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Faith and Science – Part 7

With God’s help

The Relationship between Faith and Science as a Drama in Five Acts

In this column I would like to outline a general background for the discussions that will follow. I will attempt to describe here five possible approaches to the relationship between faith and science. The description will be from a historical perspective, but this is done only for didactic reasons. All five approaches exist to this day, and not everywhere did they appear in the order described here.

We begin with a schematic and not entirely accurate description of the evolution of the relationship between Torah and science in modern times.[1]In the first period, it was dominated by The comparative approachThe main effort made in it was to refute the scientific claims that contradicted tradition. Then, when science had already assumed a status that was difficult to deal with, The apologetic position (I think most members of the 'Torah-observing scientists' movement can be included in this group), in which the main effort was to reconcile what is said in the Torah with the results of science. During this period, it was already common to engage in both fields, with an effort to reconcile them. The focus of the discourse was still the conflict, but there was a feeling that it could be resolved and reconciled.

These two periods parallel the modernist era, which developed and glorified science, and saw in it the essence of everything. Both the modern deniers of tradition, and those who deniers of science on the basis of the claims of religious tradition, shared the dichotomous view, according to which we must choose between the scientific worldview and the Torah-traditional worldview. Apologetics attempted to grasp both areas, but still saw a need to reconcile them with each other.

In the following period, a different position developed, which was The parallel position (=parallel), which sees Torah and science as two fields that are not interconnected. According to this approach, these are two fields that each deal with a different aspect of phenomena, and therefore one should not complicate issues with the other, nor is there any need to reconcile them. One of the most prominent representatives of this position was Prof. Yeshayahu Leibowitz, who claimed that as a religious man he believes that the world was created six thousand years ago, and as a scientist he believes that the age of the world is several billion years.

In many fields we adopt parallel levels of explanation, and therefore such a position should not be seen as a logical contradiction.[2]For example, according to the prevailing 'mythology', Newton was sitting under a tree when an apple fell on his head. He asked himself why apples fall to the ground, and thus discovered the law of gravitation (=the law of attraction between bodies with mass). Newton, as a believing Christian, was supposed to be satisfied with the theological answer, that the apple probably fell on his head as punishment for some sin he had committed. He was not satisfied with that, since he was looking for a scientific answer and not a theological answer. And what about the theological answer? He could believe in it, and at the same time look for a scientific answer[3]. So, we find different answers to the same question here, and each one relates to a different level. On the scientific level there is one answer, and on the theological level another answer. The same is true with regard to the promises of the Torah, according to which rains and grain depend on our mitzvot and deeds, while from a scientific point of view it seems that these phenomena are the results of physical-meteorological factors. Incidentally, this is also true in the various fields of science. For example, the same mental process can have psychological and physiological explanations, as well as on the social level, etc.

Among many who advocate this position, it is common to say that science deals with the 'what' and the Torah deals with the 'why', and therefore these are parallel planes of reference.[4]For example, the theory of evolution describes how the world was created, but it does not address the question of who led this entire campaign. In other words, there is no reason to say that God created the world through evolution.[5].

After some time, the parallel concept undergoes further development, and is created The subjective-postmodern positionDuring this period, various thinkers treated science, as well as other fields of knowledge, as subjective. This attitude provided a comfortable cushion for religious apologists, who jumped on the postmodern bandwagon and claimed that we, as religious people, can also join the 'dance of differences' (in the words of Rabbi Shagar zt"l in his book 'Broken Vessels,' which was one of the representatives of this postmodernist view).[6]According to those who advocate this approach, apologetics is not even necessary, since we are 'dancers' with equal rights in the circle. From several sources expressing such a position, it is implied that religion is something subjective, and it may not be compatible with science, but since everything is subjective, and the choice of science is also arbitrary, it is therefore legitimate to choose the religious tradition as a narrative (=discourse) no less than the scientific narrative or any other narrative.

This argument is convenient and effective, as it neutralizes the possibility of discourse, thus relieving us of the need to apologize and make excuses, but it 'throws the baby out with the bathwater.' When one gives up on the objectivity of belief in God and the Torah from heaven, and treats it as a myth whose historical or metaphysical truth is unclear (and unimportant), then one implicitly surrenders to the atheistic position. Faith becomes a type of subjective discourse (narrative), which is the result of personal (arbitrary) choice. God is here transformed from a being into an idea, feeling, or paradigm (= a conceptual framework for discourse). Such an approach is prevalent among modern religious (and not only religious) thinkers of our time (mainly in academia), who apparently do not succeed, and therefore do not even try, to reconcile their religious lifestyle with their scientific beliefs. They advocate a religion that does not deal with facts and does not make factual claims about the world, and in any case it is not subject to scientific criticism.[7].

Despite all the theoretical expedients and semantic twists, in many cases this is a position of de facto heresy. It is a belief in a God, but not one that truly exists. In this regard, we can cite the words of the Rabbi, who wrote: "There is a faith that is like heresy, and there is heresy that is like faith."[8]A God who is nothing more than a subjective creation of the believing person is exactly what Karl Marx called, and rightly so, "the opium of the masses."

In recent years, a fifth position has been developing, which is not always explicitly distinguished, but can be called The synthetic periodSuch a position holds that not only does science not contradict tradition, and not only is it of positive value, but it can even be used as an important component in the study and understanding of Torah. Some have gone so far as to actually identify the two fields. But even if one does not go that far in terms of content, more and more academic methods are being introduced into study in the study halls (a phenomenon that is accompanied by difficult polemics, as is well known).[9].

[1]    A. Before the modern era, there was generally no distinction between science and Torah, in both Christianity and Judaism. For example, many of Aristotle's claims were perceived as religious truths. In the modern era, the situation changed, and the difference between the fields became more pronounced. We are here dealing with only the second stage of this drama.

     B. The description in this chapter is presented chronologically, but in practice the division between the positions is not always according to periods. In recent years, several approaches have been mixed, and sometimes the same people raise arguments of several types. For our purposes, the main importance is in distinguishing between the positions themselves, and the historical question is marginal.

[2]    See my book 'That which is and that which is not' in the fourth chapter, at great length regarding parallel levels of explanation in various shades.

[3]    This claim is not simple at all, and seemingly has a logical problem. An 'explanation' is usually required to be necessary and sufficient, and therefore seemingly there cannot be two different explanations for the same phenomenon, see my aforementioned book on this. Here we will suffice with pointing out the fact that people accept such a reference as plausible, and therefore it can be applied equally to such conflicts between Torah and science. There are, of course, factual conflicts, in which it is not a question of explanations but of facts. For example, the question about the age of the world. Here there is seemingly only one answer: either it is 6,000 years old or it is billions of years old. Here too there is room for several parallel answers, if we distinguish between different concepts of 'age' (or time). There are several answers to these questions, and therefore I will not go into this point here.

[4]    There is room to distinguish here between phenomenological (=descriptive) theories and substantive (=explanatory) theories, and so on.

[5]    My friend Nadav Shnerb once told me that he doesn't understand why evolution contradicts our tradition any more than gravity. If we assume that the laws of nature operate without an operator, then gravity contradicts our faith no less than evolution, and if we accept the fact that science describes the action of God, then there is no fundamental contradiction between any scientific theory and religious tradition.

[6]    See my review of the book in 'Nekuda', as well as the review by my friend Nadav Shnerb, in 'Tzohar', 18.

[7]    See on this in Gili Zivan, Religion Without Delusion, Kibbutz Hameuchad 2006 (and also in her supervisor, Avi Sagi, in several places). See also in the collection on faith, Moshe Halbertal and Avi Sagi (eds.), mainly in the articles by Moshe Halbertal, Roni Miron, and others. A similar approach appears in several of Moshe Meir's articles (see, for example, Akademot 12, and in my response there in the next issue). For a sociological description of this phenomenon as part of what is called "the new religious Zionism", see Yitzhak Geiger's instructive (and entertaining) article, in Akademot 11. Such an approach also appears in many books on faith and God published in recent years, and Akmal.

     I will note that among researchers in Jewish studies, there are blatant expressions of this approach, and specifically among researchers who are committed to halakhah. Various researchers reach conclusions regarding the origins of various laws or customs, and the conclusions of their research present these in a problematic light, or unfortunately, not binding, and yet in practice they continue to treat them as any traditional Jew committed to halakhah. For them, there is a disconnect between the facts revealed in the research and halakhah, and parallelism constitutes a solution, at least on a practical level, for them. I will note that such a phenomenon is expected to appear (although not necessarily) in an extreme manner among academic researchers who also serve as rabbis. For two prominent examples, see the criticism of Rabbi Prof. Rosenthal that appears in the article by his student Menachem Kahane, "Talmud Research in the University and Traditional Teaching in the Yeshiva," in Circles of Change and Tradition, Rehovot 2009. A similar phenomenon is found in the article by Rabbi Dr. Benny Lau, "The Appearance of Truth – Rabbinics and Academia in the Writings of Rosh Rosenthal on the Salvation of a Gentile on Shabbat," Akademot 13, and in my response there in the next issue. Also, see Baruch Kahane's article, "Where the Wind Blows," Akademot 20, section 2, in a polemic with the positions of Moshe Meir.

[8] See Orot Ha'Amunah, p. 25. Also, see my thread on this topic in the 'Stop Here, Thinkers' forum, dated September 21, 2005.

[9]    See also the article by Rabbi Amit Kola, 'Tzhar' 13, in the ongoing discussion on the 'Ravadi', 'Tzhar' 15-18, and in the articles by Eliyahu Shai, 'Tzhar' 13-14, 29.

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