The Law of a Pursuer in Mutual Pursuit (Column 437)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
This past Shabbat I spoke in the synagogue about the story of Moses and the two quarreling Hebrews (Dathan and Abiram), and I examined a complex situation of mutual pursuit. Beyond the very topical question of what to do when someone witnesses a duel in the Wild West or in eighteenth-century France, I argued that this discussion also has more practical ramifications (see on this in an article in Midah Tovah for Parashat Shemot, 5767).
The Midrash: “Gilui Milta” (Clarifying a Term)
The discussion begins with Bereishit Rabbah on the parashah (Shemot Rabbah, Parashah 1, sec. 29):
“Alternatively: ‘Nitzim’—they intended to kill one another, as it says (Deut. 25), ‘When men fight together,’ and R. Elazar said: Scripture speaks of a case involving the death penalty. ‘And he said to the wicked one: Why will you strike your fellow?’—it does not say ‘you struck’ but ‘you will strike.’ From here we learn that from the moment a person raises his hand to strike his fellow, even if he has not struck him, he is called wicked. ‘Your fellow’—who is wicked like you—teaches that both are wicked.”
The Midrash states that Dathan and Abiram intended to kill one another—that is, there was mutual pursuit. It compares this to the verses in Deuteronomy (25:11–12):
“When men fight together, a man and his brother, and the wife of the one draws near to rescue her husband from the hand of him who is striking him, and she puts forth her hand and seizes him by his private parts—then you shall cut off her hand; your eye shall not pity.”
At first glance it seems the Midrash learns by gezerah shavah (verbal analogy) that “fighting” implies an attempt to kill, i.e., a lethal altercation. That is how the commentators on this Midrash usually understand it. One must understand that this is not a full-blown gezerah shavah, but what is called a “gilui milta,” namely a lexical inference (see Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. “Gilui Milta,” and at the beginning of the entry “Gezerah Shavah”—on the two types of gezerah shavah). Early authorities note that some inferences look like a gezerah shavah but are in fact a gilui milta—deriving the meaning of a term from a biblical parallel. Here the Midrash derives the meaning of the word “nitzim” (“fighting”), and from the parallel it infers that we are dealing with a lethal altercation.
The Midrash: An Interpretive Gezerah Shavah
However, from the Midrash’s own wording one can see that this is not a gilui milta but a gezerah shavah. The Midrash implies that the term “nitzim” does not necessarily denote a lethal outcome, for it says “Scripture speaks of a case involving the death penalty,” which implies that there are also fights of a different sort—mere strife (whose aim is not to kill). Thus, from the Midrash itself it emerges that the meaning of “merivah” here is conflict in general, not specifically a lethal quarrel. The inference is that in this instance it was a special type of quarrel—one with lethal intent. Hence, this is not a gilui milta but an interpretive gezerah shavah, i.e., a verbal analogy that does not legislate a new law but interprets the events and verses.
This can also be seen in Scripture itself, Exodus 21:22–25:
“When men fight and they strike a pregnant woman so that her children come out, but there is no fatality—he shall surely be fined as the woman’s husband shall impose upon him, and he shall pay as the judges determine. But if there is a fatality, then you shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.”
Here it seems we are not speaking specifically of a lethal fight, but of an ordinary quarrel between two men that devolved into injury or death for a third party—the woman.[1] Thus it is not correct that the word “they fight” (yinatzû) must mean a fight to the death. If so, whence do we know that with Moses it was specifically a lethal fight? Therefore the Midrash brings a gezerah shavah from the verses in Deuteronomy to prove it. As noted, a gezerah shavah usually teaches law, but at times there is an interpretive gezerah shavah, and it would seem that this is the case here. I will now argue, however, that this is in fact a halakhic gezerah shavah (or at least an interpretive one with halakhic implications).
The Midrash: A Halakhic Gezerah Shavah
The Midrash formulates its conclusion thus: “Nitzim—they intended to kill one another.” Above I explained that the novelty is that it was a lethal fight. In my view, the emphasis is not on “to kill” but on “one another.” That is, nitzim means a quarrel (lethal or not), and a quarrel is by nature mutual. When one person pursues another to kill him, that is not a quarrel and we would not describe them as nitzim. A quarrel is when the two combatants are pursuing one another—a mutual pursuit. From the Deuteronomy verses, the Midrash learns that the fight in question was mutual. Beyond that, it was a lethal fight—but the point is that it was a mutual fight in which both parties sought to kill one another (and not merely to brawl).
Note the interpretive novelty: Moses addresses one of them and says, “Wicked one, why will you strike your fellow!”[2]—which might suggest that only one of them was wicked and pursuing his fellow. The gezerah shavah therefore teaches that there was mutual pursuit. Indeed, the continuation of the Midrash states explicitly: “‘Your fellow’—who is wicked like you—teaches that both are wicked.” In other words, both were pursuing each other and both were wicked. When Moses said, “Wicked one, why will you strike your fellow,” he apparently addressed both, telling each that he was wicked for striking his fellow—even if that fellow was himself wicked. In other words, the Midrash teaches that even in a situation of mutual pursuit there is a law of “pursuer” (rodef), and each party is called wicked. That is already a halakhic innovation. Thus, the gezerah shavah that teaches us it was a mutual quarrel is indeed interpretive, but it has a halakhic consequence: even in mutual pursuit the law of rodef applies to both sides.
How is this learned from the gezerah shavah? For this we must turn to Bava Kamma 28a:
“Come and hear: ‘…and she shall have her hand cut off’—[yet] monetary liability [applies]. What—are we not speaking of a case where she could not save [her husband] in another way? No—[it is] where she could have saved him in another way; but if she could not save him in another way, she is exempt.”
The Gemara understands that the woman acted under the law of rodef (to save her husband). Therefore, if she had another option and nevertheless harmed the pursuer, she is liable for damages; but if she had no other option, she is exempt. A problem arises, however: as we saw, this was a case of mutual pursuit between the two fighters. Does the law of rodef apply in such a case? From the Gemara’s reading of the verses we see that it does; despite the mutual pursuit, the law of rodef applies and the woman may strike one side, even though the “pursuer” she strikes is himself being pursued by her husband.
This, apparently, is what our Midrash learns from there to our parashah. From there we see that even in mutual pursuit the law of rodef applies; therefore, in our case both are deemed wicked and both have the status of rodef. Thus, it is indeed a gezerah shavah and not a mere gilui milta (lexical point). Moreover, it is not only interpretive—it carries a halakhic implication: it teaches the law of mutual pursuit.[3]
Yet as we shall now see, at least two sources indicate that in such a case there is no law of rodef.
Mutual Pursuit: The Jerusalem Talmud
The well-known Mishnah in Ohalot (7:6) discusses a fetus endangering its mother:
“A woman who is having difficulty giving birth—they cut up the fetus in her womb and remove it limb by limb, because her life takes precedence over his. Once its head has emerged, one may not touch it, for one life is not pushed aside on account of another.”
The Mishnah distinguishes between a fetus endangering its mother, whom we kill because her life takes precedence, and a case in which its head has already emerged, in which we leave matters as they are. The Bavli (Sanhedrin 72b) explains the latter on the grounds that there is no law of rodef because “from Heaven they are pursuing him” (mishmaya kardefu lei). So why, when it is still a fetus, do we kill it? Because its life does not have the status of a full human life, and therefore the mother’s life takes precedence (the Rambam gives a slightly different explanation; not our topic here). The Yerushalmi (end of Shabbat ch. 18; Sanhedrin 8:9), however, explains the prohibition to kill the newborn after the head has emerged as follows: “You do not know who is killing whom [who is the pursuer].” That is, there is mutual pursuit, and in such a case the rule is that “refraining is preferable” (shev ve’al ta‘aseh)—one must not intervene.
True, the Bavli, which explains the law differently, might be disagreeing with the Yerushalmi and, in its view, even in mutual pursuit the law of rodef applies. Recall that we saw this also in the Midrash Rabbah cited at the beginning.
Mutual Pursuit: R. Shlomo Eiger
R. Shlomo Eiger (cited in R. Akiva Eiger’s Hiddushim to Ketubot 33b) reaches a similar conclusion from a different sugya. He begins by posing the question:
“I am in doubt: where two people are pursuing one another to kill, and they both began simultaneously (akin to what is in the Rosh and Shulchan Arukh, later §421:13, that where two people injured one another, each pays the excess to the other, but that is only where they began simultaneously), may an onlooker kill either one of them or not? Perhaps in such a case neither has the status of rodef to permit saving [the other] by taking his life, since just as he is pursuing his fellow, so is he being pursued by his fellow.”
Up to this point he is uncertain what the law is in mutual pursuit: do both have the status of rodef, such that a bystander may kill either one (but of course not both), or is there no rodef at all because rodef exists only in an asymmetric case?
He then seeks to resolve the doubt from the Sanhedrin sugya dealing with the Exodus passage we cited about two fighters who strike a pregnant woman. Recall that the verses teach that if the woman dies, the killer is liable to death, but if only the fetuses are lost, he must pay damages.
The Gemara in Sanhedrin 74a cites R. Yonatan ben Shaul:
“As it was taught: R. Yonatan ben Shaul says: A pursuer who was pursuing his fellow to kill him, and one could have saved [the victim] by [wounding] one of the pursuer’s limbs but did not—[the ‘rescuer’] is executed on his account.”
According to R. Yonatan ben Shaul, if one could have saved the pursued by injuring one of the pursuer’s limbs, and the rescuer nevertheless killed the pursuer, he is liable to execution. His proof is from the above verses:
“What is R. Yonatan ben Shaul’s reason? For it is written, ‘When men fight together…,’ and R. Elazar said: Scripture speaks of a case involving the death penalty, for it is written, ‘And if there is a fatality, then you shall give life for life’—and even so the Torah said, ‘But if there is no fatality, he shall surely be fined.’ If you say it is when one could have saved [the pursued] by one of [the pursuer’s] limbs—then he is not given over to be saved by taking his life; hence we find a case where he pays damages. But if you say that even where one could save by [injuring] a limb one may also save by killing, how can you ever find a case of monetary liability?”
The one who killed the woman was pursuing his fellow; in the course of that pursuit he either killed the woman or caused damage. If he merely caused damage, he must pay—despite being a pursuer who would be liable to death, which would ordinarily exempt him from monetary payments.[4] We are forced to say it was a case where the pursued could have been saved by injuring a limb, and in such a case the pursuer is not liable to death and may not be killed; hence he remains liable for the damages he caused. This is the proof for R. Yonatan ben Shaul’s ruling that one who kills a pursuer when he could have saved with a lesser injury is liable to execution.
R. Shlomo Eiger proceeds to resolve his doubt from here:
“Now, in the verse ‘But if there is no fatality’ it says, ‘and they strike a pregnant woman’—in the plural. This can be interpreted in two ways: either that both of them struck her, i.e., the two men mentioned in the verse who fought together; or that ‘they strike’ means ‘this one or that one,’ as Ibn Ezra discusses regarding this expression (at Exodus 21 in Parashat Mishpatim).”
If both fighters together struck the woman, a difficulty arises:
“If so, one can challenge R. Yonatan ben Shaul’s proof in Sanhedrin. For one could say the verse is thus: ‘When they fight… and they strike’—meaning both struck. ‘If there is no fatality, he shall surely be fined’—one of them, i.e., the pursued, for a pursued person who breaks vessels is liable. And don’t ask: in that case why should he pay the entire sum—let him pay only his half. That is not so, for one can say he pays all of it by the law of ‘R. Natan’ (derabbi natan), that wherever one cannot collect from this one, one collects all from the other (Bava Kamma 53 and Shulchan Arukh HM 410:35)… And the verse ‘If there is a fatality, you shall give life [for] life’ means any life—either that of the pursuer or that of the pursued who sought to save himself by the pursuer’s life. Since he intended to kill, if he ended up killing the woman he is executed, for one who intended to kill this person and killed that person is liable; and the fact that he was pursued does not exempt him—just as he is not exempt when he breaks vessels, so too he is not exempt if he kills a person.”
If both struck her, R. Yonatan ben Shaul’s proof can be deflected: perhaps the pursued killed the woman, and then clearly he must pay damages. He intended to kill the pursuer but mistakenly struck the woman; the law is that one who intends to kill one person and kills another is liable.
He therefore concludes that if R. Yonatan nonetheless brought a proof from here, he clearly was unwilling to interpret the verse as both having struck the woman:
“One must say that, according to R. Yonatan ben Shaul, it is impossible to read the verse that way, for then the latter part of the verse would be difficult: ‘If there is a fatality, [you shall give life for life].’ If ‘and they strike’ meant both struck, there would be no liability to death, for it would be like when ten people strike a man and kill him—none are executed (Sanhedrin 78a). Therefore, ‘and they strike’ must mean this one or that one. And then the difficulty stands: if the pursued struck, why should he pay? He had permitted himself to be killed [as a pursuer].”
The reason is that if both together killed her, one cannot understand why anyone is liable to death, for when two people jointly kill, both are exempt from execution.
But this, too, raises a difficulty:
“Even so, a problem remains: how can one establish the verse as a case where one could have saved by wounding a limb? For if the pursued is the one who struck, why should he be liable to death if there is a fatality? Though one who intended to kill nefalim (stillborns) and killed a viable person is liable (Sanhedrin 79), the Sages agree that if one intended to kill a non-viable and killed a viable person, he is exempt. Here, the pursued was permitted to kill the pursuer—even if he could have saved by wounding a limb. Thus, the pursuer, with respect to him, has the status of a non-viable being (nefel) for whom the pursued would not be liable; if so, even if he killed the woman he should not be liable to death…”
If it is not symmetric—there is a pursuer and a pursued—then the pursued cannot be liable, for he is permitted to kill his pursuer. If he tried to kill his pursuer and hit the woman, that is like one who intended a permitted killing (as in killing a non-viable being) and struck someone else, and he is exempt.
He therefore concludes that according to R. Yonatan ben Shaul the verse must be read as follows:
“We must say (for the view that the pursued is always permitted to kill him) that the verse ‘When men fight…’ means that both began simultaneously in a fight of lethal intent, this one to kill that one and that one to kill this one. Since neither had the status of ‘pursued’ vis-à-vis the other, and neither was permitted to kill the other, the other is like a fully viable person to him; therefore, if he killed the woman he is liable.”
We must conclude that, according to R. Yonatan ben Shaul, the verse speaks of a case where both pursued one another; in such a case, neither has the status of pursuer or pursued, and neither may kill the other. Consequently, if they kill the woman they are liable; if only damage results, they must pay (since they do not have the status of rodef). From here he proves that where two people pursue one another there is no law of rodef, as we saw in the Yerushalmi above.
I note that his proof can be deflected in several ways, but I will set that aside here.
Two Ways to Read the Conclusion
The conclusion from these two sources is that in mutual pursuit the law of rodef does not apply. This seems to contradict the Midrash, which indicates that it does apply in such a case. I noted that perhaps the Midrash follows the Bavli, which disputes the Yerushalmi. But it seems possible to reconcile the sources.
Let me preface by noting that the Yerushalmi and R. Shlomo Eiger’s conclusion can be read in two ways:
- The law of rodef exists only in an asymmetric case. In a symmetric case, neither party is a rodef.
- The law of rodef exists even in a symmetric case; however, where both pursue one another it is forbidden for anyone to intervene, because in any case one of them will die and intervention gains nothing. In a symmetric case, “refraining is preferable”; we must leave them to their fight and let whichever one dies, die. We are not to determine who dies, because neither has priority over the other.
It seems to me that on either reading—especially if we are speaking of Dathan and Abiram—in a symmetric case of two such pursuers, we can only wish both sides “good luck” and watch the bout with interest. Indeed, Moses rebukes one of them (or both, as we saw in the Midrash), but there is no hint in the verses that he actually intended to kill either of them (as they suspected him of intending).
Note that on the second possibility both are deemed rodef even in a symmetric case. Still, due to the symmetry one may not intervene and kill either of them. One might argue that perhaps there is, in principle, a license to kill, but we have no way to choose which one to kill, since both are in the same condition and equally culpable. The symmetry compels non-intervention. But that could be solved by a lottery: one could draw lots to decide which of the two to kill. My claim is that this is not the issue: in a symmetric case there is no principled license to kill at all. It is not merely that we cannot choose which one.[5]
Returning to the two readings, the first seems implausible. By way of preface: in halakhah, the law of rodef is treated as a kind of capital liability; killing the pursuer is not only for the sake of saving the pursued—it also has a punitive dimension. The clearest indication is that if the pursuer breaks vessels along the way he is exempt from payment, like one who is liable to capital punishment and monetary penalties and pays neither (the rule of kim lei bederabbah minei; see Rava in Sanhedrin 74a, ruled as halakhah). Indeed, in Afikei Yam, vol. 2, §40, it is demonstrated at length that the pursuer’s death has a punitive aspect. If killing the pursuer were solely to save the pursued, one might say that in a symmetric case there is no license to kill and no law of rodef. But if there is also punishment for being a pursuer, it is unlikely that mutual pursuit would exempt either party from the penalty he deserves; both are guilty, and it would be more reasonable that both are liable to death as pursuers (I speak of a case where both began and both are culpable, as R. Shlomo Eiger explains). Of course we would not actually kill both—there is no point—but the status of rodef would apply to both. Why, then, do the Yerushalmi and R. Shlomo Eiger rule that they are not killed? Because the pursuer is not executed in the usual punitive sense: if one can save the pursued by injuring a limb, there is no license to kill. Saving the pursued must be present alongside any license to kill. He may indeed be “liable to death” as a pursuer, but we do not kill him unless it saves the pursued. In the symmetric case, killing a pursuer does not achieve rescue; therefore, although both have the status of rodef, there is no license to kill either of them.[6]
The upshot is that the second reading is likely correct: in mutual pursuit both have the status of rodef, but there is no license to implement it. This also resolves the apparent contradiction with the Midrash cited at the outset. The Yerushalmi and the Sanhedrin sugya agree that in a symmetric case there is mutual rodef status, but there is no license to implement it in practice.
A Practical Difference for Mutual Rodef: Separating Conjoined Twins
At first glance, the analysis above would have no practical difference: even if both have rodef status, there is no license to implement it by killing one of them. So why was it important for the Midrash to teach, by gezerah shavah, that even in mutual pursuit the law of rodef applies? Is this only a hypothetical law (with implications such as whether a woman’s betrothal would be valid)? I think there are practical ramifications, and a possible example is the case of separating conjoined twins.
Conjoined twins are twins joined to each other; in some cases they share organs—sometimes even a single heart or a single brain. In certain situations we know that if we leave matters as they are, both will die within some months. The question is whether, in such a case, one may perform a separation surgery in which one twin receives the shared organ (the heart or the brain) and the other is left to die. If the surgery succeeds, one life is saved; if we do nothing, both will die.
About fifteen years ago I heard of a case of conjoined twins (I believe they shared a heart), and the halakhic authorities instructed the parents that there was no permission to perform a separation, as it would be considered murder; thus both were left to die. This shocked me; my immediate intuition was that in such a case one should be permitted—indeed obligated—to perform the separation, since it saves at least one life. What sense is there in upholding the prohibition of murder at the cost of losing both lives? The aim of the prohibition is to prevent loss of life; here, because of the prohibition, we lose more life. This seemed utterly irrational to me.
I therefore delved into the sugya, examined the sources and arguments on all sides, and surveyed the views of the halakhic authorities (the result is my article in Techumin on separating conjoined twins). To my astonishment, I discovered a complete consensus among leading decisors that there is no permission to perform a separation in such a case. I am speaking of a symmetric case—there is no reason to assign the organ to one more than to the other, and the chance to save each is identical. In short, there is no collateral consideration that would allow choosing whom to save. In such a case there is, halakhically, a consensus that the surgery is forbidden as an act of murder, and both are left to die. See my article cited above.[7]
One can view the conjoined-twins case as one of mutual pursuit (albeit without intent—but an unintentional pursuer is also a pursuer),[8] but its outcome differs from the cases discussed earlier. In those cases, without intervention one of the two would die; hence I explained that even if there is a law of rodef, there is no license to implement it. By contrast, in conjoined twins, without intervention both will die; here there is room to implement the law of rodef and intervene (i.e., perform the separation and kill one under the law of rodef).
A more clear-cut application would be in the case of two culpable adults (as with Moses’s case) engaged in mutual pursuit, where, absent intervention, both are likely to die. In such a case, if we assume the law of rodef applies, there is certainly justification to intervene to save one life. Thus, even apart from conjoined twins (a more problematic case), in mutual pursuit between adults there can be practical ramifications to recognizing that both have rodef status: there are circumstances that call for intervention.
I will now suggest two ways to permit separating conjoined twins in the case described above: either on the basis of mutual rodef or without invoking rodef.
Permitting Separation of Conjoined Twins Based on Mutual Rodef
Here I propose a permission premised on mutual rodef. True, one might argue that “from Heaven they are pursuing one another,” but where both parties have naturally been placed in this situation, it is possible that the law of rodef nevertheless applies. In the case of the fetus and its mother there is no rodef, because the mother’s danger stems from the fetus and not vice versa (although according to the Yerushalmi it seems to be mutual). In such a case there is no permission to kill the newborn whose head has emerged, because he is not a pursuer; Heaven placed him there. With conjoined twins, however, both have been placed in this situation, and killing one to save the other is warranted. To leave both to die because neither has rodef status is illogical. The absence of rodef status should lighten their situation (i.e., increase our obligation to save them), not make it worse.
Assuming mutual rodef, there is a license to kill either under the law of rodef. Obviously, there is no sense in killing both; the point is to save one life. The question, of course, is how to choose whom to save, given the symmetry. Several disputants argued to me that because of this symmetry one must prefer inaction. But, as noted, there is the option of a lottery; in my view, we should draw lots and save the one who is chosen (more on this in the next column).
Importantly, if there were no rodef status for either, a lottery would not help and would not be permissible: a lottery cannot permit murder. If there is no principled license to kill either, the lottery changes nothing. But if both have rodef status, then killing either is not murder; the only question is how to choose whom to save and whom to let die. In such a case, a lottery is a natural solution. My interlocutors objected that it is forbidden to cast lots over lives; I will address that in the next column.
Permitting Separation of Conjoined Twins Without Mutual Rodef
Now let us assume that conjoined twins do not have mutual rodef status. I contend that even so there is permission (indeed, an obligation) to draw lots and perform the separation to save the one chosen. To explain: imagine two adult twins who must decide for themselves. They would presumably decide to draw lots to determine which one will be saved. Recall that the alternative is that both die; thus, such a lottery is the preferable option for both, since it grants each a 50% chance of survival.
Could one conceivably forbid two competent adults from deciding to hold such a lottery for themselves? Surprisingly, this claim was raised repeatedly in debates I had about this topic, though in my view it is patently unreasonable. I explained that it is akin to a person standing on the roof of a burning building, contemplating a jump: suppose there is a 50% chance of dying in the jump but also a 50% chance of surviving, whereas remaining means certain death. Would anyone forbid him to jump because it is a “possible suicide”? Would anyone forbid a bystander to push him because of a “possible murder”? Any sensible person understands that in such a case one must jump (or push him) to give him a 50% chance of survival. Likewise, it is obvious that adult twins may decide to draw lots to gain a 50% chance to live.
What about twins who are minors and not legally competent to decide? In such a case, the court (beit din) is “the father of orphans,” and must decide for them what they themselves would decide were they competent. Therefore, I argued that the court should conduct a lottery on their behalf and send them for separation surgery—precisely what they would have done as competent adults.
Note that to permit a lottery in this way one need not posit rodef status at all. Even without their being liable to death, performing the surgery is permitted, because we are not “killing” anyone: the one who dies as a result of the surgery would in any case have died. On the contrary, the surgery saves the other who otherwise would also have died. In the idiom of the Chazon Ish, this is an act of rescue, not an act of killing/murder.
I mentioned that one interlocutor argued there is a prohibition against drawing lots over lives. I will address that claim in the next column.
[1] See discussion in Sanhedrin 74a (the sugya will be cited below). According to at least one opinion, that too concerns a lethal altercation.
[2] Only this Shabbat I read in Rabbi Ilai Ofran’s book, Torah Shel ha-Nefesh (in the essay beginning p. 201), that in Scripture the word “lamah” is not a question but an expression of protest or rebuke. The word “madua” conveys a question seeking an answer. Hence I was careful not to use a question mark here (putting theory into practice).
[3] One might object that the reading which applies the law of rodef is that of the Gemara; the verses themselves say to cut off her hand (i.e., monetary payment), and on the surface they say the very opposite: that there is no rodef here. If so, how can one make a gezerah shavah from this? Perhaps the Gemara has a textual hint (it may be learned from yet another gezerah shavah to the Exodus verses I cited, where there is clearly pursuit—though not pursuit of each other, but of the pregnant woman. This requires further study).
[4] The Gemara later there discusses the case as one of “money for this one and death for that one.”
[5] From Rashi in Sanhedrin it would appear that the license to kill the pursuer is based on saving him from sin. If so, even in mutual pursuit one might argue for killing one of them, for although no life would be saved, we would save whoever would otherwise prevail from the sin of murder. After all, even in an asymmetric pursuit we do not “gain” a life numerically: if we leave the pursuer, the pursued dies; if we kill the pursuer, he dies. In either case one dies; the choice to kill the pursuer could then be grounded in saving him from sin. Note that a lottery would in any case prevent murder, since either we kill the would-be killer (the one who would have prevailed) or the would-be victim.
But this reading of Rashi is very difficult for several reasons. For example, the Amoraim dispute the case of a minor pursuer (Sanhedrin 72b), and the halakhah is that he has the status of rodef and must be killed to save the pursued—even though a minor who kills is not liable for sin. It is therefore clear that even in Rashi the “saving from sin” component is coupled with the need to save the pursued; without the latter, we would not permit killing. Accordingly, even per Rashi, in mutual pursuit there is no rationale to permit killing either of them.
[6] This parallels the well-known words of the Brisker Rav on the Rambam, who distinguishes two aspects of the pursuer’s law: (1) an obligation to kill him; (2) that he has “no blood” (the prohibition of murder is suspended with respect to him). See there the proofs and ramifications. My claim here is that in mutual pursuit only (2) applies, not (1).
[7] I now noticed a discussion in Rabbi Shabtai Rappaport’s article here (see notes 1 and 3). He also cites Iggerot Moshe, YD II §60.
[8] This is evident from the case of a minor pursuer: as noted above, the halakhah is to kill him. In the Ohalot case of the fetus whose head has emerged, however, it would seem otherwise—the newborn is not deemed a pursuer because “from Heaven they are pursuing him,” i.e., nature put him in that situation; hence there is no pursuit. But in the Rambam it appears there is pursuit (a “quasi-rodef”), and elsewhere I explained that this is a weaker form of rodef, permitting killing only if he is still a fetus whose life has lesser halakhic weight. One must discuss the case of conjoined twins who have already been born: if that situation is “natural” and there is no full pursuit, then seemingly there is no license to kill either. Again, one must examine whether there is no rodef status at all, or whether only its implementation is barred in practice.
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A. The Midrash interprets Hebrew people as hawking the commandments of death. You say that this is not an interpretive revelation of the word because there are also commandments that are not of death (perhaps as in the commandments of the ’) but rather an equal decree, and this is not an interpretive equal decree (I did not know that this was also called an ‘equal decree’) but rather a halachic one, and teaches that in mutual persecution the law of persecutor applies and both are wicked.
A1. The Midrash only says “wicked” and you derive from it a law of persecutor, and this without any hint in the Midrash itself and based on a question in ”K 28 that was not brought up in the Midrash (and yet I wrote in 14 that they did not interpret persecutor as killing there either). This does not seem to be clear on the interpretive level. In addition, it is difficult to learn laws from a story in the Torah, especially one that occurred before the giving of the Torah [I saw in the Sanhedrin that Noah, who struck an Israelite, was liable to death, as it is written, “And he struck the Egyptian and buried him in the sand,” and Maimonides ruled in 1 Kings 16 that he was liable to death and was not killed in 2 Kings 14. Perhaps the reason is that one does not learn law from a deed, especially one that occurred before the giving of the Torah].
A2. Perhaps one can interpret the midrash more simply. The innovation of the midrash is that one who raises his hand is called wicked. Therefore, interpreting it in terms of the commandments of death is a reduction in innovation – it is precisely the one who raises his hand to kill who is called wicked, and not the one who raises his hand to hurt. Therefore, the possibility of interpreting it as a commandment of death is sufficient for us to have to interpret it this way. Therefore, Shafir cites the words of Rabbi Elazar, who stated that there are commandments of death, and so here too we must interpret it precisely in this way in order to reduce the innovation. Furthermore, the Midrash can interpret from its own understanding that these are mitzvot of death for any reason, for example, that Moses would not interfere in any casual fight between two Jews that he sees. Furthermore, perhaps they are simply interpreting mitzvot of death in order to exonerate the wickedness of Datan and Aviram, who according to the Midrash are the hawks (it is common among the Sages to attribute every possible offense to the wicked, for example, in 2:16 it is written, “And Esau came from the field and he was tired,” and five offenses were attributed to him with an interpretative phrase that is not unambiguous. For example, it comes about an engaged girl about whom it is written that “in the field” she found. This is certainly not a halachic phrase), and this is unrelated to the continuation that the one who raises his hand is called wicked.
A3. By the way, you wrote that when Moses addressed the wicked, he apparently addressed both of them. From the rest of the verses it seems quite clear that he turned to one, and the other answered him and said, "Who is your name, a man of power and judgment, etc.? You say, 'Kill me,' and it is already difficult to interpret that each of them said this. You have probably come to interpret this way because since they are both wicked, why did Moses turn to one? But it is quite simple that he turned to the one who had the upper hand at that time, and yet from the whole quarrel Moses saw that both were trying to kill. And the Midrash does not interpret that the entire act was preceded by any beating (then both are equal and why would Moses turn to only one), but they certainly had already beaten and beaten, but from Moses' language "smite" in the future we learn that even the future is called wicked, although in the act itself he also struck in the past.
A4. In Exodus 21 it is written "that men should be smitten" And in Deuteronomy it is written, “that people may be put to death together.” In the Midrash that you quoted, it is written, “together,” and that is why you brought the verses that speak. But in the Gemara in the Sanhedrin, up until the point you brought later, they bring the continuation of Rabbi Elazar’s words: “In the commandments of death, the scripture speaks, as it is written, if disaster strikes, you shall give a soul for a soul.” That is, we are talking about the verses in Exodus 21, and the verse “together” in the Midrash, apparently 19 (we need to check in new editions, but it seems clear). And it is precisely in Exodus that Rabbi Elazar interprets the commandments of death because this is how the continuation proves, “a soul for a soul” (in his opinion, a literal soul), meaning that he intended to kill. In the Gemara Bk 28 that you cited, I did not find in any way what you said that the Gemara understands that this is about pursuing to kill, and the early ones there interpreted it as a regular beating.
B. A person who has come out of the grave and is not touched, the Yerushalmi explained, "You do not know who is killing whom."
B1. You explained in Yerushalmi that in mutual persecution, one resortes to a falsehood. There is room for some to argue that in mutual persecution without guilt (only rescue without punishment), one resorts to a falsehood, but two murderers who pursue each other are permitted to punish (one of the murderers) and save (the other murderer, although in principle there is no rescue here) by rising up and doing [an explanation for this cannot be invented].
B2. It seems possible to interpret it differently in Yerushalmi, "You don't know who is chasing whom" does not mean that I know that both are chasing (how does that fit into Yerushalmi language?) but that in reality perhaps only one is chasing the other and we are in doubt (normally) who is chasing. For example, perhaps the mother can move in a certain way and then the fetus comes out smoothly but the mother and the doctors do not know how to move exactly, and in such a situation it would be that the fetus is not chasing at all but only the mother is chasing (the fetus and herself), or perhaps the opposite, for example, that the fetus is not positioned well and if it had been positioned better it would have come out and therefore is the only one chasing. And in doubt about who is chasing and who is being chased, it seems that the Halacha is simply resorting to a falsehood. And the Bavli disagrees and says that there is no doubt here about persecution but rather the absence of persecution at all because the Lord said they were chasing.
A1. I showed this from the midrash itself. The support I provided from the rest of the midrash regarding both being wicked is only support.
A3. It is not necessary. One of them answered him.
A4. Perhaps. I showed that the Gemara states that there too this is a commandment of death.
B1. Possibly.
B2. Perhaps, but it seems narrow to me.
A1. Where in the Midrash does it say that there is a “Din Rodef”?
A4. ?? I don't understand what you mean and I didn't find anything there. In the Gemara there it is about Dina for her own life instead of Psida.
B2. So why doesn't the Jerusalemite simply say “Tarveyhu Radfi Ahhaddi”. [To interpret the phrase “You don't know who kills” as meaning “You know that both of them kill” is not only “Duh” but simply not what is written].
A1. This is the same commandment as in the mutual persecution there. And when Moses says that he is a wicked man who strikes his neighbor, he means that he is persecuting. I don't see what the problem is here.
A4. I mean what I wrote in note 1.
B2. This language is easily interpreted as mutual persecution. You do not know whom to treat as a murderer of his friend (whom to judge as a persecutor).
Who does know?
There is no ordinary doubt here, nor is there ambiguity and the right to doubt.
This is a completely reasonable way of expressing the issue of mutual persecution, just as in relation to ambiguity, there are many who express themselves as if there were a doubt here.
A1. This is just a side note, but hey. You attribute to the Midrash the view that in mutual persecution there is a “persecuting law” against each of them (even if in fact it is forbidden to kill either of them). While the Midrash in general interpreted the case as mutual persecution and added (perhaps unrelatedly) that both are wicked. How can one not see what the problem is here.
A4. Please explain more. The Sanhedrin even explicitly mentions the verses in Exodus that people will go after and strike a pregnant woman (and this is according to Rabbi Elazar in the mitzvot of death). In Bava Kama 28, it is about the verses in the Devarim that people should be together and the wife of one of them should come near (and Rabbi Elazar did not say about this the commandments of death, and in the Gemara there it is not about a pursuer at all, but about a judgment for one's life instead of a punishment, and the first ones there, like Rav D and Ras, deal with striking one's friend to harm him, and I suggested in A4 above that the box "together" in Midrash 19 and that he also meant the verses in Exodus). Although there is no issue in all this, because I also agree of course that the Midrash brought some verses in which there is a pursuer of death.
This is a question about the version with the word “together”. But for our purposes, it is enough that the Rabbis recite the mitzvot of death, from where they did not get it, so that in our case a law of mutual persecution is renewed (an interpretative geza that has halakhic implications). We can say it this way: after it was renewed that even in the case of mutual persecution both parties are called wicked, a law of mutual persecution is a result. There was a place to say that if both parties agree to mutual persecution, it is like a duel or a mutual agreement to fight for life, and there is no wickedness here and in any case not persecution. This is why it was renewed here that it is not. Therefore, we learn from the convictions about persecution. The argument is that reciprocity is not an exemption that changes our attitude towards the separation between people. According to this, it is not even essential that we are talking about the mitzvot of death. On the contrary, they brought up the mitzvot of death in order to say that there is not only mutual wickedness here but also mutual persecution.
C. Mutual persecution.
C1. You explained the idea that in mutual persecution it is forbidden to kill one of them (by drawing lots, or by free choice, or according to the order of precedence in the instructions) that although both of them as persecutors have no blood, there is no law here to save the persecuted. But the words of the Grach who renewed a special law to save the persecuted in addition to the fiqun in the entire Torah (and this is the case for Noah's son, even though he has no fiqun. Only in this special law is the soul of a fetus somehow less than the soul of the mother) have already been rejected by the Chazva, who truly rejects the building in the Gemara that teaches fiqun (of course) rejects Shabbat from the law that it is permissible to kill a persecutor and sees that here there is only fiqun of the persecuted and nothing more. And such fiqun seems to certainly exist for each of them also in mutual persecution, because why not. And so there is no halachic explanation left for the distinction between mutual persecution and ordinary persecution.
C2. Rabbi Eiger does not bring up the idea of a lottery, but rather “it is permissible to kill every single person,” and you added it to break the symmetry. As usual, I do not understand the point of a lottery with equal chances. If we are indifferent to the outcome, then we can simply decide on any outcome based on some consideration, however slight, because a small stalk of straw can tip the scales between two heavy piles, even though the stalk on the other side is as insignificant as the other pile. In a reply to the Responsa, you once explained to me that the chance of life should be given equally. But like any non-consequential consideration, I find it difficult to accept this. (And there is also room to say that even a personal decision based on some consideration is generally egalitarian, because each decision-maker decides according to his will, and the situation in which this decision-maker is found and he decided to kill so-and-so is analogous to the situation in which so-and-so lost the lottery.)
C3. Rabbi Eiger says that one of them was hit and not both (because otherwise they would have been hit and not both), and in asymmetrical persecution, if the pursued one hit and killed the woman, he is exempt (because he intended to kill the pursuer as if he had been killed), and therefore he interprets it as symmetrical persecution and no one is forbidden to kill his companion and therefore if he killed the woman, he is liable. You discussed this, did he mean that there is no persecutory law here at all or that there is a persecutory law but it is forbidden to intervene, and the ruling explains that there is a persecutory law but there is no salvation here.
Something here escapes me in Rabbi Eiger's words and in your words. It is clear that there is a pursuer here, because the Gemara draws from this evidence for Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul who is obligated to save precisely one of his limbs. If no one pursues, then it is clear that he is obligated to pay the payments in the event that there is no disaster. R”sh Eiger apparently says that each of them has a pursuer law regarding exemption from payments, but no one is permitted to kill any of them (and therefore if he accidentally killed the woman he is obligated and does not intend to kill them). This, of course, seems like a strange idea on its face that there is a pursuer law regarding exemption from payments but it is prohibited to kill (and it is not similar to the Kalb”m in the case of accidental deaths, where he did the obligatory act), if after all in this act death is not obligated in any way (because no one is permitted to kill him) then why is he exempt from payments. It seems that R”sh Eiger is addressing this, but there is no current discussion and from the column in the previous section, it is impossible to understand.
C4. You explained that there is a pursuer but it is forbidden to interfere. The wording “intervene” is a bit confusing, because Rabbi Eiger says that even each of them is forbidden to kill his friend (otherwise if he accidentally killed the woman he would be exempt, as he intended for the fallen, according to him). In my opinion, this does not affect the explanation itself, but it somewhat weakens its power towards those who think that there is some kind of magical problem with ”intervention” from the outside more than a person himself does.
[Since I came here after an absence of a few days, I immediately felt a happy spirit and remembered what is peppered in the stupid song “Chad Gadya”: that if the cat pursues the goat, then the dog is righteous and the stick is wicked, etc. And the angel of death is lawful, and so how did the Blessed One punish him? Except that the dog is forbidden to intervene, and the stick is also forbidden to intervene, etc. until the Blessed One comes and reigns in judgment, establishing the land, and the treasurer is forbidden to intervene at all, God willing. Or a dog is forbidden to intervene to save an oppressed person, but according to the strange custom of the world, it is permitted to intervene against those who intervene (and therefore if two are many and a third intervenes in favor of one, immediately all those standing on the side of the other and intervene in the lawsuit will gather around him, saying, "Do not intervene!" and must be rejected, etc.) Therefore, the cat is evil for chasing and the dog is evil for intervening, but the stick is lawful for intervening against the intervener, and the fire is wicked, etc., and the Blessed One acted righteously.
And now it is more clear why the dog is forbidden to interfere, since the cat is chasing, but the reason is that the cat and the goat are chasing each other, like the mouse chasing the cat, and therefore the dog is forbidden to interfere, as is the tradition in the Torah. It must also be interpreted that the cat's pursuit has already ended, as it is written: "And he ate and By the way, you wrote that according to the halakha he intended to kill this and killing this is obligatory. I'm not sure that this is the halakha (I saw a disagreement between Rambam and Rabbah), but Rabbi Eiger said this, according to Rabbi Elazar, and he certainly believes so.
C1. There is a lot of evidence for this and I don't see how it can be rejected in the true sense of the word. For example, it is seen that the law of the pursuer has an aspect of punishment and not just saving the pursued. And according to the Sanhedrin, it is also saving the pursuer from a transgression. But I don't understand what the connection is between the argument you brought from the rabbi to my words. The rabbi says that there is a law of saving the pursued beyond the rabbinic law of the rabbinic law. I said something else (on behalf of the rabbi): that there is another law beyond saving the pursued (which is from the rabbinic law). And yet I say that the very claim of the prophet must be rejected. First, this source for the rabbinic law of rejecting Shabbat does not remain in the halakhic law and is in dispute there. Therefore, it is possible that even if this is the case, this source does not have such a halakhic law. Beyond that, the evidence itself is not necessary. First, the evidence is from an underground source and not a pursuer. Second, it is truly very problematic evidence. Does the fact that it is possible to kill the thief in order to save Ba’ab provide a sufficient indication that there is a high value for life? On the contrary, in killing the thief, life is taken. And third, even if the pursuer has a death sentence beyond saving the pursued, the same lesson can still be learned. But as stated, this does not concern my words.
C2. I did not bring up the issue of the lottery with Rabbi Eiger, but rather that in a reciprocal situation there is no persecutory sentence. Regarding the difference between a lottery and an arbitrary choice, I explained: You are supposed to give both equal chances, because this is the fair division in the absence of the possibility of sharing the result itself. Of course, an arbitrary choice is also a lottery. But a choice for another reason is not a fair division of chances and is therefore prohibited.
C3. Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul brings evidence for salvation in one of his limbs, but the positioning of all this in mutual persecution is that of Rabbi Eiger. After we have stated this, you are right that there must be a persecuting law in the 3rd, although Rabbi Eiger seems to believe that there is not.
34. And the 8th.
C1. Indeed, I was wrong. In my sin, I do not know the well-known words of the rabbis, but only the words of the rabbi in the first sign of the laws of the murderer and in the issue of the rabbi there, and I imagined that they were the words. Now I see that they are really not close to each other.
[I do not understand your rejection of the rabbi's rejection of the rabbi's words. The Gemara there says that for certain piku, the sources are good, and for certain piku, they are not, and from the rabbis who have written the plugata, they do not explain them. What is the connection with a high value for life? In the Gemara there it is written that because of (doubt) the piku of the householder, he is permitted to transgress the prohibition of not murder, and the Gemara learns from this that because of certain piku, it is also permitted to transgress any other prohibition. If there is a special law of "saving the persecuted" more than just the punishment of the persecuted, then there is no comparison to the punishment of Shabbat. Or is the prohibition of violating Shabbat considered "as a punishment" of the person and a mysterious law of salvation renewed in it]
[By the way, aside from movables, it seems that you have incidentally corrected two corrections in my words, and to my honor I feel. C2 As if I wrote that you brought the lottery from R. Eiger (while on the contrary, I consulted him as I thought that it is possible to choose arbitrarily. In dividing the result itself, a new result is obtained, and it is not at all similar to dividing the chance that in any case the same result is reached from a moral point of view). C3 It seems from your words that you came to correct something in my words and I did not know what it was]
Beyond the rejection of this source as a halakhic text, it itself is controversial among the conditions. The others cited other sources.
It is about saving the persecuted and not saving the persecutor (from transgression). Therefore, there is nothing to talk about saving from desecrating the Sabbath. But as I wrote, the persecutor is killed, that is, a life is taken here. So what do we learn from this? I would learn that the value of life is marginal, since it is permissible to kill in order to save a person who is in need of a life. If so, then it is permissible to desecrate the Sabbath for the sake of a life. And in general, there is the desired assumption here, after all, if it is permissible to transgress the prohibition of murder in order to save a life, what is the desired assumption that it is permissible to desecrate the Sabbath? Only because it is assumed that desecrating the Sabbath is less important/serious than the value of life. This is the desired assumption.
I just clarified 3.
By the way, regarding the song "Chad Gadya", and lest I suspect that the simple meaning will be lost in the cloud of philopol, it seems that the poet did not think at all that the dog bit the cat because it ate a goat, but rather that the dog for its own pleasure acted according to the way of the world, where the great devours the small out of exploitation and evil, and the small also devours the one who is smaller than him, and the stick for its own pleasure also beat the dog, etc. (or are they all axes in the hand of Providence that hewed them), and in the end, the greatest tyrant who has no other tyrant over him will come and deal with him, and all the evildoers will be found straw and the people of Israel will live.
If a certain person sees Reuben pursuing Simeon and Levi pursuing Judah, and he has the power to save the life of the pursuer of only one of them, what will he do?
lottery.
In other words, the symmetry between the persecutors here does not prevent the rescuer from intervening, because his intervention is beneficial so that at least one righteous person will live. So why does the issue of symmetry suddenly arise in mutual persecution? Simply say that no righteous person is being saved here and therefore it is forbidden to intervene.
(Maybe Etzel, but in my opinion, outside of the law, in mutual persecution, one is allowed to kill as he pleases, and one is allowed to sit idle, and one is allowed to hold an auction between them to see who will hire his services, and not only that, but even a rock is standing to crush one of them while they are lying tied up, and it is not clear who the other person is allowed to take one of them and put him against the rock to be arrested. And in the case of Siamese twins, if a madman comes from among those who disagree with you and lets them both die in front of their grieving parents, he is a murderer strictly speaking, what a mehadrin is a disgusting scumbag, and so of course the Sanhedrin that will arise in the end times will judge him (it will have a lot of work to change from the Shas)).
I don't agree, of course. As I wrote, fairness requires dividing the chances of survival between the two equally. If you didn't do this, you are essentially a kind of half-murderer, because you took away from someone their 50% chance of being saved. Of course, it's not murder, you just won't stand for your neighbor's blood (a crime of failure to save), but you have a crime of failure to save of 50%. Half-failure to save or failure to save half a life. Define it as you wish.
From this, you will understand that you, who called him a murderer, were also wrong. At most, you can say that he passed without a rescue. And since we have concluded that this is a failure to save, my argument returns that there must be a fair draw. And whoever does not do so, but chooses between them as he pleases, a future Sanhedrin will come and judge him accordingly.
Although, according to this, I have room to consider the case of two people walking in the desert and a third person having a pitcher of water. It is accepted among the rabbis that he can give to whomever he wants. But in my opinion, he should draw a fair draw between them.
This is because for you the concept of “murder” in the moral sense deals with the life of a certain or unknown person and not with the diminishing of life in the world.
It seems that regarding the prohibition “You shall not destroy” if we are forced to destroy one of two piles of barley, you do say that one is allowed to choose as he wishes, and in dividing batteries between two Siamese devices, he will divide and not sit and not do.
Indeed. Both. You once wrote that in your eyes failure to rescue and murder are the same thing. The debate continues.
But could you please clarify the difference between "thou shalt not kill" and "thou shalt not destroy"? In Babylon, "thou shalt not destroy" no one demands a "thou shalt not do" (dividing batteries between two devices) and does not deal with the rights of the object (therefore, in two piles, any pile will be saved, and even a lottery is not necessary) and murder is. And in all this, for you, Halacha and morality come together in a unique harmony. Where in Halacha do these differences come from?
The difference is the subject. Killing a person is not a fresh elimination, and the difference is not only quantitative. Killing a person is harming him and not only the world. Therefore, murder has two aspects: the minority of life in the world and harming the person who was murdered (intrusion into his territory). Here there is a subject with rights who must not be harmed.
You are right that in this context I identify the halakhic boundaries with morality. I think I noted this in my article on harming the innocent and targeted killing (if not, then at least I said it verbally in classes. In these areas there is an overlap between halakhic and morality). The reason for this is very simple: where there is no reason that forces me to say that halakhic operates according to other boundaries and there is a possibility of interpreting in accordance with morality, especially when it comes to very important moral principles whose violation is serious (human life), I do so.
From the perspective of the subject's right, he can forgive, meaning that if in mutual persecution one of them sticks his neck out towards the third (and even if he doesn't kill him, he will kill the other persecutor), the third is allowed to intervene. Is that right?
This is not necessary because the status of the subject does not mean that he is the one who decides. Perhaps God is supposed to decide and a person is not the owner of his own body (as the well-known words of the Radbz).
But I personally tend to think that indeed, where one of the two volunteers to die, it is permissible to choose him and there is no need to draw lots. Some believe that a person is permitted to volunteer to die in order to save others (at least regarding doubt, see the Gemayel P. A. about a murderer named Hierushalmi). So when he himself is in danger of death, he only volunteers to be a mover who is sacrificed for the sake of the others (when between so and so, one must be sacrificed) - it seems to me that it is permissible.
There is also advice for suicide with permission here. A righteous man who wishes to commit suicide with permission and the other person kills him, what should he do? He should go to his righteous friend and say to him, "Let us accept mutual persecution and arrange the distances so that it will take us at least five minutes to reach each other. During those five minutes, the one pursuing the righteous man who wishes to commit suicide will stop and call a third man, also righteous like them, to his companion and say to him, "I hereby permit myself to you, please try and kill me, and if not, you will be determined with me to kill my mutual persecutor friend, who will be so kind as to help me."
The deception, of course, is only to sift out the halachic components of the prohibition of suicide where there is no moral prohibition, and under the supervision of rabbis and rabbis.
No one is saved, no one is righteous. It's in the wave of symmetry, and that's exactly what I wrote.
Now I thought of the method that in mutual persecution, neither of them is allowed to kill their pursuer (this is the opinion of Rabbi Eiger, and the opinion of the column in this regard was perhaps not interpreted as only forbidden external intervention). So good advice, ka, means that you should know that every pursuer and pursued has the right to exempt himself from the law, since the pursuer will stop in his tracks and choose for a brief moment that he decides not to kill the pursuer opposite him, and immediately he ceases to be a pursuer and only pursues others, and how many of your deeds have you done? From now on, he is allowed to kill his pursuer, and even if he hits the woman, he will be exempt. And so it is a great wonder why a determined person is obligated to the woman, perhaps he contemplated stopping the killing for a moment as a quid pro quo and it became permissible (let's slow down in our case so that they will not decide not to kill so that they can kill) and he went to the quid pro quo, OK, from the Mona of her possessions.
The verse is: “And he said to the wicked man, why do you strike your neighbor”.
Moses did not say “wicked”, but the scripture indicates the wickedness of one of the hawks, and it is precisely to him that Moses addresses.