Faith and Science – Part V
With God's help
The Place of Evolution in the Theological Debate
Introduction
Thus far I have examined various aspects of the relationship between faith and science through the physico-theological argument and various objections to it. In the present column I will discuss the objection from evolution.
The Neo-Darwinian Picture in a Nutshell
In the beginning there was the Big Bang, from which the matter of the universe emerged (with the kind assistance of the symmetry breaking of the 'divine' Higgs). Thereafter the expansion creates stars and galaxies (the force of gravity overcomes the other fundamental forces). This is accompanied by cooling to a temperature that makes our existence possible. At the next stage, either randomly (a lucky accident, in Dawkins's view) or through abiogenesis (the deterministic formation of life), the initial protein chains were formed. From that point on, the name of the game is evolution.
This is a system in which three mechanisms operate: 1. The emergence of mutations. Changes in genetic protein chains (usually understood as random). 2. Natural selection. A struggle for survival among the mutations, with the fit ones surviving. 3. Genetics. The transmission of the traits of the surviving mutations to later generations.
The Logical Place of Evolution in the Debate
Evolution does not prove that there is no God, nor does it prove that He exists. It does not deal with Him at all. Evolution is a scientific field, and its concern is physical and biological reality.
Some claim that evolution presents a refutation of the physico-theological argument. That is its entire role in the debate. It is simply another objection in the list with which this series is concerned. This means that even if this refutation were indeed correct (and it is not), all it would show is that one of the arguments for the existence of God has fallen.
Methodology
The methodology by which this issue should be addressed is built of three layers: A. the philosophical validity of the physico-theological argument in itself. B. the scientific validity of evolution (the domain of most creationist claims). C. back to philosophy: even if evolution is correct, does it refute the argument?
If the argument is not good in itself, then there is obviously no point discussing evolution in this context. If the argument is a priori reasonable, we must discuss whether evolution is scientifically valid (if it is not, again there is no point in reaching stage C). And if both of these obtain, we can ask whether the argument remains intact even after evolution.
I should note in advance that there is a consensus between creationists and neo-Darwinians that evolution is a critical touchstone in the theological dispute. Neo-Darwinians support it and reject faith, while creationists reject it in order to preserve faith. Everyone agrees that there is a contradiction here, and in this both sides are mistaken (indeed, such a rare and pastoral consensus rests on an error). I intend to show that evolution does not touch our discussion at all.
The previous columns dealt with layer A (and we shall return to it). I will leave layer B aside here, since for the purposes of this discussion I assume that the neo-Darwinian picture described above is true. I have no better scientific theory, and below I will show that this does not matter anyway. We have now, by a shortcut, arrived directly at the discussion of layer C.
The Objection from Evolution
Evolution offers a scientific explanation for the emergence of something complex without a guiding hand. It follows that something uncoordinated and unplanned can generate a physico-theological 'illusion' regarding the necessity of a guiding hand.
Several of the respondents to the previous columns addressed this point. Some demanded a definition of the term 'complex' or 'designed.' Others argued that the existence of something complex and designed does not imply the existence of a designer (begging the question). In the next column I will return to these claims.
Shakespeare and Other Animals
I will address this whole cluster without entering into the scientific details. I will not even distinguish between the different scientific stages (the Big Bang, abiogenesis, and evolution). My claim is the following: every scientific explanation for the development of the world is given to us within a system of natural laws. But such explanations are irrelevant to the theological debate. An explanation could have theological significance only if it did not require natural laws, which is of course impossible (if that were possible, it would mean that physics and biology are branches of mathematics, or of logic).
I will clarify this through a common example. Creationists ask: what is the probability that a monkey jumping on a keyboard will randomly produce under its feet the sequence "to be or not to be"? And if we speak of an entire Shakespeare sonnet, the probability of course drops dramatically. As for the complexity of the world in all its fullness, the probability of accidental formation is negligible.
Now, in an article published in the 1980s in Scientific American, a 'conclusive' answer to this claim was published. Someone (the argument is so foolish that mentioning his name would verge on defamation; you can find him on any atheist website) reported the results of the following experiment. Take the 14-letter Hebrew sequence meaning "to be or not to be." The probability that a random draw of strings of that length would produce that sequence is negligible, since there are 2214 possible combinations. At the speed of his computer, such a string would be expected to appear only after about 200,000 years.
But that clever anonymous person performed a different experiment: he generated the letters one by one, and each time he reached the correct letter he 'froze' it. The computer begins generating single letters (rather than strings). When it reaches the correct first letter, that letter is immediately frozen, and the computer goes on to generate another. When it reaches the correct second letter, that too is 'frozen,' and it continues onward. Thus he proceeds until he reaches the full string. Guess how long it took the computer to finish in this way. Ninety seconds. An entire Shakespeare play came out in four and a half days. The Flying Spaghetti Monster had wrought a miracle, and the atheists had light and gladness and joy and honor.
I assume that the physicists and mathematicians among us are rubbing their eyes in astonishment, not at the results, but at this folly. One could have reached this result within a few minutes with pen and paper and a simple probabilistic calculation, saving the readers' time and the ecological damage to the forests of Brazil. This simulation revealed to us the astounding discovery that if there is an external factor that ensures that the correct results are obtained, the probability of their emergence rises dramatically. A more sophisticated experiment would have done this even better: to write a program that ensures that the computer immediately outputs the correct string. A not especially complicated calculation would show us that in one run we would get the desired result (and if not, the non-intelligent programmer should be fired). In general, if computers had existed in Shakespeare's time, he would have saved quite a bit of time…
Implications for the Theological Debate
Ironically, this foolish experiment also illustrates the real problem very well, and in fact serves as a demonstration in favor of the physico-theological argument. The creationist claim is that the probability of the accidental emergence of something complex is negligible. The neo-Darwinians answer that the process is not random. There are factors that dramatically improve the probability of accidental emergence (the laws of evolution: feedback, natural selection, etc.), or, in Dawkins's formulation, they flatten the slope of Mount Improbable.
But the advocate of the physico-theological argument, as noted, assumes the principle of sufficient reason. He therefore now asks again: what is the sufficient reason for the constraints that improved the process? Who is the programmer who intervened in the random process and ensured that it safely reached its goal? The laws of nature are the analogue of the constraints that improved the performance of the computer program described above. Therefore any explanation by means of natural laws that explains why an exceedingly rare process in fact has a reasonable chance is irrelevant to our discussion. The physico-theological question remains exactly as it was, except that it is directed not toward the formation of life but toward the laws that govern it.
Let us continue the analogy and take a not very long protein chain, about 300 codons. The number of possible combinations of such chains is 20300, an enormous number by any standard. The question now arises how precisely the 'living' and self-replicating chains arose in a random process. And the answer is: because of the laws of nature (these are the 'constraints' on the drawing). But now we once again ask: what is the sufficient reason for the existence of these laws? How did they come into being? And once again we arrive at an intelligent agency, or a guiding hand.
Within the Laws and Outside Them
The critical point here is the distinction between an argument within the laws and an argument outside them. There is a process whose probability of occurring is, a priori, negligible. We now find laws, or constraints, that significantly improve this probability (the freezing of the correct letters, or the laws of nature). The argument within the laws says that the process is now reasonable, for the laws allow the spontaneous emergence of life. But the argument outside the laws says that the laws themselves require us to posit the intervention of an intelligent agency.
Whoever accepts the principle of sufficient reason (and therefore advances the physico-theological argument) is not satisfied with an explanation in terms of laws. And whoever does not accept the principle of sufficient reason has no need at all for the objection from evolution (that is, for an explanation in terms of laws), since from the outset the argument does not persuade him. The conclusion is that evolution is irrelevant to the discussion in any way.
Back to Paley's Watch
Paley's watch argument operates on the same logical basis. The probability that something as complex as a watch came into being by chance is negligible. The world and life are far more complex, and therefore the probability of their spontaneous emergence is certainly negligible. The common rejection of this argument is that our world is not like a watch (because a living organism undergoes evolution, unlike a watch).
Apart from the other shortcomings of this rejection (it assumes that a self-replicating chain already exists, and ignores the necessity of earlier stages), what we really have here is the claim that the laws of nature operate to increase the probability of the 'spontaneous' emergence of life (like the computer program that ensured the appearance of the desired string). But this is an argument within the laws. Had there been other laws, or no laws at all, life would not have emerged. Thus the question of sufficient reason outside the laws now arises: can these constraints themselves (= the laws of nature) be understood without a guiding hand? And if we return to Dawkins, the question is: who is the watchmaker, and can he be blind?
Hoyle's Airplane and Gould's Parable
The same is true of 'Hoyle's mistake.' Hoyle compared the probability of the accidental emergence of life to the probability that a tornado passing over a junkyard would create from it a complete Boeing airplane. It was argued against him that he did not understand the laws of evolution and their significance, for they ensure that the process is not directionless, thereby greatly improving the chances of its occurrence. The perceptive reader surely sees that the logic of the debate is the same logic. Within the laws the objectors are right, but Hoyle's argument is correct outside the laws.
A few weeks ago an excerpt from my book was published here, in which I presented Gould's parable, demonstrating how a random process may lead to a special result. A drunk leaves a tavern and begins to stagger randomly along the sidewalk. To his right there is a wall and to his left a ditch. Despite the randomness, Gould argues, at the end of the process the drunk will be lying in the ditch. Here we have a random process that leads to a special and predetermined result, without a guiding hand.
The reactions raged, as always, but the storm reflected misunderstanding. I am not asking within the laws, but outside the laws: how was this result really obtained? By virtue of the environmental constraints (the wall and the ditch). In a random environment, the probability of this would be negligible. So who created the constraining environment (= the laws) that dictated this result? This example is just as foolish as the experiment mentioned above, and in fact it nicely demonstrates the need for a guiding hand.
Summary: Philosophy and Science
Science has taught us that in the beginning there was a singularity, and out of it the universe and everything in it came into being on its own: states and cities, seas and mountains, animals of all kinds, human beings, trees, plants, galaxies and stars, suns and moons. Each of these is complex, and very many are coordinated and finely tuned down to the smallest detail. For some reason (some sufficient reason), there is in the background a system of four precise laws (the fundamental forces of physics) that ensures that all this occurs. Simple common sense suggests that there is a guiding hand here.
This is a philosophical consideration, not a scientific one. Science and philosophy operate in two separate spheres. Our attitude toward the physico-theological argument is determined by philosophical considerations (the principle of sufficient reason and its applicability). Our attitude toward evolution is a matter for scientific investigation. There is no connection between these two planes of analysis. Criticism of evolution does not strengthen faith (as creationists think), and confirmation of evolution does not weaken it (as atheists think). For one who holds that the physico-theological argument is reasonable, evolution does not undermine it (it only shifts the discussion from looking within the laws to looking outside them, and from seeking a sufficient reason for development to seeking a sufficient reason for the laws that govern it). And if, in someone's view, this is not a reasonable argument, then he has no need of evolution either. In sum, science has no role whatsoever in the physico-theological debate.
Questions of improbability within the laws (like those asked by creationists who look for God in the scientific gaps, god of the gaps) are questions that belong to the domain of science. But if a theory is scientifically inadequate, one must seek another one (other laws), and this must be done with scientific tools. The questions outside the laws are philosophical questions, and only they are relevant to the theological debate.
For the sake of clarity I have presented a picture that is somewhat simplistic. In the coming columns, God willing, I will turn to several subtler points that follow from it (the anthropic argument, quantum theory, the meaning of randomness, sufficient reason for laws and for objects, what complexity is, and more).