A Discourse for Lag BaOmer
From the Wilderness, a Gift – 5762
In note 5 of the article we mentioned that the author of the Haggadah cited above is uncertain whether the thirteen in question are the Thirteen Attributes of Mercy or the thirteen hermeneutical principles. Against that background, it is interesting to note that there is a parallel between these two systems, as Rabbi Menahem Azariah of Fano explains in his book Asarah Ma'amarot (Ten Discourses). Here we append for the reader's consideration an article by M. Abraham dealing with the relation between a fortiori reasoning and judgment.
Within that discussion he also briefly addresses the question of the relation between reason and the hermeneutical rule of a fortiori reasoning, as a relation between the revealed and the hidden within this rule.
A.
The Hatam Sofer discusses Lag BaOmer in an interesting and unusual responsum, in Yoreh De'ah, sec. 233, and writes as follows:
Indeed, I know—and I have heard—that by saying this I would be taken as validating the present generation, who come from afar to seek the Lord in the holy city of Safed on Lag BaOmer, at the celebration of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai (Rashbi), of blessed memory. And although all their intention is for the sake of Heaven, their reward is certainly great… yet precisely for that very reason I would count myself among those who separate themselves, like Ben Duratai, so that I would not need to sit there and alter their custom in their presence, and so that I would not wish to join with them in this matter. For Peri Hadash has already gone on at length, in Orah Hayyim sec. 496, in his tract on prohibited customs, para. 14, regarding places that make a holiday on the day on which a miracle occurred for them… In my humble opinion, the reason they make a holiday on the day on which a miracle occurred is based on this a fortiori inference: if from slavery to freedom we recite song, then all the more so from death to life (if from slavery to freedom we recite song, then all the more so from death to life) [that is, an a fortiori inference from Passover; see Megillah 14a]. But to establish a festival on a day on which no miracle occurred, and which is not mentioned anywhere in the Talmud or the decisors, with no hint or allusion at all—only the withholding of eulogy and fasting is merely a custom, and its very rationale I do not know.
And in the siddur of Rabbi Jacob Emden it is written, according to the esoteric tradition, that this is like a religious court all of whose members convict, in which case the defendant is acquitted—that is, Hod (majesty) within Hod; see there. But according to this, it would have been proper to establish the full festivity when we reach the Gevurot [Gevurah (might/strictness) within Gevurah], on the ninth day of the Omer; except that in any case those are days of Nisan, and eulogies are not delivered then…
The Hatam Sofer, like many others, is astonished by and questions the custom of making something like a holiday of Lag BaOmer, on which no miracle occurred. Granted, on days on which a miracle occurred—such as Hanukkah and Purim (and also the 'Purim' days of particular communities)—we derive this by a fortiori reasoning from Passover. But on Lag BaOmer no miracle at all occurred, so what is there to celebrate? Later there he suggests another reason, based on the esoteric tradition, for refraining from eulogy and fasting on Lag BaOmer; see there.
From the remarks of the Ya'avetz cited by the Hatam Sofer, it emerges that the meaning of Lag BaOmer is judgment within judgment. The judgment-oriented sefirot (the left side) among the seven lower sefirot counted during the Omer are Gevurah and Hod. Therefore it would have been fitting to celebrate it 'when we reach the Gevurot,' that is, on the ninth day of the Omer, which is Gevurah within Gevurah; but since that falls in Nisan, it is celebrated on Hod within Hod.
Lag BaOmer is the quintessence of judgment (judgment within judgment), and this is a case of a court that is wholly convicting. Yet it is established in Jewish law that if a court in a capital case unanimously convicts, the defendant goes free. In other words, the quintessence of judgment is kindness. Judgment is the revealed dimension, and kindness is the hidden dimension within it, which is disclosed when judgment reaches its fullest realization.
In rabbinic language, 'judgment' is also a designation for the a fortiori inference (as in rabbinic expressions such as punishment is not derived from an a fortiori inference, 'punishment is not derived from an a fortiori inference,' and surely it follows by an a fortiori inference, 'but this is an a fortiori inference,' and the like). The a fortiori inference is the rule characterized chiefly by being revealed—that is, understandable to ordinary human reason, almost as a matter of logic. Yet to one who looks into it, it is clear that it contains principles that are not logical at all. In other words, within it—and perhaps specifically within it, precisely because it is the quintessence of the revealed—the hidden lies concealed.[1]
The problem the Hatam Sofer finds in the festival of Lag BaOmer is that all the rabbinically ordained festivals we celebrate are based on 'judgment,' that is, on the a fortiori inference in the Gemara in Megillah: if from death to life, etc.. Lag BaOmer, by contrast, has no a fortiori inference to justify it, since no miracle occurred on it. Once again we see that on Lag BaOmer we celebrate the quintessence of judgment, which is in fact the absence of 'judgment.' It is a festival without a rationale, without logic, and especially without the usual rationale for holidays, which is based on 'judgment'—that is, on a fortiori reasoning.
In fact, the opposite is true: Lag BaOmer is celebrated because of a second-order a fortiori inference, an a fortiori inference within an a fortiori inference (= judgment within judgment), and not because of an ordinary a fortiori inference (= judgment), like other holidays.[2]
B.
Rabbi Menahem Azariah of Fano, in Asarah Ma'amarot, in the essay on the middot at the beginning of the first rule (a fortiori inference), writes as follows:
The hint contained in it refers to the supreme Keter (crown) in its relation to the Cause of Causes, for Keter is slight and dark in relation to its cause, and yet contemplation of it is forbidden; all the more so with respect to what is above it.
His intention is to say that the very existence of the supreme Keter is for the sake of the rule of a fortiori inference: so that from it we may reason to its Creator, and express our relation to the Emanator (its cause) through it and in its terms. See there that even the rule of dayyo ('it is enough')[3] is learned from this. For the Emanator is higher by far than the supreme Keter, and nevertheless we discuss Him—that is, describe Him—in the concepts of the supreme Keter. This relation is based on the rule it is enough for that which is derived by inference to be like that from which it is derived ('it is enough for that which is derived by inference to be like that from which it is derived').
Thus, already here we see that the rule of a fortiori inference, which is the quintessence of judgment—the comprehensible and logical—is alluded to by the supreme Keter, which is the summit of kindness: the unbounded, undefined, and incomprehensible. Its role is to give Him a kind of form so that we may grasp Him and relate to Him in some way. This is the role of judgment with respect to the kindness hidden within it and standing at its root. According to this, it is clear that judgment as such simply does not exist (Keter = 'nothingness'), and its whole reality is only a shell that gives form to the kindness at its root.[4]
Thus the rule of dayyo is an inseparable part of the a fortiori inference, for the subject learned is higher by far than that from which we learn about it, and nevertheless we are permitted to learn about it from that source, by means of the a fortiori inference (= the attribute of judgment).
Further on, Rabbi Menahem Azariah explains the Sages' derivation of the rule of 'dayyo' itself, and writes as follows:
Similarly, you say: and if her father had but spit in her face, would she not be shamed seven days; one might have thought, by a fortiori reasoning, that with respect to the Shekhinah it should be fourteen days [for if because of her father she must be shamed seven days, then because of the Shekhinah she should be shamed fourteen days]; therefore Scripture says she shall be shut up seven days [see Bava Kamma 25a, where the rule of dayyo is derived in this way].
The reason is that 'her father' is said of supernal Hokhmah (Wisdom) [for in the Ari's system, the sefirah of Hokhmah is the persona of Abba], which is something from nothing [nothingness is the supreme Keter, and Hokhmah is generated from Keter—something from 'nothing.' Of this it is said: and wisdom, from where shall it be found?]. Binah (Understanding) [the sefirah of Binah, in the Ari's system, is Imma] is likewise something from something [Binah is generated from Hokhmah]. The Torah says that with Miriam both were transformed into a greenish pallor [this is the meaning of he did indeed spit green in her face], and it is of them that the verse speaks when it says would she not be shamed seven days, corresponding to the attributes beneath them, which are affected through them [the 'seven days' are the seven sefirot below Binah, those that we count in the Omer]. Hence there is no a fortiori inference here except to the eye, on the level of concrete plain meaning. And so that the reasons of the Torah in the revealed and hidden dimensions should yield equal legal conclusions, so that they may be articulated together on our lips, Jewish law came and established dayyo; and so it is fitting for all rabbinic law.
Rabbi Menahem Azariah writes that in truth there is no a fortiori inference in these verses at all, and therefore no dayyo either. Their 'true' meaning—that is, according to the path of the esoteric teaching—is that when Hokhmah affects Binah, the seven sefirot beneath those three (Keter, Hokhmah, and Binah) are shamed, that is, affected, by them.
However, if we were to read these verses according to an ordinary plain sense, and we did not have the rule of dayyo, we would conclude that Miriam must be shamed for fourteen days—a result that is not correct according to the esoteric teaching. Therefore Jewish law established the rule of dayyo so that we would reach the correct conclusion: that the seven sefirot below are affected by the greenish pallor of Binah.
It should be noted that the establishment of a legal principle like dayyo has broad ramifications in many varied passages and laws. If so, something very strange seems to emerge here: in order to fit the plain sense to the esoteric sense, a hermeneutical-legal principle is established that is seemingly not intrinsically correct, that is, it has no parallel and no root of its own in the hidden realm. According to this, it would seem that the consequences yielded by that principle are likewise incorrect. For example, in the discussion in Bava Kamma 25a, the principle of dayyo yields the rule that for goring in the damaged party's courtyard one pays only half-damages and not full damages. If indeed the principle of dayyo is not intrinsically correct, but was created only out of the need to harmonize plain sense and esoteric sense, then that law would seemingly be mistaken.
It is completely clear that this law is correct, and indeed one must pay half-damages for goring in the damaged party's courtyard, and so the accepted Jewish law rules. If so, what emerges here is a remarkable 'coincidence': an incorrect hermeneutical-legal principle happens, by chance, to generate correct laws all along the way.
C.
It is God's way to act in the world on several planes simultaneously.[5] We will cite three such contexts: 1. Events in the world have physical-human explanations, and also metaphysical explanations. 2. Human activity likewise has psychological explanations (in the form of motives and drives), and philosophical ones (intellectual, rational, and above all volitional decisions). 3. The Torah too has parallel explanatory strata, among them plain sense and esoteric sense. All of these are contexts in which the surface is judgment (action according to rules), and within it lies kindness (action without rules). In all these cases there is, at least seemingly, a correspondence between the parallel planes.[6] Yet precisely the existence of such a correspondence appears very hard to understand.
In the human context, it is very difficult to understand how a person acts out of psychological motives, and yet his act can also be justified on the rational-intellectual plane. If a person in fact returns to religious observance because of an emotional condition (mourning a close relative and the like), how can we say that his return is a rational decision to cleave to the truth? If a person becomes a criminal because of personal or social problems, how do we judge him on the plane of values and ideology? If the psychological causes are indeed real causes, then their existence is a necessary and sufficient condition for the emergence of the result, even if the conditions on the rational plane were absent (if indeed a person in such an emotional state returns to religious observance because of that emotional state, then he does so even if he has not decided anything about the truth of such a path. In effect, the decision is then understood as derivative of his emotional state, and not as the result of pure intellectual consideration).[7]
In the scientific context too, it is very difficult to see how the reason an apple falls from the tree onto Newton's head is that God is punishing him for sins he committed, while at the same time it is also a result of the law of gravity. If gravity is what causes it to fall, then even had Newton not sinned, the apple would have fallen, and vice versa.
Perhaps one may propose a solution to the problem in the human context. It may be that the cause of a person's decision is composed of both planes together, and neither of them by itself constitutes a sufficient cause of the event. A person returns to religious observance as a result of philosophical and psychological considerations together, and neither of those two planes can serve as a full explanation of the phenomenon.
In the scientific context the situation is more complicated, for if the natural-scientific cause is indeed a cause in the full sense of the term—as we ordinarily tend to understand it—then the result follows necessarily even if the metaphysical consideration is absent. If gravity acts upon the apple, it will fall even if Newton did not sin at all. Here we will be forced to say that, following Newton's sins, God brings him beneath the tree so that gravity may do its work on his head. Here too, this is a kind of combined description of the two planes.[8]
In the context of interpreting the Torah, the problem is the hardest of all. If the reasons on the revealed plane are a complete world unto themselves, then they generate the laws even without correspondence to the hidden plane, and vice versa. Here there is no room at all for any mixture between the planes. Sometimes a contradiction even emerges between them, and in such a situation the decisors wrote that the law follows the revealed plane (see, for example, Magen Avraham, laws of tefillin, sec. 25, subsec. 20).[9]
The only solution to the problem of correspondence between the different planes in interpreting the Torah is to assume that there is a deliberately prearranged correspondence between them. Such correspondence is easy to achieve if one builds the revealed system in local alignment with the hidden system—that is, every principle or law in the revealed realm has a counterpart in the hidden realm. Such correspondence necessarily creates a revealed system that fully accords with 'truth' (= the hidden).
But in the remarks of Rabbi Menahem Azariah above, a different conception emerges. There is no local correspondence between the revealed and the hidden; the correspondence is global. His remarks imply that not every law or principle found in the revealed system has a counterpart in the hidden system. For example, the principle of dayyo has no parallel principle in the hidden realm. It was created only in order to produce conclusions that would correspond to the hidden realm.
If so, what we have here is another type of correspondence. There is an entire system of interpretive and legal rules on the revealed plane. There is such a system on the hidden plane as well. There is no connection between a particular principle on one plane and a specific principle on the parallel plane. Nevertheless, the set of conclusions (the laws) produced on the two planes corresponds completely. The laws produced by the considerations of the revealed system turn out to correspond to those produced by the considerations of the hidden system (apart from exceptional cases, such as the Magen Avraham cited above, and this is not the place to elaborate).
D.
Local correspondence can, in principle, be produced by a human being or by human intellect. This is a simple, algorithmic way to ensure correspondence between the two systems of conclusions. Global correspondence, by contrast, seems impossible for human intellect to produce. It is manifestly a divine creation.
In the revealed Torah we derive conclusions by means of human intellectual deliberation, by way of judgment. These conclusions correspond, somehow, to conclusions hidden within the system of judgment itself—namely, the conclusions of the esoteric Torah. Within the revealed there is hiddenness, but it is concealed in a way that apparently makes it impossible for human beings to uncover it fully.
Within judgment within judgment, kindness is concealed. A court that is wholly convicting means acquittal. This is perhaps a small part of the 'Hod within Hod' of Lag BaOmer.
[1] See on this my article in Higayon B, where I explained it on the plain level of the matter.
[2] And this is what the Sages say (see Rashi on Genesis 1:1):
At first it arose in thought to create the world with the attribute of judgment [this is the attribute of a fortiori reasoning, the first among the hermeneutical rules], but He saw that the world could not endure [that is, with an attribute grasped by intellect alone], and therefore gave precedence to the attribute of mercy and joined it to the attribute of judgment [that is, at the root of judgment—the a fortiori inference—He placed mercy, meaning principles that lie beyond reason (which, for some reason, are unfairly called ’emotion'): intuition]. See what I explained at length in the book Shtei Agalot VeKadur Pore'ach (Two Carts and a Balloon); this is not the place to elaborate.
At the root of judgment one places kindness (mercy). When judgment is exhausted (in Hod within Hod), one can discern through it its emptiness when standing alone, in that its whole basis rests on kindness (Netzah). So too the author of the Leshem wrote that when judgment stands by itself, without kindness mixed into it, it consumes itself. This is the meaning of Lag BaOmer.
[3] See my article on Parashat Beha'alotekha, 5765–66.
[4] Just as in this world 'form' does not exist on its own, but only as attached to 'matter'; this is not the place to elaborate.
[5] For a discussion of parallel explanatory planes, see at length my book Et Asher Yeshno VeAsher Eynenu, in the fourth section.
[6] There are also mismatches. In the scientific context this is called a miracle: an event that has no explanation on the scientific plane, only on the metaphysical plane. This is a breach, or a flash, of the metaphysical into the physical, from the inside out. In the context of interpreting the Torah, the parallel mismatch is called a scriptural decree. This is a law that has no revealed explanation, only a hidden one. On the human plane, such a mismatch is an act of free choice (in which the rational breaks into the psychological-deterministic layer). This is the reason it is difficult to give a scientific description of human action, and above all impossible truly to understand human free choice.
A fascinating example of such a breakthrough, and with great intensity, is found in the book A Beautiful Mind, by Sylvia Nasar (which was also recently made into a film), about the Nobel laureate in economics John Nash. Nash suffered for decades from paranoid schizophrenia, which psychiatry regards as an incurable illness, and recovered from it (in certain respects). According to him, he overcame his illness by purely intellectual and volitional means (without psychoanalytic probing, which is a treatment that deals with the psychological layer of the illness, without using the rational-volitional layer that lies beyond it). See there especially chapter 47, entitled 'Recovery.'
[7] It is interesting here to point to a strange phenomenon: when a person returns to religious observance, the tendency of a secular observer is to ask what caused him to do so (on the psychological plane). By contrast, a religious observer will say that he discovered the truth (that is, he will describe the decision on the philosophical-rational plane). But when a person goes in the opposite direction, God forbid, then, for some reason, those observers exchange roles: the religious observer becomes a psychologist ('to permit himself forbidden sexual relations'), and the secular observer becomes a philosopher.
[8] In fact, upon deeper reflection, the problem is not really solved even in this way, for scientifically Newton's arrival beneath the tree is also a physical event; this is not the place to elaborate.
[9] And see Encyclopedia Talmudit , entry 'Halakhah,' around notes 201–209.