Response to the Rabbi's comment in the book "Science of Freedom"

Peace and blessings,
In the book "Scientific Freedom" on page 78, in the first interlude, the Rabbi brings the Maimonides' question in the Law of Teshuvah (6:5) about "they enslaved them and tormented them" and "and this people rose up and committed fornication" [and his answer]. The Rabbi comments in note 37 that there is apparently a confusion here between the ability to predict and objective determination, that is, seemingly "what is written in the Torah is that God knew that this would happen, but it does not say that He decreed it upon them" [and on the question of knowledge and choice, the Maimonides already answered at the end of the previous chapter (ibid. 5:5) that there is no contradiction between God's knowledge and choice, but that we do not know God's knowledge]. The Rabbi replies that the Maimonides apparently understood that it was indeed a decree.
In my opinion, it is difficult to understand the text in this way, and it is not clear what caused the Rambam to understand it this way. In particular, regarding "and this people arose and committed fornication," how could I possibly say that this is a decree, and why would he decree that Israel commit fornication? This is merely a statement. Not a decree.
But the Rabbi's question in the commentary is not difficult at all. On the contrary, it is indeed a question of knowledge only and not of decree. The point is that in both cases it is not just a question of knowledge [of God Himself] but of a message [to flesh and blood]. The moment God shares His knowledge with someone , even without "determining," but that what God knows – someone else knows – at that moment the matter exceeds the limits of God's knowledge and in this itself it inevitably becomes a decree = contradicting choice. Because it is no longer possible to answer that we do not attain it, etc.
I will elaborate on the matter, I am currently only addressing the problem of knowledge and choice [therefore ignoring the fact that this is a collective, which is really what Maimonides is expounding, I am only explaining why he must expound in this way]:
If God tells Moses that He [God] knows that the people will commit fornication, it is no longer possible to reconcile this knowledge with the people's choice. For if Moses knows what will happen in the future, and knows for sure that the people will commit fornication – the people have no choice, because with the knowledge of flesh and blood, there is no excuse for the Rambam (ibid. 5:5) that we do not attain it. If Moses' knowledge is not true, and there is a possibility that the people will not commit fornication – it is found that God told Moses a lie / God did not know the future, and this is impossible.
In fact, paying attention to the words of the Maimonides, he himself says that this is a matter of knowledge/announcement and not a decree, and even incorporates in his response what he already said that God's knowledge does not contradict choice:
"…and the Creator did not announce anything except the custom of the world, etc., because He announced to Moses that there would be wicked people in Israel, etc., and likewise the Egyptians, etc., announced that the end of his seed would be enslaved in a land not theirs, and we have already said that man has no power to know, as God, blessed be He, knows, things that will happen."
If the issue here is a decree, then after having already answered that there is no decree here about individuals, why does Maimonides need to add "and we have already said" that God's knowledge does not contradict choice? Who now spoke about the problem of knowledge and what it has to do with the subject at hand? On the other hand – if this answers the question, then why was all the chatter about the collective necessary?
But as mentioned, all that is at issue here is knowledge, not a decree. However, a decree becomes a decree. Therefore, first the Maimonides excuses the part of the message, and then "closes the corner" and says that in the first place the problem was only with the message and not with the knowledge itself.
In other words, the precision of the Maimonides' language in his justification shows that he distinguishes between what God informed [to Moses] and what he knows [for himself]. Moses only informed the custom of the world, only about the collective, in any case there is no contradiction to the choice since this is a statement only about the collective. But Maimonides knows that God's knowledge for Himself cannot be justified in this way, because God for Himself also knows the future of the individuals – therefore he adds that after you have solved the problem of what Moses knows, what God knows is not a problem at all, as he already answered in the previous chapter.
Regards
Nathaniel