Parashat Noah (5760)
On the eve of the holy Sabbath, Parashat Noah, 5760
What Is Morality?
At the beginning of the portion, the moral condition before the Flood is described in the words, “For all flesh had corrupted its way
upon the earth.” And Rashi comments there: “Even cattle, beasts, and birds mated with those not of their own kind.” That is,
even the animals were tainted by forbidden sexual relations, and therefore the Holy One, blessed be He, decides to blot out all living things from upon
the face of the earth, human beings together with animals.
At first glance this is a rather strange description. How can animals be in any moral state at all, whether elevated
or degraded? It is generally accepted that an animal is a creature without free choice that acts on the basis of instincts, to
the point that René Descartes, the French philosopher of the sixteenth century, went so far as to regard animals as a kind of
mechanical automata. Today we generally believe that this is not so, yet it is fairly clear
that an animal does not possess choice in the moral sense. On the other hand, it is generally accepted that the existence of the capacity for choice is
a necessary condition for evaluating the moral-spiritual state of any creature. One who cannot choose
between good and evil also cannot be classified morally as good or evil.
There are statements in the words of the Sages, anchored as well in Scripture, that hold that the destruction of living creatures in the Flood stemmed
from the destruction of man. That indeed seems to follow from the verses at the end of Parashat Bereshit, but from the beginning of Parashat Noah,
and especially from the midrash cited by the Rashi mentioned above, a different view emerges. The animals were destroyed because of their own condition
and not because of human beings. Their condition may have been caused by human behavior, but that
does not explain the Holy One’s decision to blot them out, for even if the animals’ 'moral conduct' was corrupted,
there would seemingly be in that no moral defect, or low moral level, as explained above.
It seems that we have here a phenomenon that may appear strange to modern eyes. There is here a
morally defective condition, not because of the motives and reasons for its emergence, but by virtue of its very existence. It is commonly accepted
that the moral appraisal of an act is derived, among other things, from the motives for doing it. Such an approach
is widespread in the modern world, especially since Kant, who established it as a full-fledged system. Yeshayahu Leibowitz
writes in his book 'Faith, History, and Values' (p. 126):
Ethics is not a program of specific behavior. Any act, in and of itself, is
morally indifferent [=neutral]. In two cases in which a rifle is loaded
and cocked, the safety is off, someone is in the sights, and I pull the trigger, and the result is the same
in both cases—it may be said in the one case: this is vile murder, and in the other
it may be said: this is an act of heroism and self-sacrifice by a soldier defending his homeland. It follows that it is not
the act that is judged here, but the intention of the act. Moral judgment relates to the intention of the doer.
Morality is not a doctrine of correct behavior but a doctrine of the purity of a person’s intention.
One may of course disagree with Leibowitz’s argument, as also with the view of intention as the exclusive factor
in the moral evaluation of actions, but animals are creatures altogether incapable of moral intention;
if so, the problem returns in full force: how can animals be condemned to destruction on
account of their moral condition.
There is another exceptional feature to the prohibitions concerning illicit sexual relations. In Scripture and in the words of the Sages they are perceived as
moral problems, even though they cannot necessarily be classified as problems 'between one person and another.' There are
cases in which a person violates the sexual prohibitions and no one else is harmed. One who commits adultery with
a married woman, with the consent of all those involved, seemingly causes no harm whatever to another. It is clear
that one who does so with a domestic or wild animal—which the Torah prohibits as a forbidden sexual relation—also does not constitute harm
to any other being, and yet such an act is perceived as a moral problem and not merely a 'religious' one.
These two phenomena seem to express a deep difference between religious morality and secular morality. Secular morality
is almost entirely based on the prohibition against harming another and the duty to help him. As is well known,
in the religious conception there is an entire class of commandments that are 'statutes,' religious commandments with no clear moral rationale.
What is less well known is that there is also a difference within the moral sphere itself. There are rules that although
they are not derived from duties or rights vis-à-vis any other person, are nevertheless classified as belonging to the realm of
morality. Religious morality is based on preserving, or not damaging, the 'image of God' in the human being, or,
in other words, the 'human image' within him. The foundation of morality is not safeguarding
the other, but safeguarding the self.
Injury to the image of God can occur even when I do no harm whatever to another, but simply
because I do not conduct myself as a human being ought to conduct himself. One who is sexually licentious does not preserve the human image
within him, even though no other person is harmed by it. This becomes all the more striking upon considering the phenomena
we described in the generation of the Flood. Even an animal that behaves this way is classified as a creature with no right to exist. This
is not a punishment for evil intention, or for choosing evil, but simply a condition whose
existence cannot be accepted, by virtue of its very existence, and not necessarily because of its consequences.
In earlier times, such acts were perceived as evil even in a society that was not religious. This is usually attributed
to religious influence that in the past also dominated secular societies. I do not think so, though
that is not the important point for our purposes. It is important to point to the fact that
'secular' moral lines are fluid. What was once forbidden is now permitted. Once abortion was murder,
and today, because of various social problems, it is for some reason called 'a woman’s right over her own body.' Once
the release of terrorists with blood on their hands was taboo, and today that applies only to the release of
terrorists with blood up to their elbows. Moral criteria change according to circumstances. The use
of different formulations often helps quiet the conscience in moral contexts, and this is so
because there are no sharp and clear moral lines. Almost everything is determined by fashions, needs,
and shifting conceptions.
A person’s obligations toward others can indeed sometimes change even from the standpoint of Jewish law, but the image
of God is an absolute matter. It does not change, nor can it change. There are acts
that are absolutely, and regardless of circumstances, or even of the intentions accompanying them, immoral,
and those who perform them therefore have no right to exist.
The moral formulations of the secular world also often use religious phrases, such as
'the human image' or 'the image of God,' or even 'the sanctity of human life.' As stated, the differences cannot
be erased by changing or equating formulations.
Of course, I do not mean to say that a secular person is necessarily not moral. That is not true, and I
am glad of it. Sometimes there are secular people, or secular societies, from whom the religious person
has much to learn in the moral sphere. In this essay I wish only to point to a significant difference
that cannot be ignored in defining moral laws, and let whoever chooses, choose.
Have a peaceful Sabbath.
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