that’s just a conceptual question; I’m not getting into practice right now. So the claim that one cannot acquire with a loan is not that forgiving the loan is worth nothing to you — obviously it’s worth something to you. You would pay someone if he arranged to erase your debts, right? So obviously it’s worth something to you. It’s worth something to you, but you can’t say that you received something from me. It’s driving away a lion. You received nothing from me, so there is no act of acquisition here. It’s not that you didn’t receive payment, but the act of acquisition was not performed here. Because an act of acquisition is to transfer my money and give it to you. And that did not happen here; the money was yours and remained yours, it wasn’t mine. Okay? So that is the point of this conception of a loan. Now I want to show you the significance of this. Look. The Mishnah in tractate Shevi’it, at the beginning of chapter ten — chapter ten in Shevi’it deals with remission of debts. Let me share the file for a moment. So look at the Mishnah. Regarding remission of debts, I remind you: if someone borrowed money from me before the Sabbatical year, once the seventh year arrives — at its beginning or its end, that’s a dispute — but once the seventh year arrives, the debt is remitted. He does not have to pay me back the money. The debt is remitted. All claims are released, so to speak. Now the Mishnah in tractate Shevi’it says which debts are remitted and which are not. So let’s read. This is the Mishnah, yes, I’m marking it. “The Sabbatical year remits a loan whether documented or undocumented.” Meaning, loans are remitted whether a loan with a document or without a document. “Store credit is not remitted. And if he made it into a loan, then it is remitted.” Meaning, if I borrowed money from you and the Sabbatical year arrives, I don’t have to return to you — not return, sorry, repay. I said “return”; that’s not a good expression. Okay? What happens if I bought from you on credit — sorry, you bought from me on credit. I’m sorry, I bought from you on credit. I had it written down with you, yes, like at a grocery store. So I owe you a hundred shekels. The Sabbatical year arrives — that is not remitted. Store credit is not remitted. Why? It’s a debt. What difference does it make where the debt came from? No, it’s not remitted. “And if he made it into a loan, then it is remitted.” That’s what the Mishnah says. Meaning, if he turns the store credit into a loan, then it is remitted. You see that store credit is not a loan. It’s something else. We’ll soon see. “A hired worker’s wages are not remitted, and if he made them into a loan, then they are remitted.” Rabbi Yose says, any work that stops in the Sabbatical year is remitted — never mind, those are other matters. Mishnah 2 continues after that and also says that debts fixed by a religious court are also not remitted, fines imposed by a religious court, and so on. But this is the Mishnah. Now what is the difference between store credit and a loan? Why is store credit not remitted while a loan is? Look at the Bartenura there on the Mishnah. He says this:
[Speaker C] He gave him payment in the form of merchandise, didn’t he?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “It is not remitted, because this is not a debt and this is not the manner of a loan.” Very vague. What does he mean? What does it mean, “this is not a debt and this is not the manner of a loan”? Don’t I owe him money? I bought at the grocery store, I didn’t pay him, he wrote down a hundred shekels for me. I owe him a hundred shekels, don’t I?
[Speaker C] You owe him goods, you owe him goods.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I owe him money, not goods. He gave me the goods and I ate them. Now I owe him money. I owe him one hundred shekels. So why isn’t that a debt, and not considered a loan? It’s not considered a loan in the sense that I didn’t borrow from him, I bought on credit. So what? Those are just two ways of creating a debt. What’s the difference? So it’s really not clear. Actually, the first time I heard about this topic was in a class on Hoshana Rabbah by Rabbi Amar at Noam, at the Noam synagogue in Petah Tikva. Rabbi Amar is a friend of Rabbi Battist; Rabbi Battist is the rabbi of the synagogue there. And he spoke about this Mishnah and about what this mystery is—this distinction. He couldn’t find any reasonable explanation that distinguishes between store credit and a loan, and then he brought Maimonides, whom he said he simply didn’t understand, and he left it unresolved and suggested some explanation that, in my view, isn’t reasonable. So let me explain to you what the Mishnah and Maimonides mean. In his commentary on the Mishnah there, Maimonides says this: Store credit is what people commonly do with shopkeepers—that he takes from him what he needs until an amount accumulates, and then he pays him. That accumulated amount is not canceled in the Sabbatical year, because it is not in the manner of debts. Very similar to the Bartenura. Of course, he preceded the Bartenura. But he says that the shopkeeper did not sell what he sold in order that it become a debt; rather, what is he doing? He sells him things in small amounts—he sells him a loaf of bread, and the next day he sells him two labaneh, and then at the end, at the end of the year. What exactly does Maimonides mean here? Rabbi Amar said he doesn’t understand what the difference is. You’re just describing to me what store credit is—that I also know. The question is: what’s the difference between that and a loan? What difference does it make if the debt accumulates from little debts until a large debt is formed? Why is that different from a loan? Maybe I’ll already draw your attention to this: there’s an expression here that, in my opinion, is the key phrase: “and he takes what is his.” What does that mean? Maimonides claims—I think this is what he means to say—that in a loan, what have we seen until now? In a loan, say someone lent me money. He has no money of his with me. It’s all mine. There is just an obligation on me in the future to give him one hundred shekels in a month. He does not currently have one hundred shekels with me. With store credit it’s not like that. With store credit he does have one hundred shekels with me. That’s what they mean by “because it is not in the manner of debts.” Why is it not in the manner of debts? Because it’s not that I owe him money; I really don’t owe him. He has one hundred shekels of his with me, located with me. That’s the point. And therefore he says: it joins together with other sums, it accumulates until the week is over, and he takes what is his. The shopkeeper takes from me the one hundred shekels—it’s one hundred shekels that were his even when they were already by me, still with me. He takes what is his. In a loan it’s not like that. In a loan he does not take what is his. In a loan he receives something of mine. That is the difference between store credit and a loan. And therefore, simply speaking, it is not in the manner of a debt, because there is no debt here; he isn’t owed anything. It’s not in the manner of a loan. And therefore, in a moment we’ll see why it is not canceled. Maimonides in the laws of Shemittah and Jubilee, chapter 9.
[Speaker B] For me it’s not shared.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t hear.
[Speaker B] For me it’s not shared, I don’t know whether for…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, for me too it’s not; every so often I disconnect the sharing because I want to see you. When there’s sharing I don’t see you.
[Speaker B] Ah, I understand.
[Speaker C] But a lender isn’t a lender because the money was given to be spent, so he has nothing with me, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. And with store credit the claim is that if I owe one hundred shekels… what?
[Speaker C] Also when I buy food from him, he also has nothing with me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he does. That’s Maimonides—that’s what Maimonides is claiming here. And that’s really the Mishnah. It’s not Maimonides. It’s the explanation of the Mishnah. He has one hundred shekels with me. When I give him the one hundred shekels, I’m returning one hundred shekels to him; it’s like a deposit. Remember? Last time I spoke about the difference between a loan and a deposit. Someone deposited one hundred shekels with me; in a month I have to return those one hundred shekels to him. What’s the difference between that and a loan? First of all, the difference is, ostensibly, that these specific one hundred shekels that he deposited with me in an envelope—I’m not allowed to use them, they’re his, and I have to return them to him. But it’s more than that. Even if I were allowed to use them and put another one hundred shekels in the envelope in their place, there would be no problem doing that. That’s not the point. The point is that in a deposit, something of yours is located with me. In a loan, everything that is with me is mine. There isn’t something of yours located with me. Maimonides says: store credit is a deposit, it’s not a loan. Those one hundred shekels that are with me are yours. It’s only a matter of non-delivery—I still need to give it to you—but it’s yours. Therefore it is not similar to a loan. It’s not because it’s a store or not a store. Its legal status is different. It’s not a loan at all.
[Speaker C] Yes, but if a person takes from the store, say, all month, and he has nothing, literally nothing—no house, nothing—and he keeps taking on store credit, then what does he have with me? Nothing. I ate everything, there’s nothing there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter, there are one hundred shekels of mine that are with you—the value. How?
[Speaker C] I have nothing!
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter, so what if you have nothing? Then you owe me one hundred shekels. One hundred shekels from your property that is mine.
[Speaker C] So if I owe it, that already turns it into some kind of loan.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. A debt, yes. No. Because in a loan you are obligated to give me; I have nothing of mine with you. In purchase money, I have one hundred shekels with you. But it’s not a specific one hundred shekels. Even in purchase money it’s not a specific one hundred shekels. It’s the value of one hundred shekels of mine that is with you. Something abstract like that. And therefore I don’t even rule out the possibility that you could take out all your money and spend it. I wouldn’t be able to stop you. True, you’d be acting unlawfully, but I wouldn’t be able to stop you. What is the case? There is a value of one hundred shekels that you owe me. That is true, and it always remains so. After a religious court has ruled, of course, then you won’t be able to spend those one hundred shekels. But before a religious court has ruled, then no. Now look at Maimonides in the legal code. Store credit is not canceled. And if he made it into a loan, it is canceled. Yes, just as we saw in the Mishnah. A worker’s wages are the same. Again, the same rule, right? And if he turns it into a loan, then it is canceled. What does it mean to turn it into a loan? Now we also understand what it means to charge something to him as a loan. Also a mystery. After all, it says in the Mishnah that there is purchase money, so essentially I owe you one hundred shekels. So that is not canceled. But if I charge it to you as a loan, then you’ve turned the purchase money into a loan, and then it is canceled. What does that mean? I owed you one hundred shekels, and I still remain owing you one hundred shekels. What does it mean to turn it into a loan? What was it before? What’s the difference? According to what I’m saying, it’s very clear. When it was purchase money, then you had one hundred shekels with me. Now you lent them to me. You gave me your one hundred shekels that are with me, you lent them to me, and now it really is a debt. You no longer have one hundred shekels with me. There is now an obligation on me to give you, as a gift, one hundred shekels in a month. That is what it means to charge it to you as a loan. This whole expression appears in the Talmud and in all the halakhic decisors, and everyone recites it and, in my opinion, nobody understands what it means. This is the meaning. The meaning is: it was purchase money, and I charge it to you as a loan. Meaning, I now give you a loan. I, the shopkeeper, have one hundred shekels with you. I give you a loan: those one hundred shekels that are with you, which are mine, I now transform into being yours. That is a loan. And now it really is a debt. That is called charging it. And now as well the Sabbatical year will cancel it. Since it cancels a loan, not store credit. I’ll come back to this in a moment. And the Kesef Mishneh there is puzzled by this law in Maimonides, and explains it as follows. Yes, Kesef Mishneh, chapter 10 in Shevi’it. And our teacher wrote in his commentary on the Mishnah: Store credit is trust-based buying and selling between people and shopkeepers. Yes, there’s mutual trust between us. He is willing to give me merchandise, and he trusts that at the end of the week I’ll pay him what I owe. That he lets him take whatever he needs, and when a total amount of money has accumulated against him, he repays him. And that accumulated amount is not canceled in the seventh year, because it is not in the manner of a debt, and the shopkeeper did not sell to him on condition that it become a debt. Rather, he sold to him little by little until everything accumulated and he gives him his money. End quote. That is a quotation of Maimonides. The Kesef Mishneh says: And it seems to me that the reason is that since the normal way is to extend credit time after time and he is not repaid until money comes to hand, it is not the normal way to press him for payment. It is as if he lent to him until after the Sabbatical year, in which case the Sabbatical year does not cancel it.
[Speaker C] Something else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, he doesn’t explain what I’m saying. Yes, yes. What do you mean?
[Speaker C] The time for repayment hasn’t arrived yet, and that’s why it isn’t canceled at all. What? Because the time for repayment hasn’t arrived yet. Like a loan whose due date is after the Sabbatical year, so it isn’t canceled. But what does that mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But it arrives after a week. What does “time” mean here—credit for a week. So I extended credit for a week.
[Speaker C] No, he gives him credit, sort of, yes, but he keeps giving him credit all the time until he has money.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “until you have money” mean? Until enough has accumulated. It’s not worth my while to collect one shekel from you each time. When you have one hundred shekels, come and pay me. So it’s for a week or two weeks, or it depends on local custom there. What does it mean, “as if he lent to him until after the Sabbatical year”? Yes, one who lends to his fellow for ten years—the Sabbatical year does not cancel it, because the due date is after the Sabbatical year. Fine, but here that’s not the case. What kind of reason is that? It’s a strange reason. And what does he mean also by “it is not the normal way to press him”?
[Speaker C] That he doesn’t come to claim it. I don’t know, fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think that’s the meaning. In my opinion, I think what he means to say—it’s not what I said. He’s trying to say something else. He’s allowed to disagree with me, Rabbi Yosef Karo. Yes. What he really wants to say is that with a loan, after all, cancellation of debt in the Sabbatical year is an act of kindness. I gave you a loan because you were in distress. Then the Sabbatical year comes and says: let’s do kindness for needy people, so I forgive you the debt. Now, store credit isn’t done because you’re needy. The fact that you give it to me on credit and I don’t pay each time—that’s not because you’re needy and the seller is lending him money. It’s because he doesn’t have the patience to deal with two shekels every time. So he tells him: come at the very end of the month, then there’ll already be a debt of a thousand shekels, we’ll settle the account and you’ll pay it all. I don’t have the patience for there to be a line in the store all the time, and each time we bring change, and there’s no small change, and there is change—don’t start with all this. So the purpose of the loan is not kindness. I’m not giving you the money because you’re needy, but in order to streamline the commercial relationship between us, simply to make things easier for both sides. Such a thing is not canceled, because the whole idea of debt cancellation is to ease the burden on the needy. But here, when I give you the money, I’m not giving it to you as to a needy person, and therefore what he says, “it is not the normal way to press him,” means that I am not pressing you by asking for the money. If you are a needy person and I demand the money from you, I am pressing you. That’s not okay. You don’t have the money to pay, so “you shall not press him”—there is a prohibition of “you shall not press him.” But here with store credit there is no prohibition of “you shall not press him.” If I need the money, I can certainly tell you: bring the money. Why? Because you’re not a needy person. So what’s the problem? Then give me the money. Consequently, the Sabbatical year also does not cancel it. That’s what the Kesef Mishneh says. That is basically his claim. I want to claim differently, and I claim that Maimonides also means something else—he does not mean that, although it is a possible explanation, but Maimonides does not mean that. Because understand: according to that, for example, a worker’s wages are the same thing, and also fines imposed by a religious court are the same thing, because all those things are with you not because of kindness, but because you still have not given them to me. And therefore they are not canceled in the Sabbatical year. That is how the Kesef Mishneh would explain it. I want to argue that the explanation is different: Maimonides understands, as I said before, that store credit means that the seller has one hundred shekels with the buyer. And in a loan, the lender has nothing at all with the borrower. Now what is cancellation of money? Cancellation of money basically does not—say I deposited one hundred shekels with you, as a deposit. Would there be cancellation of debts here? You wouldn’t need to return it to me after the Sabbatical year? Obviously not. Everyone agrees. Why? Because a deposit is not a loan. So what? Why should I care? What difference does it make whether it’s a deposit or a loan? So I’ll tell you what the difference is. Cancellation of debts does not transfer my money to become yours. There’s no such thing. The Torah does not say, does not force me to give charity against my will, taking money that is mine and rendering it ownerless and giving it to you. That is not cancellation of debts. If the money is mine, I have the right to receive it. Cancellation of debts is a waiver of the commandment imposed on you to give me a gift. You have a commandment to give me a gift back when you borrowed, yes? You have a commandment to repay the debt, to give me the money back as a gift. The meaning of cancellation of debts is that the commandment imposed on you to repay the debt is nullified. That’s all. But it is never to give you money that is mine. Cancellation of debts is not giving you my money—money that is not yours becoming yours. There’s no such thing. If that money is mine, then it is mine. It is like a deposit. It is certainly my right to receive my money. The Torah does not do kindness at my expense against my will, to give money against my will, to give you my money—what are you talking about? Rather, the Torah says that if there is no money with you that is mine, but rather you have a commandment to pay me one hundred shekels, then the Torah says: I nullify that commandment; you no longer have that commandment. Leave your money with you. That’s all. But it never turns—cancellation of debts never turns money that is mine into yours. That does not happen in cancellation of debts. Therefore purchase money is not canceled, because in purchase money there are one hundred shekels with you that are mine. So what would cancellation of debts even mean there? That my money becomes yours? Of course not. Cancellation of debts never does such a thing. In a loan, cancellation of debts means that you do not need to give me the gift. The commandment is nullified; the Torah nullifies the commandment. The commandment to repay a debt is nullified in the Sabbatical year. Fine, so there is no commandment on you to give me anything. That’s fine. The One who commanded is the One who permitted. But if there is money with you that is mine, that money is mine. Why would cancellation of debts turn it into yours? There’s no such thing. Just like with a deposit, so too with purchase money—the same thing. That is the meaning of the Mishnah; that is the meaning of Maimonides, in my opinion, and we don’t need all the other explanations—or non-explanations. And now I want to bring you a clear proof that this is Maimonides’ position. So just one more—exactly—
[Speaker C] One small second, so when the Torah says—and now I want to bring you a clear proof that this is Maimonides’ position—so one more small question: when you say, “If you lend money to My people,” that it’s a commandment, that if means an obligation, so basically it gives—usually it won’t tell you just give money to a person for nothing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s what it says. Why? Yes. Like charity. What? What is the commandment of charity? The commandment of charity is: take your money and give it to him as a gift so that it becomes his. Yes. “If you lend money to My people”—that is the commandment of charity. By the way, it appears in the laws of charity; a loan is kindness.
[Speaker C] Right, that’s what I was about to say, that basically the Torah gives you a commandment to do that, and now it’s your money.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, exactly. You gave a gift to a poor person. Yes. Only unlike charity, this is a gift where the poor person—not the poor person, the borrower—has a commandment to return a gift to me. And in Shemittah that is canceled. Okay. Yes, and in Shemittah that is canceled. Now look at a puzzling Maimonides over which many have spilled much ink, and they don’t understand what he wants. And as usual, as we saw, by the way, in the classes on conceptual construction, here too the source of the matter is found in Ri Migash. Puzzling laws in Maimonides—many times, or a number of times—you can find their root, their explanation, in Ri Migash. Maimonides says as follows: In the laws of sale, chapter 5, halakhah 4: And likewise, if Reuven sold movable property to Shimon for fifty zuz, and Shimon acquired the movable property and became obligated in the payment, and after Shimon became obligated in fifty zuz, if he had wine or an animal or a slave or the like from other movable property, and he wanted to sell them, and Reuven said to him: Sell it to me for the fifty zuz that I have in your hand as the sale-money, and he said to him: Yes—Reuven acquires the movable property wherever they are, even though he neither pulled nor lifted them. For this too is something not commonly found, and they did not require pulling in it. What is Maimonides saying? He says this: if Eliav bought a chair from me, now he owes me one hundred shekels, fifty zuz. Okay? Yes. Now Eliav has wine, an animal, a slave, something that I want to buy. He says to him: with the fifty zuz that you owe me—take them, I want to use them to buy the wine or the slave. Maimonides says: acquired. I acquired the chair… the wine or the slave. Even though I did not even pull the wine or the slave. I acquired them by monetary acquisition. Ah, but according to Jewish law, movable property requires pulling; it is not acquired by money? Maimonides says: this is an uncommon situation. And the rabbis did not enact that it should be acquired by pulling. Strictly speaking, movable property can also be acquired by money, only there is a rabbinic enactment that it is not acquired by money but by pulling. About that Maimonides says: because such a situation is rare, not common, the rabbis did not decree in the case of something rare. And therefore there they did not obligate you to do pulling; we follow the basic law, and monetary acquisition works. That isn’t important; that’s a side detail. Okay. But for our purposes, what does Maimonides say? You can buy merchandise with purchase money. If you have purchase money with me, you can buy things from me with that purchase money that I owe you.
[Speaker C] Not like a loan.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. But—I continue reading—if, however, he had a debt owed to him not arising from the sale, and he said to him: Sell me movable property for the debt I have with you, and both of them agreed, he has not acquired until he lifts it, or pulls it if it is not the kind of thing normally lifted, or acquires it in one of the ways movable property is acquired. Just like one who betroths a woman with a loan—the betrothal does not take effect—so too one who buys with a loan does not acquire. Which of course is agreed law; that is clear. What the commentators on Maimonides don’t understand is the first law. What difference does it make whether it is purchase money or a loan? One who betroths with a loan is not betrothed; one who buys with a loan does not acquire. So why with purchase money yes? The Raavad’s gloss: Abraham said: This matter has no root regarding acquisition. There is no basis for it. Where did Maimonides invent this from? Rather, it is only relevant regarding “He who exacted punishment.” With purchase money, if you decided to buy this slave with purchase money, you did not acquire the slave. But if he does not transfer the slave to you, then “He who exacted punishment” applies to him. It’s a kind of curse against one who doesn’t keep his word. But it is obvious that you did not acquire the slave. One who betroths with a loan, or buys with a loan, has not acquired; she is not betrothed. So what is this? What does purchase money have to do with it? Purchase money is a loan, and it’s the same thing. And you can already see where I’m going. Maimonides says: what do you mean? This is exactly Maimonides’ position. That’s why this is my proof that the Kesef Mishneh is not right and everyone is not right. Maimonides’ position in store credit in the Mishnah—and from there he learned this. Everyone asks: where is Maimonides’ source? So first of all, this law appears earlier in Ri Migash. The Maggid Mishneh here on the spot—I didn’t bring it here—the Maggid Mishneh there cites it in the name of Ri Migash. The source of the law is Ri Migash. But where did Ri Migash get it from? I claim that he got it from the Mishnah in Shevi’it. The Mishnah in Shevi’it, which makes a distinction between store credit and a loan—that a loan is canceled and store credit is not canceled—he asks himself: why really? The answer is because store credit is my money that is with you. On that there is no cancellation of debts. A loan is your money that is with you; only you owe me gifts in the future. On that there is cancellation of debts. We learned from the Mishnah in Shevi’it that there is a difference between purchase money and a loan. Ah, if so, says Maimonides, then the whole law the Talmud says—that one who betroths with a loan is not betrothed and one who sells by means of a loan has not sold—that is all with a loan. But with purchase money, I can betroth and can buy, exactly the same way that it is not canceled. Why? Because it is my money that is with you. If I waive it for you, I have given you my money. That is an excellent act of acquisition. Why shouldn’t I acquire with that and betroth a woman with that? That is what Maimonides says, and this is a decisive proof for what I’m saying here. Everyone strains with Maimonides here, straining to explain him—I don’t know—rabbinic, all kinds of strange and stranger things. Maimonides’ words are clear; his lips speak plainly. He says that this is the difference between purchase money and a loan: with purchase money there is money by me that is yours, the seller’s. In a loan there is nothing by me that belongs to the lender.
[Speaker C] And does Maimonides also bring this distinction in the laws of betrothal, the way he does here? No. No? Ah. So maybe that’s why they strained, because it’s really natural to bring it also in the laws of betrothal.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but the Talmud itself says that the same applies to a sale. Meaning, we derive it from betrothal to sale. The same law that exists in a sale also exists in betrothal. And Maimonides brings it in the laws of sale because that’s where he saw it. Maimonides’ way is to bring laws that appear in the Talmud. Maimonides does not bring laws that do not appear in the Talmud unless he prefaces them with “it appears to me” or something like that, or “the Geonim wrote,” but Maimonides brings only laws that appear in the Talmud. Therefore a law that appears in the Talmud and does not appear in Maimonides is a basis for inference. But if there is a law that appears, say, in other medieval authorities, and Maimonides does not bring it, you can infer nothing from that. It may be that he didn’t bring it because it is not written in the Talmud, not because he disagrees with it. And later authorities stumble over this. And it’s incorrect. The rule with Maimonides is that he brings laws that appear in the Talmud. From omissions by Maimonides of what appears in the Talmud, you can learn something. But from a law that Maimonides does not bring, which does not appear in the Talmud, you cannot conclude that he disagrees with it. Understood. Now regarding betrothal, that law does not appear—that one can betroth with purchase money. But regarding sale it almost appears. It appears in the Mishnah in Shevi’it.
[Speaker C] And therefore he brought it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that is my claim. And in fact this source in the laws of sale, I think, proves that the plain meaning in the Mishnah in Shevi’it and in Maimonides who explains it is like what I said earlier. And if we go backward, that basically means that the source for the distinction Maimonides makes is the Mishnah in Shevi’it. No need to search. By the way, I didn’t find anyone who says this about this Maimonides in the laws of sale. But it’s an obvious source—it’s an explicit Mishnah. It’s not an inference, it’s not… an explicit Mishnah that everyone relies on. And the simple explanation of the Mishnah is exactly this explanation. Okay, I think we’ll stop here because now I need to start something… something else. Fine, let’s stop here for today, okay?
[Speaker F] Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good night.