free will

Yeshiva student Asked 1 month ago

I recently saw in the deer forum reading an argument against free choice that seems to be a very strong argument I copy it here and I would love to hear what the rabbi thinks about this argument 
The third law avoided 
 
 
The term “free will” refers to the possibility of choosing between several alternatives. For simplicity, let's say two. When a choice has to be made between them, it can be done deterministically, according to a fixed algorithm, similar to a flow chart accepted by programmers, and it can be done randomly by rolling a cube, or using its quantum equivalent - a radioactive atom and a Geiger counter. The attempt to find another option besides these two soon brings us to the same conclusion that Avigdor Kahalani reached when the ballot count ended: there is no third way. When someone claims that in addition to these two options you can also choose "freely", and we urge him to explain how such a choice is made, it always ends with him putting another factor into the game: his desire, or his desire, or his soul - "free" factors from any limitation Physically, who are supposed to, somehow, respond to our request. "I chose freely according to what I wanted, what my will commanded me," he would say.
 
But after a second of thought it turns out that even Mr. Ratzon, the new agent called to the flag, has to make the same mysterious "free" choice from one list or another, and we have not solved anything. After all, the "free will" itself, also has to decide in some way what it wants or what is right in its eyes, and it also faces a list and the same problem from which we started. The lists, by the way, do not have to be the same: "I" can face a list that includes the two items "eat the bar of chocolate in front of me" or "not eat the bar", and my desire tells me according to the choice he made from another list: "This diet "Good" and "chocolate is delicious." The lists are different, but the problem is the same problem, hence these agents do not solve anything; They are just rolling the problem to another level, in terms of "whoever wants to confuse, will distance his testimony." Even in the world of souls free from any physical constraint, in a world with laws that are unfamiliar to us or in a world without laws at all, it is impossible for the agent we have chosen to evade having to choose. Other than calling another agent and rolling this hot potato into his hands, I came across no plausible explanation for the question: how, in the end, do you choose freely 

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1 Answers
mikyab Staff Answered 1 month ago

I answered this corny argument in my book and in an article that shortens it. He presents the argument of Peter van Inwagen's dilemma that I explained was just a misunderstanding that assumes the wanted. His assumption is that either the outcome is determined deterministically by the circumstances or it is arbitrary. But the libertarian argues that there is a third possibility: determination out of a voluntary decision. Same as non-deterministic because I decide one way or another. And it is not arbitrary because I am acting out of value considerations and for a purpose and not for nothing.

Yeshiva student Responded 1 month ago

What chapter / page in the rabbi's book talks about this

mikyab Staff Responded 1 month ago

Beginning of Chapter Four. But the full answer is in the second chapter, where I distinguish between this path and libertarianism and randomness.

Yeshiva student Responded 1 month ago

What you are writing is exactly the escape to the will he is talking about
But the question of why a person wants a and not a in the end is either causal or random it is never his choice

mikyab Staff Responded 1 month ago

And that's exactly the mistake I'm talking about. When you ask why he wants to, you assume there is a reason for it. But the meaning of free will is that there is none. It has a purpose and not a reason. He chooses it for some purpose.

Yeshiva student Responded 1 month ago

What is the name he chooses for some purpose why he chooses for this purpose and not otherwise why others do not choose for this purpose
In the end it's regression Reuben chose a because he wanted (and this desire will include wanted for any purpose or anything else) now asked about the desire there is a reason he wanted a if there is a reason it is not his fault if there is no reason it is not his fault if it is because he wanted To want what he wanted to want and so on and so forth

Michi Responded 1 month ago

I answered a very clear answer to that. There is no point in missing out again and again.

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