Parashat Balak (5761)

With God's help, on the eve of the holy Sabbath, Parashat Balak, 5761

In Praise of Formalism

This week's Torah portion describes Balaam's "curses" against Israel. In the end Balaam's curses

turn into blessings, yet Israel falls prey to his schemes in a more sophisticated way. They

begin to engage in sexual immorality with the daughters of Moab, and the moral fall, as always happens, brings in its wake

disintegration (it is worth looking around us today from this perspective). A plague breaks out

among the people of Israel, in addition to Moses' unequivocal command to kill all those attached to the daughters of Midian and to the idolatry

that came with them (Baal Peor).

The Sages describe a state of general disintegration, in which Zimri, leader of the tribe of Simeon, who openly fornicates before the entire people with

one of the princesses of Midian, asks Moses our teacher embarrassing "questions of Jewish law" and taunts him. Moses

cannot answer his questions (a law escaped his memory), and all the people (at least those among them

to whom such matters still mean anything) burst into tears. The leadership loses its authority, and the forces

of holiness enter a state of general paralysis.

Since that is the situation, Phinehas son of Eleazar son of Aaron the priest "saw the act and remembered the law," and he

decides to act. He takes a spear and kills Zimri and his partner, and immediately afterward

the plague ceases and the disintegration is halted. God rewards him for his zeal with a covenant of peace and an eternal priesthood.

Here zeal is blessed and essential.

In light of this description, it is far more difficult to understand the words of the Sages regarding the relationship between Phinehas and Zimri.

The Sages rule that if Zimri had turned around and killed Phinehas before the latter managed to kill him,

he would have gone unpunished for his act (for the murder). The reason is that Phinehas had the legal status of a "pursuer."

Anyone who pursues another person in order to kill him may—and indeed it is a commandment for everyone—to kill the pursuer in order

to save the pursued. Phinehas, say the Sages, was pursuing Zimri, and therefore Zimri could have

killed him. It should be noted that the entire situation of the people of Israel depended on Phinehas. By his act

he would determine the fate of the entire community: whether the people would disintegrate or be rebuilt. And even in such a situation,

the law rules that Zimri had a legal "right" to kill Phinehas.

Let us try to sharpen the problem further. The commentators ask why Zimri was permitted to kill

Phinehas, when he could have saved himself in another way and thus avoided the need to kill

his pursuer. He could have stopped sinning, and then Phinehas would not have tried at all to kill him.

The law rules that if there is a way to save the pursued by inflicting some injury on the pursuer without

killing him, there is absolutely no permission to kill the pursuer. For example, one who can injure the pursuer's leg,

and thereby prevent him from reaching the pursued, clearly has no right at all to kill the pursuer, and if

he kills him, his punishment is death like that of any murderer. In light of this it is all the more difficult why the Sages say

that Zimri was permitted to kill Phinehas, when he could simply have stopped sinning?

One of the Gur rebbes (cited in the book Kli Chemdah on our portion) explained this by saying that

Phinehas had no right to demand that Zimri stop his act, even if it was a grave transgression. Zimri

was under no obligation to Phinehas to stop his sinful act. He was required to do so because it was

a serious legal and moral prohibition, but he had no obligation at all toward Phinehas. Since that is so, although

Zimri was required to stop his act because of the prohibition involved, there was no demand upon him

to do so solely for the sake of saving Phinehas's life. Despite the fact that the act was a grave transgression,

and in effect the destruction of the entire social-moral fabric of the people of Israel, he was not obligated to stop it

in order to save Phinehas's life. If Phinehas threatened him, he was permitted to kill him and

not be punished for doing so.

What is this comparable to? To Shimon, who lives in a certain house, and then Reuven comes and tells him that if he does not

vacate the house, then he (Reuven) will kill Yaakov, his father (Shimon's). The question is whether

Shimon may kill Reuven, who is a "pursuer," and thereby save his father from the threat, or whether

he is obligated to vacate the house and thereby save Yaakov's life without needing to kill

Reuven. It seems clear that there is no obligation to vacate the house, and that Shimon is permitted to kill

Reuven, even though ostensibly he could avoid doing so. The reason is that no one has the right

to force me to give up something that is mine in order to save himself. The obligation to refrain from killing

applies only if I have a way to save the pursued (Yaakov) without killing the pursuer (Reuven), without

giving up things that belong to me or actions that I have the right to perform.

Of course, here the situation is more complex, for we are speaking about a case in which the house does in fact belong to Reuven, that is,

that Shimon is occupying it unlawfully, and even so the Sages say that there is no obligation to vacate the house in order

to save Reuven. That is, even an act that is in itself a transgression does not place me under an obligation to stop it

in order to save the one who is pursuing me.

At first glance this is an absurd law, but several deep insights are hidden here. Some of them concern

the relationship between my obligations toward God and my obligations toward other people. Other implications concern

the relationship between a formal legal conception and moral principles that go beyond the letter of the law. Formal law

here bluntly "pierces" the moral-value "mountain." The law is not only an expression

of values as we understand them; its very formal existence also has meaning. The Brisker Rav

gave this mode of thought an extreme formulation in reference to the Talmudic statement that the Messiah will not

come on the Sabbath if doing so would involve a rabbinic prohibition. The salvation of the people of Israel from all its troubles (physical

and spiritual) is delayed because one person may not transgress a rabbinic prohibition.

Have a peaceful Sabbath

It may be deposited for respectful disposal in any synagogue or yeshiva. Comments and responses are welcome.

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