Messianism – Rabbi Michael Abraham – Lesson 3
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- [0:01] Parents pushing you to go far away
- [1:04] The story of Moses and the portrait
- [3:43] Yaron London the editor and friend
- [5:48] Interpreting the verse in Habakkuk
- [10:50] Is there a prohibition against calculations?
- [14:27] Maimonides on Kabbalah and explanation
- [27:58] Building the Temple in a modern state
- [30:01] A dispute over Maimonides’ laws on the Messiah
- [38:15] Defining a false messiah according to Leibowitz and Ben-Gurion
- [40:44] The Talmud, “the law is so but we do not instruct accordingly” — what does it mean?
- [44:46] Reward and punishment in the World to Come — its meaning
- [51:20] Modern messianism: communism as an example
- [54:28] Utopian and communist models are unrealistic
Summary
General Overview
The text moves between anecdotes about Liron London and humor about “face reading,” and an attempt to formulate a cautious framework for studying messianism from the sources, mainly around calculating the end-times and the claim that there is no decisive tradition about the signs of redemption, only interpretations of verses that can change. Maimonides is presented as warning against involvement with end-time calculations and midrashim about the end of days because they do not lead to fear or love, even though in practice he himself also calculated in the Epistle to Yemen in order to encourage people. Out of a history of disappointments and phenomena such as conversions to Christianity בעקבות messianic expectations, the text sharpens the point that false messianism is hard to diagnose in halakhic terms, and that messianic movements can be criticized not only by whether they succeeded after the fact but also by problematic patterns of conduct, such as unrealistic steps or dangerous certainty, while distinguishing between secular messianism in the style of communism and religious messianism in the context of Religious Zionism.
Parents, clan mentality, and Liron London
The speaker describes parents who push a child to leave home, go far away, and succeed, in contrast to the “different mentality” of the clan that wants “all the little chicks around the skirt.” He describes an amusing interview in which a “kabbalist” tells Liron London that he sees on his face “the basic modesty in him,” and London himself laughs at the diagnosis. He weaves in a story about Moses, presented as having been born with “all the bad traits,” but correcting his character traits, and connects this to the possibility that the radiance of his face was already there from birth.
Name, culture, and Liron London’s autodidacticism
The “kabbalist” suggests that Liron London add a more suitable name, and the speaker offers something like “Yaron Adoram London,” connecting it to images of a battalion commander, a pilot, and Yaron Zehavi from Hasamba. The speaker describes London as a “very interesting person,” an autodidact with broad knowledge, though not someone who studies systematically. He quotes a friend who worked on the journal Status, whose main job was to do “de-Londonization,” because after London edited an article, it would be written the way he wrote, not the way the original author had said it.
Calculating the end in the Talmud and the phrase “may the spirits of those who calculate the end expire”
The text moves to “matters of messianism and the Messiah” and presents calculating the end-times as a step that brings one close to the question of messianism from the sources. It quotes from tractate Sanhedrin the verse from Habakkuk, “For the vision is yet for the appointed time… though it tarry, wait for it; because it will surely come, it will not delay,” and the exposition, “May the spirits of those who calculate the end expire,” which warns against those who say that if the end has arrived and he did not come, “then he will no longer come.” It presents two possible readings: a prohibition/instruction not to calculate at all, lest faith be harmed if the date does not materialize, or a warning against the conclusion that “he will no longer come” even if one calculated and was mistaken.
The medieval authorities (Rishonim), the Epistle to Yemen, and Maimonides on not dealing with signs
The text points to the difficulty that medieval authorities (Rishonim) nevertheless did make calculations, and asks how this fits with “may their spirit expire.” It describes the standard explanation for Maimonides, who calculates in the Epistle to Yemen in order to encourage a community in distress, even though he writes against calculating the end-times in the Mishneh Torah. It quotes Maimonides that the matters concerning the coming of the Messiah are things that “no person knows how they will be until they happen,” that they are “obscure matters,” and that “even the sages have no tradition regarding these matters, only according to the apparent meaning of the verses,” and therefore there is dispute, and one should not make them a principle, because “they lead neither to fear nor to love,” and similarly “one should not calculate the end-times.”
Rabbi Hillel, verses versus tradition, and skepticism toward studying the Hebrew Bible
The text returns to Rabbi Hillel, who said, “Israel has no Messiah, for they already consumed him in the days of Hezekiah,” and interprets the Talmud’s response, “May the Master forgive him,” as teaching that the conclusion rests on verses rather than on an orderly tradition. The speaker presents a qualified skepticism toward studying the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), because “in the end, whatever you want, you put into the Bible,” and he has trouble seeing how one can learn anything decisive from it when verses can be interpreted in different ways. He raises modern interpretations in which the messiah is not a person but a period, including attributions to Rav Kook in the context of Messiah son of Joseph.
Prophecy as a criterion for the Messiah and actual behavior in history
The text raises the intuitive expectation that prophecy should declare the choice of the Messiah, but argues that in practice great later authorities (Acharonim) and communities were not deterred from supporting Shabbetai Tzvi or other phenomena even without a prophet announcing it. It concludes that people did not see such a criterion as binding, and that even if they claim a candidate is a “prophet,” this does not solve the problem of distinguishing truth from falsehood, because anyone can declare that about himself.
The commandment to build the Temple versus “a Temple descending from heaven”
The text quotes from Sanhedrin the three commandments upon entering the Land: “to appoint a king, to wipe out the seed of Amalek, and to build the Chosen House,” and emphasizes that building the Temple is a commandment for all generations and is even counted by Maimonides. Against this, it cites Rashi in Sukkah that the future Temple is “built and perfected… it will come from heaven,” based on the verse “the sanctuary, Lord, that Your hands established.” It quotes the Arukh LaNer, who proposes that the Temple will be built by human beings, while a “spiritual Temple” will descend and enter the physical one “like a soul within a body,” similar to “the heavenly fire” within “the ordinary fire” kindled by human beings.
Haredi Judaism versus Religious Zionism and actions to bring redemption
The text presents a modern reading that ties the dispute about the Temple to a broader disagreement between Haredi Judaism, which emphasizes waiting and descent from heaven, and Religious Zionism, which emphasizes human initiative and taking action to bring redemption and build the Temple. It gives the example of the Temple Institute and Rabbi Yisrael Ariel as practical preparation and even a demand to build, not just to prepare the vessels. It raises the question of how much one should act through “realistic” means and how much one should say, “What have you to do with the hidden matters of the Merciful One,” while claiming that involvement with the future order of things is seen as speculative and useless, in line with Maimonides.
False messianism: halakhic difficulty, historical damage, and lack of criteria
The text argues that there is no clear halakhic prohibition against being a false messiah the way there is a prohibition against being a false prophet, and that if a person sincerely believes he is the Messiah, he may not be consciously lying, so it is hard to judge the matter with halakhic tools and one also needs sociological tools. It gives historical examples of candidates and movements such as Shabbetai Tzvi, Alroy, and Solomon Molcho, and argues that at times there was broad “agreement” or hesitation about them. It describes phenomena of severe disappointment, including a description from Shulamit Lapid’s book Like Broken Clay about a mass conversion to Christianity in Jerusalem after a rumor of a messiah who did not arrive, as evidence that the fear of damage is not theoretical.
Leibowitz and Ben-Gurion: a Messiah who must not arrive, as a principle
The text quotes Yeshayahu Leibowitz’s saying, “I believe in the Messiah who will come; forever he will come. A messiah who has come is a false messiah,” and the claim that this alludes to the Christian messiah, and that for him the problem is the very realization itself. It quotes Ben-Gurion: “The Messiah has not yet come, and I do not wish for the Messiah to come… when you find the Messiah’s address… he is no longer the Messiah,” and links this to the concern that disillusionment will harm public hope. It argues that a proposal to instill a belief “that you know is not true” in order to create hope is problematic, and presents a discussion around the idea of “the law is so but we do not instruct accordingly” and the tension between publicizing knowledge and giving practical guidance.
Facts, halakhic ruling, and Maimonides on principles of faith
The text sharpens a distinction between halakhic ruling in normative matters and beliefs as factual claims, and raises the question of what use a majority ruling is if the issue is a fact about which someone reached a different conclusion. It quotes Maimonides that belief in the Messiah is grounded in verses, and that one who doubts it “denies the Torah,” which promised it “explicitly in the portion of Balaam and in ‘You are standing today,’” but also emphasizes that the verses are open to interpretation and therefore do not provide certainty like a tradition does.
Secular messianism: communism, utopia, and the postmodern fracture
The text describes the borrowed use of the concept of “messianism” with regard to movements like communism, and presents the negative connotation of determined striving toward utopia that leads to “heavy costs” and violence. It tells of a conversation with a communist activist in Jerusalem and of a funeral in Yad Hannah that illustrates “mourning for a vanished world,” and describes a shift in which there is no longer a “clear utopian model,” but rather an ongoing striving for improvement without a clear final goal. It presents this as a “fracture” of secular messianism, similar to the fear of disillusionment in religious messianism, and connects it to despair over the great ideologies associated with postmodernism.
The criterion of conduct: certainty, unreality, and retrospective results
The text argues that messianism can be criticized even before the question of final success, because something “in the conduct itself” can be flawed, such as certainty that justifies cruelty or unrealistic steps taken out of confidence that “the Holy One, blessed be He, is with you.” It compares this to criticism of communism, where even if it had “succeeded,” violent conduct would still not be justified, and transfers this to the religious context as unrealistic actions such as extreme initiatives around the Temple Mount. It brings the story of Rabbi Shach’s opposition to the Entebbe operation to show that the claim of unreality is not refuted by the fact that a move succeeded after the fact, because the decision is made according to the data available at the time, and it distinguishes between a normative argument about risk and a factual argument about probability.
Secular Zionism versus Religious Zionism as messianism
The text concludes by distinguishing between secular Zionism as messianism in the secular sense of improving historical conditions and sovereignty, and “Religious-Zionism” with a hyphen, which sees the political enterprise as part of bringing redemption and the Messiah. It states that the question under examination is how to characterize this religious messianism, and whether it is appropriate to view it as a messianic phenomenon in the negative sense, perceived as dangerous, even without defining it as a halakhic prohibition.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And we said, my parents pushed me to go far from home: succeed, go where you want. Why do you need all the little chicks around your skirt?
[Speaker B] It’s a different mentality, the clan mentality.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, but I’m saying, you trap your children and then you even cry over the fact that they succeeded and still left. It was interesting. But apropos his hubris, right? He came once in… it was in that same series. He came to some kabbalist-type person, one of those figures. So he came to interview him, and it was absolutely hilarious.
[Speaker B] He’s probably missing an asterisk.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I mean, he spoke to him somewhat seriously, and the other guy was really talking to him seriously, explaining that he could see on his face the basic modesty he possessed, this divine kabbalist.
[Speaker B] Saying that to Liron London.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He said it to Liron London! Through face reading, meaning he managed to figure it out. So London himself laughed at this amusing diagnosis.
[Speaker C] And that could be like the story about Moses. What? It’s a story — Rabbi Eitan writes that its source is among the gentiles and that it isn’t true, but I don’t know how it got passed along, at least to some Jewish commentator as well. What? Moses — some king in his time wanted to determine his character traits, so he sent a painter to paint him. And they brought the portrait to some sage skilled in physiognomy who lived in those days, and he said that Moses had all the bad traits there are
[Speaker D] in the world.
[Speaker C] And then they asked him, and he said: correct, I was born with all the bad traits, and I worked and refined my character and managed to correct them all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But they say the skin of his face radiated, meaning from when he was born. So at the end of this interview with the “kabbalist,” in quotation marks, he suggests that he change his name. A name that would suit him better. So, what do you suggest for me? Instead of Yaron? No, add a name. Maybe Adoram? Yaron Adoram London. That’s the name of a battalion commander.
[Speaker E] That’s the name
[Speaker B] of a
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] pilot.
[Speaker E] He was the basis for Hasamba; Yaron Zehavi was the basis.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In his childhood he lived near
[Speaker E] Yigal Mosenzon.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He used to have that show, London’s Parliament, once — that was also interesting. A very interesting person, an autodidact. I was interviewed by him once, so we talked a bit beforehand.
[Speaker E] Yes,
[Speaker B] before
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the program started, so we talked a bit. But I’m not talking about formal study — we talked about the doctorate I did in physics and so on. He’s not someone who studies systematically, but he has a very broad education. I have a friend who was his editorial assistant at the journal Status, which used to go out to various Knesset members and businesspeople and cost a lot of money. Yaron London was the editor, and my friend was also an editor or his assistant. I told him what my friend had told me when we spoke — that his main job was to do de-Londonization of the articles. Because once Yaron London goes over an article, it’s all written the way he writes, not what the original person said. He subordinates everything to himself.
[Speaker D] He edits the way an editor is supposed to.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s a reasonable person — Aharon Barak. Fine, so we’re dealing with matters of messianism and the Messiah. Last time I began with belief in the coming of the Messiah and Rabbi Hillel, and we discussed authority regarding facts — that was some time ago. In the Talmud in tractate Sanhedrin there begins a discussion about calculating the end-times. Calculating the end-times already starts bringing us close to the question of messianism. I’m moving toward it as much as possible from within the sources. It was taught: Rabbi Natan says, in the Talmud in Sanhedrin, “This verse pierces and descends to the depths”: “For the vision is yet for the appointed time, and it speaks of the end and does not lie; though it tarry, wait for it, for it will surely come, it will not delay.” A verse in Habakkuk. Not like our rabbis who would expound, “until a time, times, and half a time,” and not like Rabbi Simlai who would expound, “You fed them bread of tears and gave them tears to drink in large measure.” “And gave them to drink” — what?
[Speaker F] “Gave them to drink.” “Gave them to drink,” right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And gave them tears to drink in large measure.” And not like Rabbi Akiva, who would expound, “Yet once, it is a little while, and I will shake the heavens and the earth.” Meaning, all kinds of calculations of when exactly the Messiah is supposed to come. Rather: the first kingdom lasted seventy years, the second kingdom fifty-two, and the kingdom of Ben Koziva two and a half years. So all of these, basically, were expounding and calculating the end-times. And this verse in Habakkuk — “not like our rabbis who would expound” — the verse says not to expound. Now that’s interesting, because those Jews also read the verse in Habakkuk, so why did they do it?
[Speaker G] Well, okay, they just didn’t interpret it that way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe they didn’t interpret it that way, but it doesn’t say that here. The verse is brought, and then: “not like our rabbis.” So what did our rabbis say? Say that there are apparently two interpretations of the verse. In the Talmud it’s presented as though this is the interpretation of the verse, and there’s no alternative. What is the meaning of “it speaks of the end and does not lie”? The Talmud there expounds: Rav Shmuel bar Nachmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan — this is that verse in Habakkuk — “May the spirits of those who calculate the end-times expire, for they would say: since the end has arrived and he has not come, he will no longer come. Rather, wait for him, as it is said: though it tarry, wait for it.” Now, this can be read in two ways. One could read it as: “May the spirits of those who calculate the end-times expire” because of the concern — meaning, if you calculate the end and conclude that the Messiah is supposed to arrive on such-and-such a date, and he doesn’t arrive, then you’ll lose faith in the Messiah altogether, and maybe in the Torah too. Therefore, don’t make calculations. Right? Like “do not test” — it’s forbidden to test the Holy One, blessed be He. Some kind of idea of not making calculations. But it could also be read differently. It could be read that “may the spirits of those who calculate the end-times expire” refers to those who draw conclusions from their calculations and conclude that if the Messiah didn’t arrive, then he’ll never arrive. Make the calculation — but know that you could be wrong. Then it wouldn’t be a prohibition against making the calculation; it would just be a warning that your calculation might not be correct, and if it is disproven, that doesn’t mean you should lose faith in the coming of the Messiah. It seems that the standard explanation is not to make calculations at all, but there are several medieval authorities (Rishonim) who did make such calculations. So the question is exactly how they understood the issue. I once thought — I saw someone address this explicitly — but I once thought that maybe this is the explanation. Meaning that they basically read the Talmud differently. Not “may their spirit expire” because of the calculation, but because of the person who draws the conclusion from the calculation and ends up deciding that the Messiah will not come.
[Speaker I] Maybe “may they expire” isn’t a prohibition. Maybe it’s something like saying, this won’t work out for you, but it’s not a prohibition — it’s not the language of prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I also think about the wording — it’s not the language of prohibition, and in a moment I’ll note that too. But still, if the Talmud says “may the spirits of those who calculate the end-times expire,” I wouldn’t expect the medieval authorities (Rishonim) to engage in calculating the end-times, even if it’s not a prohibition. Maybe it’s still something negative.
[Speaker I] Yes. Maybe they said there’s no joy like facts?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Huh? Yes. But these aren’t facts. On the contrary, it’s guidance, not a fact.
[Speaker C] No, it says: “May the spirits of those who
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] calculate the end-times expire” — that’s a statement. You’re saying that even though I conclude that the Messiah will come in another one hundred and twenty-two years, one should not make the calculation — that indeed is a fact. If I conclude that the Messiah will come in another one hundred and twenty-two years, that’s a factual conclusion, whether true or false, but that’s my conclusion. I estimate that this is what will happen, factually. But when you say not to make the calculation, that’s normative guidance. There’s room to discuss this.
[Speaker C] And let’s also say, I don’t know if the medieval authorities (Rishonim), when they offered various hints, were really sure this was correct. It could be that they said it more in order to encourage the masses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But then it’s really
[Speaker C] still
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] even harder — then why are they doing it at all?
[Speaker C] Maybe to encourage the masses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. In some places — when Maimonides does this in the Epistle to Yemen, that really is the standard explanation. Maimonides makes a calculation there. So that’s the standard explanation: Maimonides himself writes against it in the Mishneh Torah, yet he does it in the Epistle to Yemen, and people say that because of the distress and the difficult situation there, he did it in order to encourage them. But there are those who do it in a commentary on Daniel, or somewhere that doesn’t look like something aimed at the masses to encourage anyone, but simply as an interpretation of verses. So, fine, I don’t know. In any case, Maimonides writes in the Laws of Kings, chapter 12 — chapter 11, law… 11, law 4 — “As for the thoughts of the Creator of the world, man has no power to grasp them, for our ways are not His ways and our thoughts are not His thoughts.” So therefore all the signs and characteristics of the coming of the Messiah and so on — don’t occupy yourself with it; we cannot know, even though, again, the sages do give such signs. So that’s a little strange. What does it mean not to occupy oneself with it? Not to study the Talmudic passages that do it? At the end of Sotah there are signs that the son of David is coming, right? “Insolence will increase,” and all those lists there. So what are we… what does it mean not to deal with it? Then why did the sages deal with it? So one could somewhat say that really, one should not deal with it. Meaning, the sages did it — maybe they had some kind of heavenly source of information, I have no idea. They did it, but you shouldn’t deal with it, because only trouble comes from it. Not a prohibition — indeed, the wording is not the language of a formal halakhic prohibition. But don’t deal with it, because only trouble comes out of it. It’s a kind of “the law is so but we do not instruct accordingly,” or not law but aggadah and we do not instruct accordingly. Meaning: don’t study it. Also in chapter 12, law 2 there in the Laws of Sanhedrin he writes: “All these matters and those like them, no person knows how they will be until they happen, for they are obscure matters in the prophets. Even the sages have no tradition regarding these matters, only according to the apparent meaning of the verses.” This is a very interesting point. Meaning, the signs the sages brought — and this is what I discussed in the previous lecture when I spoke about the coming of the Messiah, the arguments against Hillel. Rabbi Hillel said: “Israel has no Messiah, for they already consumed him in the days of Hezekiah.” In the Talmud in Sanhedrin. So the Talmud says, “May the Master forgive Rabbi Hillel,” and it brings a verse from the prophets. So I said there that this hints at, or expresses, the idea that there is apparently no orderly tradition about this. Not that there was some clear tradition, a law to Moses at Sinai, I don’t know exactly, about when the Messiah arrives — because then Hillel would simply be a denier of a principle of faith. Rather, what they told him was: listen, this goes against the verses. Like the end-time calculations here, which go against verses. There is a verse that says otherwise. Fine — but he could interpret it differently. Meaning, I don’t know, all sorts of other things are possible. Therefore here there is room for hesitation. In that sense, tradition is stronger than verses. Because from verses we know — after all, “an eye for an eye” is also written. A lot of things are written in the verses. We interpret the verses. So in my opinion, one reason I’m very reserved about studying the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) is that you can’t really learn anything from it. In the end, whatever you want, you put into the Bible. So why study it? What I want, I already know myself. I don’t need to insert it into… it doesn’t help me to put it into the Bible. I have never in my life seen someone actually learn something from the Bible, by the way. I don’t… almost — I can hardly even imagine such a thing. So I don’t really understand why people deal with it.
[Speaker H] Wait. Questions. When Rabbi Hillel says, “Israel has no Messiah,” what does that mean? That Israel has no redemption? Or that there is no…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what it says. Now you can interpret it however you understand.
[Speaker H] I don’t know how they understood it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They understood it to mean yes, that the Messiah will not come.
[Speaker H] That there’s no redemption? No, what does that mean, no redemption? No Temple? No… what…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does it mean? I don’t know.
[Speaker H] Maybe there’s no messiah, no individual person.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, okay, that doesn’t seem all that significant to me. I assume the meaning is that… in general, nowadays there are all kinds of interpretations that the messiah is not a person but a period or something like that.
[Speaker C] What interpretations like that are there?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Today there are — even in Rav Kook there are. He speaks there about Messiah son of Joseph. In one place he talks about Herzl, but elsewhere he says that
[Speaker C] about Messiah son of Joseph, but not about…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are several sayings about Messiah son of David too — I’ve already seen various statements… I’d have to look, but there are, there are such statements. What basically lies behind this is the question whether we aspire to monarchical redemption. Nowadays there’s an instinctive resistance to monarchy, and democracy is seen as a better form of government. So what about Messiah son of David, who will come and once again be our king? Are we going back to monarchy? No, no — there will be democratic government, and the coming of the Messiah just means there will be redemption.
[Speaker J] Will he
[Speaker B] be prime minister?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Maybe prime minister, or maybe he won’t exist at all — it’s just a period called the messianic era, but it doesn’t have to be specifically… Meaning, if we get to that level of interpretation, then you understand that it’s very hard to derive anything from verses. In any case, Maimonides writes: “Even the sages have no tradition regarding these matters, only according to the apparent meaning of the verses.” Admittedly, he’s talking about the signs of redemption, not about the very coming of the Messiah. There I don’t know what he thinks. But about the signs of redemption he says that even what the sages wrote — and they did write such things, as I noted earlier; there’s the end of Sotah and elsewhere, and Sanhedrin too — that’s based on the apparent meaning of the verses. That’s how they understood the verses. But how can you know? Verses can be interpreted in all kinds of ways. “Therefore there is dispute regarding these matters. In any case, the order of how these things will happen and their details are not fundamentals of religion. And one should not dwell at length on the midrashim said concerning these matters and the like of them” — I assume he means aggadic teachings that deal with this; I don’t think he means aggadah in general. I don’t know. Maybe Maimonides thought that in his early period. “And one should not make them a principle, for they lead neither to fear nor to love.” In short, it’s not useful. There’s no reason to occupy oneself with it. “And similarly, one should not calculate the end-times. The sages said: May the spirits of those who calculate the end-times expire. Rather, one should wait and believe in the matter in general,” just as you believe that the Messiah will come. Signs and details, whether this is being realized or not being realized — there’s no point in dealing with it. I’ll jump to our own day as well: in our time quite a few people deal with it. Certainly in Religious Zionist thought, right? “Land of Israel, you shall give forth your branches,” and the Talmud at the end of Sotah and “insolence will increase,” and all the signs the sages already gave. And the argument all the time is whether the signs are being fulfilled or not. But Maimonides claims: regardless of whether the signs are being fulfilled, don’t deal with it — it’s not useful. Meaning, it may be that the concern is that the signs won’t be fulfilled and then damage will be done. Fine. But in the end, it’s not the question of whether the sages were right or wrong; it’s that this is not a tradition, it doesn’t add fear of Heaven, it doesn’t… so why deal with it? It’s just something lacking…
[Speaker H] I don’t know. When you’re in exile, don’t deal with it — but maybe when you’re here and you see the process of redemption, wait, then you see the process of redemption, so then how should the High Priest’s garments be sewn? Then you do need to deal with it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Leave that aside. According to the signs, you need to sew the High Priest’s garments?
[Speaker H] If you see that there are signs that yes… No, but when the Messiah comes, then we’ll deal with the issue. I mean, a thousand years ago in exile, when you didn’t see the light at the end of the tunnel.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is the light at the end of the tunnel? And what if in the end it doesn’t happen?
[Speaker H] What, what? I don’t know, it’s a practical question. It’s a practical question.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Same consideration. Same consideration. But there it’s a practical question. The prohibition — there is no prohibition… no, in exile, I’m saying, there’s no prohibition on engaging in end-time calculations. Neither in the Talmudic wording nor in Maimonides does it sound like there’s some halakhic prohibition here. Rather, it’s not recommended, because who knows — in the end, if that’s the interpretation of the Talmud, in the end it won’t come true and everyone will lose their faith.
[Speaker H] There’s a difference between preparing the High Priest’s garments in the time of Maimonides, when you still hadn’t begun to see any ingathering of exiles, and today, when you see the process of gathering… call it what you want, the beginning of redemption or… call it what you want, and you see… and you see…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if in the end it can be disproven? It can. Oh — so if it can, then why deal with it? Same consideration. The chance that it will be disproven is smaller. Okay, but it still exists. Right? So why are you dealing with it? Who knows. We’ll discuss this later. I think I once mentioned that Rabbi Kalner from the Har HaMor circles once said — I heard this in his name — that if the State of Israel is destroyed, he’ll take off his kippah. I’m not sure he’ll still be here to take off his kippah. But he’ll take it off. Now, actually I appreciated that statement. Because at least he was willing to stand behind the thesis that everyone basically declares. I believe that in the end he wouldn’t stand behind it if that happened. But at least he says he’s willing to put things to an empirical test. As opposed to those who always find excuses in the end. Yes, it was, it wasn’t, but in the end it did happen, and that’s how redemption works — it rises upward and goes downward, and it’s like the dawn.
[Speaker D] The immigration to the Land in 1840 — Arie Morgenstern wrote about it, gave a lecture about it. It was based on some end-time calculations. And when it didn’t happen, they kept correcting the calculations. Yes, right. There were updates.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there were all kinds of phenomena. There were all kinds of phenomena. I think it’s Shulamit Lapid, in her book Like Broken Clay — I think in Like Broken Clay — she writes there about the period of World War I, or even before World War I in Jerusalem, that there was some mass conversion of Jews to Christianity in Jerusalem. That’s interesting. Why? Because there was some rumor that the messiah was arriving. Before World War I it was a hard period there, with severe famine too. During World War I there was really terrible famine there; people reached utter destitution… before World War I? Or during the war? I think it was even before, or during the war — I don’t remember exactly.
[Speaker D] They raised the issue of the settlement…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the famine yes, but I think the book deals even with a period that I think was before. And there was some mass conversion of Jews there because there was a rumor about the messiah, and when the messiah didn’t come, people said, forget it, it’s all nonsense. That’s it, we’re leaving. So there were such periods in various places. Meaning, this isn’t a concern without basis. That’s why I say: we’re not talking here about a prohibition. I don’t think the language of the Talmud or of Maimonides functions as a halakhic prohibition. Rather, there is some concern about damage, about problems that will result from this issue. That’s one point regarding calculating the end-times. A second point — I’m simply trying to gather whatever can be derived from the sources. As I said, the phenomenon of false messianism is difficult. It’s very hard to discuss it in light of the sources. We’ll see more of this later too. But I’m trying somehow to organize the framework, more or less, of what can be drawn from the sources. Meaning, can I ask something for a moment?
[Speaker C] Something here seems missing. Assuming we understand it, at least in the way I know to be the accepted or almost agreed upon understanding of messiah — namely, that the messiah is a specific person chosen to be the Messiah — then I would expect that, meaning if I take it from Maimonides, and it also seems reasonable to me, that in order to determine that someone is the Messiah, meaning in order to determine that God chose someone to be the Messiah, there must be a prophecy declaring it. And once there is prophecy, then by definition it’s understood that it’s true. What about Elijah there? What he says?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or that he himself
[Speaker C] will be a prophet — that’s the most natural thing. And if not he himself, then some other prophet who will be there at that time. And it turns out that apparently the great later authorities (Acharonim) didn’t think so. They’ll say he’s a prophet? The great later authorities — no, there are tests for prophecy.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are tests for prophecy. Maimonides writes how to test whether a prophet is a true prophet. But the great later authorities (Acharonim) talked about Shabbetai Tzvi and various others, and at first they did think he was the Messiah, and they weren’t troubled by the fact that no prophet had appeared beforehand
[Speaker C] to announce
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] this or something like that.
[Speaker C] Meaning, it doesn’t seem that people really saw this, even the Chabad people, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Chabad people who thought their Rebbe was the Messiah, and they are always so precise about everything in Maimonides and all that. Meaning, I’ve never seen a reference to this — surely they have some sort of reference to it there.
[Speaker C] It could be that they also thought he was a prophet. At least that’s how some of them see it; I don’t know if all of them do.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if so, then if so, it’s not a criterion for anything. Then anyone can be a prophet and declare himself a prophet and the Messiah and everything is fine. It needs to be tested somehow, but if it’s enough to think he’s also a prophet, then there’s no problem.
[Speaker C] I’m not saying they were right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but what — how did they base it? If he announces that he is the Messiah and also announces that he is a prophet and therefore it’s fine, okay, then you haven’t added anything.
[Speaker F] I haven’t heard them say he was a prophet.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I haven’t heard that either, but I’m saying — in short, I don’t think, I don’t see that people really treat this criterion — that there first has to be a prophet — as some binding criterion. That’s one point. A second point concerns actions to bring redemption or the Messiah. And that too touches on the question of false messianism; I’ll define that further later, but for now I’m just circling around the issue. On the one hand, the Talmud in tractate Sanhedrin brings: “And so Rabbi Yehuda would say: Israel was commanded with three commandments upon entering the Land: to appoint a king for themselves, to wipe out the seed of Amalek, and to build for themselves the Chosen House.” All right? This commandment is a commandment for all generations, not just upon entering the Land. Maimonides even counts it in the enumeration of the commandments, commandment twenty: that we were commanded to build a house of worship. As for a king, that’s another not-so-simple question, but certainly regarding establishing the Temple — that is an ongoing commandment. Meaning, the Temple has to be built. It’s an obligating commandment. But Rashi in tractate Sukkah 41 says: “But the future Temple for which we wait, built and perfected, will be revealed and come from heaven, as it is said: ‘the sanctuary, Lord, that Your hands established.’” So Rashi says the future Temple will descend from heaven, even though there is a commandment to build the Temple. But the future Temple will descend from heaven. As is well known, the Arukh LaNer there in that same sugya in Sukkah writes as follows: “Therefore it seems to me, in my humble opinion” — this is often brought up in the context of Haredi Judaism versus Religious Zionism; people maybe tie it to that disagreement. The Arukh LaNer says: “Therefore it seems to me, in my humble opinion, that certainly the Temple in the future will be built as an actual structure by human hands, for there is a commandment to build the Temple. And what is said, ‘the sanctuary, Lord, that Your hands established,’ which in Tanchuma is expounded to mean that it will descend below,” as though from heaven — “this refers to a spiritual Temple that will come into the physically built Temple like a soul within a body. And just as in the Tabernacle and in the Temple the heavenly fire descended into the ordinary fire kindled by wood.” We kindle the fire below, and the fire from above somehow descends like a soul in a body. “And so too it appears in the Mekhilta, which expounds from the verse, ‘the place for Your dwelling that You made, Lord,’ that the Temple above is aligned opposite the Temple below. And this is what is meant by ‘the sanctuary, Lord, that Your hands established’: that in the future, when the Lord reigns forever and ever before the eyes of all the inhabitants of the world, He will dwell below within a Temple that is already built and aligned opposite the Temple. And that is what is meant by its descending below into the Temple that will be built.” The specific interpretations he gives here on the verses don’t matter for our purposes at the moment, but on the principled level he does not accept what Rashi writes — or perhaps he is even offering an interpretation. In Rashi it doesn’t enter, by the way. Rashi doesn’t say this; that’s clear. Because Rashi there is speaking about the actual building itself, in terms of building, and the question whether it will be on the Sabbath or not on the Sabbath — in Rashi it’s clear that this is not his intention. But he offers another interpretation. The claim is that we will build it by human hands, and the Temple above will somehow enter the Temple we build here, like a soul in a body. Then there is a dispute here about what exactly is expected for us in the future: whether we are supposed to build the Temple, or whether the Temple is supposed to be given to us, somehow descend from heaven. By the way, that doesn’t have to mean exactly that. Here too it can be interpreted in various ways. Meaning, “descend from heaven” could mean it will be given to us — we won’t need to make some special exertion for it — and then one can reconcile these two possibilities somewhat. Meaning, we will build it, but it will be something like a declaration of Cyrus, that is, they will grant us the… we won’t have to fight for it; it won’t be something we need to do against natural means. But in the simple sense, there is a dispute here whether it descends from heaven or whether we are supposed to build it. And quite a few thinkers, especially in the modern period, have tied to this issue the disagreement between Haredi Judaism and Religious Zionism. Religious Zionism thinks one has to take action so that the Temple will be built, to bring the Messiah in general, and also to build the Temple. Haredi Judaism basically holds that we are supposed to wait, and the Temple and the Messiah and everything — it will descend from heaven; we are not supposed to take actions to bring it. This already touches more directly on the question of false messianism. Because actions to bring the Messiah already connect in some way to false messianism. I’m not saying that everyone who acts is engaged in false messianism, but it already begins to approach the sugya.
[Speaker F] What actions are associated with bringing the Messiah? Rashi says the Temple will descend from heaven. Rashi says that, but Religious Zionism doesn’t accept that either, does it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not all of them. Why?
[Speaker F] They don’t accept Rashi?
[Speaker I] They go according to the Arukh LaNer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s a dispute. It’s the dispute between the Arukh LaNer and the Malbim. Who accepts Rashi?
[Speaker F] No, they take action, even though…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They take action. Look, Rabbi Yisrael Ariel with the Temple Institute, who is making the vessels—he wants, no, they are acting in order to build the Temple. They want to build the Temple. Obviously, not to bring the messiah and wait for it to come down from heaven.
[Speaker F] Not to build the Temple, to prepare all the equipment that will be inside the Temple.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no—to build the Temple. The equipment they’re already making, because that doesn’t depend on the place. But they want—there’s the Temple movement there that wants to build the Temple.
[Speaker F] Have they already chosen a quarry or…?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They haven’t chosen any quarry, because that still isn’t—I think, as far as I know—because it isn’t realistic. But they want to, they’re trying to pressure—no, what suddenly?
[Speaker F] They don’t see the light at the end of the tunnel and they’re already talking about this and more.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. There’s an approach there that says we need to build it, that they are demanding that the government of Israel carry out the building of the Temple. For now, of course, that isn’t getting much of a response, but yes, that is an approach. You can ask Bibi. By the way, also a great many—I think much broader circles than this Temple movement support this in principle, support it in principle. They just don’t see it as realistic right now; Bibi won’t do it and the world won’t allow it. So you have to be realistic. But they have no principled objection to the Arukh LaNer’s approach, that we are supposed to be the ones who initiate and build the Temple. The question is how far—and this will also bring us to the question of false messianism—the question is how far this should be done with realistic tools. Or maybe not: what have you to do with the hidden plans of the Merciful One? You have a commandment to build the Temple, and don’t worry—you should do what you were commanded, and the problems will have to be dealt with.
[Speaker H] But according to Rabbi Ariel’s view, even if the Temple comes down from heaven, still—what? The priestly garments still have to be prepared, the Temple vessels still have to be prepared.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] True, correct, but he also argues more than that. He argues that the construction itself also has to be done.
[Speaker F] But are the two things dependent on each other? The building of the Temple and the coming of the messiah? Simply yes?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s part of the issue. It’s part of the redemption. I don’t know who does what and in what order; there are all kinds of statements like that among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). I never read that stuff because it doesn’t interest me. It’s a lot of speculation, and I don’t understand why one has to deal with it.
[Speaker F] It does interest you—you’re giving a lecture about it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m giving a lecture about why it isn’t interesting. That’s the purpose of the lecture. I’ll get to that later, but that’s—the purpose of the lecture is that Maimonides writes this. Again, here I’m in good
[Speaker F] company—Maimonides writes
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that it adds nothing to fear of Heaven, and there’s no reason to deal with it, just pointless. And despite that, he calculates end-times. In the Epistle to Yemen? Yes, and there he writes that it is forbidden to calculate end-times. There he apparently thought it was necessary because of the troubles they were experiencing there.
[Speaker H] He writes that there too. The Temple Institute also discussed here, according to the Rabbi’s order, what comes first: to wipe out the seed of Amalek and then the building of the Temple. You can’t say Maimonides doesn’t deal with it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he rules Jewish law; he doesn’t “deal with it.” Fine, the Talmud says it, and he rules all the laws. When the King Messiah arrives, he’ll read Maimonides and know what to do.
[Speaker H] Okay. It’s permissible to disagree with Maimonides. Seemingly it’s permissible. It’s permissible—I mean permissible—so he does raise a discussion about it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem, it’s permissible, everything’s fine. I didn’t say this approach isn’t legitimate. Rashi says it too. He differs. There’s no problem at all. Yes. I have no issue. The views are legitimate. Right now we’re studying the topic. Fine. Now, as I already said in previous lectures, false messianism is a topic that’s hard to discuss in halakhic terms. There is no halakhic prohibition against being a false messiah, on the face of it. In a moment I’ll bring a Yad Ramah that maybe does claim there’s such a prohibition. But there’s no prohibition against being a false messiah; there is a prohibition against being a false prophet. Is there a prohibition against lying? It’s forbidden to lie, yes. We talked about that. But fine—if a person genuinely, sincerely believes that he is the messiah, and we think people should follow him, then he isn’t lying. So he’s okay. He’s lying unintentionally—or not; the question is whether
[Speaker J] It’s not his believers who are the liars; only he isn’t lying.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying: the question is whether a lie has to involve reflection, or whether whenever you don’t say the truth that’s always a lie, and if you don’t know, then you’re lying under compulsion.
[Speaker J] It’s a lie, but you’re not a liar.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, in any case—so there’s no halakhic prohibition here, and therefore it’s very hard to discuss these things using halakhic tools. This has to be discussed more with sociological tools. And indeed, throughout history, all kinds of people and movements arose that declared themselves messianic, and at some stage they were declared false messianism—but very often that was far from clear. There was broad rabbinic agreement with some of these movements. And that’s aside from Shabbetai Tzvi, I
[Speaker C] mean
[Speaker K] Were there others that had agreement?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Alroy, yes, there were various ones. Shlomo Molcho, there were all kinds. I’ll give examples. There was agreement about them? Yes. Yes. Yes. There was agreement, there was hesitation, yes, various things. With Molcho, all the way to the end—in fact, even more after the end. And in the end this stems from the fact that there really are no unequivocal tools, because they don’t really deal with signs, and there’s no point dealing with signs, and Maimonides says we have no tradition about this. The Sages derived it from verses, and those verses can be interpreted in all kinds of ways. So basically the whole topic is very vague. On the other hand, it’s also very charged. It’s very charged because it’s quite clear that this is a phenomenon with severe damages. A very problematic phenomenon—even though there’s no formal prohibition you can point to, there are serious harms here. Meaning, it has to be dealt with. And therefore this is a very vague topic. And by the way, I hardly know of any treatment of this issue of false messianism. Meaning, when we did this work with my daughter, we looked around a bit—there are almost no orderly discussions of this issue: how do you diagnose false messianism, by what criteria do you determine false messianism? People assume all kinds of things without even realizing they’re assuming them. We talked about actual realization. The fact that it didn’t actually materialize—so that’s a sign he was a false messiah. Who said realization is the criterion? After all, afterward there are always excuses, like with the Lubavitcher Rebbe, right? That we didn’t merit it, we weren’t worthy, or all kinds of things of that sort. Among those who do think that he already…
[Speaker F] On what verses do they rely that a messiah will come?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I brought Maimonides, for example, who writes also—
[Speaker F] Not Maimonides—before Maimonides.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Talmud. There is in the Talmud—it starts in the Talmud? Yes, in the Talmud, about Rabbi Hillel—no, the Talmud brings verses. There, Rabbi Hillel says: “Israel has no messiah, for they already consumed him in the days of Hezekiah.” Rav Yosef said, “May the Master forgive Rabbi Hillel. When was Hezekiah? In the First Temple period.” Hezekiah was in the First Temple period. Whereas Zechariah, who was after the First Temple, was prophesying in the Second Temple period and said: “Rejoice greatly, daughter of Zion; shout, daughter of Jerusalem. Behold, your king comes to you, righteous and victorious is he, humble and riding on a donkey, on a colt, the foal of a she-donkey.” That’s a verse he brings to show that there is redemption, and that’s already after Hezekiah; that’s already in the Second Temple period. Malachi prophesies about it, therefore—sorry—Zechariah prophesies about it, and that’s already in the Second Temple period. Maimonides himself also writes that there are verses about this in Parashat Nitzavim and in Balaam. Verses in the Torah itself as well. Not a verse in the Torah? In the Torah itself, verses from which it appears that the messiah will come. Meaning, Maimonides takes belief in the coming of the messiah as something anchored in verses. We read that too, I think. Here: “May the spirit of those who calculate the end-times expire.” To believe in him and to affirm his greatness, in accordance with what was said of him by every prophet from Moses until Malachi. And anyone who doubts him or belittles his matter thereby denies the Torah, which explicitly promised him in the passage of Balaam and in “You are standing [today].” Maimonides claims there are verses in the Torah regarding the messiah. Yes. Well, as he himself writes, these are verses that can be interpreted, and therefore…
[Speaker C] Yes, but verses—Maimonides writes, if I’m not mistaken, that those verses can be interpreted, meaning that if there is proof against them, against the plain meaning, then they can be interpreted—not that this is how one must take them.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, fine. In any case, you can never be certain, even before there’s proof. And once it’s based on tradition, you can’t—when there is tradition, then that’s how it’s supposed to be. And if there is proof against it, that means the whole business is probably wrong. But if it’s an interpretation of a verse that can later be disproved in light of proofs or factual indications, then from the outset you can’t have full confidence in that verse even beforehand.
[Speaker C] No, maybe full confidence not—but at least an assumption that… okay, fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But you can’t say that someone who doesn’t believe this is a heretic regarding a fundamental principle.
[Speaker C] Ah, on the basis of those verses. I understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore… okay. Now, as a result of these dangers I talked about earlier, dangers we generally know from history and from examples of this issue, there is very great reluctance toward false messianism in Jewish thought. Again, I’m saying, this isn’t—“may the spirit of those who calculate end-times expire” appears in the Talmud as well, though not as a prohibition, but it appears. False messianism is a much broader concept. And there it’s something that simply developed after the damages occurred. Meaning, it isn’t anchored in some halakhic prohibition. Perhaps the most extreme expression of this issue—and again, I am not counting him among the later authorities, of course, Isaiah Leibowitz and Ben-Gurion, two of the greatest later authorities—but Isaiah Leibowitz, yes, so I bring a quote from him here: “I believe in the messiah who will come; forever he will come. A messiah who has come is a false messiah. The messiah will always come in the future.” What he meant to say is: he will not come. Meaning, once the messiah has arrived, that’s a false messiah. And this is not a factual belief; it is apparently supposed to spur us to action, to give us hope, but there is no factual claim here. Yes, he says: “A messiah who has arrived is not a messiah,” or “is not a Jewish messiah,” he writes elsewhere. A hint, of course, to the Christian messiah who did arrive. Meaning, he understood the problem in Christianity not as the fact that their messiah is not the true messiah, but precisely that he is true—in that he was realized. Meaning, a messiah who is realized is a false messiah. And that is proof that Christianity is false, because their messiah was realized. Meaning, it really reaches absurdities. The same with Ben-Gurion…
[Speaker H] So why not say that basically he is making Rabbi Hillel’s claim: “Israel has no messiah”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, correct.
[Speaker D] No,
[Speaker H] only he
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] is careful not to say it. He is careful not to say it, and he himself of course does say it while preserving the whole principle that one must not say it—so as to leave people with hope.
[Speaker F] No, he doesn’t say it like that. He sort of says he will come.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but he says he won’t come. He doesn’t say—once he comes, that’s it. “A messiah who has come is a false messiah.” Ben-Gurion writes: “The messiah has not yet come, and I do not wish for the messiah to come. The moment the messiah comes, he ceases to be the messiah. If you find the address of the messiah”—without “the,” yes, so note that—“if you find the address of messiah in the phone book, he is no longer messiah.” I mentioned HaGashash HaHiver, yes, like: how do you get onto the Ayalon? When the messiah there wants to go up to Jerusalem. What brings them to this? I think what brings them to this is the fear of disillusionment. They also, of course, assume it will be disproved, because they don’t believe—or at least Ben-Gurion doesn’t believe at all in the principles of faith. So from his point of view, beyond the error involved in adopting principles of faith that you don’t need because they aren’t true, there is also a harmful error here. Because once this is disproved, everyone will basically abandon the messianic hope on which he built his whole move. All in all, he mobilized the public for his project when a large part of the public came on the basis of messianic hopes. Meaning, this is no simple story in terms of the beginning of Zionism. Now this thing is strange, because—I’m talking about Leibowitz; Ben-Gurion simply didn’t believe in it, so there’s no point discussing it—but Leibowitz’s claim basically says that you should instill belief in something you know is not true, in order for it to give you hope. But if I know it isn’t true, then I won’t have hope from it either. Unless what? For idiots who don’t know it isn’t true—so then you should keep quiet.
[Speaker B] Don’t reveal to them the truth that you, the wise one, know—don’t reveal…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. There are precedents. Maimonides, after all, brings laws of which “we do not instruct so.” The Talmud also mentions laws of which “we do not instruct so.” I assume that the Talmud’s and Maimonides’ assumption was that ignoramuses don’t open these books—neither Talmud nor Maimonides. And therefore, basically, you can teach this to Torah scholars, because that’s fine; the ignoramuses won’t open the books in any case. It seems to me—because otherwise it’s really hard to understand this.
[Speaker C] Or maybe “we do not instruct so” means in a practical context—we teach it in the sense of studying Jewish law, but we don’t instruct it to someone who comes to ask you what to do right now.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but the Talmud says it—so I’ll draw the practical conclusion on my own about what to do now. After all, when a law is written in the Talmud in the laws of Sabbath, I don’t need to go to a halakhic decisor to tell me what to do now. If it’s written in the Talmud and I understand that this is the situation, that’s what I’ll do.
[Speaker C] Fine, and then that’s okay. Like the issue of zealotry: Pinchas comes to Moses and says, “You taught us that zealots strike him.” And then Moses says, “Let the reader of the letter be its messenger.” Meaning, that actually was okay. But then the Talmud says, “It is a law, but we do not instruct so,” meaning it’s not something that should come…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but Moses our teacher also didn’t reveal that law to him—not only did he not instruct him to do it. Apparently this was something where he knew the law, despite…
[Speaker C] How did he know? Moses our teacher was the source of the whole Torah. The version I know is that Pinchas said to him, “Moses our teacher, you taught us.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, “you taught us.” He does say that. But I’m saying, I still assume the intention is that you teach this to Pinchas, you understand? You don’t teach this law—even without an instruction for practical action—to the broad public. Because Torah scholars will already know what to do with it, so to them you can reveal it; otherwise this law would simply be lost. You can’t fail to pass it on, because otherwise how would people know? They wouldn’t know. Even a law of which “we do not instruct so” still has to be known, even if not instructed. But on the other hand, if you publicize it widely, what’s the difference between that and instructing it? In other words, people who know will implement it.
[Speaker C] It could be that the issue with “we do not instruct so” is not something meant to prevent unworthy people—or to prevent it from being implemented—so that people… Rather, it is not intended for practical implementation at all by anyone. No, it is for practical implementation, but it should not come from a halakhic ruling—only from something already known from the past.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but if it’s written in the Talmud, then it comes from a halakhic ruling. The Talmud says the law, and I implement it. So what’s the difference? The Talmud is the Maimonides of that period. It was the legal book they had.
[Speaker H] There’s a more fundamental question here. Suppose Rabbi Hillel had said something on a straightforward halakhic topic, okay? He would say there’s no problem doing labor on a Jewish holiday. And then the Talmud would say, “May the Master forgive Rabbi Hillel,” and that would be it. So what would we say? Fine, there’s some lone view of Rabbi Hillel, but Jewish law was ruled otherwise—that he’s an extreme lone opinion, and that’s it. Now once the Talmud is structured so that he says “Israel has no messiah” and all that, and it’s brought as a lone opinion, and the Talmud says “May the Master forgive Rabbi Hillel,” and no one presents any supporting position, that’s a sign he wasn’t talking sensibly, let’s call it that. So fine, that Leibowitz supports
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] him is very nice.
[Speaker H] But fine, it wasn’t ruled as Jewish law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but that’s exactly what I’m saying. And that’s why I gave that whole introduction in the first lecture about halakhic rulings with regard to facts. In other words, there’s a difference between doing labor on a Jewish holiday and belief in the coming of the messiah. Belief in the coming of the messiah is a fact. True or not true—fine, you can argue—but it’s a fact. What does halakhic ruling have to do with it? If he’s right, then he’s right. I don’t care if the majority think otherwise.
[Speaker K] It has nothing to do with what he said. Even if Rabbi Hillel would say—what? Then even if Rabbi Hillel would say…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously, correct, that’s the point. Even against the coming of the messiah I don’t need to rely on Rabbi Hillel. If that’s my conclusion, then that’s my conclusion. What does halakhic ruling have to do with this issue? Maimonides himself writes that there is no halakhic ruling on something that doesn’t pertain to practice, even though the Thirteen Principles he does present as some kind of determination—or actually apparently does see as something halakhic, because someone who doesn’t accept them is a heretic regarding a fundamental principle, and that has halakhic implications—what do you do with someone who is a heretic regarding a fundamental principle. And that is a halakhic implication of…
[Speaker K] Right. Therefore the Thirteen Principles—it sounds like one can issue rulings on that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but even so, it’s still a factual matter. The question is a factual one. If I disagree with this, it’s not that I don’t accept the authority of Jewish law; rather, I’ve reached the conclusion that this fact is not true.
[Speaker K] Maimonides says something that doesn’t pertain to practice. The Thirteen Principles do pertain to practice.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand. But I’m saying: what stands behind that? What stands behind it, apparently, is the conception that there is no authority with respect to facts. So here too, even if there are practical implications, we are still dealing with a fact. So if I’ve reached the conclusion that it’s not true, what will it help me if all the sages of Israel say it is true? That’s my conclusion—unless I’m persuaded, as I talked about in the first lecture. So in this matter I don’t think there is a difference. I’ll perhaps give an example that I once thought of—maybe someone even told me, I no longer remember—but it’s an interesting point. Think about reward and punishment, say, in the World to Come. Basically, the Holy One, blessed be He, punishes sinners in Gehinnom in the World to Come. Why would He do that? What good does it do? After all, none of us knows what happens there. By the time we get there, it’s already too late; we’ve already done our commandments and our transgressions. Right? So why do it? What’s needed is to tell us that there is punishment in the World to Come, not to carry it out. Right? To tell us there is punishment in the World to Come, because that could cause us to keep commandments here—but not to carry it out.
[Speaker C] Because if the goal is to get us to keep commandments here, then it seems to me He could have given something more tangible.
[Speaker E] What do you mean?
[Speaker C] Like some kind of fire?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, He didn’t want to—we already talked about this once—He didn’t want to deviate from the laws of nature in the conduct of this world. Okay? “There is no reward for a commandment in this world.” So He tells us, fine, in the World to Come you’ll reap it. Fine, so I understand if He tells us that; I understand that has a purpose, it will improve our ways. But according to that logic, it means that really He should tell us, but not actualize it. Why cause harm for no benefit? Would the Holy One, blessed be He, do us harm for nothing when it doesn’t help?
[Speaker H] Maybe there’s some sort of mode of governance here. What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? Yes, but that would be a different kind of governance.
[Speaker H] He doesn’t do that
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] as reward and punishment—it’s a mode of governance. What do you mean He doesn’t do it as reward and punishment? It is reward and punishment.
[Speaker D] We don’t understand the concept of reward and punishment, but in any
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] case we understand that the Holy One, blessed be He, has an interest in how we behave here. Let’s analyze this—what do you mean we don’t understand? Here, we do understand. He is trying to get us to perform commandments, and in principle He could have achieved that just by telling us, without the actual implementation. And therefore it could indeed be that the statement exists even though in the end it is not realized.
[Speaker F] So maybe indeed it isn’t realized?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe indeed it isn’t realized. Except what?
[Speaker F] Obviously they won’t say
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that, because if they say that, then it also won’t have its effect. But on the other hand—now on the other hand, when I make this calculation and really reach the conclusion that in the end it isn’t realized, then for me too it won’t achieve its goal. So how can that be? Meaning, somehow He does need to do it, because otherwise it won’t achieve the goal. But I don’t know—I mean, again, it’s a kind of cycle and I don’t know where to stop it. It’s the same thing. Leibowitz says something even worse than that. Leibowitz says a messiah who arrives is not the messiah. So what does he expect—that we should believe in the messiah but know he’ll never come? Then I no longer believe in him. In what sense can this affect me subjectively if objectively I know that this fact is not true? You can’t dance at two weddings. It might be possible not to reveal it to the public, because the public are idiots and think the messiah really will come. Fine. But you are saying it openly, so you are also preventing this thing from functioning. You can’t. Now true, of course, he can rely on the public not accepting what he says; that’s fine. And whoever does accept it, fine, it probably also won’t harm him because he’s smart. And the fools around him won’t accept it anyway, because they’re used to what they were educated on, and everything is fine. So you can even say it, and we see with our own eyes—even when he says it publicly, people don’t accept it. Maybe justifiably; I’m not judging that right now. I’m only saying that factually, it’s a correct assessment.
[Speaker F] The statement is only a statement. In the end, we don’t know what will be. Obviously, fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but if Leibowitz says such a thing and people were to accept it, then it would ruin it even according to his own view. He probably relied on people not accepting what he says. Yes, if indeed he relied on anything.
[Speaker C] I don’t know specifically about Leibowitz, but it seems to me that this kind of claim—and I think not only Leibowitz made claims from this family, specifically regarding the messiah and maybe also other beliefs—it seems to me the intention is not to say that one should believe in it even though it isn’t true, but rather to offer some sort of statement that this should be kind of a…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You have to assume it’s true even though it’s not certain?
[Speaker C] No—that basically, it seems to me the direction is more to replace belief in the messiah in the traditional sense—some king who will rule over Israel and build the Temple—with some belief in hope, or progress, or striving for perfection, or some abstract thing like that, I think.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, then that’s not the messiah.
[Speaker C] Fine, that’s not the messiah,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] but I’ll get to that in a moment, about messianism in broader senses.
[Speaker C] No, I’m not saying it’s correct. I’m saying it seems to me that, again, not specifically about Leibowitz, but claims from this family often at least mean that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is there improvement in the end? In the broader sense of messiah, is there improvement?
[Speaker C] There is improvement, but not in the sense that the messiah will arrive—there will simply be improvement.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Never mind, so you’re interpreting the concept of messiah differently, but you’re still claiming that this is a factual claim. No—the factual claim is not that some person will arrive, but rather some improved state.
[Speaker C] No, but it’s also not a state that arrives. It’s like rising toward the sky—meaning, the more you rise, you continue to see that the sky remains above, and it’s not that you haven’t risen.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning the improvement does happen? The improvement does happen, but it never arrives. I don’t care, that doesn’t matter—but in the end it does happen. That’s still a factual claim, and the claim is that there is improvement.
[Speaker D] Maybe it’s like what we learn from the Binding of Isaac: human sacrifice is forbidden, but the Binding of Isaac is still presented as a model.
[Speaker C] The Rabbi gave a lecture about that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, no—but there there was a direct instruction from the Holy One, blessed be
[Speaker C] He, so that’s something else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That doesn’t matter, it proves nothing. In the end, though, you are saying yes, there is improvement. That’s a factual claim: there is improvement, it just never ends. No problem. But that’s not what he says. He claims: no, this is not a factual claim at all. It’s a claim whose purpose is psychological; it is not a factual claim. You are proposing a different interpretation of the concept of messiah. That’s somewhat close to what I said earlier, messiah as a period—only you add another layer. You say not only that the messiah is a period, but also that it’s a process that never ends. And that is still at the level of interpreting the concept of messiah.
[Speaker C] Isn’t it more than interpretation? Obviously that’s not what was meant.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, doesn’t matter. But what you proposed—that is an interpretation. Whether you accept it or not is another question. Here, again, the accepted approach really isn’t like that, and to my mind it’s also implausible. I mean, how can you plant hope in people on the basis of something that is simply false? It just doesn’t sound plausible to me. That is the accepted approach. And still, even within the accepted approaches, in a moment I’ll distinguish between them. But before that I’m making another conceptual distinction, which really came up in what Arik was just saying. Today people talk about concepts of messianism also in borrowed senses. For example, communism was a kind of messianism. Or any movement that tries to advance some idea or create a better world is often perceived as a messianic movement, and sometimes even with the negative connotations. Certainly after communism and all that, because very often when you try too hard to bring the messiah—the messiah in quotation marks—there are heavy prices. A lot of oil gets spilled on the wheels of the revolution, so to speak. So that’s why these things are called messianism, and not for nothing—because of the negative connotation of the term messianism. In other words, it’s also a kind of false messianism in the sense that you act too decisively on behalf of some predetermined utopia. Not long ago I spoke with some communist activist, he’s a professor of economics, red-haired, I forgot his name, from Jerusalem. A communist from the people of Rakah—there are still a few of them left, very frustrated ones. My brother-in-law’s father was one of the dinosaurs of Rakah, and when he died there was, over there—the whole family basically are still communists in one way or another. And when he died it was very interesting: there was a funeral there in Yad Hanna, in Kibbutz Yad Hanna, which is also a communist kibbutz. And there was—it was touching, because there stood, I don’t know, fifty or seventy people there, which is probably more or less all the activists and voters of Rakah today, those who still hold those views.
[Speaker C] The Hadash crowd? Rakah, yes. There’s also the party that entered the Knesset, Hadash, until not long ago.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, no—I mean among the Jews, it’s a small minority. Fine, it wasn’t all of them, but it was, say, a substantial portion of them. All the central activists, all of them were there. There was also an Arab Knesset member, I think, who eulogized him there, from Hadash; I forgot his name. In any case, it was very moving because it was a kind of mourning for a world that had vanished. Meaning, they understand that they’re no longer relevant. The world is not with them. They are certain they’re still right, but the world is not with them. Then when we got to his house afterward, after the funeral—well, not after the funeral, it was already during the condolence visit—I spoke with that economist, and he really said that original communism had a very clear model of what ought to be, what the utopia is, what is right. And all that remains is simply to strive as much as we can toward the model—yes, the dictatorship of the proletariat. But in the current model, he says they don’t have—that is, in the picture now—they don’t have a clear utopian model. He also understands that complete cooperativism and communism are not a realistic option; it’s not correct. He’s past age twenty-three, as the saying goes. But he says that in the course of progress, he hopes it will become clear what the correct model is. And then I tried to get out of him in what sense he is a communist, because behind that sentence even I could stand. I’m not a communist. Behind that sentence even I could stand. Okay, I agree that today is not ideal. All that remains is only Marxism in its underground sense—not in the sense of the result you are striving for, but in the sense that you are striving. And in the end, that’s what we’ve been left with. Meaning, this activism that says we are always searching for a model because we are dissatisfied with the current situation, even though we currently have no model toward which we are striving—that, in his view, is what communism means today. It’s very interesting, because I think it’s not even coherent in its philosophical definition. How can you say such a thing? You can call it communism, but it has no connection to the ordinary meaning of the term.
[Speaker H] But it’s interesting because it is consistent in the sense that the ideology leads him, and he doesn’t surrender to practical life, he doesn’t surrender to practice.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does it mean for it to become clear what the truth is? Practice will determine what’s right, what works and what doesn’t work; practice determines that. Everyone agrees that the current situation is not ideal; there is no ideal situation. You—do you want to offer a concrete proposal for something that will improve it? If you convince me, I’ll work with you to bring it about, no problem. But as long as you’re not proposing anything, then what are you saying? Let’s look and see whether there’s a model. Fine, let’s look and see. If you’re not saying anything beyond that, it’s hard to call that communism. Meaning, it’s some remnant of the activism that existed in communism—that you’re willing, that you want to search, that it matters to you to turn over every stone and see whether there’s a better model. Fine, there’s some feature here that also characterized them, but to call that communism today is ridiculous. And I think that voting for Hadash because of something like that is foolish, because lots of people are looking for all kinds of models. Fine, that’s not what… What characterizes Hadash is the model they found, not what they’re searching for. Meaning, they are proposing a certain model—not in the political sense, but in the economic-social sense. All right? So I’m saying, this rupture marks the collapse of messianism in its secular sense. Meaning, there is some loss of confidence in the concept of messianism—not in the religious sense, but it’s the same thing. Since the collapse of religious messianism comes from the destructive results when it doesn’t materialize. And that is exactly what happened there: in the end, secular messianism, the communist one, did not materialize, it caused damage, and as a result—well, enough with calculating the end. We don’t want to know what will be at the end. We’ll search and see, we’ll try constantly to improve reality, but we are no longer striving toward a point that already today we know where it is. Meaning, that we know where we’re headed, our face is toward the rising sun. Right? So no, we’re not there anymore. And that’s the same break in messianism I’m talking about here. But the concept of messianism in its secular sense still is not the concept of messianism I’m talking about here. Because there we’re not talking about some eschatological process, right, some process in which some metaphysics bursts into the physical world and somehow takes it over. That, at least, is the standard religious conception, right? The Holy One, blessed be He, somehow starts moving things here, and it’s not just ordinary historical processes. That’s called bringing the Messiah. Bringing the Messiah means that something will happen here that is directed from above. Meaning—not that, because I don’t think anyone would think to say that people are forbidden to do things that improve the world. Is that called a messianic movement? What’s forbidden about that? On the contrary, I think that’s the most basic thing: to try and improve as much as possible. So what is this whole thing called a messianic movement? It is tied at the navel, incidentally, to the idea I mentioned earlier. It is tied at the navel not to despair over ideologies and not to backing away from these absolute models, but truly to the religious meaning of the matter. And therefore I don’t think it’s right to project it there automatically, even though the phenomenon is a similar one. There is indeed one similar aspect, and I’ll get to it in a moment: that in a messianic movement in the religious sense too, it’s not only the question of fearing what will happen as a result; there is apparently a conception that there is something mistaken in messianism itself. Something you can even identify in real time, before you know what happened in the end, whether it succeeded or not, and what damage it did or didn’t cause. Something in the conduct itself seems problematic. I’m not saying forbidden, but it seems problematic. And here perhaps there is a similarity—and I return to the similarity—to secular messianism. What is called modernism, really. Postmodernity is despair over modernism, secular messianism. Modernism said, yes, “We will destroy the old world to its foundations,” meaning we will create a better world. And postmodernity is basically the rupture that this messianism brings in its wake. Meaning, despair over the great ideologies, the utopias, the perfect models. And with that despair, actually, I do identify. Even though I don’t like postmodernity, because they took it too far. Because really, going with a model—even if it may be correct—and cooperation sounds very nice and really seems beautiful, if it had materialized, maybe it would have been a wonderful world. I don’t know, not sure, but maybe. But it is certainly a good aspiration. You can argue whether you’re for it or against it, but it’s a good aspiration, good people. The problem is that when you aspire to a good aspiration too decisively, it’s very dangerous. Because you kill for it, and you fight for it, and you’re unwilling to hear any criticism. It turns into a religion in the bad sense of the word, and in that sense it is negative even before the question of whether it will succeed or fail. The process, the messianism, the movement within this messianism is problematic—not the question of whether it will succeed or fail. And in that sense I want to argue that this is also true of messianism in its religious context. And it’s not only a question of whether it will materialize in the end and whether it will cause damage in the end, but something in the conduct itself is very problematic. In the case of secular messianism, it’s really this decisiveness that leads to cruelty sometimes, and to not seeing additional sides, to an unwillingness to see additional sides, to renewed silencing, turning these principles into some kind of religion that does not stand up to critical examination, and so on. In the religious context, this appears in the form of unrealistic actions. And again, I’m not talking about prohibitions now. Right now I’m talking about realpolitik, meaning taking unrealistic actions. And many times, indeed, when you hear the accusations against Zionism even, part of the claims are that it is unrealistic. It is rebellion against the nations—even in the religious discourse, I’m saying—it is rebellion against the nations. What is the problem with rebellion against the nations? There is no prohibition against rebelling against the nations. There are the Three Oaths, fine, but there is no prohibition. The problem is that it’s unrealistic, meaning you must not take unrealistic actions. Now many times, I’m trying to gather characteristics, right—why is this a messianic movement? This too is an important characteristic. One of the characteristics of a messianic movement is when that movement starts doing things that are unrealistic in the existing circumstances. Meaning, once you’re sure that you are the Messiah and the Holy One, blessed be He, is with you, then you launch a world war, because no problem—the Holy One, blessed be He, is with you and you’re all set. Okay? Which is actually very similar to what happened in communism and to the criticism of what happened in communism. Because it too took actions—not in the sense of unrealistic, but in the sense of immoral, cruel. Its mode of conduct, as a result of the confidence and decisiveness it had in its path—so the conduct itself, even if in the end it had succeeded and brought redemption and we would all be living in one big kibbutz and everything would be wonderful and the wolf with the lamb and so on. “And the lamb shall dwell with the lamb”—right, we already said that “the wolf shall dwell with the lamb,” provided I’m the wolf. But even if in the end it reached the result that we want, something in the conduct itself is problematic, since the end—the goal—does not necessarily sanctify the means. And communism held that the goal sanctifies the means. Meaning, in order to bring world peace and eternal equality and absolute justice, you are allowed to kill everyone who disagrees with it, and not listen, and put people in gulags, and do all kinds of terrible things. And suppose we are still in the middle of it, and it may be that communism is on its way to victory and will ultimately succeed. Can I already determine now that such a thing is invalid, or do I have to wait and see whether in the end it materializes or not? My claim is that there too—I’m not saying there aren’t means that sometimes the goal does sanctify; sometimes it does. I’m not ruling that out, I’m not saying categorically that a goal sanctifies no means. But sometimes there’s a feeling that you’ve crossed the boundary of good taste. And then I say that even if in the end you succeed and it materializes in the end, that will not be the sole criterion. It may still be that you acted wrongly. And you must not do that, even at the price of perhaps not succeeding in realizing your great idea. And even if I agree with your great idea. And the same thing with a messianic movement. Meaning, a messianic movement has other criteria too, and we’ll see that; there are also criteria in the mode of conduct that are unrelated to the question of what will happen in the end. Maybe you are the true Messiah? Even if you are the true Messiah, you are not allowed to behave like that. Understand? This is an important point, because the arguments often revolve around the question: wait, let’s see what happens in the end, and then we’ll see who was right. That is not necessarily the criterion. Even if in the end it really will be the Messiah and Bibi will repent and it turns out that he is a direct descendant of the house of David and he will be the Messiah king, as some people hope—and many people hope not—the claim is that this does not confirm, or give a stamp of approval, that the whole path was conducted correctly. If you say that it’s unrealistic and it’s rebellion against the nations and so on, it may be that even if you are the true Messiah, you are not allowed to do it.
[Speaker G] Fine. If, in the case of communism, the flaw in the way things were conducted was really violence—moral problems—then of course even if it succeeds, that doesn’t justify it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the flaw in the messianism of—right, I didn’t make an exact comparison.
[Speaker G] You mirrored it. If a person does—if a person, say Herzl, he also made some crazy calculations in terms of their political chances. Okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but he didn’t do dangerous things; he did things that maybe wouldn’t succeed.
[Speaker G] Okay, so the fact that it’s dangerous is problematic, but it’s not a moral flaw. Meaning, if, say, there were a messianic faith that would do things, would take these crazy gambles on the assumption that the Holy One, blessed be He, is behind it and it will succeed—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there, I already brought the example earlier. I said earlier I brought the example of a group—and it really is a small group—that wants to build the Temple, I don’t know if you were here; we talked about this earlier. A group that literally wants to build the Temple—not to mention Yehuda Etzion and those who wanted to blow up the Dome of the Rock there. That was their conception. Their conception was that if we do what is incumbent upon us—“What have you to do with the hidden matters of the Merciful One?”—the Holy One, blessed be He, will help. Now, that claim is one that I don’t know to what extent it can be rejected outright. But the intuition says no—you still have to be realistic on some level, and you crossed the line. Meaning here—so I’m saying, you can relate to all of Zionism as messianism, as a messianic movement; you can relate only to that pole, which becomes—, which takes unrealistic steps, as a messianic movement. I’m raising possibilities here, because I’m going to try to move forward a bit, but I’m trying to sketch the different possibilities without laying down the law yet.
[Speaker G] Maybe it can be said that it’s not only an unrealistic step—as if—it’s that the realistic doesn’t interest him. As far as he’s concerned, there’s something higher driving events here, and therefore… It’s like charging with a horse.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Same claim, same claim. By the way, Ben-Gurion’s declaration of the state was perceived by quite a few people as something unrealistic. And as Ben-Gurion said: whoever does not believe in miracles here is not realistic. Meaning, Ben-Gurion declared a state at a time when there was serious fear that we would all be destroyed afterward. It’s not clear to me to what extent you couldn’t have determined that this was some delusional messianism, even though it wasn’t on a religious basis. But never mind: in the sense of lack of realism—and whoever joins it in the religious context—then you can also accuse him in the context of messianism in its religious sense. Meaning, there were steps here that one could have viewed as unrealistic steps. Yes.
[Speaker C] But again, here if it actually seems to me that it’s specifically in this category of doing unrealistic things, then it seems that to a large extent, at least in this case, this kind of thing—if it does succeed, then in retrospect we understand that it actually was good. Unlike murdering many people, where you can say that even if a good world came out of it, maybe that still wouldn’t justify it. But if you did something whose flaw was that it was unrealistic, and it succeeded?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So Rav Shach wrote that—we once talked about Rav Shach’s letter, Letter 2 in one of the… He has several books here, but one of them, I think the first one that came out, and that one I read. So in Letter 2 he talks there about Operation Entebbe. We talked about it once—that he opposed Operation Entebbe. And he claimed there was no chance it would succeed, and you are endangering soldiers when most of the chances are that you won’t succeed, and it was not right to do it. Now in the end it did succeed. Yoni Netanyahu was killed, but still, in the end the operation was considered a tremendous success. So they came back to him and said, well Rabbi, you see, it succeeded? So he said, fine, okay, I also said there was a five percent chance it would succeed, but you don’t launch an operation on a five percent chance of success. Meaning, you’re bringing me proof that it succeeded in retrospect, but the decision was made in light of the data we had at the time we made the decision. And when we made the decision, in my assessment the chance of success was very small, and therefore it was forbidden to do it. Now when I talked about this, I commented on it—you asked, so I’ll discuss it already—I said that it depends on what the argument was about. Rav Shach’s claim is interesting, but it’s not necessarily correct. If the argument was about the question of whether it is proper to do something unrealistic, then Rav Shach is basically saying: I argued that it is not proper to do something unrealistic. Your claim that it succeeded in the end is irrelevant, because it was still something unrealistic that succeeded. Unrealistic things also succeed at some percentage. But the assessment is that it probably won’t succeed. But if the argument was about the statistics themselves—meaning, what is the probability that it will succeed? Rav Shach argued a low probability, and that—
[Speaker J] is already an argument about facts.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. And others—fine, we don’t know the facts, there are estimates. And the other people argued that there was a good chance it would succeed. Now if you tell me that it did succeed, that is already some confirmation of the claim against Rav Shach. True, it’s only one case of course, and everything is limited.
[Speaker J] Also, the one who said… he didn’t say zero percent. If he had said zero percent, that would have been clear confirmation that he was wrong.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But still, when you do the calculation in terms of conditional probability, given that the result succeeded, the hypothesis that the chance was high is a bit more… it has a somewhat higher probability than the hypothesis that the chance was low. Somewhat more. So there is some degree of confirmation here for the claim. So if the argument was the argument over what the probability would be, then the claim was a relevant claim. If the argument was about the question of whether it is proper to go out [on the mission], even if the probability is low, then the fact that it succeeded in the end is no proof of anything. Okay, so incidentally to the…
[Speaker C] No, but regarding messianism, it seems to me that someone making a non-rational claim—what is he saying? Meaning, either he argues about the interpretation of reality and says this actually is rational, or he says: true, in physical terms it is not rational, but because this is messianic, there is a chance that God will help and we will nonetheless succeed. Now if we do succeed, then what have we seen? A certain probability that God really does help.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re basically saying that the claim is really a dispute about the facts, only the facts of course have to take into account divine assistance too, not just realpolitik. Yes indeed. And then indeed the dispute can be decided on the basis of what happened in retrospect. Okay, yes, yes indeed. Okay, so here really I’ll just finish with one sentence: this distinction between the two types of messianism is basically also a distinction within the Zionist movement, between secular Zionism and Religious Zionism. Secular Zionism is messianism like communism in a certain sense—meaning it’s a secular concept, meaning to bring about a state that in our eyes is more correct, more proper, more—I don’t know—through our own merit, sovereignty, self-definition, and so on. Religious Zionism, at least that part which is not simply Zionist and also religious, as we once discussed, but rather is Zionist with a hyphen—religious-Zionist with a hyphen—means that the purpose of this whole thing is not that we should have self-definition in the secular sense, that we should have self-definition but not in the secular sense, but rather that it is part of bringing the Messiah, meaning it is part of bringing redemption. So here you have two movements walking together, one of which is messianism like communism, and the second is messianism in the sense we are talking about here. Again, I still haven’t defined whether this is positive or negative, but messianism in the sense of a messianic movement—meaning a movement that takes steps in order to bring redemption and the religious Messiah. Okay, and then one has to divide the discussion between how I relate to the secular Zionist movement and how I relate to the religious Zionist movement. And for our purposes here, in this context, it is of course the second context, the religious context. The Zionist context—fine, it’s like communism; you can discuss it in terms of realpolitik and whether the end sanctifies the means, but that is not our discussion here. Our discussion here is really the question of how to characterize, and whether Religious Zionism can be seen as a messianic phenomenon in the negative sense, meaning in the sense perceived as negative—because again, not prohibition, but in the sense perceived as negative—or not. That is basically our question. Okay, let’s stop here.