Between money and the prohibition of interest
I dealt with the issue of interest and Ben Patura and it turned out that there is a connection between them beyond their location on the same page, which on the surface is just an alternative sermon to "May your brother live with you," and I argue that there is a fundamental connection between the two sermons, both of which have even been ruled on by law despite their apparent contradictions. The article is attached .
As part of the study, I wanted to expand a little on the question of stealing the Kiton in order to live. I found what I found in the books and something else tickled my mind related to you. Victor (pseudonym) returned my lost memory when he told me there was an article of yours about it, bringing me back to the happy days of Azekah.
Yesterday I rummaged around and found four articles in which you address the topic, and one of them is the one linked here.
http://asif.co.il/?wpfb_dl=101
I commented on it: Interest is placed in the Yoreh De'ah column and not in the Chosen Mishpat, and you claim there that the reason is because it is a mitzvah and not truly money.
A. This is a disagreement among the Rishonim as to whether one actually goes down to his assets with a cut interest or not. It is true that the Torah rules as the Rashba does that they are only forced, and it is still not clear that he would hold as the Haritaba in Kiddushin that the temple with a cut interest is sanctified, and not as Rabbi Yeruham does that it is not sanctified. The Shulchan Arba apparently rules as the Maimonides does that one goes down to his assets, but of course this is not a question of why he did not return the interest to the foreigner.
B. And this is the more important note, the column itself apologizes at the beginning of the second sign in the Laws of Interest (X) for why he introduced interest to the Jews, indicating his occupation with the laws of Gentiles and the permission to lend to them at interest. See there in B.
I also touched a little on the complexity between money and the prohibition of interest in the article above.
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0 Answers
Hello.
I read it quickly (due to lack of time), and I have a lot of comments. I will comment on a few briefly.
1. I did not notice the comment in the column in R.S.I. 66. It is indeed very interesting. But it seems to me that he did not come to explain why it is not abroad, but rather why it is located there and not elsewhere in the Jewish Law. Rabbi Shlok retired there in the Saka (and also suggested another possibility that this is an explanation for why he did not arrange it abroad). From my perspective, it does not seem to me that the column would change the place of interest laws in such a fundamental way just because I am near it and want to say a milta. Therefore, it seems to me that what I said is true.
2. In my opinion, there is no evidence that according to the Rambam it is money. The location in the Halachah of the Melul does not mean anything, since the Rambam arranges the laws according to the substantive content and not according to the essence. The Halachah of the Melul deals with loans and it is no wonder that interest appears there. In contrast, the Toshu'a arranges them according to four parts, and the Khom has an essential characteristic that deals with money debts (civil law, as explained in my article).
3. What is reduced to assets, Rabbi Shmuel elaborated on in general lessons 22, as I believe in 10th-11th, and my memory shows that even for these methods, it is not a matter of money. There is certainly the well-known opinion of the Ramban that until you force him with his body, force him with his money, and this means that the reduction to assets is a matter of coercion and not a matter of collection.
4. The one who disagrees with the Rashi you cited is the Rashba in Teshuva, but not all those who disagree believe this. And indeed, the Rashba's opinion is puzzling, since the fact that I must save someone is not a moral obligation but rather a prohibition (Yod and not Chom), and how does this permit another to take my money when I did not give it to him? And is it permissible for a poor person to rob me of the charity that I must give him (Yod obligation)?
5. Regarding the theft of the kiton, the Chazo wrote that it was murder and not theft (his typical explanation). I wrote about this in my article on the laws of property in the Kovno ghetto.
6. As for your point, I don't think you explained it enough. I understood you to be claiming that this is a debt of a kind that is based on the obligation of the judge to revive the borrower. I remember that I wrote about this mechanism in the article "Good Measure" on the shedding of money. And this is how the latter explain the law of the "Pri'at of a mitzvah" that exempts heirs from repaying a loan (because they are not Bnei Mitzvahs), even though the debt is of course financial.
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Asks:
1. The judge also explained as I said, and I'm not sure there is a big difference whether the apology is for here and not abroad or not elsewhere in the Jewish community. If order must be maintained, this is also true for internal order within the sections.
2. In the article, I was also very surprised by your assertion that Maimonides is the technical one and the column is the essential one. As far as I can tell, the brief one actually achieves the complete opposite.
Maimonides arranges according to essences throughout his work. Tefillin appears with a sabbath and a mezuzah and not with a tzitzit, unlike the tur. The laws of Nida are divided between the prohibitions of coming to the bed and the defilement of the seat at a level that makes it difficult to find a complete law, only because he was very careful to put everything in its essential place. More examples for the most part. Only recently did I wonder why unloading and loading were associated with saving a life and not with loss, and the explanation seems to be that loss is the return of wealth and unloading is saving the animal and also helping the person himself and still za. Honoring father and mother is found together with the old man of Mamre. The connection is of course essential and not technical.
The very arrangement of life in the lifestyle section, on weekdays from morning to evening and on Shabbat from evening to sunset, and first of all the laws of the daily routine and only then the works, is not a fundamental arrangement but a technical one for the sake of convenience.
I always understood that the Rambam built the entire Torah in an ideological form and from there it flowed downward into practice, and the column dealt with the whole, how a Jew should conduct his life.
If you are right that interest is a prohibited and not a monetary area, it would be expected that the Torah would place it with monetary matters, because after all, it is business, and the Rambam would find a place for it among the prohibitions.
3. The simplicity of the issue At the beginning of a certain passage, which our root also deals with, it is quite clear that usury is theft, at least after it has been forbidden. This is really difficult for the Rishonim. I also brought up the controversy about whether it is possible to sanctify a woman with a cut interest. Maimonides disagrees with the Geonim that forgiveness is not beneficial and believes that it is beneficial after taking, because it is complete wealth. It seems quite clear that Maimonides, in an Abeki way, perceives usury as complete theft and judges it as wealth for everything, except for heirs.
4. The latter say the Rashba's opinion in the opinion of Tosafot and the Rosh (Afiki Yam, Ahiezer). It is interesting that they did not see the Rashba's answer. I included it in my article, the credit (which I did not give in writing) goes to your article. There I found it and opened it inside.
5. Nice but not binding. It seems that the AGM of the Y.D.A. Kama comes out differently.
6. A general comment for the introduction if you will: Our Rabbi taught us, and this may be from the year of your life, the axis 'analytic – synthetic'. If I managed to understand it correctly, then in the end you are the one who ostensibly advocates synthetic, in reality creating an analytic of synthesis. You settle for precise definitions until the end, and leave no room for intuitive ambiguity. Really?
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Rabbi:
1. I definitely see a difference between internal order in Judaism and mixing up the parts.
2. It is clear that according to the Rambam there is order and systematicity, but it is according to the content. In his book, Sefer Mishpatim, Nezikin, and Sefer Shofitim all deal with khum. He did not combine them into one whole, unlike the Tur. For the Rambam, loan laws, even if in nature (i.e. in the classification of the Tur) they are yud, will fall under the hilch of loan. The Tur is the one that achieved the categorical distinction between mamunot and issurim, and therefore it is he who placed interest in the Yuud. He is the one who created another level of classification, above the level of the Rambam's books (= the Turim). Incidentally, the essence of the Tur also varies between the parts. In the Uh, this is similar to that of the Rambam, since it deals with laws in the order of the day and the year. Only the Uh achieves a theoretical category and not an arrangement according to content. The distinction between the parts, i.e. Uh and Yuud versus Abbaaz and Sefer Shofitim – Dayinot versus Rabbinot, is a categorical distinction.
3. Indeed, the issue of the Rish of Azhu is very puzzling in many respects, and it is already difficult for the Rishonim. I do not deny that there are Rishonim who viewed usury as money (such as those who believe that it should not be sanctified), but I am not sure that this is the case in Rambam. See at great length the novellas of Rabbi Shmuel 22 above (see 9-10).
4. In some of the early ones, it does not seem to be the Rashba's, what's more, his explanation is puzzling, as I wrote. Incidentally, as far as I remember, it does not appear in it that the Pi'z does not permit the possession of Gentile money. I remember this from Rabbi Yisraeli's response on the action of the Kiviyya. It is true that this is required according to the Rashba's method.
5. I definitely try to create definitions, but I am aware of their limitations and am willing not to bend to them completely.
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Asks:
Regarding the Rambam's grading methods versus the Tur, first, the Abba'az is not entirely Dayanot, if the intention is that a Beit Din is needed. (I'm sure you don't mean the Dayanot exams of the Chief Rabbinate, for which indeed all Ah'az belong to this certificate and not to the Rabbinate certificate)
Although gittin and chalitza require a court of law, kiddushin is no different from a principled ruling, and ketubah are, for the most part, a real shari'ah.
The classification of the column is not substantive but technical, the Abbaaz is everything related to a man and a woman.
HOM is the only category created here, and I ask, does fewer categories mean a higher or lower level of classification? Maimonides distinguished between four different categories in the law of money: torts, property, laws, judges. Somewhat parallel to the Mishna: BK = torts. BM = laws. BB = property. Sanhedrin = judges. With exceptions as usual.
The column only composed four essays and not a hand, so it had to cram more topics into each section. This is no more than sorting but relative mixing.
In a way of life, the Rambam collects all the laws of prayers, for example, on weekdays, Saturdays, and holidays. And the laws of Shabbat include only the actual laws of Shabbat. The column arranged the Shabbat prayers throughout the Shabbat day, to serve the reader and not the content. Thus, the laws of the Sabbath that the Rambam included in the laws of opinion were included in the column as the laws of the night after Arish. This is not the essence but is entirely technical.
Yoreh Deah, the Rambam connected the sending of the nest to the slaughter, because it is one essence. The column sent the nest to the end of the section, because it does not meet the usual slaughterer. This is completely technical.
In short, I see Tor as a consistent organizer for the benefit of the common Jew, and Maimonides is a man of substance, as expected from all his personality and works. If interest were a tax in its technical nature and a prohibition in its essence, then Tor would have had to put it in the foreign language and Maimonides in the holy book. I wonder how our rabbi turned things around.
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Rabbi:
Indeed. But why did the column choose to divide its work into four and not like the Rambam? The Rambam roughly followed the Talmud and the column changed it. In my opinion, it is because of his intuitive conceptualization.
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Asks:
Because of the general picture of the column, which does not appear to be a higher level of sorting and conceptualization, in my humble opinion it is more correct to go for a more trivial explanation.
The column wrote about far fewer topics, mainly because it did not write about what is not customary, and thus omitted holy things, purity, seeds, and state laws. In addition, it did not deal with philosophical laws, such as repentance (he added a little bit on Yom Kippur, again a technicality) or opinions. Half of the material was omitted.
He wrote four separate works. One everyday, one rabbinical, one legal, and one family. In other words, indeed general topics, but not from a fundamental conceptualization, but according to the target audience that would study in his books, which would be convenient.
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Rabbi:
Perhaps. And yet he included charity and interest in the Law, even though there are laws of monetary transactions between man and his fellow man and it was supposed to enter into the legal system. The legal system (=legal system) is the very essence of his overall conceptualization.
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Asks:
Regarding charity, I wonder if it is financial or not, not on a substantive-conceptual level but in human language. Charity is a mitzvah and not a business. People buy a lulav, donate to a synagogue and give charity. It is not perceived as something financial like damages, guardians, or partners.
We talked about interest.
In any case, my main concern is to defend the good name of the Great Eagle as the greatest of all-time. Am I right?
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Rabbi:
I don't completely agree. I still think his division was substantive and not categorical. And in the column, at least abroad, we see a categorical dimension.
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Asks:
The more I think about it, the harder I have to accept it.
What substantive division can combine the tzitzit and circumcision, or the prohibitions of entry and slaughter, and alternatively separate holy from sacred and forbidden things, or between prohibitions of entry for women?
Indeed, the column places the prohibitions on marriage, which are matters of clear moral guidance in nature, in the Evin HaEzer, because it deals with a man and a woman.
I admit that I never understood the division between work and sacrifice, and it is partly visible almost only on the basis of the name of the halakhah. This is the only difference I was able to find between the 'work' of Yom Kippur in Sefer Avoda, and the 'sacrifice' of Pesach in Sefer Korbanot. Perhaps public and individual in the way of the majority?
Regarding the column, you argue that even if it does not encompass the entire scope of the essay, the breastplate of a sentence is a conceptual point, that is, one essential gem in an entire technical space.
But he did not edit it carefully until the end either. How did the laws of Ma'qa, for example, come into it? Why were the written laws not included?
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Rabbi:
Prohibitions of marriage are a matter for the Jewish Judaic Court, as they prevent marriage. Furthermore, prohibitions of virginity prevent the perception of kiddushin and are thus part of the Abbaaz. And all prohibitions of marriage create a status for the descendants, and this is certainly a personal status. All matters of personal status are part of the Dayan.
Your two comments at the beginning about the Rambam obviously play into my hands, but here is one. Mila and Tzitzit are both "love". You see that the classification is according to the reasons and purposes of the mitzvah, and not according to the halachic category to which it belongs. And that is what I said. You see in the MUN his explanation for the division into the Fourteen Books, and all on the basis of the purposes and purposes (the reasons), and not according to a halachic category. And that is exactly what I said. The Rambam does not divide his book according to halachic categories, but according to topics. This is a more primitive division (less scholarly-conceptual), although much easier to navigate. Anyone who searches for the laws of interest in the Rambam will find them much more easily than in the column.
And I would also like to note that even in the Torah there is a degree of conceptualization (which is partly programmed like the Maimonides, and there is still a broader connection, since it is divided into at least books) in the other parts as well: O'H are matters of everyday religious life. Y'D is prohibition and permission (and there are connections between a large part of them). Ab'Ha'Z and H'M are dayinut. This is a rather impressive broad conceptualization, even if today it seems obvious to us.
Written laws are in the Abha'az because it is part of marriage law. After all, Abha'az is also a law. And should the laws of the parota of kiddushin (all issues related to the law of kiddushin) be included in the law?
These laws of restraint are about preventing damage, and tort laws appear abroad. Here, a person has an obligation to prevent damage from his friend, even if it is in his possession. It would indeed be appropriate to put this in the Jewish Law, but it is not terribly difficult in my opinion.
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Asks:
I see that a large part of the argument between us stems from a disagreement about language.
You present a 'purpose-technical-conceptual' axis. I don't understand this axis.
In my opinion, purpose is much closer to the conceptual than the technical, which is lower, on the practical level.
The common man is much more easily familiar with a practical technical division than with a purposive conceptual division. Maimonides is more difficult to understand, except for the case of interest, which is where the whole discussion began, because you claim that interest is taxing on the technical level and forbidden on the conceptual level, and I claim that it is taxing on all levels, certainly according to Maimonides, and the column just put it in the Rabbinate and apologized for it.
Putting interest aside, I suggest a simple survey. Ask your students and I ask mine a few orientation questions and we'll see where it's easier for the uninitiated to find laws.
A word in the book of love (by the way, not suitable for the purpose of the MN, where it is in the sacred) is a conceptual distinction of the purpose of the mitzvah and the gedera. This is a higher division in my opinion and not primitive. On the contrary, placing it 'as in the Siddur' is simple and easy and indeed the purpose of the column is to make it accessible and not to define.
In the column, I thought you focused mainly on abroad and agreed that the other parts are not really based on a conceptual division. What conceptually divides religious everyday life from prohibition and permission? This is a completely technical division.
I have already asked about the AHAZ as 'dayinat', what is dayinat in it? Personal status is a matter for dayinat only in the definitions of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel, and as is known, you are not among the recipients of its authority.
Kiddushin has no dimension of law, and therefore no marriage. This is a prohibition and permission from the realm of personal status, which is bound up with law from the realm of personal status, ketubah and gittin. Again, a completely technical category. What is my concept here?
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Rabbi:
On the contrary, I argue that there is a purposive-ideological axis (the meaning of the mitzvah and its purpose), which the Rambam classifies according to, and there is a technical-conceptual axis (the boundary of the law and its category), which the Torah uses (partially). Tzitzi and mila are related in purpose (love), while nezikin and loans are related conceptually-analytically-technically (both are legal obligations).
Indeed, the common man will be more familiar with the functional and conceptual division. That is exactly what I wrote. I do not agree with you that the Rambam is less accessible than the Shulchan Arbiter. It is much more accessible. When you tell a person the laws of interest, he will go to the laws of loans, and will not know that conceptually these are laws that belong to the Rabbis and not to the foreigner. He does not distinguish between debts by virtue of rights and ordinary debts because this is a conceptual-technical distinction.
The question of what is high and what is low is debatable. In my opinion, the technical-conceptual requires much higher abstraction and conceptualization, but there is no point in arguing about that.
Regarding the survey, if you let them examine whether it is in Yiddish or in foreign languages or in the Hebrew language without giving them the internal content, then I think they will be less interested in the Shulchan Arba'ah.
Daily religious and prohibition and permission are indeed not divided categorically, which is why I wrote to the Hadiya that the division there is conceptual. But it is an internal division within the larger division of the column into rabbinate and dayanim.
As for the Abba Ze'ez, he is the father of dayanut. As I explained in the article, every legal system insists on defining personal status (marriage and divorce), meaning that it belongs to the legal part of halakha and not the halakhic-ritual part. This has nothing to do with the Chief Rabbinate and my relationship with it. On the contrary, they ride the wave that this is a legal matter and therefore demand that the state regulate it through them. If not everyone understood that this is a legal matter, they would not receive this authority. My anger is that they are exploiting it. This is a prohibition and a permissibility from the realm of personal status, just as stealing is a prohibition and a permissibility from the realm of property law. At the heart of everything is a prohibition and a permissibility, after all, we are dealing with halakha. The division is to give categories within halakha.
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