On Festivals of Judgment and a Festival of Grace

The eve of Purim is a good time to examine the halakhic status of the festival of Purim and its commandments.

The dispute between Maimonides and the author of Halakhot Gedolot (Behag)

At first glance, Purim is a rabbinic festival, and of course its commandments are rabbinic commandments. This also emerges from the words of Maimonides, who devotes a separate section to the Laws of Megillah and Hanukkah, and at its opening he writes:

The Laws of Megillah and Hanukkah. They include two positive commandments of rabbinic origin, and they are not part of the count. The explanation of these two commandments is given in these chapters.

This is the only section in his code devoted entirely to rabbinic laws, and therefore he notes this explicitly. It appears that he is hinting here at the well-known view of Behag, according to which these two commandments are included in his count of the 613 commandments. In his first root-principle, Maimonides emphasizes that rabbinic commandments are not included in the enumeration of the commandments, and there he explicitly mentions this very view of Behag:

The first principle is that it is not proper to include among this count commandments that are rabbinic. Know that this matter should not have required clarification at all, for since the language of the Talmud is that 613 commandments were stated to Moses at Sinai, how could one say of something rabbinic that it is included in the count? But we addressed it because many erred in this and counted the Hanukkah lamp and the reading of the Megillah among the positive commandments… Yet anyone who hears their words would understand that they were stated to Moses at Sinai… and would count the Hanukkah lamp, which the sages instituted in the Second Temple period, and likewise the reading of the Megillah.

He then rejects a possible explanation of Behag's position:

But as for saying that Moses was told at Sinai that he should command us that when, at the end of our kingdom, such-and-such would happen to us with the Greeks, we would then be obligated to light the Hanukkah lamp—I do not think anyone would imagine this or entertain it in his mind.

It is implausible that the Torah at Sinai referred to events that had not yet occurred—for example, that it said that when, in the course of history, we would defeat the Greeks and find a cruse of oil and so forth, we should light candles; or that when Haman would arise against us and we would be saved, we should read the Megillah. This is a somewhat strange argument, since there is no logical impediment to the Torah's stating that if some calamity should occur and we are saved from it, we should establish for ourselves a special day in memory of those events, and the Sages should institute certain practices (such as Megillah reading or candle-lighting) to commemorate the miracle. Maimonides apparently understands that even if there were such a commandment, its specific manifestations would still be rabbinic, just as every other rabbinic commandment is based on do not deviate and yet is not counted among the commandments.

And indeed, that is exactly his next passage there:

What appears to me to have led them to this is that we recite a blessing over these matters: "who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us" regarding the reading of the Megillah, lighting the lamp, and completing Hallel. And the Talmud asks (Shabbat 23a): "Where did He command us?" And they answered: from "do not deviate."

The Talmud itself says that the commandment of Hanukkah (like Purim) is derived from do not deviate, and in the passages that follow Maimonides explains that this does not suffice to count these commands as Torah-level commandments; the same applies to Hanukkah and Purim. At the end he concludes:

I have explained this to you so that you should not think that the reading of the Megillah, because it was instituted by prophets, is called Torah-level.

The Hatam Sofer's explanation of Behag's position

The Hatam Sofer explains the position of Behag on the basis of the Talmud in tractate Megillah 14a:

The Rabbis taught: Forty-eight prophets and seven prophetesses prophesied to Israel, and they neither subtracted from nor added to what is written in the Torah, except for the reading of the Megillah. What exposition did they derive? Rabbi Chiyya bar Avin said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha: If from slavery to freedom we recite song, then from death to life all the more so.

The obligation to read the Megillah is derived by an a fortiori inference from Passover: if in a deliverance such as Passover, which was from slavery to freedom, one recites song (Hallel), then in the deliverance of Purim, which was from death to life, all the more so.

In tractate Shabbat, 32a, the Talmud invalidates a Hanukkah lamp that was placed above twenty cubits. The term 'invalid' is used regarding Torah-level laws, and therefore the Hatam Sofer, in his novellae there, writes as follows:

It is invalid, like a sukkah and like an alleyway. It seems to me that he used the term "invalid" because it applies to Torah-level law, as Tosafot wrote, to indicate that although the lighting of the candles in itself is not Torah-level, Hanukkah itself, and all festivals established on account of miracles, are indeed Torah-level, in accordance with the view of the Behag that Hallel, Megillah, and Hanukkah are Torah-level. Maimonides and Nachmanides dispute this in Sefer HaMitzvot, in the first principle, at the end of responsum 1 and responsum 2; see there. And in my humble opinion it is not at all difficult to say that the kal va-homer derived in the first chapter of Megillah is Torah-level: if now from bondage to redemption we say a song, then from death to life all the more so. It follows that there is a Torah-level positive commandment to establish a day for every miracle; the sages only established what is to be done on it in a manner corresponding to the event—here, to read the Megillah and send portions, and there, to recite Hallel and light candles. Thus its basis is Torah-level, while its specific interpretation is rabbinic.

His claim is that the festival itself is Torah-level even if its specific commandments are rabbinic, and the same applies to Purim. This is evidence for the position of Behag. He finds the source of Behag's position in the Talmudic passage that derives the obligation of Megillah reading by an a fortiori inference from Hallel on Passover. As is well known, an a fortiori inference is one of the hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is expounded, and therefore one can certainly claim that Megillah reading is a Torah-level commandment.[1] According to this, the obligations of Purim are not based on do not deviate (as Maimonides suggested in his own view), but on the commandment to recite song on Passover. Yet there is still room for inquiry regarding the enumeration of the commandments, for even if this is indeed a Torah-level commandment, it would make more sense to include it under the commandment of Hallel on Passover rather than count it as an independent commandment.[2]

An extension of the a fortiori inference

This idea appears in several places in the Hatam Sofer's responsa. One of them appears in a kind of 'riddle-letter' concerning Lag BaOmer (Yoreh De'ah, sec. 233), where he explains why he does not go up to the Land of Israel:

However, I know what I have heard: that now people deem these generations worthy, and from afar they come to seek the Lord in the holy city of Safed on Lag BaOmer, at the celebration of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, of blessed memory. And although all their intention is for the sake of Heaven, their reward is certainly great.…But for this very reason, I was among those who separated themselves, like Ben Durtai, so that I would not have to sit there and alter their custom in their presence, and so that I would not wish to join with them in this. For Pri Chadash in Orach Chayim, siman 496, in his treatise on customs of prohibition, paragraph 14, already went to great lengths concerning places that observe a holiday on the day a miracle was performed for them…

He writes that he does not go up to the Land so as not to become entangled in the customs of Lag BaOmer, whose intention is good and whose reward is great, but which are nevertheless improper. His claim is that this involves do not add, since it adds a festival that is not written in the Torah and was not instituted by the Sages.

He then adds:

In my humble opinion, we say [=that is, the reason one celebrates a festival on the day on which a miracle occurred for a particular community—such as the Purim of Frankfurt or Casablanca] it is from this kal va-homer: if from bondage to freedom we say a song, then from death to life all the more so [=the a fortiori inference from Passover]. But to establish a festival on which no miracle occurred, and which is not mentioned anywhere in the Talmud or the decisors, not even by way of any hint or allusion—rather, merely refraining from eulogy and fasting is only a custom, and I do not know its reason at all.

The festivals that different communities add in memory of miracles that occurred to them are based on the a fortiori inference we saw in the Megillah passage. Every deliverance from death to life requires thanksgiving and song, and apparently this is a Torah-level obligation. This, of course, runs contrary to Maimonides' assumption that such a claim of the Torah about future events is impossible. Still, it is reasonable to assume that Maimonides too would agree that such a festival may be celebrated by virtue of that same a fortiori inference, but in his view it should not be regarded as a Torah-level festival, and certainly not counted among the commandments.

The Hatam Sofer concludes that Lag BaOmer is a festival on which nothing occurred that ought to be celebrated, and therefore one cannot rely there on the a fortiori inference from Passover; consequently, its observance raises a concern of violating do not add.

An interesting approach to Lag BaOmer

There the Hatam Sofer concludes with a riddle-like remark that nevertheless offers a possible explanation for this problematic festival:

And in the prayer book of Maharivatz it is written, according to the esoteric approach, that it was like a court in which all are liable, and thus it was acquitted—that is, "hod she-be-hod"; see there. But according to this, it would have been fitting to establish every good thing when we arrive at Gevurot [=that is, Gevurah within Gevurah] on the ninth day of the counting of the children of Israel [=that is, the ninth day of the Omer] but in any case these are the days of Nisan, during which eulogies are not delivered…

Briefly explained: Lag BaOmer corresponds to the sefirah of 'Hod within Hod' (the fifth day of the fifth week). The sefirah of Hod is one of the two sefirot found on the left side in the kabbalistic structure of the sefirot (Gevurah and Hod), and therefore it belongs to the axis of judgment (as opposed to the axis of kindness on the right: Hesed and Netzah). Hence Lag BaOmer (as also the ninth of Nisan) is a case of 'judgment within judgment,' and, as is well known, in capital cases if all the judges of the court sentence the accused to death, he goes free: judgment within judgment is nothing other than kindness.[3] Lag BaOmer is a festival of kindness, not of judgment.

To understand the terminology, one must remember that the term logical inference in rabbinic language means an a fortiori inference (Punishments are not derived by logical inference, Surely this is a logical inference!). Purim, and in its wake all the commemorative days of the different communities, are festivals of judgment, since all of them are derived by an a fortiori inference from Passover. By contrast, Lag BaOmer is the only festival whose foundation is not an a fortiori inference, and therefore it is not a festival of judgment; but it is a festival of 'judgment within judgment,' and therefore it is actually a festival of kindness. It is a festival devoted to what departs from ordinary understanding—what lies beyond formal inference—and focuses on the esoteric teaching hidden behind it.

* Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham, the Institute for Advanced Torah Studies at Bar-Ilan University.

[1] Admittedly, according to Maimonides' position in the second root-principle, laws derived through exegetical derivations are of rabbinic authority and are not counted. This explanation was stated only according to the position of Behag himself.

[2] In the first root-principle, Maimonides raises such an argument against Behag with respect to various obligations of charitable kindness: he does not claim that these are rabbinic commandments, but rather that they are included in the commandment of what he lacks.

[3] Behind this terse statement stands a broad and deep philosophical-logical conception. In brief, an a fortiori inference is judgment because it is logically intelligible and expresses a conclusion that follows logically from premises (what is derived by judgment is learned logically from the case under discussion). Binah is understanding one thing from another (logical inference—that is, drawing a conclusion from premises), and it is of course the sefirah that stands at the head of the axis of judgment on the left side. But when we ask what the basis is for the very principle of logical entailment itself (what is the logic behind logical inferences such as an a fortiori argument), we will have no answer in terms of logical inference (that is, in terms of yet more judgment). Therefore, to the question of judgment within judgment—the logic behind logic itself—the answer is that it is true from within itself and not on the basis of some other premise. If the conclusion of a logical argument is judgment, then such a claim belongs to the category of Chokhmah, which, as is well known, is the sefirah that stands at the head of the axis of kindness on the right.