Lesson 6: Bereshit

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Principles of Halakhic Thinking by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Concepts

• Mitzvot (commandments) of action versus mitzvot of result.
• The act of the mitzvah versus discharge of the obligation.

Summary

In this article, we begin with an examination of the mitzvah of procreation, which according to many views is a result-commandment, and from there propose a general distinction between action-commandments and result-commandments. The underlying idea is that in such situations the results are not under our control. It is therefore possible that although the Torah is interested in the result rather than the action, it nevertheless imposes upon us, as the mitzvah, precisely the act itself.

We distinguish here between several kinds of result-commandments. In some of them, only the effort to attain the result is incumbent upon us; in others, we are commanded to perform an act in order to attain it. In the latter type, one must distinguish between acts that constitute fulfillment of the mitzvah and cases in which the result is attained only indirectly, so that although the mitzvah itself has not been fulfilled, we have nevertheless reached a state in which we are exempt from it. In this article we touch on several aspects in which the halakhic (Jewish legal) ramifications depend on whether the mitzvah is defined as one of action or of result—for example: a mitzvah fulfilled through a transgression, fulfillment of a mitzvah while one is exempt, a positive commandment overriding a negative commandment, intention when performing a mitzvah, and more.

We also discuss the implications of this distinction for the issue of deriving law from the scriptural rationale. The rationale is usually the state attained through the act of the mitzvah. Commandments in which the Torah’s goal is the result but the command is directed to the action are examples of the principle that one does not derive law from the scriptural rationale, even when we have no doubt that the rationale is correct and true.

By its nature, the Torah generally commands us regarding actions, since only actions are under our control. Yet toward the end of our discussion we bring several further examples of result-commandments: circumcision, tending the lamps, sowing and cooking on the Sabbath, and we also briefly discuss the nature of the mitzvah of charity. We divide result-commandments into two types, distinguished by whether the action still retains significance.

At the end of the article we briefly discuss the relation between the distinction treated here—between action-commandments and result-commandments—and the common distinction found in later authorities between laws centered on the object and laws centered on the person. These distinctions are very similar, but apparently not quite identical.

The Rules and Principles That Emerge from the Article

1. Most Torah commandments are action-commandments, since action is what lies within human control.
2. Nevertheless, there are also result-commandments: procreation—according to Minchat Chinukh, against Turei Even and Tosafot; circumcision—according to Rabbi Hayyim Or Zaru’a and the Tur, against Maimonides.
3. A result-commandment can be fulfilled even without an act, or by way of indirect causation—according to Chelkat Mechokek and Beit Shmuel.
4. Some disagree and maintain that there are no result-commandments at all, but at most action-commandments that must lead to the attainment of a result—such as in Har Tzvi and Be-Oholah Shel Torah.
5. According to these views, when the result is attained without an act, or through indirect causation, the mitzvah has not been fulfilled, but one is exempt from it. A similar consideration appears in Minchat Chinukh regarding sitting in a stolen sukkah.
6. A result-commandment may be fulfilled even when the relevant acts took place at a time when one was exempt from it—according to Minchat Chinukh.
7. Even according to those who hold that mitzvot require intention, result-commandments do not require intention—according to Oneg Yom Tov, Sefat Emet, and Kovetz He’arot, against Minchat Chinukh and Rabbi Tzvi Elimelech of Dinov.
8. Sometimes one does not derive law from the scriptural rationale even when the rationale is clearly correct—according to Maimonides. We suggested a possible explanation: the legal definition of the mitzvah is determined by the action, whereas its rationale is the result.
9. Necessary results are regarded as lying within the control of the person who performs the act, and therefore they too can be defined as result-commandments.
10. The distinction between action-commandments and result-commandments is not identical to the distinction between object-centered and person-centered commandments, although there is a close affinity between the two.

On Procreation: A Look at Action-Commandments, Result-Commandments, and the Reasons for the Commandments

Introduction

A Jew is commanded to have at least two offspring: a son and a daughter. Prima facie, this mitzvah seems to be a clear result-commandment. Presumably, the Torah is interested in our continuity, not specifically in the actions that bring that continuity about.

Yet apparently this matter is not in our hands. We can only make efforts to have children, but the result lies in Heaven’s hands. If so, even if the Torah indeed wants the existence of a certain state, what lies in human hands is only the action that leads to that state. It is possible that in such a case the Torah defines the mitzvah specifically as an action-commandment and not as a result-commandment, even though what it truly wants is the state rather than the action.

Is there any halakhic difference between these two possibilities? Prima facie, in every case only the action is in human hands, while the state that results from it is not under our control. It therefore seems that in all cases only the action is actually imposed upon us.

In this article we will try to understand the meta-halakhic distinction between action-commandments and result-commandments, and its halakhic implications, through a legal discussion of the mitzvah of procreation.¹

A. The Commandment of Procreation: Between Action and Result

Procreation as a Result-Commandment: The View of Minchat Chinukh

Several details in this mitzvah indicate that it is a result-commandment. For example, fulfillment of the mitzvah depends on various results: that a man have a son and a daughter, and that they in turn have children. Moreover, Minchat Chinukh, mitzvah 1, subsection 5, writes that even if after birth the son becomes incapable of procreation—for example, through a physical injury that renders him unable to father children—the father has not discharged his obligation.

Beit Yosef, Even Ha-Ezer 1, cites several early authorities who hold that even if a man fathers an illegitimate child, he has fulfilled the mitzvah. Minchat Chinukh proves that this refers even to a case in which the intercourse itself was sinful. He then asks: how can a person discharge his obligation of procreation by fathering illegitimate children? Is this not a mitzvah fulfilled through a transgression? Several early authorities wrote that in the case of a mitzvah fulfilled through a transgression, one does not discharge one’s obligation, either by Torah law or at least on the rabbinic level.

Minchat Chinukh resolves the difficulty on the basis of the reasoning of later authorities, according to which a mitzvah is defined as coming through a transgression only if the transgression is committed at the time the mitzvah is fulfilled.² For example, if a person carries matzah from the public domain into the private domain on the Sabbath and then eats it, eating the matzah is not considered a mitzvah fulfilled through a transgression, since the mitzvah is fulfilled through the eating, whereas the transgression was already committed earlier, at the time of carrying it. In light of this, writes Minchat Chinukh, the law that the mitzvah of procreation is fulfilled even through an illegitimate child can also be explained. In that case, the transgression is committed at the time of the forbidden intercourse, whereas the mitzvah is fulfilled at the time the child is born.

He goes on to add that, accordingly, the act of intercourse is not itself a mitzvah but only a preparation for a mitzvah, since the latter is impossible without it. He brings proof for this from the law that if a man fathers no children at all, or if he fathers children and they die, he has not discharged his obligation. So too he writes there in subsection 14.³

There, in subsection 14, he cites the difficulty raised by Turei Even on Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 28a. In that sugya it is explained that if a person was coerced into eating matzah, he has fulfilled his obligation of eating matzah. The Gemara there considers who did the coercing and raises the possibility that he was driven by a fit of madness; it rejects this on the grounds that in such a case he would be legally incompetent, and fulfillment of a mitzvah at a time when one is exempt from it is ineffective. Turei Even then asks: how can a gentile who fathered children and later converted thereby discharge his obligation of procreation? While he was a gentile, he was not obligated in procreation at all. Minchat Chinukh answers that in light of his earlier explanation, there is no difficulty. The mitzvah of procreation is a result-commandment, and therefore if this person in fact has children, he has discharged his obligation. The rule that fulfillment of a mitzvah at a time of exemption is ineffective applies only to action-commandments, such as eating matzah, and not to result-commandments. In our case, only the preparatory stage of the mitzvah took place at a time of exemption. Below we will explain this somewhat differently.

In subsection 25 he adds that if a deaf-mute or a mentally incompetent person fathered children and later recovered competence, he too has discharged the obligation of procreation, just like a gentile who converted.

Thus the view of the author of Minchat Chinukh is clear: the mitzvah of procreation is a result-commandment. We will now bring evidence that this is not universally accepted, and that some authorities disagree with him.

Procreation as an Action-Commandment: The View of Tosafot

First, the comments of Turei Even just cited suggest that he apparently does not accept the opinion of Minchat Chinukh. In his view, the mitzvah of procreation is an action-commandment, not a result-commandment. Therefore, if the mitzvah was fulfilled at a time when the person was exempt from it, he does not thereby discharge his obligation. See there for how he resolves the difficulty from the sugya in Rosh Hashanah concerning coerced eating of matzah.⁴

A source that clearly disagrees with Minchat Chinukh is Tosafot on Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 13a.⁵ The Gemara there cites the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel regarding a person who is half-slave and half-free:

An objection was raised: One who is half-slave and half-free serves his master one day and himself one day; these are the words of Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai say: You have repaired his master, but you have not repaired him. He cannot marry a slave woman, and he cannot marry a free woman. Shall he then remain idle? Was not the world created only for procreation, as it is said: “He did not create it a waste; He formed it to be inhabited”? Rather, we compel his master and make him free, and he writes a deed for half his value. And Beit Hillel retracted and ruled in accordance with Beit Shammai.

The law is that such a slave cannot marry either a slave woman or a free woman, and therefore he cannot fulfill the mitzvah of procreation. Beit Shammai argue that in such a case the master must be compelled to free him, and Beit Hillel later agreed and ruled accordingly.

Now, as is well known, the rule in halakha is that a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment. Accordingly, Tosafot there ask:

“We compel his master” — But if so, why do we compel him? Let the positive commandment of procreation come and override the negative prohibition that bars a free Jewish man from relations with a slave woman. Rabbeinu Yitzhak answers: first, because a positive commandment overrides a negative one only when the positive commandment is fulfilled at the very time that the negative one is uprooted. Here, from the moment of initial penetration the negative commandment is already violated, whereas the positive commandment of procreation is not fulfilled until the completion of intercourse.

It follows from Tosafot’s words that they understand the mitzvah of procreation as lying in the action and not in the result, for according to them the time of performance of the mitzvah is the completion of intercourse and not the birth of the children.⁶⁷

Intention: The View of Rabbi Tzvi Elimelech of Dinov

As is well known, the tannaim disputed whether mitzvot require intention or not. The amoraim disputed the matter as well, and later decisors did likewise. Some rule in practice that mitzvot do not require intention, while others rule that they do; this is also the ruling of the Shulchan Arukh.

Now Minchat Chinukh, there in subsection 29, explains that according to those views which hold that mitzvot require intention, Tosafot’s understanding would imply that procreation likewise requires intention in order to discharge one’s obligation, just like all action-commandments. But according to his own view, he writes, no intention is needed. The reason is that intercourse is only a preparation for the mitzvah, and a preparation for a mitzvah does not require intention, just as building a sukkah or baking matzah does not. He adds that apparently intention should then be required when the son and daughter are born. In the end, however, he inclines to the view that in a mitzvah in which a person does nothing, and its fulfillment occurs automatically, no intention is needed in order to discharge the obligation. According to his claim, then, result-commandments do not require intention according to all views.

In Derekh Pikudekha (section 1, beginning of the practical portion, and introduction A),⁸ Rabbi Tzvi Elimelech of Dinov cites the wording of the Tur and the Shulchan Arukh, Even Ha-Ezer 1, who write: “Every man is obligated to marry a woman in order to be fruitful and multiply.” From this he infers that when a man enters kiddushin (the formal act of Jewish betrothal), he must intend to fulfill the mitzvah of procreation.⁹

He further writes there, in positive commandment 1:

The law has been decided that a Torah-level positive commandment requires intention. The nature of this intention is that one intend, through this act, to fulfill the commandment of the Creator, blessed be He. This intention is needed immediately when he marries a wife as a helpmate, and each time at the moment of union.

In a mitzvah for which the Torah explicitly states a reason, one is obligated also to intend that reason, and without this he does not fulfill the mitzvah. And in this mitzvah too it says, “Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth,” but filling the earth is not in human hands; all that lies within his power is to make an effort by uniting with his helpmate.

It therefore appears that the explicit reason in the Torah is this: I command you this matter in order to fill the world with worshippers of God. And from the very words “be fruitful and multiply” this too is evident, since the Merciful One formulated this mitzvah in the language “be fruitful and multiply,” and that is not within human power. Many times people may engage in union and labor in vain. The command ought more properly to have been, “Take a wife and come to her,” for that is within human power and choice. Since He expressed it in the language “be fruitful and multiply,” this is an explicit reason in the Torah, and one must intend this reason.

His argument is that the Torah’s command “Be fruitful and multiply” is in fact not a command but a reason, since that result—birth—is not in human hands at all. If so, “be fruitful and multiply” is clearly not itself the command; rather, it is the reason for the mitzvah of kiddushin. He adds that wherever the reason is explicit in the verse, one must intend that reason when fulfilling the mitzvah, and according to all views such intention is indispensable.¹⁰ He therefore explains that, in the case of procreation, this intention is indispensable in kiddushin according to all views, even according to those decisors who hold that mitzvot do not require intention.¹¹

One should note that his assumption is that the mitzvah of procreation is an action-commandment and not a result-commandment—like Tosafot and against Minchat Chinukh—despite the fact that he too agrees that the Torah is interested specifically in the result. For this reason he also writes explicitly that the intention required at the time of performing the mitzvah is intention directed to the action, that is, to kiddushin and intercourse.

He then continues and asks, on the basis of this principle, about the law that a convert who had children while still a gentile has fulfilled the mitzvah of procreation—at least if his children also converted—similar to the difficulty raised by Turei Even above. He argues that while still a gentile, the man did not intend to fulfill a mitzvah, and therefore, according to the views that mitzvot require intention, he could not have discharged his obligation.¹² He explains that this additional intention, beyond the intention to discharge one’s obligation—the ordinary question of intention in mitzvot—is not indispensable.¹³

Now, regarding the difficulty of Turei Even above, Minchat Chinukh explained that since the mitzvah is a result-commandment, one can discharge the obligation even if the preparation for the mitzvah took place at a time of exemption. The same kind of answer can be given here as well: result-commandments do not require intention, as Minchat Chinukh wrote above, since intercourse is only a preparation for the mitzvah and therefore does not require intention, while the birth of the children involves no act at all and likewise does not require intention.

Rabbi Tzvi Elimelech of Dinov, however, understands procreation as an action-commandment and not as a result-commandment, and therefore remains consistent with his overall view.

The Sugyot in Bekhorot 47a and Yevamot 62a

At first glance, there is a source in the Gemara for the conception of procreation as a result-commandment. Babylonian Talmud, Bekhorot 47a, brings two laws concerning the relation between a gentile who converted and his children:

It was stated: If a man had children while he was a gentile and then converted, Rabbi Yohanan says: he does not have a firstborn with regard to inheritance, and Resh Lakish says: he does have a firstborn with regard to inheritance. Rabbi Yohanan says: he does not have a firstborn for inheritance, because he already had “the first of his strength.” Resh Lakish says: he does have a firstborn for inheritance, because a convert who converts is like a newborn child. And they follow their own reasoning. For it was also stated: If he had children while he was a gentile and then converted, Rabbi Yohanan said: he has fulfilled procreation, and Resh Lakish said: he has not fulfilled it. Rabbi Yohanan said: he has fulfilled it, as it is said, “He did not create it a waste; He formed it to be inhabited.” Resh Lakish said: he has not fulfilled procreation, because a convert who converts is like a newborn child.

The first law concerns inheritance among his sons after conversion, and the second concerns the law of procreation. Immediately afterward, the Gemara explains why both disputes had to be stated:

And both are necessary. For had it been stated only in the first case, Resh Lakish would say so only there, because while he was a gentile they were not heirs. But in this case, I might have said that he would concede to Rabbi Yohanan, for “He did not create it a waste; He formed it to be inhabited,” and he has indeed helped inhabit the world. And had it been stated only in this case, I might have said that Rabbi Yohanan would concede to Resh Lakish in the other case. Therefore both are necessary.

The Gemara is saying that had only the first dispute been presented, we might have thought that the gentile son was not regarded as an heir while he was still a gentile, and therefore when the father converts, a son born to him later as a Jew would indeed inherit a double portion as firstborn, since the earlier gentile son would not count as his son for that purpose. But regarding procreation, we might have thought that Resh Lakish would concede to Rabbi Yohanan that the mitzvah had been fulfilled, since in the end he has already “settled” the world—that is, he has brought about human habitation.

At first glance, the Gemara seems to be saying that a gentile who converts discharges his obligation of procreation because he had already fulfilled this mitzvah while still a gentile. However, Tosafot there comment as follows:

“And he has indeed helped inhabit the world” — In the chapter Ha-Ba Al Yevimto (Yevamot 62a), the Gemara uses a different formulation: that from the outset these were already children relevant to procreation. It does not mean that they were persons obligated in procreation, for in the chapter Four Death Penalties (Sanhedrin 59b) it is clear that a gentile is not commanded regarding procreation. Rather, it means that his offspring are attributed to him. That is what is meant here by “he has indeed helped inhabit the world.” And with regard to a slave, the Gemara in Yevamot 62a says that all agree that he has no lineage.

Tosafot note that a gentile is not obligated in procreation. Therefore the Gemara’s meaning is that this is a result-commandment, just as Minchat Chinukh wrote above: he has fulfilled procreation because in fact he has children who are attributed to him, even though their coming into being occurred at a time when he was exempt.

In the sugya in Yevamot 62a, the wording is somewhat different:

It was stated: If he had children while he was a gentile and then converted, Rabbi Yohanan said: he has fulfilled procreation, and Resh Lakish said: he has not fulfilled procreation. Rabbi Yohanan said: he has fulfilled procreation because he has them, and Resh Lakish said: he has not fulfilled procreation, because a convert who converts is like a newborn child. And they follow their own reasoning. For it was stated: If he had children while he was a gentile and then converted, Rabbi Yohanan said: he has no firstborn for inheritance, because he already had “the first of his strength”; and Resh Lakish said: he does have a firstborn for inheritance, because a convert who converts is like a newborn child. And both are necessary. For had he taught us only that first case, Rabbi Yohanan would say so there because from the outset they were already relevant to procreation. But with regard to inheritance, since they were not heirs, I might have said that he would concede to Resh Lakish. And had it been stated only there, Resh Lakish would say so there, but in the other case I might have said that he would concede to Rabbi Yohanan. Therefore both are necessary.

In this sugya Rabbi Yohanan says explicitly that the reason he has fulfilled procreation is that in fact he has children—implying that this is so even though a gentile is not commanded in procreation. Here the necessity argument is reversed, and the rationale supporting Rabbi Yohanan is that from the outset the man was already in the category relevant to procreation. We should recall that this does not mean that he was obligated in the mitzvah of procreation, as Tosafot noted, but rather that he had in practice fulfilled it: the result exists.

It should be noted that the reasoning in the two sugyot draws on different sources. In Bekhorot, the mitzvah is brought from the Prophets: “He did not create it a waste; He formed it to be inhabited.” In Yevamot, by contrast, the Gemara cites the mitzvah of procreation itself. The relation between these two commandments is highly obscure and complex, and in several places in rabbinic literature and among the early authorities they seem to be interchanged. Perhaps there is some hint here to their relation: the mitzvah of “He did not create it a waste” is a result-commandment—settling the world—whereas procreation is an action-commandment whose purpose is that result. Therefore, when the Gemara in Bekhorot wishes to say that the desired result has been attained, it uses specifically the language of “settling” the world.¹⁴ The matter still requires further study.

Halakhic Implication: Conception in a Bath

See on this Rabbi Yaakov Ariel, responsa Be-Oholah Shel Torah, Even Ha-Ezer, no. 69.¹⁵

In Chelkat Mechokek, Even Ha-Ezer 1:8, it is written that if a woman conceived in a bath from a man’s semen and gave birth to a son or daughter, the man has thereby fulfilled the mitzvah of procreation. He brings proof from Sefer Ha-Yihud, attributed to Rav Hamai Gaon, which states that Ben Sira was the son of the prophet Jeremiah from his wife, who conceived from him in a bath. In this case there was no intention of fulfilling a mitzvah, and not even an act of intercourse; the conception occurred only through indirect causation. So too wrote Beit Shmuel there, subsection 10, and he proved it from the words of the Bach on Yoreh De’ah 195 in the name of Semak. See also Taz, Even Ha-Ezer 1:8, who disputes the proof from his father-in-law, the Bach.

This example of conception in a bath is a clear example of understanding procreation as a result-commandment. Here no act was performed at all, and there was no intention, yet the father has nonetheless discharged his obligation. The reason is that in the end he in fact has a child, and that is the definition of the mitzvah.

B. A Third Mode: Between Fulfilling a Mitzvah and Reaching a State of Exemption

Introduction

As we saw in the introduction above, the case of procreation is problematic. On the one hand, the content of the mitzvah quite clearly looks like a result-commandment. It is obvious that the Torah wants us to have children, not the act of intercourse itself. Moreover, according to all views the fulfillment of the mitzvah depends on the result. For example, if a man fathered children who themselves had no children and died childless, he has not discharged his obligation. This is a far-reaching determination, for fulfillment of the mitzvah depends not only on results that lie in Heaven’s hands, but even on the actions of other human beings. If his children decided not to have children, or were unable to have them, then he too has not discharged his obligation.¹⁶

On the other hand, what lies in human hands is only the preparation for the mitzvah—the acts of kiddushin and intercourse—and therefore it would seem that only with respect to those acts can the Torah command us. For that reason, such a mitzvah seems to have to be an action-commandment rather than a result-commandment.

It seems that in such a case the Torah has two options before it, and these are precisely the two views we surveyed above:

1. To define the action as the halakhic obligation, even though what it really wants is the state itself. This is the path chosen by Tosafot in the previous section, who understood the mitzvah of procreation as an action-commandment.
2. To define the state as the halakhic obligation, with the duty to perform the action following automatically as a preparation for the mitzvah. This is the path chosen by Minchat Chinukh.

Explaining Tosafot and Rabbi Tzvi Elimelech: The State as a Condition for Fulfillment in Action-Commandments

At first glance, Minchat Chinukh presents several strong arguments in favor of his position. If a person does not discharge his obligation when his children themselves have no children, then it would seem obvious that this is a result-commandment and not an action-commandment. The mitzvah is fulfilled when the state comes into being, not when any specific action is performed.

According to the views that disagree, we must assume that the mitzvah is indeed an action-commandment, and that this is precisely because the result is not entrusted to us. In the end, the Torah wants the result and not the action. How, then, can the Torah incorporate the result into the halakhic definition that pertains to us? Usually this is explained as a condition for the fulfillment of the mitzvah. The mitzvah itself is indeed an action—kiddushin and intercourse—but its fulfillment is conditioned on the desired state coming into being, that is, on there being children who themselves have children.

This is a third way to understand the halakhic definition of a mitzvah: an action-commandment whose fulfillment is conditioned on the emergence of a certain result. Here we have proposed this possibility as a way of resolving the situation in which the Torah is interested in the result, but only the action lies within human control.

It should nevertheless be noted that this definition does not seem to solve the essential problem. If the Torah does not command us with respect to things that are not in our hands, then it would seem that introducing conditions for fulfillment that are likewise not under our control is no better. In the end, the Torah is still defining goals that are beyond our reach. What difference does it make whether this is a condition for fulfillment or the fulfillment itself?

Between Fulfillment of the Mitzvah and Reaching a State of Exemption

Rabbi Ariel, in the responsum mentioned above, cites Rabbi Tzvi Pesach Frank in Har Tzvi on the Tur, Even Ha-Ezer 1. Rabbi Frank resolves the question of Minchat Chinukh cited earlier: how can a person discharge his obligation through an illegitimate child, if this is a mitzvah fulfilled through a transgression? Rabbi Frank explains that one who fathers an illegitimate child has indeed not fulfilled the mitzvah of procreation and does not receive reward for fulfilling the mitzvah, but he is nevertheless exempted from the mitzvah of procreation. In practice, he has a child who is attributed to him, and therefore there is no basis to require him to bring another child into the world.

He compares this to a gentile who had children while still a gentile and then converted. As we mentioned, according to most decisors a gentile is not obligated in procreation, yet after conversion he is regarded as having fulfilled the mitzvah. Above we proved from this that it is a result-commandment, but Rabbi Frank defines the matter differently: there is indeed no act of mitzvah here, and he will not receive reward for fulfilling the mitzvah, but in the end he has children attributed to him, and therefore there is no basis to require him to bring more children into the world.

Rabbi Ariel explains in the same way the rulings of Beit Shmuel and Chelkat Mechokek mentioned above, according to which one fulfills the obligation of procreation through conception in a bath. He asks: where was intention present here, when even awareness that conception had taken place was lacking?[^^17] According to his proposal, the explanation is that of Rabbi Frank: the mitzvah of procreation was not fulfilled here, but since in practice the result was achieved, there is no place to require him to bring more children into the world.

This seems to be the natural explanation of the Gemara’s phrase cited above: “he has helped inhabit the world.” That is, we exempt the gentile who converted from bringing additional children into the world because he has already contributed to the world’s habitation. There is no fulfillment of a mitzvah here, but the desired state has already been produced.

How Does This Option Differ from the Previous Ones?

Prima facie, this offers a sharper definition of result-commandments. Until now, however, we understood that if a given mitzvah is defined as a result-commandment, then when the result is attained the mitzvah has been fulfilled, and there is even reward for doing so—perhaps a lesser reward, since reward corresponds to effort. We are now distinguishing between two different levels: fulfillment of the mitzvah, with reward, and discharge of the obligation. There are situations in which the mitzvah has not been fulfilled, but the person’s action has brought him to a state in which he is exempt from it. Fulfillment is achieved only by means of the action, but one can reach exemption from the mitzvah through attainment of the state, since in the end the Torah’s will has been realized. This is a better formulation of the conception according to which the mitzvah is the action, while the state is a condition for fulfillment.

Example: A Stolen Sukkah

There are additional examples in other halakhic contexts of this distinction, and over the course of the year we will probably encounter several of them. In order to sharpen the point, let us bring one well-known example: a stolen sukkah.

Tosafot on Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah 9a ask why a textual source—“You shall make for yourself the festival of booths”—is needed in order to disqualify a stolen sukkah. After all, one should in any case fail to discharge the obligation because it is a mitzvah fulfilled through a transgression. Minchat Chinukh, mitzvah 325, subsection 10, resolves this difficulty on the basis of the idea that, beyond the first night, there is no positive mitzvah to eat in a sukkah. If so, when a person sits in an invalid sukkah he indeed does not fulfill a mitzvah, but there is no positive mitzvah there to fulfill. On the other hand, there is certainly a prohibition against eating outside the sukkah during the other days of the festival, yet eating in a stolen sukkah is not considered eating outside the sukkah. That is, from the standpoint of a mitzvah fulfilled through a transgression, and absent the scriptural verse cited by the Gemara, we would have thought that one who eats in a stolen sukkah has indeed not fulfilled the mitzvah of sukkah, but he has also not eaten outside the sukkah. Therefore a verse is required to disqualify this sukkah entirely. For our purposes, this is a case of exemption from the mitzvah without fulfilling it, and of course without receiving reward for fulfilling it.¹⁷

C. The Scriptural Rationale: Between Action and Result

The Connection to the Issue of Scriptural Rationale

Above we raised two possible ways in which the Torah may define a halakhic obligation: the obligation is the action, perhaps with the result as a condition; or the obligation is the result itself, with the action being only a preparation for the mitzvah.

These two possibilities reflect a tension between the rationale of a given law and its halakhic definition. They point to the possibility that these two need not coincide. According to the first possibility, the halakhic definition reflects the halakhic value, meaning that the scriptural rationale coincides with the legal definition. But according to the second possibility, the legal definition does not reflect the essential value. Here a gap is created between the rationale and the halakhic definition.

In halakhic terminology, “deriving law from the scriptural rationale” means drawing halakhic conclusions from the reason for a given mitzvah. As is well known, the tannaim disputed whether we do this or not. According to Rabbi Shimon, we do; according to Rabbi Yehudah, we do not. The law follows Rabbi Yehudah.

The common explanation for why one does not derive law from the scriptural rationale is that we are unable to penetrate the full depth of the reasons for the Torah’s commandments. But in the sugya in Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 21a—at least according to Maimonides—we discover a surprising fact: sometimes the Torah itself explicitly reveals the reason for the mitzvah, and nevertheless, even though the reason is certainly true, we still do not derive law from it.¹⁸ The sugya there deals with the command that a king must not multiply wives for himself. The Torah itself explains the reason: “lest his heart turn away.” Yet Maimonides rules—in his Commentary on the Mishnah there, in the fifth root of Sefer HaMitzvot, and in Laws of Kings—that we do not derive law from the scriptural rationale even in this case. Therefore, the multiplication itself is forbidden—beyond eighteen wives—without any dependence on whether his heart in fact turns away. This yields two halakhic ramifications, both discussed in that sugya and subject to tannaitic dispute: taking even one wife who would turn his heart away is not forbidden under this law of multiplying wives; and taking additional righteous wives who would not turn his heart away is nevertheless forbidden under this law. According to Maimonides, the halakhic definition is that a king may not take more than eighteen wives, regardless of their character.

How can it be that we do not derive law from the scriptural rationale in a case where the Torah itself tells us the reason?¹⁹ Here there is certainly no concern that we are misunderstanding the reason, since the Torah itself gives it to us.

Our example of procreation suggests an interesting mechanism for explaining this puzzling rule. Sometimes the reason for the mitzvah cannot determine its legal definition because of side considerations. Not because the reason is not correct, but because the halakhic definition also takes into account other considerations beyond the reason. In the case of procreation, we saw that according to all views the reason is the settling of the world. Therefore it is clear that the purpose of the command, that is, the rationale of the mitzvah, is the final result—that the person have children. Nevertheless, we saw views according to which the halakhic definition of the mitzvah is different. In the case of procreation, this seems to stem from the constraint that the result is not in human hands, and therefore one cannot command a person to attain it. In other cases, other considerations may enter and lead to a distinction between the rationale of the mitzvah and its halakhic definition.

Generalization: Why Does One Not Derive Law from the Scriptural Rationale?

Above we saw that Rabbi Tzvi Elimelech of Dinov argued that when the Torah formulates some result that is not entrusted to human control, it is apparently speaking not of the legal definition of the mitzvah but of its rationale.²⁰ Prima facie, a similar claim could be raised with respect to almost every mitzvah.

In fact, the reason for a mitzvah is essentially a state, not an action. We are commanded to do something in order to achieve some result or state. We would therefore expect that, generally speaking, the reason for the mitzvah is the state brought about by performance of the act. In addition, results are usually not directly made by human beings. What a person can usually do is an action. The result that emerges from it is an automatic consequence, not a direct deed of the person’s hands.

The Torah wants to attain some result, and therefore it commands us regarding a particular mitzvah. The result is usually not in our hands, because we can only perform actions, and results are natural derivatives of those actions. Therefore the results will always be the rationale of the mitzvah, while the halakhic definition will be the action.

The consideration presented here seems to show that the mechanism we proposed for understanding the rule that one does not derive law from the scriptural rationale is not merely a particular case or a single example, but a more general explanation of the rule: as we have seen, the reasons are often states of result, whereas the legal definitions of the commandments are actions. Therefore we never derive the legal definition of the obligation from the reasons for the commandments, because the results are not in our hands, whereas the actions are.

An example of an action-commandment is eating matzah, which we already saw above to be an action-commandment.²¹ What might the result be in that case? Perhaps the remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt and of the haste, which is created through the eating. No one would think of replacing the commandment of eating matzah with a commandment to remember the haste by other means. Here we have an implication of the halakha that one does not derive law from the scriptural rationale. The remembrance is a state that is produced—though not deterministically—by the act of eating. Here too, the intention that accompanies the action is connected to the scriptural rationale, as we saw above regarding sukkah and procreation. In that sense, there is indeed a halakhic implication to the scriptural rationale, and whenever it appears explicitly in the Torah there will always be such an implication, as we saw above.

But as we noted, the Torah also contains result-commandments. The basic question therefore returns: what is the criterion for determining when a given mitzvah is a result-commandment and when it is an action-commandment? Rabbi Tzvi Elimelech’s consideration should have led us to the conclusion that all Torah commandments are action-commandments, and that the results are at most the reasons for the commandments. We should recall that, in practice, halakha does not derive law from the scriptural rationale.

Are Results Never Dependent on the Acting Person?

The argument we raised above, according to which results are always derivatives of human action and never what a person is directly engaged in, may be formally correct, but in practice it seems somewhat artificial. For example, a person is commanded to make a parapet for his roof. He can build the parapet, but he is engaged in an action and not in a result. The result arises automatically out of his action. Prima facie, here too one could view the result as an act of nature and not of the person: the laws of nature determine that if metal is fastened together in certain ways, a parapet will stand on the roof as required.

But this distinction is artificial. The built parapet does indeed seem to be something under human control, unlike procreation. The reason is apparently that in this case the result is necessary and predictable in advance—an inevitable consequence. That is not so with procreation, where the result is not necessary. In procreation, the relation between the action and the result is complex and indirect, and certainly not deterministic.

Let us consider another example: the mitzvah of dwelling in a sukkah. There too, a person is in a state and is not engaged in an action. Nevertheless, it seems correct to say that this too is entrusted to him. He can decide to remain in the sukkah or to leave it. It seems artificial to say that a person is commanded to enter the sukkah, while remaining in it is only an automatic result of that action.

Another example is the positive commandment of fasting on Yom Kippur, or of resting from labor on the Sabbath and festivals. These are positive commandments, but their practical meaning is non-performance: not to eat, not to drink, not to anoint, not to do labor, and so forth. In this case it is hard even to distinguish between action and result. Some define fasting or resting as an action of the person, but in reality it seems to be the result of mere non-performance. In any case, here the state is certainly in the person’s hands, since refraining from eating necessarily brings about affliction, and refraining from labor necessarily brings about rest.²²

D. Examples of Result-Commandments

Introduction

We have seen that the claim that commandments are necessarily action-commandments is not compelling. Still, the straightforward conception of the commandments, absent special circumstances, is indeed that they impose actions upon us, while the states are only consequences of those actions. Nevertheless, the Torah does contain several result-commandments, such as procreation according to Minchat Chinukh. Understanding these as result-commandments can clarify a number of otherwise obscure points concerning them.

In this section we will illustrate the matter briefly. We will bring two examples in which such a discussion appears in the commentators, and one further example of a different sort. As the year goes on, we will probably expand this discussion with respect to several other such mitzvot.

Sowing and Cooking on the Sabbath

The prohibitions of labor on the Sabbath are clear examples of action-prohibitions. There is no prohibition that something be cooked or built on the Sabbath. A gentile who does so has done nothing wrong. The prohibition is imposed on the person not to engage in these labors. Some later authorities derived halakhic conclusions from this principle—for example, that one cannot violate this prohibition through agency, since it is a person-directed prohibition of rest and not a prohibition attached to the object in question.²³

Yet among the prohibited labors of the Sabbath there are two prominent examples in which the person in fact does nothing at all. The meaningful element of the labor lies in the result that arises automatically from his act:

1. Cooking. In the labor of cooking, a person does not actually cook at all, but only performs the preparations that make cooking possible. A person places a pot on the fire, and afterward the fire cooks the food inside it. The labor of cooking is placing the pot on the fire, even though this is merely a technical act not directly connected to the result—the cooked food. The result is achieved by the fire and not by the person.
2. Sowing. In the labor of sowing, the situation is quite similar. A person places a seed in the ground, and nothing more. After that, the seed takes root and begins to grow. The rooting and growth are results of the person’s act, but they are certainly not done by him. The person does nothing beyond placing the seed in a certain location. The results are a derivative of the seed’s being in that place.

And indeed the commentators discuss what the basis of the prohibition is in these labors. In cooking, is the prohibition on the result, namely that the dish becomes cooked, or on the act of placing it on the fire? Likewise, they discuss whether the prohibition of sowing is on placing the seed in the ground or on its taking root and becoming established there. The Rashash, on Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 73a, wrote that the liability is for the taking root, and inferred that if one removed the seed from the ground during the week, it would be clarified retroactively that he had been exempt all along for the act of sowing. He compares this to baking, where placing the dough is likewise the liability-producing act, even though a result is required for liability.

By contrast, Minchat Chinukh, in mitzvah 298,²⁴ holds that the liability in sowing is for placing the seed in the ground, since the taking root occurs during the week; with respect to sowing in the sabbatical year the law is apparently different. The same is the view of Chayei Adam.²⁵

The Rashash there on 73b also discusses one who placed a pot on the fire on the Sabbath and the dish was cooked only after the Sabbath, and one who placed a pot on the fire on the eve of the Sabbath and the dish was cooked on the Sabbath. Peri Megadim, in its general introduction to the laws of the Sabbath, also considered this question. The author of Halakhot Ketanot, however, distinguished between sowing and cooking.²⁶

If so, these labors are apparently result-prohibitions and not action-prohibitions. Yet this does not fit our earlier claim that all the Sabbath labors are person-directed prohibitions. It therefore seems that these labor-prohibitions—at least cooking—are defined as action-prohibitions that are conditioned on the attainment of a result.²⁷

Circumcision

The previous examples involved negative commandments. With such commandments there is no room for the intermediate definition that we saw above, according to which one distinguishes between fulfilling the mitzvah and reaching a state of exemption. We now turn to an example involving a positive commandment.

With regard to circumcision, there are detailed discussions as to whether it is a result-commandment or an action-commandment. First, one may note the well-known comments of the Brisker Rav in Laws of Hanukkah and of his grandfather in responsa Beit Ha-Levi, part 2, no. 47, who discuss the dispute between Maimonides and the Tur regarding repeating the removal of shreds of flesh that do not invalidate the circumcision. According to the Tur, one does not return to them on the Sabbath, but on weekdays one does; according to Maimonides, one does not return to them even on weekdays.

According to the explanations of those later authorities, this dispute depends on whether the mitzvah of circumcision is to circumcise—so that once the act of circumcision has been completed, the mitzvah-act is over and there is no longer any possibility of enhancing the mitzvah—or whether the mitzvah is to be circumcised, in which case one can continue the act of circumcision even after the basic act is over in order to improve the resulting state. See their discussions there.

We also find in responsa of Rabbi Hayyim Or Zaru’a, no. 11, that the father’s mitzvah is to see that his son be circumcised, not to circumcise him. The ramification is that the father need not appoint the circumciser as his agent, since the mitzvah need not be performed by him personally.²⁸

Two Kinds of Result-Commandments

In this context, it seems that the definition leans even more sharply toward the result than in the case of procreation. With respect to circumcision, the obligation is to see to it that the child be circumcised in some way, even if the father does no act at all. In procreation, by contrast—at least according to Rabbi Tzvi Pesach Frank—even if we define it as a result-commandment, it is still clear that some obligation remains incumbent upon the father.

In terms of Rabbi Frank’s distinction, we would say that with respect to circumcision, if the father did not appoint the circumciser as his agent, we would not say that he failed to fulfill the mitzvah and merely became exempt from it. Here there is actual fulfillment, for all that was imposed upon him was the effort to attain the desired result. But with procreation, as we saw, even if we define the mitzvah as a result-commandment, the action still has a role. Attaining the result without an action would not constitute a mitzvah-act, even though the resulting state exempts the person from the mitzvah.

Tending the Lamps

By way of a side remark, the mitzvah of tending the lamps also seems to be a result-commandment of the same kind as circumcision, and perhaps we will discuss it later in the year. See on this Kli Chemda at the beginning of the portion of Tetzaveh, where he derives it from an enigmatic midrash (rabbinic interpretive text) that compares the mitzvah of tending the lamps to circumcision.

Charity

Several later authorities also discussed whether the mitzvah of charity is an action-commandment or a result-commandment. Is the mitzvah the act of giving charity to the poor person, or is the mitzvah to see to it that the poor person have money? Some later authorities wrote that this is a result-commandment, and therefore the disqualification of a mitzvah fulfilled through a transgression does not apply to it. See the sources cited above in footnote 1.

One may ask a similar question regarding charity: is charity intended for the poor person or for the giver? Is its goal to improve the condition of the poor person, or is its goal to improve the character traits of the giver?[^^30]

One may see something like a contradiction in the Babylonian Talmud, at the beginning of Bava Batra. In the sugya on 9b, the following passage appears:

Rabbi Yitzhak said: What is the meaning of the verse, “He who pursues charity and kindness will find life, charity, and honor”? Is it because he pursues charity that he will find charity? Rather, it teaches you that anyone who pursues opportunities for charity—the Holy One, blessed be He, provides him with money so that he may perform charity with it. Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said: The Holy One, blessed be He, provides him with worthy people to whom he can give charity, so that he may receive reward for them. What does this exclude? It excludes what Rabbah expounded. For Rabbah expounded: What is the meaning of the verse, “Let them be made to stumble before You; in the time of Your anger act against them”? Jeremiah said before the Holy One, blessed be He: Master of the universe, even when they subdue their inclination and seek to perform charity before You, cause them to stumble upon unworthy people, so that they will receive no reward for them.

The case of Jeremiah, who asks God to cause the people of Anatot to stumble specifically upon unworthy poor people, clearly presents a conception of charity as a mitzvah for the sake of the recipient. If the recipient was not worthy, the mitzvah was not fulfilled, even if the giver acted with a full heart and a generous hand.

On the other hand, a few lines later, the following passage appears there on 10a:

It was taught: Rabbi Meir would say, your opponent may answer you and say: If your God loves the poor, why does He not support them? Say to him: So that through them we may be saved from the judgment of Gehenna. And this very question was asked by the wicked Turnus Rufus to Rabbi Akiva: If your God loves the poor, why does He not support them? He said to him: So that through them we may be saved from the judgment of Gehenna.

Here a conception appears according to which the Holy One, blessed be He, created the poor so that we would give them charity and thus be saved from the judgment of Gehenna. This is clearly a conception of charity as being for the giver, not for the recipient.

A possible resolution of this tension may be found in Maimonides. A study of his words, both in Sefer HaMitzvot and in the Mishneh Torah, shows that he sees a difference between the negative prohibition against turning one’s eyes away from charity and the positive commandment. In negative commandment 232, Maimonides writes:

The 232nd prohibition is that He warned us not to withhold charity and relief from the poor among our brothers once we know the weakness of their condition and our ability to support them. This is His statement, may He be exalted: “You shall not harden your heart, nor shut your hand from your poor brother.” This is a warning against acquiring the trait of stinginess and cruelty, which would keep one from doing what is proper.

Here the emphasis is on the giver, that he not acquire the trait of stinginess.

By contrast, in positive commandment 195 he writes:

The 195th positive commandment is that He commanded us to practice charity, to strengthen the weak, and to provide for them. This command came in different formulations. He said, may He be exalted: “You shall surely open your hand to him”; and He said: “You shall uphold him, whether stranger or resident”; and He said: “Your brother shall live with you.” The intent of all these expressions is one: that we assist their condition and strengthen them sufficiently for their needs. The rules of this commandment have been explained in many places, mostly in Babylonian Talmud, Ketubbot 48a–50a and 66b–68a, and Bava Batra 8a–11a and 43a. And the tradition has come down that even a poor person who is himself supported by charity is obligated in this commandment—that is, in charity—toward one who is poorer than he, or even toward one equal to him, even with something small.

Here the benefits to the giver are not mentioned at all, only the improvement of the poor person’s condition.

Maimonides’ source is the Gemara cited above, for the case of Jeremiah concerns the positive commandment, since it speaks of receiving reward and not of punishment. Therefore there a conception is expressed of charity as being for the poor. By contrast, Rabbi Akiva’s statement to Turnus Rufus concerns the negative commandment, since it speaks of the punishment of Gehenna, and therefore it expresses a conception of charity as being for the giver. These are precisely the words of Maimonides. Many proofs for this can be brought from Maimonides’ rulings, but this is not the place.

Does this division mean that the positive commandment is a result-commandment and the negative prohibition is an action-commandment? Prima facie, yes. If charity is for the sake of the giver, the emphasis is on the action; if charity is for the recipient, the emphasis is on the result.

However, this distinction is mistaken. One can certainly understand that in both cases we are dealing with results, and the question is only which result properly defines the mitzvah of charity: the improvement of the giver’s character or the improvement of the recipient’s condition.

Here it would be more accurate to define the question as whether charity is a law centered on the object—the poor recipient—or a law centered on the person—the giver, the one who fulfills the mitzvah.

A Note on the Relation to the Distinction Between a Law in the Object and a Law in the Person

In conclusion, let us return to the distinction between action and result itself. Prima facie, this distinction parallels the distinction between a law centered on the person and a law centered on the object. For example, with regard to the labors of the Sabbath, we saw that the question concerning sowing and cooking is whether the prohibition is the action performed by the person or the result—the change in the object. Here one could formulate the very same dilemma as the question whether these labors are a law centered on the person or on the object, rather than, as we formulated it, whether they are an action-prohibition or a result-prohibition.

What is the general relation between these two distinctions? Are they really the same distinction stated in two different ways, or are these two different distinctions?

We saw in the previous subsection that with respect to both sides in the understanding of the mitzvah of charity, one had to distinguish between the two formulations. The formulation that places the inquiry on the axis of person versus object was correct, whereas the formulation that sees it as an inquiry on the axis of action versus result was mistaken. If so, these are not exactly the same distinction, despite the connection between them.

This is not the place to elaborate on that question, but it is likely that over the course of the year we will return to it, with God’s help, from several different directions.

Footnotes