Lesson 15: Miketz

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Principles of Halakhic Thinking by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Concepts

Subjective dimensions of halakha (Jewish law)

Abstract

In this article, we begin with the question of the halakhic status of dreams and arrive at a distinction between two different dimensions of halakha: the subjective and the objective. We show that, according to most halakhic decisors, a dream is regarded as having doubtful reliability. Therefore, it cannot be used to extract money from another person, since the burden of proof rests on the claimant; but in matters of prohibition, it is sufficient to require stringency because of doubt, since in a Torah-law doubt one rules stringently.

In Maimonides’ view, however, the picture appears different. According to Maimonides, a dream has no halakhic status at all, whether in monetary matters or in matters of prohibition. Even so, a person who is excommunicated in a dream must have that excommunication lifted. We explain this by saying that dream-excommunication binds only the person himself; it does not belong to the public realm of halakha. In such contexts, and only in such contexts—we also mention the example of a formal warning received in a dream—a dream has halakhic standing even according to Maimonides. In every other halakhic context, whether monetary or prohibitory, a dream is mere nonsense.

We explain that this does not stem from the dream’s lack of reliability. Rather, that reliability is not admissible in the public realm of halakha; it belongs to halakha’s subjective dimension. We conclude with several further examples of the distinction between the objective and subjective dimensions of halakha.

The Rules and Principles That Emerge from the Article

The Halakhic Status of Dreams: A Look at Subjective and Objective Dimensions in Halakha

Introduction

In our Torah portion, Pharaoh’s dreams and Joseph’s interpretations are presented. As is well known, Joseph’s brothers call him “the master of dreams” because of the dreams that he himself had related to them. Dreams and their interpretation thus form a central axis in the chain of events that led Israel down to Egypt. What is the status of dreams? Do they have any halakhic standing at all? Or are they merely psychological events, products of the preceding day’s experiences or of the depths of the subconscious, as people commonly tend to think today?

Authors of aggadah and Jewish thought have written at length about the meaning of dreams. Abarbanel here, the author of Akeidat Yitzhak (Gate 29), and Ein Yaakov on the chapter “One Who Sees” in Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 90b, all discuss these matters at length.¹ They distinguish between dreams rooted in bodily causes, such as digestion producing vapors, or a weakness in the body’s constitution; such dreams are false dreams, “with no substance.” But there are also dreams that are instruction and communication from Heaven, and about them the Sages said in Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 57b: “A dream is one-sixtieth of prophecy.”

In his novellae to the aggadic passages on Berakhot 55b, Maharsha, commenting on the story of Bar Hedya, who interpreted dreams as he wished, writes that a person has the power to shape things according to what seems good in his own eyes, and that a person’s desires determine the correct interpretation of dreams, as it says in Proverbs 22:9: “He who has a good eye will be blessed.”²

It turns out that halakha, too, contains parallel discussions of dreams, and in this week’s article we will try to begin from the relevant talmudic passages and see what they teach us about dreams in particular and more generally.³

Excommunication in a Dream

In Babylonian Talmud, Nedarim 8a-b, we find:

Rav Yosef said: If one was excommunicated in a dream, he needs ten people to release him. And these must be people who study Jewish law; but those who only study Mishnah do not suffice. If there are no such people, then even those who only study Mishnah suffice. If there are none, let him go and sit at a crossroads and greet ten people, until ten people learned in Jewish law happen upon him. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: If he knows who excommunicated him, what is the law—may that same person release him? He said to him: They made him an agent to excommunicate, but they did not make him an agent to release. Rav Aha said to Rav Ashi: If he excommunicated him and then released him in his dream, what is the law? He said to him: Just as there is no grain without straw, so there is no dream without nonsense.

Ran comments there:

If one was excommunicated in a dream, he needs ten people to release him, because it is possible that he was excommunicated on Heaven’s behalf, and therefore ten are needed to release him, for the Divine Presence is with them.

That is, excommunication in a dream requires release just like ordinary human excommunication. The reason is that the excommunication may have been imposed on Heaven’s behalf. In other words, the dream is a reliable medium, and therefore an excommunication that occurs in it is like a regular excommunication. If a dream were merely the result of digestion producing vapors, there would be no reason to fear its contents. It therefore seems that a dream is a medium that God Himself uses to convey messages to us.

Yet the plain meaning of the Talmud suggests that this rule applies only because of doubt, out of concern that perhaps that dream had genuine substance. If so, the dream is not treated as a straightforward medium, but at most as something of doubtful reliability. It seems that the doubt at issue here is precisely the one we presented in the introduction: is the dream a natural event produced by bodily processes, in which case its contents should be disregarded? Or is the dream a medium through which divine messages descend from above, in which case its contents should be treated as reliable?

And indeed, at the end of the passage, when the question is raised what happens if the excommunication was lifted in the dream, the Talmud says that such a release is invalid, because there is no dream without nonsense. Clearly, we are dealing with doubt: we are concerned that the excommunication may be reliable, while at the same time we are concerned that the release may not be reliable.

This implies that a dream contains both true and false elements—and necessarily both. Every dream, then, is seen as combining the two mechanisms mentioned above: bodily events are used by God to convey messages, but those messages are hidden and embedded within a problematic and random whole.

This rule is codified in Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Torah Study 7:12, and likewise in Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 334:35:⁴

A person who was excommunicated in a dream, even if he knows who excommunicated him, requires ten people who study Jewish law to release him from his excommunication. If he does not find them, he must trouble himself to seek them out up to a parasang away. If he does not find them, then even ten who study Mishnah may release him. If he does not find them, then even ten who know how to read the Torah. If he does not find them, then even ten who do not know how to read. If there are not ten in his place, then even three may release him.

So far we have dealt with excommunication in a dream. Here one might still think that the requirement of release reflects recognition of the dream’s effect on the dreamer, but not necessarily recognition of the dream’s objective reliability in itself. We therefore turn now to examples from prohibitions and monetary law, where an actual reliability of the dream appears to be at issue.

Vow and Excommunication

The first example concerns a vow made in a dream. Ran, in the same talmudic passage in Nedarim, writes:

Just as there is no grain without straw—as it is written in Jeremiah 23, “The prophet who has a dream, let him tell the dream… and what has straw to do with grain?”—one must consider whether a person excommunicated in a dream must observe all the laws of excommunication. And it seems to me that although we say here that one who was excommunicated in a dream needs release, we should not learn from here that one who made a vow in a dream requires release. Here the reason is that one may say that Heaven excommunicated him, which cannot be said regarding a vow. However, I saw that Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet, of blessed memory, wrote in a responsum (no. 668) that such a case came before him and he required release.

At first glance, according to the logic we have presented, there is no reason to attach significance to a vow made in a dream, since the vow was supposedly made by the person himself, and that certainly is not done in proper halakhic form within a dream. And this indeed is Ran’s view. But Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet, whom he cites, holds that even a vow made in a dream requires release.

One might have thought that Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet means that God imposed that vow on the person, and that is why it binds. But that claim depends on a number of far from simple halakhic assumptions, and that is presumably why Ran does not accept it as likely. Perhaps Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet means, instead, that the person appearing in the dream is the one making the vow, and that this is treated as though the waking person made it. That would reflect a third conception of dreams: they are not only divine messages, nor only random byproducts of physiological events, but also products of subconscious thoughts and desires, and as such they express a person’s genuine will.

The question, however, is why Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet sees a connection between the determination that excommunication in a dream requires release and the determination that a vow in a dream requires release. Dream-excommunication is a message from God, but a vow in a dream is a different mechanism altogether, whose reliability does not depend on the dream as a medium for transmitting messages from above.

Perhaps one could say that the person excommunicated in the dream is not the real person, but the figure that appears in the dream. If the excommunication nevertheless takes effect, that means the dream-figure is treated as an authentic expression of the real person. If so, the aspirations and desires of the dream-figure also express the desires of the real person, and therefore his vows require release as well.

Charity

In a responsum, Tzafnat Paneach, no. 200, also cited in his novellae to Sanhedrin 30a, extends the ruling of Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet and rules that if a person pledges charity in a dream, that pledge is valid charity, since it is a vow that he made in his dream. He cites Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 55b: “Rabbi Yonatan said: A person is shown only the thoughts of his heart.” This reflects the conception that what a person does in a dream is his own action, as we suggested in explaining Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet above. He adds that although vows generally require explicit verbal articulation in order to take effect, with regard to charity—and likewise fasting—the law recognizes a willing heart, so that even a firm inner resolution is effective.

Tzafnat Paneach, then, understands Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet exactly as we suggested above: a vow in a dream expresses the person’s real will. It should be noted, however, that this stands in tension with Rama’s ruling in Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah, at the end of section 259, where he writes explicitly that in such a case the money is not charity, because dream-statements neither add nor detract. Rama apparently rules like Ran, that one cannot make a binding vow in a dream.⁴

Is the Reliability of Dreams Objective?

What emerges from everything we have said so far is that a dream’s reliability is directed toward the person himself, whether as the actor or as the one acted upon. But what about objective questions? Is a dream a reliable medium in any genuinely objective sense? We must examine this on two levels:

1. prohibitions that do not depend on the person’s own intent, unlike a vow or oath;
2. monetary law, where the ruling and its implications concern other people as well.

Both questions are addressed in a passage in Sanhedrin, to which we now turn.

A Dream as Evidence in Prohibitions and Monetary Law

In Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 30a, it is taught—the source of these laws is in Tosefta, Ma’aser Sheni 5; see also Jerusalem Talmud, Ma’aser Sheni 4:4-6:

The Rabbis taught: If one person says to them, “I saw your father hide money in a chest, a box, or a cabinet, and he said, ‘It belongs to so-and-so; it is second tithe money'”—if it was in the house, he has said nothing; if it was in the field, his words stand. The general rule is this: whenever it was in his power to take it, his words stand; whenever it was not in his power to take it, he has said nothing. If they themselves saw their father hide money in a chest, a box, or a cabinet, and he said, “It belongs to so-and-so; it is second tithe money”—if he said it as one conveying information, his words stand; if as one acting deceptively, he has said nothing. If a person was distressed over money his father left him, and the dream master came and said to him, “The amount is such-and-such; it is in such-and-such a place; it is second tithe money”—such a case once occurred, and the Sages said: dream-statements neither add nor detract.

The Talmud is dealing with testimony that certain money belongs to a particular person or that it is second tithe money, which must be spent only on food in Jerusalem. It presents three different situations:

1. One witness says that he saw their father hide money. In this case, he is believed only where the witness himself could have taken the money, and precisely because he could have taken it, he is believed with regard to its status.
2. They themselves saw their father hide the money and say that it belonged to so-and-so or that it was second tithe money. Here he is believed, unless there is reason to think he was acting deceptively.
3. The third case is the one that concerns us: the person searched and did not know where the money his father had left him was hidden—apparently he knew that such money existed, and that his father had left it for him—and the dream master came⁵ and told him where it was, or that it was second tithe money. In this case the evidence is inadmissible, and dream-statements neither add nor detract. The implication is that the money found in the place revealed in the dream is not treated as belonging to that third party, nor is it treated as second tithe money; rather, it is treated as ordinary, non-sacred money.

These rulings are codified in Maimonides, Laws of Second Tithe 6:6 and Laws of Acquisition and Gifts 10:7, and in Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat, at the end of section 255. Accordingly, if someone dreams that a figure tells him that his father’s second tithe money is hidden in a certain place, and he indeed finds money there, he takes it as ordinary money and does not treat it as second tithe money. Likewise, if someone learns in a dream that money hidden in a certain place is deposit money belonging to Reuven, who had entrusted it to his father, and on searching he indeed finds money there, he may take the money; there is no proof that it belongs to the depositor.

What Is the Problem with Dreams?

Several later authorities—notably Torat Chaim here, and Ha’amek She’elah on Parashat Miketz, on She’ilta 29, sec. 16, though the point is already explicit in She’iltot itself—note that in the case of the dream here we seem to have very strong indications that the dream contains genuine truth. The case is one where the person was “distressed” over this money, meaning that he knew such second tithe money existed and was searching for it; and after the dream revelation he indeed finds the stated amount in the exact place mentioned. Yet the halakha still rules that dream-statements neither add nor detract. Why, then, is the dream not regarded as evidence?

It seems that, at least in these cases, the problem is not the dream’s basic reliability, since part of it has clearly been confirmed as reliable. But we do have a rule that there is no dream without nonsense. Therefore even in a dream that is clearly reliable in some respects, we fear that some of the details mixed into it are incorrect, and so one cannot rely on all of its details.

What emerges is the same picture we saw above: a dream contains elements that are genuinely messages from above, but they are wrapped in a great many random details, produced by bodily vapors and the like, and so one cannot know which elements of the dream can be trusted.

The Difficulty: What About Doubt in a Prohibition, Which Calls for Stringency?

Notice that we do not even treat the case as a doubt that the money is second tithe money. In the monetary context—that is, when the depositor claims against the heir of the deceased bailee—one could say that even where there is doubt, we do not give the depositor the money, because the burden of proof rests on the claimant. But with regard to second tithe, the issue is a doubt in a prohibition. If we were really in doubt, we should have to be stringent and treat this money as second tithe money, because the rule is that in a Torah-law doubt one rules stringently.

If so, it seems that the dream does not even rise to the level of doubt. Everything in it that has not been openly verified as true is treated as sheer falsehood. Why is that, if the dream does indeed contain reliable elements?

Moreover, we concluded above that a dream has the status of doubt. If, as we now see here, the content of the dream does not enjoy even doubtful reliability, why does a person excommunicated in a dream need release? And why, according to Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet, does a vow made in a dream—and according to Tzafnat Paneach, even a charitable pledge made in a dream—take effect? The passage in Nedarim quite clearly suggests that a dream has at least the status of doubt.

Tashbetz and His School: Distinguishing Between Monetary Doubt and Prohibitory Doubt

Tashbetz, part II, no. 128, discusses the status of dreams at length. In general, he distinguishes between true dreams, which are conveyed by an angel, and false dreams, which are conveyed by a demon. He then adds a further distinction between dreams sent from above and dreams that are the result of bodily vapors and the like. His conclusion is that a dream is indeed a matter of doubt.

From this he derives a practical distinction between the treatment of dreams in monetary law and in prohibitions: in matters of prohibition one must be stringent, because a Torah-law doubt is treated stringently, and therefore excommunication in a dream requires release—and even if the release also occurred in a dream, that does not help. But in monetary matters, money is not extracted on the basis of doubt. This is also the practical ruling of Yad Malakhi, Kelalei Ha-Dinim, rule 167. And as for second tithe, which seems at first to be a matter of prohibition, Tashbetz argues that it is really a monetary question, and halakha therefore obligates us to leave the property in the status it possessed before the dream.

From this it follows that if we were dealing with money that had been hidden and about which we had known nothing, and the dream master told us that it was second tithe money, we should have to be stringent and treat it as second tithe money, because here there was no prior presumption. Tashbetz apparently understands the Talmudic case as dealing with a dream that testified concerning money already in the person’s possession, not money that was hidden.

Three novel points emerge from Tashbetz’s approach:

1. one must distinguish, with respect to dreams, between monetary law and prohibition, because the dream has the status of doubt;
2. the issue of second tithe is treated as a monetary issue, not a prohibitory one—and Ran says similarly in his novellae to Sanhedrin, because in second tithe one is effectively transferring money from oneself to the domain of Heaven;⁶
3. the Talmudic discussion of second tithe concerns known money, not hidden money.

See also the responsa Divrei Yatziv, Yoreh De’ah 122, which discusses the law of dreams at length, analyzes the wording of the early authorities, and shows how each one understood the case—some as involving various types of doubt, and some as involving money with an already established presumption. His conclusion as well is that the matter remains in doubt. He proves this also from the language of the Tur, Choshen Mishpat, at the end of section 255, and the Mordechai, first chapter of Bava Batra, end of no. 658, and he seems to understand Maimonides this way as well. Kli Chemdah, Parashat Vayera, sec. 4, explains Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet in this same way.

Maimonides’ Approach

But it seems that Maimonides’ language will not allow such an interpretation. He brings this law in Laws of Second Tithe 6:6 and writes as follows:

If they said to him in a dream, “The second tithe money of your father that you are seeking is in such-and-such a place,” then even though he found there what he was told, it is not second tithe money; dream-statements neither add nor detract.

Maimonides emphasizes that we have an indication that the dream is speaking truth, since after searching for the money he found it exactly where the dream had said it was hidden, and yet dream-statements neither add nor detract. The dream thus revealed even the place of concealment, and nevertheless the money is treated as ordinary money. This is not like Tashbetz’s interpretation.

The same follows from Laws of Acquisition and Gifts 10:7, where Maimonides writes:

If a person was distressed over money his father had left him and did not know where it had been hidden, and they said to him in a dream, “The amount is such-and-such, it is in such-and-such a place, it belongs to so-and-so, and it is second tithe money,” and he found it in the place named and in the amount named—such a case once occurred, and the Sages said: dream-statements neither add nor detract.

So in both places the money was not already in his possession; rather, it was discovered following the dream. In such a case it is difficult to see how one could rely on any prior presumption regarding the money. At most, one might stretch and say that since it was found in his house, it is presumed to be his. But if so, Tashbetz’s proposal is not relevant in Maimonides’ view. Maimonides does not rule on the basis of a prior presumption; he grants dreams no reliability at all, neither in monetary law nor in matters of prohibition.

The language Maimonides uses in both places also sounds categorical: “they neither add nor detract”—that is, they have no legal consequence whatsoever, and one need not take them into account at all. This is not the language of doubt. The Talmud itself uses this phrase, and the plain meaning of the Talmud is therefore that there is not even a doubt here.

Yad Malakhi, rule 167—who basically follows Tashbetz’s approach—proves from Babylonian Talmud, Horayot 13b, that even in prohibitions, dream-statements have no standing at all; see also the lengthy discussion in Sedei Chemed, general principles, sec. 45. This accords with the Maimonidean approach we have just seen regarding second tithe.

The conclusion that follows is therefore that, at least according to Maimonides, dreams have no halakhic standing whatsoever—not even as doubt. And as we noted, this also seems to be the plain sense of the Talmud itself, since the language “dream-statements neither add nor detract” appears in the Talmud itself.

I later found that Perishah, at the end of section 255, writes that the Tur omitted the case of second tithe, and it seems that he understands the matter like the Mordechai, who distinguishes between monetary law and prohibition. But Maimonides compares second tithe money to a deposit, and this is his language:

It appears from the words of the Mordechai that this rule applies specifically to tithe money and charity money, but not to a deposit, where theft from others is involved. In parentheses there he adds: However, Maimonides in chapter 10 of the Laws of Acquisition also wrote “it belongs to so-and-so” regarding a deposit, just as our master did.

This is precisely our point.

Subjective Dimensions of Halakha

Yet the question of excommunication remains: if according to Maimonides dreams have no standing at all, whether in prohibitions or in monetary law, then it is not clear why excommunication imposed in a dream requires release. As we mentioned above, Maimonides himself rules this way in Laws of Torah Study. It therefore seems that Maimonides does not distinguish between monetary law and prohibition, but makes a different distinction: between excommunication in a dream and dream-testimony about second tithe or a deposit. What is the nature of this distinction? In what way is excommunication different from second tithe, which is also, at least in one sense, a matter of prohibition?⁷

It seems that excommunication is an exceptional case, because its consequences concern only the dreamer himself. In such a case the dream does have standing—at least as a matter of doubt—and the person must take seriously what occurred in the dream. By contrast, in any matter that also concerns others, not only in monetary law—and the fact that the money is second tithe money also concerns others from the standpoint of prohibition, because there are things others are forbidden to do with that money—the dream has no standing at all, not even as doubt. The reason is not that the dream lacks reliability, for its status is indeed that of doubt. The reason is that in halakha’s objective dimension, in its public realm, dreams have no standing. Even if they possess a high degree of reliability, by definition they belong only to halakha’s subjective dimension.

Accordingly, Maimonides’ distinction is not between monetary law and prohibition, but between halakha’s subjective dimension and its objective one. Some laws belong to the many, and as such they are not determined by a revelation that occurs in the dream of a single individual. But with respect to that person himself and his own status, it is quite possible that a dream does have standing, since in such matters subjective factors can suffice.⁸

A further interesting implication of this would concern a formal warning received by a person in a dream. At first glance, this too is a personal matter, and therefore the dream should have halakhic standing and the warning should be valid. On the other hand, a court cannot act on the basis of such a warning—indeed, the person would not even be believed to say that he received such a warning, both because a single witness is not accepted in that context and because a person cannot establish his own wickedness. What, then, about punishment from Heaven? Here it would seem that a warning in a dream should be admissible. And indeed, in Kli Chemdah, Parashat Vayera, sec. 4, this issue is discussed at length—see there why a warning is needed at all in cases of heavenly punishment—and it is explained that such a warning is invalid only because a dream necessarily contains nonsense. In our terminology, we would say that the dream is valid in the subjective dimension, but even there its standing is only doubtful. For excommunication, a doubtful standing is enough to require stringency; for a warning, however, a definite warning is required, not a doubtful one.⁹

Additional Halakhic Examples of Subjective Dimensions in Halakha

1. Vow and oath. At first glance, the most obvious examples of subjective dimensions in halakha are the laws of vow and oath. In a vow or an oath, a person imposes prohibitions on himself that do not appear in the Torah, simply because he decided that they should be prohibited. Yet these examples are somewhat problematic. In a vow, a person can impose prohibitions even on those around him: if an object belonging to him is forbidden by vow for benefit, others too may not benefit from it. But things are not so simple, because in an oath he certainly cannot impose prohibitions that concern others; and even in a vow, the reason he can do so is that the object belongs to him, and therefore he has the right and power to impose on it whatever legal status he wishes. This is really no different from matters that concern himself alone.¹⁰ For precisely this reason, an oath—which applies not to the object but to the person swearing—cannot be relevant to others.

2. Personal self-prohibition. Another example is the halakhic rule that a person’s own statement about himself binds him, even where it cannot bind those around him. In rabbinic language, a person can render himself as though he were a forbidden object. For example, in Babylonian Talmud, Ketubbot 23b, we find:

If she said, “I am defiled and my companion is pure,” and one witness said to her, “You are pure and your companion is defiled”—she has rendered herself forbidden; her companion is permitted on the basis of her statement…

A woman can disqualify herself and validate herself—such as in a case where she was taken captive and testifies that she was defiled—even if there is one witness against her. This is not because she is more credible than the witness opposing her, but because with respect to herself she possesses a special credibility to determine the halakha that concerns her. By contrast, she is obviously not believed to testify about her companion any more than any other single witness would be.

The early and later authorities discuss this rule at length, and we cannot enter into it here. It is enough for our purposes to note that this credibility is subjective, and it is effective only with respect to the person herself, even though according to the rules of “objective” halakha this woman does not have the credibility of a full witness when there is a witness against her.

3. Admission by a litigant where it does not prejudice others. Another example is a person’s admission of liability to his own detriment, which is accepted as equivalent to a hundred witnesses; see Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 65b, and parallels. For example, if a person comes and says that he owes so-and-so 100 shekels, he is believed like a hundred witnesses. Indeed, even without the ordinary requirement of two witnesses, halakha obligates him to pay the debt. Here too, a person has a kind of subjective credibility to obligate himself, even in circumstances where the rules of “objective” halakha would not accept such evidence as sufficient.

And indeed, halakha teaches that this credibility exists only where the admission does not prejudice others; see Babylonian Talmud, Ketubbot 19a, and parallels. Where the admission imposes obligations on someone else as well, it is null and void. The reason cannot be that a person becomes less truthful when speaking about someone else, for if he is obligating himself as well, he still has exactly the same degree of credibility—after all, if a person obligates himself, there is a strong reason to assume he is speaking truthfully, since otherwise why would he worsen his own position?¹¹ If so, why does this credibility vanish when the admission also affects someone else? Clearly, the reason is not that his degree of reliability decreases in such a case, but that this kind of credibility belongs to the subjective part of halakha and has no standing in the “objective” part, the part that concerns others. In that domain, the testimony of two witnesses is required, and the admission of a single person is not enough, even if in sheer trustworthiness he is more reliable than one witness.

In all these examples, just as in the matter of the halakhic status of dreams, the distinctions and the lack of legal force do not derive from questions of reliability or probability. They derive, rather, from the existence of a subjective dimension within halakha, and from the fact that certain elements can be used only within that dimension.

Footnotes