Vaera (5765)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Midah Tovah — Sabbath eve, Parashat Va’era, 5766

The Questions

1. What is the dispute over whether specifically the final general term is decisive, or specifically the first general term?
2. Why does this dispute not appear in every exposition of “general term, particular, and general term”?
3. Do the school of Rabbi Akiva really work with general terms, while the school of Rabbi Ishmael works with particulars?
4. How can the first general term, which is itself general, serve to exclude?
5. And again: what is the relationship between the logic of “inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion” and that of “general term, particular, and general term”?

The Hermeneutical Principles

General term, particular, and general term. Inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion.

A. Summary of Last Year’s Article

“And the Lord said to Moses: Say to Aaron, Take your staff and stretch out your hand over the waters of Egypt, over their rivers, over their canals, over their ponds, and over every gathering of their waters, and they shall become blood; and there shall be blood throughout all the land of Egypt, even in wood and in stone.”

— Exodus 7:19

Rabbi Yose bar Avin said: “General term, particular, and general term — you may infer only what is similar to the particular. ‘Over the waters of Egypt’ — this is the first general term. ‘Over their rivers, over their canals, and over their ponds’ — this is the particular. ‘And over every gathering of their waters’ — this is another general term. What does this include? Everything similar to them.”

— Exodus Rabbah, Shenan edition, 9:11

“Stretch out your hand over the waters of Egypt, over their rivers, over their canals, and over their ponds — that is, everything in the Nile, in the ponds, and in the rivers. ‘And over every gathering of their waters’ — that which is in a pitcher. ‘And there shall be blood throughout all the land of Egypt’ — even if an Egyptian spat, it was all blood.”

— Exodus Rabbah, Shenan edition, 9:10

The verse cited above expresses the fact that the plague of blood struck the whole land of Egypt, in every location and in every kind of setting, even in wood and stone. The first midrash (rabbinic exposition) cited above uses the hermeneutical principle of “general term, particular, and general term.” This principle appears among the thirteen principles of Rabbi Ishmael, but it does not appear in the list of the thirty-two principles of Rabbi Eliezer ben Rabbi Yose ha-Gelili, which are usually classified as the principles of aggadic midrash, that is, non-legal rabbinic exposition. Our midrash here is a clear case of aggadic exposition, and from this it follows that the principle of “general term, particular, and general term” is used in aggadic exposition as well, and not only in halakhic (legal) exposition. We noted that Rabbi Eliezer ben Rabbi Yose ha-Gelili’s principles are associated with the school of Rabbi Akiva, and this may be the reason that the principle of “general term, particular, and general term” does not appear in his list.

We also noted that the instruction attached to this principle in Rabbi Ishmael’s list is: “you may infer only what is similar to the particular.” It follows that this is a limiting principle: from the general term we exclude everything that is not similar to the particular. Yet our midrash ends with language that points specifically to inclusion, not exclusion: “What does this include? Everything similar to them.” How are we to understand this?

We argued that the matter may depend on the angle from which we view the structure. If we begin with the two general terms on the sides, then the imprisonment of a particular between them narrows the range of meaning. But if we begin with the particular trapped in the middle, then it is natural to say that the general expressions on its two sides broaden the meaning beyond what is contained in the particular. In the end, on both approaches the scope of the midrashic result lies between the scope of the particular and the scope of the general terms that surround it. Therefore, the result of using this principle may be described both as inclusion, relative to the particular, and as exclusion, relative to the general terms.

We pointed out that in all the general-and-particular principles in the baraita of Rabbi Ishmael, only the name of the principle appears — that is, the label defined by the scriptural linguistic form to which it applies — but not the practical instruction telling us how to operate the relevant principle on that linguistic form. This addition appears only in the principle of “general term, particular, and general term” — “you may infer only what is similar to the particular.” We proposed to explain this by suggesting that this instruction provides, in one form or another, the definition of all the general-and-particular principles.

We then explained how the principles of general and particular operate. When a particular appears after a general term, the particular interprets the preceding general term. Rashi writes that the word “particular” is derived from the root meaning interpretation. Therefore, within the general term there is only that which clearly characterizes the particular — “only what is in the particular.” In the structure of “general term, particular, and general term,” the second general term, which appears after the particular, once again includes everything similar to the particular, and a broader set is formed — “only what is like the particular.”

In contrast to Rabbi Ishmael’s school, which expounds by general and particular, the school of Rabbi Akiva expounds by inclusion and exclusion. According to this method, the medieval commentators disagreed. According to Rashi, in the two-stage structure the particular constitutes a limitation of the scope of the general term, rather than an interpretation of it. Therefore, already in the two-stage structure we are in a situation where the scope is everything similar to the particular. According to Rabbenu Hananel, however, the mechanism works exactly as it does in the school of Rabbi Ishmael. According to all views, a three-stage structure of “general term, particular, and general term” is expounded in the school of Rabbi Akiva as an inclusion that returns us to the original general category, excluding one item — the item that seems most plausible to the interpreter to exclude.

The conclusion was that, at least according to Rashi, the school of Rabbi Akiva expounds the three-stage structure symmetrically. By contrast, according to the school of Rabbi Ishmael the three-stage structure works asymmetrically: interpretation, not limitation, followed by inclusion. Yet the structure as a whole is meant to expand the particular into a group that includes everything similar to it. From an overall perspective, according to Rabbi Ishmael the structure expands the particular, whereas according to Rabbi Akiva it limits the general term.

We noted that the claim of the school of Rabbi Akiva — that a two-stage structure of “general term and particular” aims to limit the law’s application relative to the general term, and to define it as applying to a domain “similar to the particular” — is problematic. If only the particular had been written, we would have reached the same conclusion, by means of a binyan av (an argument from an archetypal case), or “what do we find?” We would have learned from the particular to everything similar to it. If so, what purpose does the first general term serve?

The Raavad and Tosafot explain that the purpose of the first general term is to prevent the expansion of the particular by means of “what do we find?” It seems that precisely because of this problem, Rabbenu Hananel argues that the two-stage structure is not subject to dispute, and that its purpose is interpretive. According to Rashi, however, the difficulty remains: why, according to the school of Rabbi Akiva, do we need the first general term?

From another angle one can raise the opposite difficulty against the school of Rabbi Ishmael, according to both Rashi and Rabbenu Hananel. According to Rabbi Ishmael’s school, the three-stage structure teaches us to infer “what is similar to the particular.” But that would have been the result had the Torah written only the particular and we then extended it by analogy through a binyan av. If so, the whole structure would seem superfluous.

These difficulties lead us more deeply into questions about measuring the degree of similarity — similarity in different respects — which we discussed briefly on the page for Parashat Vayikra, 5765, and to which we will return in this week’s article.

We also noted that according to Rabbi Akiva the operations of general term and particular are operations between sets, whereas according to Rabbi Ishmael they are acts of generalization and specification concerning particulars. The general terms only hint to us what to do with the particulars.

In the course of our discussion we also examined the complex relationship between analogy and induction, and applied this both to the dispute between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva regarding the expositions of general and particular, and to cases of “general term, particular, and general term” in which the first general term differs from the final general term. In such cases, discussed in Babylonian Talmud, Hullin 66a, Rabbi Ishmael expounds by general and particular, whereas Rabbi Akiva does not. We explained this by saying that according to Rabbi Ishmael the two general terms function only as indicators for the expansion of the particular, and therefore the particular determines the scope of the law. The two general terms are thus mere supporting actors, whose specific properties are not really important for the purpose of the generalization. By contrast, according to Rabbi Akiva the two general terms are the dominant elements, and the middle particular merely excludes one item from among them. Therefore, if the two general terms are not identical, we have no starting point from which to proceed. Our article this week will deal with a case in which the two general terms are identical.

Even in the midrash cited above, which apparently belongs to the school of Rabbi Ishmael, the first general term — “over the waters of Egypt” — is not equal to the second — “over every gathering of their waters.” We explained in this way the language of inclusion used by the midrash, even though the principle of “general term, particular, and general term” is a limiting principle. The midrash expands the particulars and limits only in relation to the general terms.

At the end of our discussion last year, we also considered, from the differences between the expositions, the value significance that emerges from this midrash — the question whether the Holy One, blessed be He, strikes only the work of human hands, or also His own handiwork.

B. The Relationship Between the First General Term and the Final General Term¹

Introduction

We have seen that the school of Rabbi Akiva and the school of Rabbi Ishmael disagree about whether a structure of “general term, particular, and general term” is meant to limit the general terms or to expand the particular. Yet in the sugya in the Babylonian Talmud, Eruvin, an internal dispute appears within the school of Rabbi Ishmael, which at first glance seems to reflect a similar disagreement. We will now examine this dispute in light of the course of the sugya.

The Fundamental Dispute in the Sugya in Eruvin

At the end of Deuteronomy 14 we are commanded regarding the commandment of the second tithe. As is explicit there, the second tithe must be eaten by its owner in Jerusalem. If it is difficult to bring the produce itself up to Jerusalem, one may redeem it for money and bring the money to Jerusalem instead. In Jerusalem one purchases food with that money and eats it there. The sugya in Babylonian Talmud, Eruvin 27b–28a deals with the question of what may be bought in Jerusalem with second-tithe money.

The verse that commands this situation is as follows, in Deuteronomy 14:26:

“And you shall spend the money on whatever your appetite desires: on cattle, on sheep, on wine, on strong drink, and on whatever your appetite asks of you; and you shall eat there before the Lord your God and rejoice, you and your household.”

— Deuteronomy 14:26

The description of the things that may be bought with second-tithe money appears in a threefold structure of “general term, particular, and general term”: “on whatever your appetite desires” — the first general term; “on cattle, on sheep, on wine, and on strong drink” — the particulars; “and on whatever your appetite asks of you” — the final general term. As expected, such a structure is expounded by the Sages in two different ways: one according to the school of Rabbi Akiva as “inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion,” and the other according to the school of Rabbi Ishmael as “general term, particular, and general term.”

In the course of the sugya, after these two methods are presented, an additional dispute appears, this time an internal dispute among the sages who follow Rabbi Ishmael’s method and expound by “general term, particular, and general term.” According to the sugya’s conclusion, they disagree over a general methodological issue concerning the relative status of the two general terms — the first and the final — in such a threefold structure. The sugya states:

“Rabbi Yehudah ben Gadish and Rabbi Eliezer expound by inclusions and exclusions, while these tanna’im expound by general terms and particulars. Rabbi Yehudah ben Gadish and Rabbi Eliezer expound by inclusions and exclusions: ‘And you shall spend the money on whatever your appetite desires’ — this includes; ‘on cattle, on sheep, on wine, and on strong drink’ — this excludes; ‘and on whatever your appetite asks of you’ — it includes again. Inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion — it includes everything. What does it include? It includes all things. And what does it exclude? According to Rabbi Eliezer, it excludes fish brine; according to Rabbi Yehudah ben Gadish, it excludes water and salt.”

“And these tanna’im expound by general terms and particulars, as it was taught: ‘And you shall spend the money on whatever your appetite desires’ — a general term; ‘on cattle, on sheep, on wine, and on strong drink’ — a particular; ‘and on whatever your appetite asks of you’ — again a general term. General term, particular, and general term — you may infer only what is similar to the particular. Just as the particular explicitly denotes produce derived from produce and things that grow from the ground, so too everything must be produce derived from produce and things that grow from the ground. And another baraita taught: Just as the particular explicitly denotes offspring of the offspring of the earth, so too everything must be offspring of the offspring of the earth.”

Rabbi Yehudah ben Gadish and Rabbi Eliezer expound by “inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion,” and therefore, in their view, the law permits purchasing all kinds of food with second-tithe money, with only one thing excluded. According to Rabbi Eliezer, what is excluded is fish brine — a fish sauce with no actual fish pieces in it — and certainly also water and salt, which are inferior to it in the sense that will become clear below. According to Rabbi Yehudah ben Gadish, only water and salt are excluded; fish brine is not excluded. Later, when the Gemara discusses the view of the Sages, it becomes clearer why precisely these things are excluded.

By contrast, the Sages expound this structure as “general term, particular, and general term,” and therefore the conclusion is that one may buy anything that is “similar to the particular,” that is, anything resembling the particular. Here too there is an internal dispute over which foods count as similar to the particular. According to one tanna, we include “produce derived from produce and things that grow from the ground” — that is, things generated from other things, whether fruit or animals, and in addition things nourished by and growing from the ground. According to the second tanna, we include “offspring of the offspring of the earth” — that is, things generated from the earth in the six days of Creation.

The Practical Difference Between the Two Sides Within the Method of “General Term, Particular, and General Term”

The Gemara then clarifies the practical difference between these two disputants within the method of “general term, particular, and general term”:

“What is the difference between them? Abaye said: Fish. According to the one who says, ‘produce derived from produce and things that grow from the ground,’ these fish are things that grow from the ground. According to the one who says, ‘offspring of the offspring of the earth,’ fish were created from water. But did Abaye really say that fish are things that grow from the ground? Didn’t Abaye say: If one eats a putita, he incurs four sets of lashes; an ant, five; a hornet, six. And if so, let a putita as well incur lashes because of the verse ‘the swarming thing that swarms upon the earth’! Rather, Ravina said: Birds are the difference between them. According to the one who says, ‘produce derived from produce and things that grow from the ground,’ these too are things that grow from the ground. According to the one who says, ‘offspring of the offspring of the earth,’ these birds were created from mire.”

According to the Gemara’s initial suggestion, the difference would concern fish. Fish are indeed produce derived from produce, and they also count as things that grow from the ground in the relevant sense, but they were not created from the ground. The Gemara rejects this possibility, however, by concluding that fish are, according to all opinions, not things that grow from the ground. The conclusion is therefore that, according to all opinions, one may not buy fish with second-tithe money.

The Gemara then presents a practical difference regarding birds. Birds are produce derived from produce — they are born from parents — and they are nourished from the ground, but they were not created from the ground, that is, they are not “offspring of the offspring of the earth.” Rather, they were created from mire, that is, clay or mud composed of water and earth.² This remains the practical difference between the two opinions according to the sugya’s conclusion.

Searching for the Reasons for the Dispute

The Gemara now turns to the reasons of the tanna’im who exclude birds and those who include them:

“What is the reason of the one who includes birds, and what is the reason of the one who excludes birds?”

Already this initial question seems puzzling at this stage of the sugya, for we have already identified the reasons above. One tanna generalizes from the particulars and says that what they share is that they are all produce derived from produce and things that grow from the ground, and therefore he includes birds. The other tanna generalizes and holds that what they share is that they are offspring of the offspring of the earth, and therefore he does not include birds.

To put this differently: we have previously distinguished between two different stages in carrying out an exposition, as discussed, for example, on the page for Parashat Vayehi this year. In the first stage, which is formal and universal and does not depend on the specific context under discussion, we identify a scriptural structure that requires the use of one of the hermeneutical principles. After that comes a second stage, which concerns the content under discussion, and there we must proceed in light of our understanding of that content. In our case, the first stage is the identification of a threefold structure of “general term, particular, and general term.” Formally, we already know that we must generalize and apply the law to everything “similar to the particular.” Now comes stage two, where we must decide the nature of the generalization — that is, we must seek what all the particulars in the threefold structure have in common, and apply the law to other particulars that possess those same features. At first glance, at this stage there is no reason to seek some general methodological schema. Rather, we would expect local explanations rooted in the halakhic content under discussion here, explanations that would clarify why we chose specifically the direction of generalization toward produce derived from produce and the like, rather than, for example, a generalization stating that the law applies to all foods whose names in the sacred language begin with the same letters as “cattle,” “sheep,” “wine,” and “strong drink.” As stated, this choice arises from our conception of the law of eating the second tithe, which is the topic of the present sugya, and not from the application of general methodological rules pertaining to the principle of “general term, particular, and general term” as such.

And yet, the Gemara here looks for a methodological principle that underlies this dispute, contrary to what we would have expected. It assumes that even in the second stage of the exposition — the stage that appears to be content-based — the general methodology still has something to say, and the matter is not left only to the content. From the standpoint of the content, it would seem that the axis of generalization indeed points toward produce derived from produce and connection to the ground. But even if the direction is clear, the question remains how far to carry the generalization. The sugya implies that this question concerns the universal rules governing the use of the principle of “general term, particular, and general term,” and not only the specific context. We should therefore not be surprised to find, in the Gemara’s conclusion, that the foundation of the dispute is indeed the question of how far the particulars in the threefold structure are to be generalized. Put differently: what is the radius of the circle that we are to draw around them?

Explanation of the Dispute³

The Gemara’s conclusion explains the dispute as follows:

“The one who includes birds holds: specifically the final general term is decisive. A particular followed by a general becomes a general category added to the particular, and thus all things are included. And the first general term is effective in excluding whatever is not similar to it in two respects. But the one who excludes birds holds: specifically the first general term is decisive. General and particular — the general includes only what is in the particular; these, yes, but anything else, no. And the final general term is effective in including whatever is similar to it in three respects.”

According to the Gemara’s explanation, the dispute arises from viewing the threefold structure as a double structure with a correction. According to one opinion, “general term, particular, and general term” is fundamentally a structure of “particular and general.” The threefold structure is formed by adding yet another initial general term before this two-part structure, in order to limit. By contrast, the second opinion holds that the basic structure is “general term and particular,” to which an additional final general term was then added in order to expand it.

A structure of “general term and particular” is expounded as “only what is in the particular,” that is, as excluding all foods except those entirely identical with the particular. The radius of generalization is therefore effectively zero. Adding the final general term at the end then includes things similar to the particular in three respects. In other words, it enlarges the radius of generalization somewhat, but still only to the narrowest possible group, one composed only of items fully similar to the particular stated in the text. According to this view, birds are not included among the foods that may be bought with second-tithe money, because they resemble the scriptural particular in only two respects. They are not “offspring of the offspring of the earth.”

By contrast, a structure of “particular and general” is usually expounded as a maximal inclusion of the particular, meaning that resemblance in only one respect is enough. The circle’s radius is therefore very wide. Hence the addition of the first general term cannot be intended to include. The conclusion is that the first general term is meant to limit the circle of generalization and set it at a medium radius: whatever resembles the scriptural particular in at least two respects, and no more — that is, not whatever resembles it in one respect alone. According to this view, birds are indeed included among the foods that may be purchased with second-tithe money.

The “Respects” in This Exposition and Their Meaning

The different “respects” are the dimensions of similarity to the particular stated in the text. The sugya mentions three such dimensions: produce derived from produce, things that grow from the ground, and offspring of the offspring of the earth.

Similarity in three respects means anything that is at once produce derived from produce, something that grows from the ground, and offspring of the offspring of the earth. This does not include birds, which are indeed produce derived from produce and things that grow from the ground, but are not offspring of the offspring of the earth. It certainly does not include fish either, since they are not even things that grow from the ground, nor are they offspring of the offspring of the earth.

Similarity in two respects means everything that is both produce derived from produce and something that grows from the ground.⁴ This is a broader group, and it includes birds as well.

Similarity in one respect means something that is either produce derived from produce or something that grows from the ground. This is the broadest group, since it includes all items similar to the scriptural particular in at least one of the three characteristics.

Summary of the Hermeneutical Principles of “General and Particular”

To summarize: “general term and particular” does not expand the particular at all. “Particular and general” expands the particular in a maximalist way, to the group of items similar to it in at least one respect. As for “general term, particular, and general term,” the opinions are divided: according to one tanna, it produces a minimalist inclusion, only of what resembles the particular in three respects, and therefore it does not include birds, which resemble the scriptural particular in only two respects. According to the second tanna, it includes what resembles the particular in two respects, and therefore it does include birds.

It should be noted that according to the first method there seems to be no way in the Torah to include something on the basis of two respects, and according to the second method there is no way to include on the basis of three respects. What is the Torah to write if it nevertheless wants some law to apply to a group defined by such a radius, two or three respects respectively? It would seem that in such cases the Torah would not use the method of general-and-particular principles at all, but would state its intention explicitly.⁵ The conclusion is that the methods of general and particular can produce only a limited number of halakhic inferences.⁶ Below we will nevertheless suggest another possibility for the opinion that holds that specifically the final general term is decisive.

A Further Look at the Formalism of the Principle of “General Term, Particular, and General Term” According to the Two Disputed Views

At first glance, according to both opinions, the two general terms in the threefold structure function in the same way: the second general term includes, while the first general term, together with the particular, limits. The dispute between the two positions appears to concern only the question of which of the two general terms belongs to the basic structure and which serves as a later correction. In the language of the Gemara, this is described as the question of which of the two general terms is the principal one.

But there is another aspect to the dispute. In the expansive view, the second general term is attached to the particular, while the first acts alone to produce the limitation. In the restrictive view, the first general term is attached to the particular, while the second includes on its own. From this it would seem that the dispute is not only about which general term belongs to the basic structure, but also about which of the two attaches to the particular and which acts on its own.

The question then is why, according to the expansive view, the first general term limits at all. In the principles of general and particular, the function of every general term is to include, not to exclude. Therefore, if the first general term is not attached to the particular that follows it, then it ought to include even more than the inclusion of “particular and general” that follows it — if such a thing is possible at all. It therefore seems that even according to this view, the first general term is conceived as acting together with the particular that follows it, and the whole structure of “general term and particular” is the limiting component.

The conclusion is that according to all opinions, the first general term is attached to the particular that follows it, and together they produce a limitation. In fact, it is the particular that limits the general term, not the general term that limits the particular. Likewise, according to all opinions, the second general term includes. The only question is whether the second general term is attached to the particular and includes first, or whether it operates at stage two — apparently by itself, without attachment to the particular — after the initial limitation created by the structure of “general term and particular.”

The result is that the dispute is twofold:

1. There is a dispute over whether the final general term attaches to the particular, or whether only the first general term attaches to it.
2. There is a further dispute over which one acts first.

Accordingly, according to the view that the first general term is primary, the starting point is the general term. The particular limits it completely, to a radius of zero. After that comes the final general term and expands the particular to everything similar to it in three respects. According to the view that the final general term is primary, the starting point is the particular. The final general term acts first and expands the particular to everything similar to it in at least one respect. The first general term attaches to the particular and limits this to similarity in at least two respects.

The question facing the expansive view is how the first general term can attach to the particular after the particular has already been expanded earlier by the final general term. Seemingly, after the final general term’s first action, no bare particular remains on the scene for the first general term to attach to and limit.

This consideration suggests that according to this view the two general terms act simultaneously. The first general term attaches to the particular while it is still a “bare” particular, and it accompanies it through the expansion performed by the final general term. In the end it acts upon that expansion and limits it to a radius of generalization based on similarity in at least two respects.

The Uniqueness of This Exposition and Its Implications

The dispute over whether the first general term or the final general term is primary does not accompany every exposition involving general and particular. It therefore seems that this dispute does not characterize the methodology of “general and particular” as such, but only cases of the kind presented here. What distinguishes the type of expositions with which our sugya deals, as opposed to the ordinary expositions of “general term, particular, and general term”? See Tosafot, s.v. “Ahani,” on Eruvin 28a, where several such expositions are cited.

We must also ask why there is any motivation at all not to expound the words of the verse in the order in which they appear: first the first general term, then the particular, and finally the final general term. At first glance, the view that the first general term is decisive seems more reasonable.

Rabbenu Hananel, in his commentary ad loc., raises the first difficulty. He explains that the dispute here arises because the first general term and the final general term are similar to one another: “your appetite desires” and “your appetite asks of you” are very similar expressions. In his view, only in such a situation must we ask what the relationship between the two general terms is.

What, then, is the nature of the exposition of “general term, particular, and general term” in an asymmetrical case? Is the first general term decisive, or the final general term? It would seem that here we follow the order of the text. That is, in the ordinary expositions the radius of generalization will be three respects, not two.

Above we raised a difficulty in the course of the sugya: why did the Gemara ask what the basis of the dispute between the opinions is, if the dispute had already been explained as a question about the radius of generalization? We also asked why the Gemara assumes that the dispute must be a general methodological one, and not a specific dispute over the logic of the generalization in this case. It is possible that the reason for these assumptions also lies in Rabbenu Hananel’s consideration: since the two general terms are similar, the question naturally arises which of them should be used first. This consideration stood before the eyes of the sages of the sugya already at the stage of the question, and not only in the answer, as Rabbenu Hananel writes.⁷

This is the place to return to our comments from last year, where we saw that according to Rabbi Akiva, when the two general terms are different there is no room at all for an exposition of “inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion.” According to Rabbi Ishmael, however, as the Gemara says in Hullin 66a, even when the two general terms are different we do expound by “general term, particular, and general term.”

We can now also understand why the Gemara sets the dispute in our sugya specifically within Rabbi Ishmael’s method. According to Rabbi Akiva, in every biblical case expounded by “inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion,” the two general terms are equal, for as we have seen, when they are different there is no room for such an exposition at all. If so, according to Rabbi Akiva our case is simply the ordinary case of “inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion.” By contrast, according to Rabbi Ishmael this is an exceptional case, and therefore it is possible to dispute whether we include on the basis of two or three respects of similarity without changing all the rules of exposition.

In light of our discussion here, another difficulty raised above is also resolved: how is the Torah supposed to write if it wishes us to include only what is similar in two respects, according to the view that the first general term is decisive, or only what is similar in three respects, according to the view that the final general term is decisive? At least according to the latter view, one can answer as follows: if the Torah wishes to include only what is similar in three respects, it should present a case in which the two general terms are not identical. As we have seen here, in such a situation we will expound according to the order of the text, and we will arrive at inclusion based on three respects, just as in the view that the first general term is decisive.

A Note on the Relationship Between the Exegetical Methodologies of the School of Rabbi Ishmael and the School of Rabbi Akiva

Above we noted that, according to those who expound by inclusion and exclusion, it is not clear why the exclusion should fall specifically on fish brine or on water and salt. Only at the second stage of the sugya, where the expositions of the method of “general and particular” are described, do we encounter the axes of inclusion and exclusion. It seems that the school of Rabbi Akiva also understands that exclusions must operate along axes related to the particulars that appear in the text. The excluded items in the expositions of inclusion and exclusion — whether water and salt or fish brine — are neither produce derived from produce, nor things that grow from the ground, nor offspring of the earth. They are not animals or fruits. It is worth noting that the Jerusalem Talmud, also cited by Rabbenu Hananel ad loc., discusses grasshoppers, truffles, and mushrooms as well. If so, these are exclusions of things that do not resemble the particulars in any parameter of similarity. This is the minimal exclusion that can be made from this threefold structure.

This is a very interesting conclusion, for we learn from it that even the school of Rabbi Akiva, which expounds by “inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion,” does not exclude some arbitrary thing as such, as their language sometimes seems to imply, but rather something that has some connection to the particular that appears in the middle. This is certainly a more reasonable approach.

If so, the difference between the two schools becomes somewhat minor. The question is only how much to exclude from the general term. According to the school of Rabbi Akiva, one excludes the minimum — only things that are not similar to the particular in any parameter at all.⁸ According to the school of Rabbi Ishmael one excludes more: things similar in at most one respect, according to the view that the final general term is decisive, or things similar in at most two respects, according to the view that the first general term is decisive.

Generalization and Specification

We must now ask whether the overall picture of the dispute between the school of Rabbi Akiva and the school of Rabbi Ishmael still stands. In last year’s article we argued that Rabbi Akiva operates on the level of adding and subtracting sets, whereas Rabbi Ishmael operates by way of generalization, that is, by moving from particulars to general rules. In the picture described here, the school of Rabbi Akiva sees the threefold structure as a limiting structure. Within the school of Rabbi Ishmael the situation is more complex. We saw that there is a dispute within Rabbi Ishmael’s school, at least in a case of a threefold structure where the two general terms resemble one another, over whether to generalize to two respects or to three. In both cases, does Rabbi Ishmael’s school still generalize — that is, does it view the structure of “general term, particular, and general term” as a structure of inclusion — or is there an opinion within that school that comes close to the approach of Rabbi Akiva?

We have seen that according to both opinions the first general term, together with the particular, limits, while the final general term includes. But there was a difference in the starting points. According to the opinion that the final general term is decisive, the starting point is the particular. According to the opinion that the first general term is decisive, it seems that the starting point is the general term, which the particular then limits. If so, this is a limiting structure, concerned with sets rather than particulars, and thus similar to the school of Rabbi Akiva.

But in light of what we concluded above, the picture is not necessarily so. As we saw, even according to the opinion that the first general term is decisive, the limitation arises because the general term attaches to the particular. We explained on the pages for Parashat Va’era and Parashat Vayikra, 5765, that the purpose of the first general term is to prevent the expansion of the particular by means of a binyan av. If so, the starting point is the particular, and the preceding general term merely leaves it as a focused particular. The conclusion is that according to all views, the basic direction of the school of Rabbi Ishmael is indeed one of generalization, from the particular to a group with some radius of generalization. This is true even according to the view that the first general term is decisive, for there too, as we saw, the first general term limits only because of its attachment to the particular. Thus the overall picture of the dispute between the two schools remains intact.

Footnotes