Talmud, Yoma Chapter 8 – Lesson 9

This transcription was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Just the habituation, but you can’t perform the commandment properly according to Jewish law. After all, the Ritva learned in the passage in tractate Sukkah, in the case of Queen Heleni, that education has to be done through a commandment with all its details, properly according to Jewish law. Now here, this detail—that the lulav has to belong to you—is not fulfilled. So what commandment of education is there here? So you suggest, following Rabbeinu Manoach that we saw above, that maybe here we’re talking about getting him used to commandments, and not about the law of education in the sense of fulfilling the commandment properly according to Jewish law. That could be, even though it isn’t written here. But we’ll soon see. So the Mishnah Berurah there writes as follows: “That is to say, because of this the minor acquires nothing at all, and therefore it is permitted even if he has not yet reached the age of commercial understanding. And the same applies if one does not transfer ownership to the minor at all, or if one says to him: it shall be yours until you fulfill your obligation with it, and afterward it will be mine as at first, for then it is considered borrowed, as above in סימן ג’.” Rather, with all these devices, they help only the adult, so that he can afterward fulfill his obligation with it, but the minor has not fulfilled his obligation through such a taking, since it is not his, and it is not called “for yourselves,” and his father has not fulfilled through him the commandment of education. All right? All these tricks are done so that afterward the father will still be able to fulfill his obligation with the lulav, so there won’t be a problem. But the father has not fulfilled the commandment of education here. All right? Where does this come from? From that same Ritva we saw earlier. So the question still comes up: why this whole story at all? Why do this in the first place? Then don’t do it at all.

You could understand the Mishnah Berurah here, in this explanation of the Mishnah Berurah, as saying this only as a halakhic hypothetical. If you want to do this with a minor, there is no obligation, and there isn’t much value in it either. If you want to do it, just make sure he does not acquire it. That’s all. Is that the Shulchan Arukh’s recommendation? The Shulchan Arukh does not write here: give it to the minor because of education. He doesn’t write that. All he writes is: do not give it to him in a way that allows him to acquire it. So there is no recommendation here to give it to him, because there really is no law of education here. Only, if you nevertheless want to give it to him, and maybe there is even some point in it in order to get him used to commandments or something like that—but that is not an obligation, it is not part of the commandment of education—then make sure he does not acquire it. The law stated in the Shulchan Arukh is only the negative law, only what you have to be careful about: that he not acquire it. There is no positive law here saying: actually give it to the minor in order to educate him. And maybe in this matter there really is nothing. And again, this is not very different from what you suggested in hanging it on Rabbeinu Manoach, because Rabbeinu Manoach too says that this is not an obligation from the Sages, but rather just to accustom him to commandments. Rather, it is the parents’ own concern if they want to teach their child, but there is no rabbinic obligation upon them to do so.

So the Shulchan Arukh is talking about that. He says: if you do this, very nice, be well, and may you have much joy from your children. It’s good that you do this. Just note: from a halakhic perspective, what I can tell you is only this—there is no obligation to do it. He did not say there is an obligation to do it. It is not a halakhic matter. It’s your own judgment. But if you do it, make sure the minor does not acquire it. Because otherwise you yourself won’t be able to fulfill your obligation with it afterward. And—I return to the Mishnah Berurah—“there are some later authorities who hold that the commandment of education is fulfilled even with a borrowed one, for through this too the son is educated in commandments. And so it appears from the Mordechai in the name of the Ra’avan.” What does that mean? What are the Mordechai and the Ra’avan saying? One could say that they disagree with Maimonides and Rabbeinu Manoach. They claim that the commandment of education can also be done not fully according to Jewish law. But that is strange, because we proved from the passage in Sukkah, explicitly in the Talmud, that the commandment of education has to be done properly according to Jewish law. And there are two kinds of education in our Talmudic passage in Yoma. Therefore, it seems to me more reasonable that the Mordechai and the Ra’avan are saying that even if the commandment of education must be done properly according to Jewish law, the minor still fulfills it with a borrowed lulav on the first day. How? After all, on the first day there is the law of “for yourselves,” that it has to be yours. So here, here you can

[Speaker E] say as follows.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The later authorities write in several

[Speaker E] places—soon

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll bring a few places for this—that wherever the whole problem in the minor’s commandment is only because of his minority, then there is no problem. Meaning: if you give him a lulav that is not kosher, you have not fulfilled the commandment of education. But if you give him a lulav and the whole problem is just that he cannot acquire it because he is a minor, then the fact that he took the lulav—after all, from his point of view he performed the commandment properly according to Jewish law. The only thing that impaired the commandment is simply that he is a minor, not that he performed a commandment in an invalid way. Rather, the fact that he is a minor caused the commandment to be—well, being a minor is built in, so that doesn’t bother me; that you can do. And that is how they explain the Ra’avan and the Mordechai. They say this: with a borrowed lulav, what you can do is that through this too the son is educated in commandments. What about education needing to be done properly according to Jewish law? It is being done properly according to Jewish law. If you gave this to the same child when he is already an adult and did exactly the same thing, it would be fine, right? Right now it is not fine only because he is a minor. But you are doing all the actions exactly as they ought to be done when he is an adult; that is education through the commandment properly according to Jewish law. A minor can acquire.

[Speaker G] Do you hear? A minor can acquire; he just can’t return it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the case of a minor who can acquire but cannot return it, this explanation cannot work. It could be that the Mordechai and the Ra’avan would not agree with this; I’m speaking about a minor who cannot acquire, who has not reached—or has reached—the age of commercial understanding or something like that. All right? So they are speaking only about that; the Mishnah Berurah is dealing with this clause. So the claim is that where what interferes with or impairs the minor’s commandment is only the very fact of minority, but the action in itself—if you photographed this action and did not know that this child is a minor—you would say there is no problem, this is a commandment properly according to Jewish law, absolutely fine. That is the claim.

And notice what this actually means. Earlier I said that these two kinds of education—Rabbeinu Manoach and so on—are distinguished from one another in an essential way. Because education to fulfill the commandment properly according to Jewish law means that the minor has to fulfill a commandment, which is not just habituation for the future. Right? Here it comes out not like that. Because if the minor himself has to fulfill a commandment, then what do I care that he did not fulfill the commandment because he is a minor? Bottom line, he did not fulfill the commandment. And after all, there is also an obligation on the minor to fulfill the commandment, so what does that help? It seems that the Ra’avan and the Mordechai, even if I am right that they fit this into the passage in Sukkah as well, this does not contradict the passage in Sukkah. It is not from the law of the Nazir passage; it is from the law of the Sukkah passage, that the minor has to fulfill the commandment properly according to Jewish law. Still, they understand this as a commandment oriented toward the future. Not as I explained. Earlier I explained that habituation in commandments is future-oriented, in order to help ensure that he will fulfill commandments when he becomes an adult, that he will know how to fulfill commandments, that he will have motivation, and so on—that is future-oriented. The fulfillment of the commandment properly according to Jewish law is a present obligation, not future-oriented. A minor has to fulfill commandments now—not future-oriented. If that were so, there would be no room to explain what I just explained in the Mordechai and the Ra’avan. Because even if the defect in the commandment is due to his being a minor, still, bottom line the commandment is defective, he did not fulfill the commandment. What difference does it make why? They apparently understand that even fulfilling the commandment properly according to Jewish law is future-oriented. And they apparently understand that in fact we are talking here—these two kinds of education really are a graded process, which is what I denied in the Talmud and in Maimonides. And they are basically saying that it is all future-oriented. There is just a law or an obligation as part of the commandment of education, that at first you begin with what the minor can do; that is not yet really the commandment of education, but it is a beginning. In the end you have to reach a point where, even before age 13—or 12 for girls—he already reaches the point where he performs the commandment properly according to Jewish law. That is what you have to do, because you have to teach him, as part of the education, not because he is obligated in the commandment. As part of the education he has to come to perform the commandment with all its details, because then you know he is already prepared to be an adult and fulfill the Torah obligation. Okay?

The Mordechai and the Ra’avan say: if so, I have no problem with this in commandments where minority does not allow him to do it. I cannot reach full fulfillment of the commandment before the age of adulthood. But that does not matter, because I taught him perfectly what must be done. The fact that the result is still not an actual commandment—that is not interesting, there is no problem in the result, because the minor is not really obligated in commandments. Rather, I have to accustom him to this for when he becomes an adult. So what if no actual fulfillment of the commandment came out of it? A minor is not obligated in commandments. The Ra’avan and the Mordechai apparently understand that this too—the law of completion or of commandments properly according to Jewish law—is really to accustom them. Meaning, they do not accept the distinction Rabbeinu Manoach made between the Talmud in Nazir and the Talmud in Sukkah—or maybe what Maimonides is doing, if Rabbeinu Manoach is right—between the Talmud in Nazir and the Talmud in Sukkah, or the two kinds of education in our Talmudic passage. They read the two kinds of education in our passage as a process, where the second kind of education is simply the final stage in the educational process of the first kind of education. You eventually arrive at complete knowledge; you learn gradually until you reach full fulfillment of the commandment. And once you have reached full fulfillment of the commandment in terms of what you are doing, I do not care if you did not actually fulfill your obligation, if no actual commandment was really performed because you are a minor and cannot acquire. That does not matter to me, because this whole thing is future-oriented; there is no obligation on the minor now. Okay? That is what seems to emerge from the Mordechai and the Ra’avad. Let’s see.

In Sha’ar HaTziyun he writes as follows: “And those knowledgeable in understanding return it to its place, and the children themselves take it and recite the blessing over it, and so it is also brought in the Or Zarua in the name of the Ra’avad, and from the fact that he praised them, it appears that so he holds according to Jewish law. And according to the first opinion, the father has not fulfilled the commandment of education; rather, certainly he holds that the commandment of education applies only to the essence of the commandment and not to the details of the commandment.” What is he saying? That the commandment of education does not have to be done properly according to Jewish law. Perform the commandment, but you do not need to fulfill the obligation with all the details. “And afterward I found in Birkei Yosef that he too wrote that from this it appears that the Ra’avad holds that the minor may take the lulav without transfer of ownership. But there he wanted somewhat to reject this, for perhaps one may allow a minor to recite the blessing even if not according to law. But what will he answer, since in any case the father has not fulfilled the commandment of education? And why then did he call them knowledgeable in understanding? Rather, certainly through this too one fulfills the obligation of education.” So clearly the father too fulfills the commandment of education, not only that he is allowed to let the minor do it, but the father also thereby fulfills the commandment of education. So we see that the education need not be fully according to Jewish law. “And also the plain sense of the language of the Shulchan Arukh, that he wrote ‘it is acceptable,’ also implies that his father may do so from the outset and recite the blessing with him and the like.” After all, if you can recite the blessing, that means there is a commandment of education here; otherwise it is a blessing in vain. “And what the Rosh already brought—this was already rejected in Birkei Yosef; see there.”

So here he says that the father also fulfills the commandment of education. And that apparently contradicts the Mishnah Berurah we saw earlier, the Sha’ar HaTziyun we saw earlier, where he brings the Ritva that the minor has to be educated with all the details, with commandments properly according to Jewish law, with a kosher lulav. And here he says calmly and straightforwardly something that completely contradicts that. We are forced to say that he is speaking about a commandment properly according to Jewish law where the only thing preventing it is minority, but the commandment here was done properly according to Jewish law. That is what he means. Then it comes out that when the Mishnah Berurah brings the Ritva, he understands the Ritva not as saying that the minor has to perform a commandment, and therefore it has to be properly according to Jewish law so that he can fulfill his obligation. Rather, it is an obligation on the father to educate the minor so he will know what to do when he grows up. Only, that obligation ends—as with the Ra’avad we saw—that obligation ends with complete fulfillment of the commandment with all its details, but both laws of education are future-oriented. That is how the Mishnah Berurah learns, that is how the Ra’avad learns, and the Mishnah Berurah learns the Ritva that way too. That what the Ritva says—that one must fulfill the commandment properly according to Jewish law—does not mean there is really such a law within the law of education; rather, it is the completion of the educational process. Yes? The educational process is a beginning, and the completion of the educational process—like the dedication of the altar is a beginning—it is the completion of the beginning, of education, dedication.

[Speaker E] There’s a case in the laws of tzitzit, right? The Mishnah Berurah brings in section 14 there, the Mishnah Berurah brings what happens if a minor ties tzitzit for himself. Now a minor is not someone fit to perform an act with specific intent; he lacks halakhic intent. And tzitzit has to be tied with specific intent.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the question is whether that tzitzit may be put on the minor. So he brings there two opinions, and he comments on this point, that there is a problem here because the tying was not done with the proper intent. And nevertheless he brings an opinion that it is permitted to put that tzitzit on the minor. Why? I claim that again this is because the perspective—even in the education of completion, of doing it properly according to Jewish law—is a future-oriented perspective. And where the whole problem is only the minor’s minority, but what he is doing is a commandment properly according to Jewish law—if you photographed the commandment and did not know he was a minor, it would be a commandment properly according to Jewish law—that is perfectly fine under the law of education. Again we see in the Mishnah Berurah the same conception: when he brought the Ritva, he understood the Ritva not as Rabbeinu Manoach understands him—that there is a commandment to perform the commandment itself, which is a different law of education, properly according to Jewish law—but rather as future-oriented. Even the commandment to perform the commandment properly according to Jewish law is future-oriented. And the practical difference is: what happens when you perform the commandment properly according to Jewish law, but because of minority you still do not actually fulfill the obligation? According to the Mishnah Berurah and the Ra’avan, that is perfectly fine. According to Rabbeinu Manoach, that is not perfectly fine, because you have to fulfill the commandment and the minor did not fulfill the commandment. So there is value in accustoming him to perform commandments—that is perfectly fine—but that is not the rabbinic commandment of education.

So how do we fulfill the rabbinic commandment of education with lulav on the first day? Or with tzitzit? With tzitzit, we would have to tie the tzitzit for him and put it on him, because if he ties it, the tzitzit is not valid. And with lulav there really would be no commandment of education, because he cannot—he’s a minor, he cannot acquire on the first day, he will not be able to acquire the lulav. There would only be the obligation to accustom him, but there would not be the commandment of education… there would be the idea of accustoming him. It is not an obligation according to Rabbeinu Manoach. But there would not be the obligation to fulfill the commandment because it is simply impossible. What can you do? In this case it is impossible. But according to the Mishnah Berurah it is not like that. The Mishnah Berurah presents a different conception, that these educational laws are indeed a gradual educational process. In short, Rabbeinu Manoach and the Mishnah Berurah actually disagree on how we relate to the two kinds of education in our passage. Are the two kinds of education in our passage a gradual process, all of it future-oriented, as the Mishnah Berurah, the Ra’avan, the Mordechai learn? Or do Rabbeinu Manoach and the first opinion in the Mishnah Berurah say no: you have to do it properly according to Jewish law, and if it is not properly according to Jewish law—even if that is because of minority—you have not fulfilled the second law of Rabbeinu Manoach. There is the first law, that there is value in accustoming him as much as you can. Whatever you can manage, you can manage. But the law of actually fulfilling commandments while still a minor—that, you do not fulfill even if the failure is because of minority.

I already mentioned this whole story about the Avnei Nezer; I brought it in an earlier passage. Right, that his father sent him to eat on Yom Kippur together with kiddush there, right? His father sent him to eat on Yom Kippur when it fell on the Sabbath, and when he came back to the synagogue his father asked him whether he had recited kiddush. So he said no. So his father said, what do you mean, you ate on the festival—why didn’t you recite kiddush? So he answered: since my entire obligation to recite kiddush is only because of education—what is the law of education? That I should know what to do when I am an adult. But when I am an adult I won’t eat on Yom Kippur. So there is no law to recite kiddush now, because it is not supposed to train me to do something when I am an adult. This line of thought is very similar to what we saw here in the Mishnah Berurah: that even the law of fulfilling commandments properly according to Jewish law is future-oriented. And if you do it in such a way that when you do it in the future it will be fine, that is education in the highest way, even though right now it is not fine. The other side of the coin is the Avnei Nezer: if there is something that will not be relevant when you are an adult, then there is also no point in educating you toward it when you are a minor. Of course one can discuss that maybe you need to educate him for what will happen if he is sick as an adult and eats; maybe he should be educated that when one eats, even if one is sick, one should recite kiddush. Fine, one can analyze that, but this mode of thinking of the Avnei Nezer is the other side of the coin of what we saw here in the Mishnah Berurah and in the Ra’avan and in this camp of halakhic decisors. Okay? Fine, let’s stop for five minutes for a refreshment break, and afterward we’ll come back and continue the lecture.

[Speaker E] If the anointed High Priest issues a ruling for himself, errs and acts unintentionally, he brings a bull. If he erred and did not act unintentionally, he does not bring a bull. For the ruling of the anointed High Priest for himself, and the ruling of the court for the public, apply only to an erroneous ruling together with an erroneous act. If he ruled by himself and acted by himself, he obtains atonement by himself. If he ruled with the public and acted with the public, he obtains atonement with the public. For the court is liable only when they rule to nullify part and uphold part, and so too the anointed one. And in idolatry as well, only when they rule to nullify part and uphold part. Talmudic discussion. From where are these words derived? For the Sages taught: “If the anointed priest sins to the guilt of the people”—behold, the anointed one is like the public. Just as the public brings an offering only for an erroneous ruling together with an erroneous act, so too the anointed one brings an offering only for an erroneous ruling together with an erroneous act. Just as the public brings an offering only for a matter whose intentional violation incurs karet and whose unintentional violation incurs a sin-offering, so too the anointed one brings an offering only for a matter whose intentional violation incurs karet and whose unintentional violation incurs a sin-offering. Just as the public, in idolatry, brings an offering only for an erroneous ruling together with an erroneous act, so too the anointed one, in idolatry, brings an offering only for an erroneous ruling together with an erroneous act. Just as the public brings an offering only for a matter whose intentional violation incurs karet and whose unintentional violation incurs a sin-offering, so too the anointed one brings an offering only for a matter whose intentional violation incurs karet and whose unintentional violation incurs a sin-offering. From where do we know that they do not bring a provisional guilt-offering? The verse says: “to the guilt of the people”—behold, the anointed one is like the public. Just as the public does not bring a provisional guilt-offering, so too the anointed one does not bring a provisional guilt-offering. If he ruled by himself and acted by himself, he obtains atonement by himself. If he ruled with the public and acted with the public, he obtains atonement with the public. From where are these words derived? For the Sages taught: “If the anointed priest sins to the guilt of the people.” How so? If he ruled with the public and acted with the public, he obtains atonement with the public. If he ruled by himself and acted by himself, he obtains atonement by himself. Since we find that the public obtains atonement through the anointed High Priest, one might think that they obtain atonement through him and he obtains atonement through them. Therefore the verse says: “for his sin that he sinned”—he brings for his own sin, and the public does not bring for his sin. And he does not obtain atonement through the atonement of the public. Okay. Let’s come back, friends. Check cameras, whoever still hasn’t connected. Aharon, are you with us? Aharon? Okay, let’s begin. Or let’s continue.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good, so we mentioned the passage in tractate Nazir from which it emerges that at least according to Reish Lakish, the commandment of education applies only to sons and not to daughters. Let’s just see it briefly. Right, it says: a man can impose Naziriteship on his son, but a woman cannot impose Naziriteship on her son. The Talmud there says as follows: a man, yes, but a woman, no—what is the reason? Why can the man impose it and not the woman? Rabbi Yohanan said: it is a law specifically about a nazirite, a special law given to Moses at Sinai. And Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina said in the name of Reish Lakish: in order to educate him in commandments—that is, it is a law of education. The Talmud asks: if so, then even a woman as well? Doesn’t a woman also need to educate her son in commandments? He holds that a man is obligated to educate his son in commandments, but a woman is not obligated to educate her son. So the division of roles between the parents is: the man is obligated to educate his son, and not the woman.

Now, according to Rabbi Yohanan, who said it is a special law about a nazirite, that is why it is his son and not his daughter. It also says both in the one imposing and in the one upon whom it is imposed, only the son, right? So why does it say his son and not his daughter? If it is a law specifically about a nazirite, then apparently that law says it applies only to a son. But according to Reish Lakish, then even his daughter? The Talmud says: he holds that he is obligated to educate his son, but not obligated to educate his daughter. All right, so we see that the commandment of education applies only to the son and not to the daughter. Now here, on the face of it, this seems to be only the view of Reish Lakish. Right? Rabbi Yohanan apparently does not seem to hold that, because the Talmud says that according to Rabbi Yohanan it is obvious why it is only a son and not a daughter, because for Rabbi Yohanan this is a special law about a nazirite. Which implies that from the regular laws of education this would not have been obvious; it would apply to both son and daughter. Reish Lakish answers no: even in the laws of education there is a difference between son and daughter. Similar, by the way, to what we saw regarding half-measures, the same kind of thing, right? The question whether—yes, regarding a koy, a creature of its own category, and all that we saw in the previous passage—again a dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish. Reish Lakish gets into difficulty and gives an answer. The question is whether this answer is also accepted by Rabbi Yohanan or not. All right?

So here too, some of the medieval authorities assume that Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with Reish Lakish and claims that there is a commandment of education both for a son and for a daughter, and probably also that the obligation to educate applies to both the father and the mother. And this is only the view of Reish Lakish, which was not accepted as practical Jewish law. But some of the medieval authorities claim not so. At first the Talmud was not aware that there is such a distinction in the law of education between son and daughter and between father and mother. After it discovered this through Reish Lakish, there is no reason to assume that Rabbi Yohanan also disagrees with it. Rabbi Yohanan also agrees with it. He simply does not need to come to it because this is a special law about a nazirite. But in principle it is also true according to him. Logically you can say that, even though the plain sense of the Talmud looks less like that. But in principle you can say it.

Now the Tosafot Yeshanim in our passage—I return to our Talmudic discussion—the Tosafot Yeshanim in our passage says as follows: “At age eight, age nine, we educate him—and the same with a little girl. This is difficult for me, for we say in Nazir, in the chapter ‘One who said I am hereby a nazirite,’ in the Talmudic discussion: a man imposes Naziriteship on his son according to Reish Lakish, who said it is in order to educate him in commandments; his son yes, his daughter no, for he is not obligated to educate his daughter.” So here we see that in Yoma it applies both to a boy and to a girl. In Sukkah, of course, there is no way to know what is being discussed, because in Sukkah the commandment is a positive time-bound commandment, so even for adults it is a commandment that applies only to males. So for minors too, clearly there will be no law of education for girls in Sukkah, because even as adult women they are not obligated. So from the Talmud in Sukkah one cannot bring proof either way. It remains open. But in the Talmud in Yoma we see that the education applies also to girls and not only to boys. So how does that fit with the Talmud in Nazir?

Now notice what the problem is. Our Talmudic passage is according to Rabbi Yohanan, whose view is accepted as practical Jewish law. Right? So what is difficult? The Tosafot Yeshanim assumed that apparently in the Talmud there too Rabbi Yohanan also accepts what Reish Lakish said, that there is a difference regarding education between son and daughter and between father and mother. And therefore he raises a contradiction from our passage. “And one can say,” says the Tosafot Yeshanim, “that there they are speaking specifically only regarding Naziriteship, but certainly regarding other commandments he is obligated to educate her.” What does that mean? That this is a special law in Naziriteship. Even according to Reish Lakish, what is written there—that it is by reason of education—is a law of education specific to Naziriteship. In Naziriteship specifically there is reason to do this only for sons and not for daughters, but the general law of education also applies to daughters. What is special about Naziriteship? I don’t know—apparently there is no particular point in daughters becoming nazirites, so they do not want parents encouraging their daughters to become nazirites. Sons, yes. But that is only specific to naziriteship, and in that sense it is interesting, because what Rabbi Yohanan says, “it is a law specifically about a nazirite,” comes out to mean that even according to Reish Lakish it is a special law specifically about a nazirite—admittedly rabbinic, but still only a special law specifically about a nazirite. Again, that is not what the Talmud sounds like, but that is how it seems.

“And if you say,” the Tosafot Yeshanim continues, “that which we say everywhere, if a minor eats forbidden carcasses, the court is not commanded to separate him from it—now if we educate him, all the more so must we separate him from prohibition?” Meaning: if when a minor eats forbidden foods the court is not commanded to separate him from prohibitions, then you need to make sure he fulfills commandments? His assumption, of course, is that separating from prohibitions is something more basic than education toward fulfilling commandments—about which, by the way, one can discuss, for example a positive commandment overriding a prohibition. Meaning, positive commandments seem in some sense more severe than prohibitions. True, in terms of spending all one’s money: for a prohibition one must spend all one’s money in order not to transgress, while for a positive commandment only up to a fifth; “one who spends should not spend more than a fifth.” So there are sides both ways. But the Tosafot Yeshanim says this is an a fortiori argument: if the court is not commanded to separate him from prohibitions, then certainly there should be no need to educate him toward commandments. So how is the existence of the law of education reconciled with the halakhic ruling that when a minor eats forbidden carcasses, the court is not commanded to separate him? This is not a question on our passage; it is a question on the whole commandment of education.

And Rabbi Eliezer of Metz says: “Education applies only to doing a commandment, not to separation from prohibition.” What does that mean? That the commandment of education applies only to positive commandments, not to prohibitions. Why? What is the idea behind this? I assume he understands the commandment of education as some kind of attempt to accustom the child physically, through his limbs, to perform commandments. That applies only to positive commandments. Prohibitions—you have to not eat pork—there is nothing here to become accustomed to in non-action. Again, if the purpose were to educate him in the sense of giving him halakhic knowledge, I do not see a difference between positive commandments and prohibitions. He needs to know what must be done and what is forbidden. But apparently he understands that education means habituation to performing, yes, putting into his hands and feet the actual doing of commandments, that he should engage with them bodily. That applies only to positive commandments and not to prohibitions.

Here too there is room to comment: there are prohibitions that are fulfilled by positive action. For example, “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.” That is a prohibition, but in order not to violate the prohibition I am supposed to perform an act. If I see someone drowning in the river, I have to get up and act to save him. If I sit and do not act, I have violated a prohibition. There are other prohibitions like this. “Do not place bloodguilt in your house” is also a prohibition. To avoid violating it, what must one do? One has to build a parapet on the roof. One has to do something active. So there are prohibitions where what they demand of me is the doing of an act. But of course the act itself still has no independent value; it only comes to prevent stumbling into a prohibition. Therefore there is no point in accustoming a person to perform that act. I have to put into his hands, his blood, his veins, this matter of fulfilling commandments, and that applies only to positive commandments and not to prohibitions. And how does this resolve the issue that when a minor eats forbidden carcasses the court is not commanded to separate him? There we are talking about prohibitions; a minor eating forbidden carcasses means forbidden acts. The commandment of education here is speaking about positive commandments. And the a fortiori argument he said earlier—right, after all he made an a fortiori argument: if when a minor eats forbidden carcasses the court is not commanded to separate him, then education certainly need not be done. But no, the a fortiori argument is not correct, because education is for positive commandments and separation from prohibition is for prohibitions, and in that there is no a fortiori argument at all. With positive commandments you need to accustom him to do the act; with prohibitions there is no point in accustoming him, and therefore there is no commandment to separate him either.

[Speaker H] So is the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur now considered a positive commandment of affliction?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s his next sentence. Let’s keep reading, his next sentence: “And that which we call here education in what we afflict him on Yom Kippur”—exactly your question—after all, Yom Kippur is a prohibition, so why is there a commandment of education here regarding prohibitions? He says: “This is not separating him from prohibition, by separating him from eating; rather, it is education, in that we educate him in the commandment of ‘and you shall afflict yourselves.’” After all there is both a positive commandment and a prohibition here. So he says: one could read it as though there is no prohibition here, only a positive commandment. And in fact in the Torah itself there appears only “and you shall afflict yourselves”; there does not appear a prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur. It says only “and you shall afflict yourselves.” And the Talmud on page 81, maybe 81, something like that, has half a page where it twists itself around—let’s look at it. One second.

[Speaker E] I’m sharing with you the Talmud in Yoma 81a. Talmudic discussion: Reish Lakish said: Why was no explicit prohibition stated regarding affliction?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no explicit prohibition against eating on Yom Kippur. There is the commandment of “and you shall afflict yourselves,” but there is no explicit warning, no prohibition. Now the question is what “was not stated” means. Is there no prohibition, or is there a prohibition but the warning was not stated in the Torah? Meaning, if there is no warning in the Torah, then there is also no prohibition. But the Talmud says: because it is not possible. There is no way to formulate this prohibition. How should the Merciful One write it? Should the Torah write “he shall not eat”? Eating means an olive’s bulk. Should the Torah write “you shall not afflict yourselves”? That would imply get up and eat. Right? So that doesn’t work. Maybe let us say, “take heed lest you not afflict yourselves”? If so, there would be too many prohibitions—there would come out to be two prohibitions, not one. In short, there is no way to formulate it, that is the Talmud’s claim. “Take heed” in a positive commandment of affliction—“take heed” for a prohibition is a prohibition, “take heed” for a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Do not depart from the affliction. In short, there is a whole discussion here as to why no prohibition was stated for Yom Kippur. In principle, according to most medieval authorities, there is a prohibition regarding eating on Yom Kippur, but it was simply not stated in the Torah because it could not be, according to Reish Lakish. According to Reish Lakish. Then the Talmud brings a possibility nevertheless to derive it, either from an exposition or from some other way, it does not matter. But according to Reish Lakish no prohibition was stated.

Now there are two possibilities. According to most medieval authorities, it was not stated but it exists. It was not stated because it was impossible to express it. So how do you know it exists? I don’t know—tradition, whatever. A second possibility is that according to Reish Lakish there really is no prohibition; there is only a positive commandment. And the karet on Yom Kippur is for the positive commandment, not for a prohibition, like the karet of Passover and circumcision. Also on Yom Kippur the karet is on a positive commandment. And in fact, if you look in the Sefer HaMitzvot of Rav Saadia Gaon, Rav Saadia does not bring a prohibition on eating on Yom Kippur, only a positive commandment. I think Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perla explains that this is the reason. There is no explicit warning in the Torah, so it is only a positive commandment. Now if I return to the Tosafot Yeshanim, in the Tosafot Yeshanim one can read this both ways. Either he learns like Rav Saadia and Reish Lakish that there is no prohibition at all, and then what is written here about education really is about the positive commandment of “and you shall afflict yourselves,” because there is no prohibition. But of course that is not necessary. Even according to the medieval authorities who hold that there is a prohibition on Yom Kippur, it is obvious that there is also a positive commandment. So the commandment of education in our passage is only the education toward the positive aspect of the matter. As for the prohibition itself, there is really no issue, because when a minor eats forbidden carcasses the court is not commanded to separate him.

“And my teacher says,” I continue reading in the Tosafot Yeshanim, “that education applies only to the father, but with another person education does not apply.” So until now we assumed that education and the case of a minor eating forbidden carcasses are aimed at the same addressees. If when a minor eats forbidden carcasses the court is or is not commanded to separate him, the meaning is not only the court, of course, but everyone—anyone who sees them. So it would come out that education too is a commandment on everyone, not specifically on the parents. That is the assumption of the Tosafot Yeshanim up to this point. Now his teacher tells him: education applies only to the father; with another person there is no concept of education. What is written, that when a minor eats forbidden carcasses the court is not commanded to separate him, refers to the other people in the world, not to the parents—or the parents, or the father, right? We saw Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan. But the parents—true, this is not by reason of “when a minor eats forbidden carcasses the court is not commanded to separate him,” but it is by reason of education, which is imposed on the parents. And again there is no a fortiori argument here. The parents would of course have to educate the children both regarding prohibitions and regarding positive commandments according to this answer. Education is not only about positive commandments, as in the answer of Rabbi Eliezer of Metz; it also applies to prohibitions. Only, this commandment applies only to the parents. Other people, or the court, or the whole world, are not commanded to separate the minor either from prohibition or from neglect of a positive commandment. Because when a minor eats forbidden carcasses, the court is not commanded to separate him. The distinction is not between prohibition and positive commandment, but between parents and other people. And the practical difference is what happens regarding prohibitions: whether the parents need to educate their children concerning prohibitions. According to Rabbi Eliezer of Metz, no. According to the teacher of the Tosafot Yeshanim, yes. Therefore too people are not careful to separate him, because these are other people.

“And the case of Queen Heleni, who sat with her seven sons in the sukkah”—after all, there the mother educated them, and the commandment of education is only on the father. He already answered this above, you remember—what did he answer above? That this is a special law regarding Naziriteship. Even Reish Lakish agrees that there is a commandment on both the father and the mother, and that is a special law regarding Naziriteship. Here, apparently, there is a different answer: maybe they had a father, and he educated them in this way. And even if they did not have a father, she would educate them in commandment practice in general. Fine, that is another answer. It is a little strange—“she would educate them in commandment practice in general”—so then she did not really fulfill the commandment of education. So what is the proof from the fact that she sat them in a sukkah higher than twenty cubits? That is what the Talmud there says: “and moreover, she did all her actions only according to the Sages.” What does that mean? That although she was not obligated in the commandment of education, she still acted according to what the Sages instructed for one who is obligated in the commandment of education. That is how one has to read it according to this Tosafot Yeshanim.

Now the question is whether this is a different answer from the first answer. The first answer said that the Talmud in Nazir speaks only about Naziriteship, but in principle there is a commandment regarding both son and daughter. I am not sure. Because the Talmud in Nazir says two things. It distinguishes between son and daughter and between father and mother. And earlier the discussion was why this applies only to the son; why in our Talmud in Yoma does it apply also to the daughter and not only to the son? About that they say: because the law of education also applies to the daughter. In Naziriteship there is a special verse saying that there the law of education applies only to the son. Here, the teacher of the Tosafot Yeshanim is speaking about the parents, not the children. Why did Queen Heleni, who was a mother, educate them, after all the law of education is only on the father? That is not a question about the children; it is a question about the parents. And it could be that these are not two conflicting answers. Regarding the children, indeed the commandment of education applies both to a boy and to a girl, except in Naziriteship. And as I said, that is also the simple logic: if the girl is obligated in commandments, why should one not need to educate her? What difference is there between her and the boy? Therefore what the Tosafot Yeshanim says at first is very plausible: that this was said only about Naziriteship, even according to Reish Lakish—not Reish Lakish; Rabbi Yohanan also agrees, otherwise there would be a difficulty—but they said it only about Naziriteship, while the commandment of education in general applies to both son and daughter.

In the last section he is talking about—yes, but Queen Heleni was a mother, and the Talmud in Nazir also says that the commandment of education applies only to the father, and the Tosafot Yeshanim assumes that this is already a general law, not only in Naziriteship. Therefore this cannot be resolved the way he resolved it above. So that is what he says: maybe they had a father, or she educated them voluntarily even though she was not obligated. Then that would mean that this answer is not an alternative to the answer written above; it is a continuation of it. What was written above refers to son and daughter; what is being discussed here refers to father and mother. Then it comes out that the words of the Talmud in Nazir were said in two different respects. Son and daughter is a special law in Naziriteship; father and mother is a general law in education—that it applies only to the father and not to the mother. In any case, the Tosafot Yeshanim here assumes that the law of education is indeed only on the father and not on the mother—unless we say that the first answer disagrees with the last answer. If we see them as complementary, then throughout the Tosafot Yeshanim the education is only on the father. As regards the children, education applies both to a boy and to a girl, except for Naziriteship. What is the relation between education and the case of a minor eating forbidden carcasses? We saw two possibilities. One is that this concerns prohibitions and that concerns positive commandments. The other is that this concerns the parents and that concerns other people—the parents, meaning the father, because according to the Tosafot Yeshanim it applies only to the father. So the Tosafot Yeshanim indeed remains, also practically, with the conclusion that the commandment of education is imposed only on the father and not on the mother.

[Speaker C] Now the Gilyon HaShas here comments on the Tosafot Yeshanim, the Gilyon HaShas in Sukkah, right, comments

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On Tosafot Yeshanim, he says: "On the rabbinic level she is not obligated, and see Yoma 82a and Tosafot Yeshanim, and what he wrote there, that she was only training them for the commandment in a general sense." And this is difficult for me: how can we say in our passage, "And if you would say that a minor who no longer needs his mother is obligated only rabbinically, and if it is only rabbinic she paid no attention to it—come and hear: all her actions were done only in accordance with the sages"? But even on the rabbinic level she was not obligated to educate them, and this requires great analysis.
So I said that when Tosafot Yeshanim read the Talmud in Sukkah, they say that "all her actions were done only in accordance with the sages" means that really she was not obligated, but she did it in accordance with the sages—that is, she did what the sages obligate the father to do under the law of education. She was especially righteous even though she was not obligated. But from the glosses on the Talmud it does not sound that way, because the Talmud says: what, will you say that with a minor this is only a rabbinic law, and for a rabbinic law she paid no attention? "All her actions were done only in accordance with the sages." What does "she paid no attention" mean? She was not obligated in it at all. In the Talmud it sounds like she really was obligated, except that it was only rabbinic, and there was a thought that perhaps a rabbinic obligation she did not observe.
It is not such a strong difficulty. You could say that she did all the Torah-level laws that were imposed, even though she was not obligated, and as for rabbinic laws, I might have thought she did not do them because she was not obligated, and it comes to teach us that she also did the rabbinic laws that she was not obligated in. Like a woman who fulfills positive commandments that are time-bound, from which she is exempt. So too, if a woman is exempt from a rabbinic commandment, there is still value in her observing it, and she was righteous—"all her actions were done only in accordance with the sages," even with rabbinic commandments, again, not commandments incumbent on her but on others.
But Rabbi Akiva Eger assumes that this is difficult in the Talmud, and he leaves Tosafot Yeshanim with a "requires further analysis."
So the Kehillot Yaakov on Sukkah, section 2, brings this difficulty from the Gilyon HaShas of Rabbi Akiva Eger. And I’ll do this briefly because I want to finish, so now without sources—and afterward you can see it on YouTube, I’ll upload it to Dropbox. There’s a file there with an article of mine and the lecture.
So the Kehillot Yaakov brings this difficulty of the Gilyon HaShas by Rabbi Akiva Eger, and in order to resolve it he brings a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot in Berakhot and in Megillah about the parameters of the commandment of education. He says that Tosafot holds that the commandment of education—the discussion there is whether a minor who recites Grace after Meals, and after all he is obligated only rabbinically because this is the commandment of education—can discharge the obligation of someone else who did not eat to satiety and is therefore obligated in Grace after Meals only rabbinically. Because one rabbinic obligation can discharge another rabbinic obligation; a rabbinic obligation cannot discharge a Torah-level one.
So Tosafot says yes, because the minor himself is rabbinically obligated, and so he can discharge the adult who is rabbinically obligated. Rashi writes, in his own principled way—it doesn’t matter, I’m not going into that passage right now—Rashi writes that the obligation is on the father, not on the minor. There is a rabbinic obligation on the father to train the minor to recite Grace after Meals. So how could the minor discharge an adult’s obligation? Even an adult who is obligated in Grace after Meals only rabbinically cannot be discharged by a minor. Because the minor himself is not obligated rabbinically to recite Grace after Meals. Rather, the father must train him to recite Grace after Meals on the rabbinic level. That cannot discharge someone who is himself obligated in the rabbinic law of Grace after Meals.
Fine, there’s a whole calculation there because from the passages it seems otherwise, but that doesn’t matter now. In any case, this is a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot.
So the Kehillot Yaakov says that basically we see here that according to Tosafot there is an obligation on the minor himself to recite Grace after Meals. Or in other words, the definition of the commandment of education is not an obligation on the father to take care of the minor; rather it is the minor’s own rabbinic obligation to fulfill commandments. That fits, if you remember, with all the parameters of education—what they obligated, and everything we saw—that the commandment of education means, and not like the Raavan and the Mishnah Berurah and all the others, but rather as I said there in Rabbenu Manoach, that there is a commandment on the minor himself to perform the commandments. That is the law of education. Okay?
Fine. The Kehillot Yaakov asks: but wait a second—doesn’t the Talmud in Nazir say that the law of education is imposed on the father and not on the mother? But then it’s not on the father and not on the mother—it’s on the minor. Why discuss the father and the mother? It is not an obligation on the father or the mother at all; according to Tosafot it’s an obligation on the minor. According to Rashi, where the obligation is on the parents, then you can discuss whether it’s on the father or on the mother—that’s the discussion in Tosafot Yeshanim, the Talmud in Nazir, everything. But if the obligation is only on the minor himself, then what does it have to do with the father and the mother? You could discuss whether it applies to a son or also to a daughter, fine. But what difference does it make whether it’s the father or the mother? The obligation is not on either of them; it’s on the minor.
Therefore, he says there is no choice but to say that Tosafot also agrees that there is an obligation on the parents to educate the minor, except that besides that there is also an obligation on the minor himself to fulfill the commandment. And that is really exactly Rabbenu Manoach, which we saw. He doesn’t bring Rabbenu Manoach, but it really is Rabbenu Manoach that we saw—I think he doesn’t cite him. Two laws of education: there is an obligation on the minor, and there is a commandment on the parents to accustom him to commandments. And that is imposed only on the father and not on the mother according to Tosafot Yeshanim and all the discussions we had earlier. Aside from that, there is also an obligation on the minor himself to recite the blessing, and that is according to Tosafot. And that is what Tosafot means when it says that a minor can discharge the obligation of someone else who is obligated in Grace after Meals on the rabbinic level, because he himself is obligated. According to Rashi there is only the law of the parents’ obligation and not this second law, which is really parallel to the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) that we saw.
Now the question is of course: what is the meaning of these two obligations, where do they come from? One possibility is to say that they really are two separate laws, as we learned in Rabbenu Manoach. What does that mean? That there is an obligation on minors to fulfill commandments, maybe even on the Torah level, except that they are exempt from punishment. I mentioned the Pri Megadim in the introduction, who claims that the entire exemption of minors is only an exemption from punishment, but they are still obligated to fulfill commandments. So if that is really so, it is a bit difficult in the Talmud—I already noted that in the introduction I gave. But if so, then certainly one can understand that the obligation on the minor himself is really an obligation—perhaps even a Torah-level obligation. The obligation on the parents to educate him would be a rabbinic obligation.
But that is a bit difficult in Tosafot, because Tosafot says that the obligation on the minor himself is rabbinic. Otherwise, why can the minor not discharge the obligation of an adult who is obligated on the Torah level? And he can discharge an adult who is obligated in Grace after Meals on the rabbinic level, because the minor himself is rabbinically obligated. So the obligation even on the minor himself is only rabbinic and not Torah-level; this is not the Pri Megadim. So how are we to understand it?
It seems to me that one can understand it like this—I’ll do this really briefly; afterward you can see it in the summary, because I want to finish this topic. There is a difference between a state in which you fulfill a commandment, where the obligation to fulfill the commandment is imposed on you, and the question of who bears responsibility to make sure the commandment is fulfilled. The minor is obligated in commandments on the rabbinic level, at least when he understands, okay? Why? The motivation may be educational; it doesn’t matter. But the minor is rabbinically obligated in commandments. However, the minor does not have legal competence—or not enough of it. And by competence here I don’t simply mean intellectual understanding, but legal responsibility: that you impose an obligation on him and he can be aware of it and responsible for it, and you can rely on him to carry it out. He does not have that responsibility; he is a minor. So what do you do? You place the responsibility for the fulfillment of the commandment on the parents.
These are not two different laws; they are two aspects of the same commandment of education. The commandment of education is to impose a rabbinic obligation on the minor, and the responsibility to make sure that this obligation is fulfilled rests on the parents—or only on the father according to Tosafot Yeshanim. Here are the disputes we saw. But the responsibility rests on the parents.
Where do we find something like this? An example would be the commandment of Hakhel as discussed in Sefer HaChinukh. In the commandment of Hakhel in Sefer HaChinukh, you see throughout—and again, I’m not going into it, you can look at the article I’ll send you—but in the commandment of Hakhel in Sefer HaChinukh, you see that this is a commandment on the community. Not a commandment on each individual member of the community; it is a commandment on the community as a whole. That is why, for example, women are obligated in Hakhel, and there is an opinion that even minors are obligated in Hakhel. Obligated themselves—not that the adults have to bring them, but that the minor himself is obligated. That is a dispute between the Shaagat Aryeh and Turei Even on one side, and the Minchat Chinukh on the other.
That is one side. On the other side, Sefer HaChinukh writes at the end that if someone stayed home and did not come to Jerusalem for the commandment of Hakhel, he has nullified this positive commandment. Now I say: if this commandment is a communal one, and most of the community was there, and the Torah was read, and the whole Hakhel ceremony took place, then the commandment was fulfilled. So what does it mean that if I stayed home I nullified the positive commandment? I am not the one obligated; the community is obligated. So how can it be that a commandment that was in fact fulfilled—someone transgresses by nullifying it? It was fulfilled. The one obligated is the community, not me. And the community fulfilled what it was obligated to do. So in what sense was this positive commandment nullified?
My claim is: a pot owned jointly is neither hot nor cold. When you impose an obligation on a collection of people, it won’t happen. Everyone says, "Yes, they’ll do it already," and no one actually does it. So what does the Torah do? When the commandment is communal, the responsibility rests on the individuals. Every individual in the community bears responsibility for making sure the community fulfills its obligation. And now the great novelty is this: the community came to Jerusalem, most of the community; they fulfilled the commandment of Hakhel. The commandment was fulfilled, and the addressee of the commandment is the community, and the community fulfilled the commandment. But you, as an individual, relied on others being there and fulfilling it, and you did not contribute your part. You did not come there as part of your collective responsibility to make sure the collective does what it needs to do. So you have nullified a positive commandment. That means that even though the positive commandment was fulfilled, I nullified it. This is a remarkable novelty in communal commandments. Because what Sefer HaChinukh is basically saying, it seems to me, if I am right in the interpretation, is that there is a split between who fulfills the commandment and who is responsible for seeing that the commandment gets fulfilled. The one who fulfills the commandment is the community. The ones responsible for seeing that the commandment gets fulfilled are each and every member of the community. If everyone says, "Fine, let the community fulfill it, but I don’t need to, I’m exempt," then even the communal commandment will not be fulfilled. So the Torah imposes responsibility on each individual to participate, and if he does not, that is considered nullifying a positive commandment—as though the commandment was not fulfilled from his perspective, even though it in fact was fulfilled, since the community was there.
I brought additional examples of this in the article. There is a contradiction in the Mishnah Berurah about Torah reading. On the one hand, in one place it seems clear that it is a communal commandment. Someone who is in prison does not have to have a Torah scroll brought to him, because it is a communal commandment; he is not individually obligated. On the other hand, it writes that it is forbidden to leave the synagogue while the Torah is being read. Several halakhic decisors ask: yes, this is a contradiction in the Mishnah Berurah. What is the problem? After all, the community fulfills it—let you leave, ten others in the synagogue will still fulfill it. It is a commandment for the community, not for the individual. You as an individual are not obligated in it.
The answer is: not true. There is no contradiction. It is a commandment for the community, and therefore when someone is alone in prison, there is no need to bring him a Torah scroll. But the responsibility to fulfill the commandment rests on each individual. So if you leave the synagogue, all the others may also leave the synagogue. Therefore they forbid you to leave the synagogue, even though the commandment is for the community and not specifically on you. The responsibility that the commandment be fulfilled is on you, and therefore you may not leave the synagogue, even though it is a communal commandment.
I want to say the same thing about the law of education according to Tosafot, and in the Kehillot Yaakov’s reading of Tosafot: the law of education has two aspects; they are not two separate laws like in Rabbenu Manoach, because Tosafot said that both are rabbinic. Rather, these are two sides of the same coin. It is like in the community: when there is a problem that the one obligated in the commandment is someone we cannot rely on to make sure it gets fulfilled, we appoint someone else to be responsible for seeing that the commandment is fulfilled. In the case of the community, that is all the individuals that make up the community. In the case of education, it is the child’s parents. Each time for a different reason, we have some concern that the one obligated in the commandment may not actually fulfill it. The minor, because he does not have enough responsibility, he lacks legal competence. And the community, because each person will rely on the others. In all those cases where there is concern that the one obligated in the commandment may not fulfill it, we place the responsibility on whoever does have responsibility and who must make sure it happens. And those are the two laws in Tosafot.
Therefore, there is no need to ask what the source of these two laws is and where they come from. They are two aspects of the same law. Once the sages obligate the minor in commandments on the rabbinic level, they want to make sure it will actually happen. How do they do that? They place responsibility on the parents to ensure that it happens, and that is the commandment of education. On whom did they place the responsibility? That is the dispute in the Talmud—on the father, on the mother, on both, it doesn’t matter; those are the disputes we dealt with. But they are two sides of the same coin, not two separate laws. It is not the "two kinds of education" of Rabbenu Manoach, but this seems to me to be the explanation here in the Kehillot Yaakov in Tosafot.
Okay, I did this briefly. You can see it later in the summary at greater length. I’ll upload both the summary and the file with the article to Dropbox.
And with that I’ve finished the issue of education. We now have quite a long gap until the next lecture. Sunday is a day off ahead of Rosh Hashanah, so there won’t be a lecture. Monday is the eve of Rosh Hashanah. The next lecture is Thursday, on the Fast of Gedaliah. So really we have about another week. Wait, what day is today? Yes, today is Thursday. So we have another week until the next lecture, and there I’ll begin a new passage. I’ll write for you at the end of the file what we’ll be dealing with. Okay, that’s it.

[Speaker C] Thank you very much, have a good holiday.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] See you.