With God's help

Daf Yomi – Lod – 2014

Rabbi Michael Abraham

This is an introductory lecture to Tractate Sukkah. At the outset I will describe the structure of the tractate, present some of the foundations of the laws of sukkah for the benefit of learners, while emphasizing the dimension of the relationship between a preparatory element and the thing itself, and finally I will discuss the question of the status of building the sukkah and of preparatory acts for commandments in general, and their relation to the act of the commandment itself.

A. General introduction: the object of a commandment and a prerequisite for the object

 

Tractate Sukkah: a general description

The laws of sukkot are divided into several categories: the laws of the structure of the sukkah (sekhakh, walls, area, and height; its location—on a ship or a wagon; Astarot Karnayim-type forms). The laws of making it (it must be made and not arise from something already made; intention and shade: the GNBaKh and RaKBaSh cases). The laws of dwelling in the sukkah (you shall dwell as you ordinarily live; one who is ill or distressed; agents engaged in a commandment; in the rain; the obligations of eating and sleeping). The laws of the materials of the sukkah (sanctity and being set aside for its commandment). The laws of the four species (binding, beauty, theft) and of taking them, and the laws of beating the willow. The festival sacrifices. The commandments of rejoicing, Hallel, and the water libation. The festival and its prayers.

The chapters of the tractate are divided as follows: the first chapter deals with the sukkah, the second with dwelling in it and its location. The third chapter deals with the laws of the willow and the four species. The fourth chapter deals with the laws of the festival and its prayers. The fifth chapter deals with rejoicing and Hallel, shofar blasts, and sacrifices.

The prerequisite of the object: the sekhakh is the sukkah

As stated, the first two chapters deal mainly with the structure of the sukkah itself and its construction, and only somewhat with dwelling in it. The laws of the sukkah are divided into the laws of the sekhakh, the laws of the walls, the laws of the interior space, and the laws of dwelling in the sukkah.

Rashi, on the first Mishnah in the tractate, writes regarding the disqualification where its sunlight exceeds its shade:

And if its sunlight exceeds its shade—the minority is nullified by the majority and is considered as though it were not there, and the sukkah is named after the sekhakh.

He also writes on the Mishnah on 12a:

And all of them—the disqualifications that we taught with regard to sekhakh.

They are valid for walls—for whenever Scripture says “sukkah,” it implies sekhakh, because a wall is not called a sukkah. And the fact that we derive walls from the terms basukkat, sukot, sukkot (Sukkah 6b)—we learn it from the extra wording of the verses, not from their plain meaning. Therefore, “You shall make sukkot for yourself from your threshing floor and your winepress” refers to the roofing alone.

He explains that the disqualifications of the sukkah stated in that Mishnah (bundles of straw and twigs) were all stated regarding the sekhakh, but from his reasoning it follows that all disqualifications of the sukkah were stated regarding the sekhakh.

At least according to some approaches among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim), there are no laws that apply to the walls at all. According to these views, the laws of the walls (for example, size and height) are really laws about the interior space, or an operative condition for the validity of the sekhakh. These are laws that serve as a condition for the sekhakh to be called 'sekhakh.' According to this, the principles of a bent wall, gud asik, and the like are part of the requirement for the validity of the walls, and that is a condition for the designation 'sekhakh.' In any event, factually it is clear that most of the laws of the sukkah concern the sekhakh.

Ravyah and Tosafot disagree regarding the view of Rabbi Yoshiyah (on 7b), who invalidates when the sunlight exceeds the shade because of the walls: does he hold that this is a special rule in the case where the sunlight exceeds the shade (Tosafot, s.v. 'Mechitzah,' ad loc.), or that in Rabbi Yoshiyah's opinion all the disqualifications of the sekhakh were also stated regarding the walls (Ravyah, cited by Mordekhai no. 731)? In any event, as a matter of Jewish law, we certainly do not rule in accordance with Rabbi Yoshiyah, and therefore it seems that according to all views all the disqualifications of the sukkah were stated regarding the sekhakh.[1]

Consequence: the sanctity of sukkah wood

The main practical ramification brought in this context is the dispute between Maimonides and the Rosh regarding the sanctity of sukkah wood. Maimonides, chapter 6, law 15:

The wood of the sukkah is forbidden throughout all eight days of the festival, whether the wood of the walls or the wood of the sekhakh..

By contrast, the Rosh, chapter 1, no. 13:

That sukkah wood is forbidden applies specifically to the sekhakh.…

(See Arukh LaNer there, who discusses the question of how one can establish the prohibition only on two walls and a handbreadth if this is a law regarding the sekhakh.)

Rabbi Joseph Dov Soloveitchik, in his novellae at the beginning of the tractate, explains that their dispute concerns the status of the walls: are they part of the object of the sukkah, or only a prerequisite for that object (since the essence of the sukkah is the sekhakh, as we have seen)? If so, in his view there is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) regarding this basic point in Rashi.

But his grandfather, Rabbi Chaim, on the above Maimonides, proves from the sugya on 7b that according to Jewish law the rules of the sukkah were certainly stated only regarding the sekhakh, and the sekhakh is the sukkah according to all views. Therefore everyone agrees that the main law of the sanctity of the sukkah was also stated only regarding the sekhakh; rather, according to Maimonides, the walls too, as part of the fulfillment of the commandment of sukkah (the act of the commandment also makes use of them), were set aside. If so, according to the Rosh the prohibition applies to the object of the sukkah, and therefore it is only regarding the sekhakh; whereas according to Maimonides, the disqualifications of the sukkah are only in the sekhakh, but the prohibition of the sanctity of the wood is not a disqualification of the sukkah. Rather, it is a prohibition on everything that serves the commandment of sukkah, and therefore it includes the walls as well:

[15] The wood of the sukkah is forbidden throughout all eight days of the festival, whether the wood of the walls or the wood of the sekhakh; one may not make use of them for anything else during all eight days, etc. The Rosh, however, wrote in the first chapter of Sukkah as follows: “This prohibition of sukkah wood applies specifically to the sekhakh, but the wood of the walls is entirely permitted, for everything we derive from ‘the festival of Sukkot’ applies specifically to the sekhakh, as explained later regarding refuse from the threshing floor and winepress; and not like Maimonides, of blessed memory, who wrote: ‘The wood of the sukkah is forbidden all seven days of the festival, whether the wood of the walls or the wood of the sekhakh,’ etc.”

It seems possible to explain Maimonides’ view as follows: granted, if we are discussing the sukkah itself, certainly the sekhakh is considered the essence of the sukkah, as stated in Sukkah 7b—see there, where Rabbi Yoshiah and the Rabbis dispute whether the walls are included together with the sekhakh or not. And for us it is established that the walls are not sekhakh; moreover, if the sunlight exceeds the shade because of the walls, it is still valid, because the law of sukkah does not apply to them. Only the sekhakh alone is that upon which the status and law of sukkah rests. However, all this is only with respect to the laws governing the validity and invalidity of the sukkah, which pertain to the object of the sukkah itself; that concerns only the sekhakh and not the walls, since the walls are not included in “sukkah.” But with respect to this law—that sukkah wood becomes prohibited—which we derive from the verse “the festival of Sukkot,” Maimonides holds that it does not depend on the essence of the sukkah as such, as though Scripture had decreed that one may not derive benefit from a sukkah. Rather, this law was stated regarding the commandment of sukkah: whatever is involved in the fulfillment of the commandment of sukkah is prohibited for benefit, and it is the commandment aspect within it that forbids benefit from it. Therefore, since we also derive the walls from the verse “in sukkot,” and without walls it is not valid, it follows that the walls too are included in the commandment of sukkah. And although the designation “sukkah” does not apply to them, nevertheless such is the commandment: for the sake of the sukkah constituted by the sekhakh, walls are also required. That is why Maimonides ruled that the wood of the sukkah’s walls also becomes prohibited.

Later, at the end of the lecture, we will see a different formulation of this dispute. But first let us precede this with a discussion of the law of building the sukkah and of preparatory acts for commandments in general.

The entire sukkah is a kind of preparation for a commandment

Let us conclude with one further remark from the Meiri, who writes on 30a:

Rather, it seems to me that one does not fulfill the commandment with the sukkah through its very substance, for he is sitting on the earth, and the sukkah merely surrounds him… But with a lulav, one fulfills the commandment with his body directly, and therefore it is appropriate to apply to it the law of a commandment that comes through a transgression. This is similar to what they said in the Jerusalem Talmud: what is the difference between lulav and shofar? With lulav one fulfills the commandment with the object itself, whereas with shofar one fulfills it through its sound—and sound is not subject to the law of theft.

At first glance, one might understand that he is speaking about the mode of fulfilling the commandment: with a sukkah one does not use its very substance, but sits inside it. But it seems more likely that he understands even the sekhakh as only a kind of instrument of the commandment. Perhaps the commandment is imposed on the person, to sit in a sukkah. According to this, the entire sukkah is not the object of the commandment but a prerequisite for fulfilling the commandment.

And indeed it is possible that some of the laws of the sukkah are laws stated not about the sekhakh and not about the walls, but about the whole configuration: a sukkah beneath another sukkah, or a sukkah that is not made for shade, or a sukkah on a ship or on a wagon, and so on.

Summary

We thus find that the walls are a prerequisite for the object of the commandment, not a prerequisite for the act of the commandment. This is one kind of prerequisite that serves as a means to the thing itself. Below we will see the relation between a preparatory act for a commandment and the act of the commandment, and afterward we will return to comment on the dispute we saw here.

B. The status of making the sukkah: commandment and preparatory act

The status of making the sukkah

Above we distinguished between making the sukkah and dwelling in it. The commandment is of course to sit in the sukkah (You shall dwell in sukkot). What is the status of making the sukkah? At first glance, it is merely a preparatory act for a commandment. The verse You shall make for yourself the festival of Sukkot, in its plain meaning, speaks of making the festival and not of making a sukkah. To be sure, the Sages derive from it the disqualifications of 'you shall make, and not from something already made,' and therefore it seems that in their view there is room to interpret it as referring to the making of the sukkah itself as well. According to that, the verse commands the making of a sukkah. Does this mean that there is a commandment in making the sukkah—in other words, that it is not only a preparatory act for a commandment?

In what follows we will discuss what a preparatory act for a commandment is in general. Is it a neutral act, or does it have halakhic status? And what is the connection between it and the body of the commandment?

One might cite here the ruling of the Rema in the Shulchan Arukh (Orach Chayim no. 624):

Those who are meticulous begin building the sukkah immediately after Yom Kippur ends, in order to go from one commandment to another (Maharil, Minhagim, and Hagahot Maimoniyot, ch. 2 of Berakhot, citing Mahari Weil).

Maharil writes that one should begin building the sukkah immediately after Yom Kippur in order to go from one commandment to another. Does that mean that making the sukkah is a commandment in its full halakhic sense? Not necessarily. It may be only a matter of religious sensibility, not a substantive halakhic definition. 'Involvement in a commandment' in the conceptual sense, not in the strict halakhic sense. We should move from involvement in one commandment to involvement in another, but involvement in a commandment does not necessarily mean fulfillment of a commandment in the full halakhic sense. Even so, we do find in several contexts that there is a commandment in building the sukkah, and we will now examine some of them.

A. Chopping wood and building a sukkah

The Mishnah (Makkot 8a) states:

"And who goes with his fellow into the forest" (Deuteronomy 19:5)… Abba Shaul says: Just as wood-chopping is optional, so too everything [included here] is optional. This excludes a father striking his son, a rabbi disciplining his student, and an agent of the religious court.

Chopping wood in a forest is a discretionary act, and one who killed unintentionally while engaged in a discretionary act goes into exile. From this Abba Shaul learns that one who killed unintentionally while engaged in a commandment is exempt from exile, for he is like a father striking his son to educate him in Torah, or a teacher disciplining his student, or an agent of the religious court carrying out his duty.

The Talmud there says about this:

A certain sage said to Rava: From where do you know that wood-chopping is optional? Perhaps it refers to chopping wood for a sukkah or chopping wood for the altar fire, and even so the Merciful One said [that exile should apply], in order to include it! He said to him: Since if he found wood already cut he would not chop, it is not a commandment; so too here, it is not a commandment.

From Rava's words it emerges that the teacher's disciplining of his student, and the father's discipline of his son, are indeed a commandment, but chopping wood for a sukkah is discretionary.

The Ritva there explains that chopping wood for a sukkah is a preparatory act for a commandment, not the commandment itself, and therefore one who kills unintentionally while chopping the wood nevertheless goes into exile (and so too in Meiri there):

Even when he did not find wood already cut, so that he has to chop it and cannot do otherwise, that chopping is still not considered a commandment; it is merely preparation for a commandment. And there is no greater enhancement of the commandment in this than in the other case. This excludes the case of a father striking his son, a rabbi disciplining his student, and an agent of the court, where the Talmud explains that there there is always a commandment involved.

He writes that this is a preparatory act for a commandment, and adds that there is no value even in engaging in it unless he needs it for that purpose, that is, unless he has no wood.

Later authorities wrote that according to the Ritva and the Meiri one still goes into exile for chopping wood for a sukkah even if he has no wood and needs to chop it, since in the final analysis this is not a commandment. That is, even if he has no wood and the preparation is necessary, it is not thereby an act of commandment; it remains a discretionary act, indeed even less than a teacher's disciplining his student or a father's striking his son, whose halakhic status likewise does not seem to be a full-fledged commandment.

By contrast, Tosafot Shantz there writes:

Rava then said: What we said is incorrect, etc. And if you would say that it is a commandment, could it be that he would manage without entering? Rather, the verse is clearly not speaking of chopping done for a commandment, and therefore it is possible… On the Mishnah—in the Mishnah, among those who do not go into exile: one who went into the forest to chop wood for a sukkah and willow branches, and any chopping of… commandment.

From here it emerges that if a person has no chopped wood, and he chopped wood for a sukkah and killed unintentionally, he does not go into exile, even though his action is only a preparatory act for a commandment. A preparation that is indispensable is an act of commandment for purposes of exile.

But Rashi there adds another layer, which may perhaps be accepted by both sides:

Even now—when he did not find wood already cut, the chopping is not a commandment; rather, the making of the sukkah is.

It is clear that in his view, even if the conclusion of the sugya is that chopping the wood is not a commandment—whether according to Tosafot Shantz or according to the Ritva—making the sukkah is certainly a commandment according to all views.

To be sure, this can be rejected by saying that he does not mean that making the sukkah is literally a commandment, but only that it is a preparatory act for a commandment; except that in his view even a preparatory act exempts from exile, like a father striking his son and a teacher disciplining his student. What he means to claim here is only that not every remote stage, such as going to work in order to buy wood for the sukkah, can be regarded as a preparatory act for a commandment. Therefore chopping the wood, even if it is necessary, is not a preparatory act for a commandment that has halakhic status—of course it is a preparation in the factual sense; without it there is no sukkah—whereas making the sukkah is.

Now, Rabbi Zalman Pines wrote to Rabbi Kook (Iggerot HaRe'iyah III, pp. 294-295):

In Makkot 8a, Rashi, s.v. now: “When he did not find wood already cut, the chopping is not a commandment; rather, the making of the sukkah is.” Seemingly, the phrase “rather, the making of the commandment” would be superfluous. And furthermore, even making it—if he found one already made, is that not also not a commandment? One may say that Rashi means that making it is nevertheless always a commandment, because it is explicitly written in the verse: “You shall make for yourself the festival of Sukkot.”

He interprets the verse as a verse that speaks about making the sukkah.

Rabbi Kook responds to him (Iggerot HaRe'iyah III, p. 274, and see also Tov Ro'i, Sukkah, p. 229):

I recall that your honor wrote a comment on Rashi’s words in Makkot 8a, in the passage dealing with wood-chopping as optional, regarding what Rashi wrote—that the commandment is the making of the sukkah. In truth, however, the commandment is only the sitting in it, and even a sukkah of thieves is valid. Still, the verse is needed also according to Beit Shammai, who hold that we require a sukkah made for its own sake, and also according to Beit Hillel. One may say, along the lines of Sefer Ḥaredim (as cited in abbreviated form by the author of Ḥayei Adam, ch. 1, sec. 10), in explaining the view that commandments do not require intention: namely, that intention itself is a commandment derived from “to serve Him with all your heart,” but he holds that it is not indispensable. So too here, one may say that the verse does not depart from its plain meaning, and making [the sukkah] is a commandment (and one recites Shehecheyanu over it), but it is not indispensable for validity; and even if one did not fulfill the commandment of making it, one still fulfills the commandment of sitting in it…

Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook maintains that building the sukkah is a full-fledged commandment, but even if one did not build a sukkah because his sukkah was already prepared, this does not invalidate the commandment of sitting in the sukkah. Rabbi Kook's innovation is that the verse truly commands the making of a sukkah and that this is a full commandment, not a mere preparatory act; but the making does not determine the validity of the sukkah, and even if he did not make it, he can fulfill his obligation in a sukkah that he did not build himself. This is a very extreme approach, and as stated above it does not necessarily emerge from Rashi's words.

B. The blessing at the time of making the sukkah

The Jerusalem Talmud (Sukkah 1:2; Berakhot 9:3) states:

What does one who makes a sukkah for himself say? “Blessed [are You] … who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to make a sukkah.” For another: “…to make a sukkah for his sake.” When he enters to sit in it, he says: “Blessed [are You] … who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to sit in the sukkah.” Once he blesses over it on the first festival night, he need not bless over it again thereafter.

According to the Jerusalem Talmud, one should recite a blessing when making the sukkah, and there is even a difference in the formula depending on whether a person builds the sukkah for himself or for others. It appears from the Jerusalem Talmud that this is a commandment-blessing, and therefore it seems that in its view there is a commandment in making the sukkah. This strongly supports Rabbi Kook's view cited above.

By contrast, in the Tosefta, Berakhot ([Lieberman], chapter 6, laws 9-10):

9. One who performs all the commandments recites a blessing over them. One who makes a sukkah for himself says: Blessed [are You …] who has kept us alive, sustained us, and brought us to this time. When he enters to sit in it he says: Blessed [are You …] who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to sit in the sukkah. Once he has recited the blessing over it on the first day, he need not bless again.

10. One who makes a lulav for himself says: Blessed [are You …] who has kept us alive, sustained us, and brought us to this time. When he takes it, he says: Blessed [are You …] who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us concerning taking the lulav. And he must recite a blessing over it all seven days. One who makes tzitzit for himself says: Blessed [are You …] who has kept us alive. When he wraps himself in it, he says: Blessed [are You …] who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to wrap ourselves in tzitzit. And he must recite a blessing over them every day. One who makes tefillin for himself says: Blessed [are You …] who has kept us alive. When he puts them on: Blessed [are You …] who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to put on tefillin. From when does he put them on? In the morning; if he did not put them on in the morning, he may put them on the entire day.

Here we are dealing with a blessing of praise, and one cannot infer that there is a commandment in making the sukkah. The Tosefta's position is that one recites a blessing of praise even over making the object of commandments, and not only over their performance. In principle the Jerusalem Talmud could also have been interpreted this way, but the formulation of the blessing there indicates that this is a commandment we are commanded to perform. Indeed, this Tosefta is cited in the Babylonian Talmud (Pesachim 7b; Sukkah 46a), but the rule of blessing over the making of the sukkah is not cited. Therefore it is commonly said that we have here a dispute between the Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud; and, as stated, Rashi in Makkot does not necessarily follow the Jerusalem Talmud.

In another place in the Talmud (Menachot 42a), they discuss the blessing over making an object for a commandment, especially tzitzit. In the course of the discussion, the Talmud proves that one does not recite a blessing over making tzitzit from the fact that one does not recite a blessing over making a sukkah:

As it was taught: One who makes a sukkah for himself says: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, who has kept us alive, sustained us, and brought us to this time. When he comes to sit in it, he says: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to sit in the sukkah. But over making the sukkah itself he does not recite a blessing.

Here the Talmud says explicitly that one does not recite a blessing over making the sukkah. The conclusion that emerges there is that for every commandment whose making is not the completion of the commandment, such as the four species, sukkah, tzitzit, and tefillin, one does not recite a blessing at the time of making, but only the blessing of 'Shehecheyanu.'

Tosafot (Menachot 42b, s.v. 'Ilu') note the words of the Jerusalem Talmud cited above and write that we have before us a dispute between the two Talmuds:

And in the chapter HaRo'eh (Jerusalem Talmud, Berakhot 9:3) it requires one to recite a blessing over making tzitzit, a sukkah, and tefillin. And the Arukh cites it under the entry cropped up 3. It disagrees with our Talmud.

We see that there is a dispute whether to recite a blessing over making a sukkah or not. In the straightforward reading, the dispute is whether there is a commandment here or not.

But there on 42b, the Talmud explains the Babylonian Talmud's view:

Rather, is this not the reason: any commandment whose performance itself completes the commandment, such as circumcision—even though it is valid if performed by a gentile—in the case of a Jew one must recite a blessing; and any commandment whose performance does not itself complete the commandment, such as tefillin—even though they are invalid if made by a gentile—in the case of a Jew one need not recite a blessing. And regarding tzitzit, this is their dispute: one master holds that it is an obligation of the garment, and one master holds that it is an obligation of the person.

Here the formulation is 'a commandment whose making is the completion of the commandment.' It appears that we are not speaking about a mere preparatory act for a commandment, but about the beginning of the commandment.[2]

In the Or Zarua (part I, laws of tefillin, no. 583, s.v. 'BePerek HaTekhelet'), it is brought:

The Jerusalem Talmud disagrees with our Talmud in the chapter HaTekhelet, and we rely only on our Talmud. The reasoning of the Jerusalem Talmud is that because it is a commandment to perform the commandment for its own sake, one recites a blessing over making it.

It is not clear whether he means to say that there is a commandment in making the sukkah, and the proof is that we require making it for its own sake—according to Beit Shammai, and according to Beit Hillel for the sake of shade; see 8b, the cases of GNBaKh and RaKBaSh, and Maimonides, chapter 5, law 9—or whether he learns from here that there is a commandment to make the sukkah for its own sake, that is, this is a requirement for the validity of the object of the sukkah, like all the laws of 'for its own sake,' and not really a commandment upon the person.

In the straightforward reading, the fact that making it for its own sake is required proves nothing, for even baking matzah must be done for its own sake, and the law of 'for its own sake' is a law regarding the preparation of an object of commandment, as distinct from the law of intention, for which it is enough at the moment of the act of the commandment. A number of later authorities wrote likewise; see Rabbi Lichtenstein's lectures on Zevachim and elsewhere.

But the plain sense of his words seems to be that because there are laws regarding the making, and not only regarding the object that is made, this proves that the action of the commandment has already begun at the time of making, and therefore it is appropriate to recite a blessing already at the time of making. According to this, making the object is the beginning of the fulfillment of the commandment. This is what we also saw in the language of the Babylonian Talmud in Menachot, that one does not recite a blessing because it is not the 'completion of the commandment.' The Babylonian Talmud sees the preparatory act as the beginning of the fulfillment of the commandment, except that one does not recite a blessing because it is only the beginning and lacks completion.

It should be noted that Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perlow, in his commentary to Sefer HaMitzvot of Rav Saadia Gaon (cited by Rabbi Tzvi Pesach Frank, Mikra'ei Kodesh, Sukkah I, p. 111), writes that even according to the Jerusalem Talmud there is no commandment, but one still recites a blessing over a preparatory act for a commandment.

Maimonides rules in practice in accordance with the Babylonian Talmud, and uses its formulation (Berakhot 11:8):

Any commandment whose performance completes the obligation is blessed over at the time of performance, whereas any commandment for which there is another commanded act after its making is blessed over only when one performs that final act. How so? One who makes a sukkah, a lulav, a shofar, tzitzit, tefillin, or a mezuzah does not recite, at the time of making, “who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to make a sukkah or a lulav” or “to write tefillin,” because there is another command after the making. When does one recite the blessing? When he sits in the sukkah, or waves the lulav, or hears the sound of the shofar, or wraps himself in tzitzit, or at the time of putting on tefillin, or at the time of affixing the mezuzah. But if one makes a parapet, he recites the blessing at the time of making: “who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to make a parapet,” and similarly in all comparable cases.

If our analysis is correct, then this formulation in Maimonides also indicates that the preparatory act is the beginning of the performance of the commandment itself.

By contrast, the formulation in the Tur (Orach Chayim no. 641) is different:

One who makes a sukkah for himself does not need to recite a blessing over making it. Even though in the Jerusalem Talmud we read: “One who makes a sukkah for himself recites: ‘…who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to make a sukkah’; if he made it for another, he recites: ‘…over the making of a sukkah,’” we rely on our Talmud, which says that one need not recite a blessing over making it.

From here it appears that there is nothing at all in the making. He does not formulate it as a commandment whose making is not the completion of the commandment. It somewhat appears that he understands the language of the sugya in Menachot as not necessarily precise, and that the preparatory act has no halakhic status.

C. Linguistic inferences

In Shevuot 3:8 we find:

If one swore to nullify the commandment—not to make a sukkah, not to take a lulav, and not to put on tefillin—this is a vain oath, for whose intentional violation one is liable to lashes, while for its unwitting violation one is exempt.

There is a difference here in the wording between sukkah, where the language speaks of making it and not of sitting in it, and lulav, where the language speaks of taking it, or tefillin, where the language speaks of putting them on.

The Mishnah in Nedarim 2:2 also brings these examples:

This is a stringency in oaths over vows, and a stringency in vows over oaths. How so? If one said: “Konam, the sukkah that I make,” “the lulav that I take,” “the tefillin that I put on”—in the case of vows it is forbidden; in the case of oaths it is permitted, for one may not swear to transgress the commandments.

To be sure, in Nedarim 16b we find an explanation of this Mishnah:

Rava said: This is [the case of] one who said, “The sitting in the sukkah is incumbent upon me,” and that is [the case of] one who said, “I swear that I will not sit in the sukkah.”

It seems that after all the matter concerns sitting in the sukkah. But even so, the habitual form of expression also seems to tell us something.

Similarly, we find in the Talmud in Ketubot (86a; and see also Hullin 132b):

Rav Kahana said to Rav Pappa: According to you, who say that repayment of a debt is a commandment, if the debtor says, “I do not wish to have a commandment done,” what is the law? He said to him: We learned: When does this apply? To prohibitions. But with positive commandments—for example, if they tell him, “Make a sukkah,” and he does not do so, or “Take a lulav,” and he does not do so—they beat him until his soul departs.

To be sure, regarding lulav too it says here 'does,' but in the Ritva the reading is indeed 'takes.'

Similarly, we find in the Jerusalem Talmud (Pe'ah 1:1; Kiddushin 1:7):

"Honor the Lord with your wealth" (Proverbs 3:9). With what do you honor Him? From what He has graced you with. One sets aside gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the corner [of the field]; one sets aside terumah, the first tithe, the second tithe, the poor tithe, and hallah; and one makes a sukkah, a lulav, a shofar, tefillin, and tzitzit; and feeds the poor and the hungry and gives drink to the thirsty. If you have, you are obligated in all these; and if you do not have, you are not obligated even in one of them.

To be sure, here the language 'does' is used for all the commandments, but the Bi'ur Halakhah (no. 656, s.v. 'Afilu') explains that here too the Jerusalem Talmud follows its own view:

For the Jerusalem Talmud follows its own view, as stated there in Berakhot, chapter 9, halakhah 3: “One who makes a sukkah for himself says: Blessed [are You] … who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to make a sukkah.” …Thus the Jerusalem Talmud holds that making commandments is itself a separate commandment, since one recites a blessing over it (and see Tosafot on Menahot 42b, that the Jerusalem Talmud disagrees with our Gemara on this), and one cannot exempt oneself by buying tefillin or a sukkah from another with one’s money. Therefore the Jerusalem Talmud says that in this matter the Torah did not obligate him to make the sukkah himself. …If he does not have [the materials], the Torah did not obligate him to go searching for wood for a sukkah or parchment for tefillin and the like. Rather, he buys with his money tefillin and a mezuzah made by others, and similarly with a sukkah and all commandments where the making is only preparation. But the essence of the positive commandment—to wear tefillin, and similarly in the fulfillment of the other commandments—from this the Torah did not exempt him at all, for it is an obligation incumbent upon his person.

According to him, on the basis of the Jerusalem Talmud, a person who cannot buy wood for a sukkah with his money would be exempt from doing so, although he would not be exempt from the actual fulfillment of the commandment of sukkah, and he would sit in another person's sukkah.[3]

But it seems that the plain meaning of the Jerusalem Talmud is not in accordance with the Bi'ur Halakhah. The Jerusalem Talmud merely says that one must spend money on the commandment, and in the case of sukkah it is obvious that the expenditure is on its preparation and not on its making.

The view of the She'iltot

In the She'iltot, no. 161, Rav Achai writes:

For the House of Israel is obligated to make a sukkah and sit in it.

And the Netziv, there (Ha'amek She'elah, sec. 1), writes:

Although the primary commandment of sukkah is sitting in it, and the making of it is only preparation, nevertheless there is still a commandment in it, since this preparation is written in the Torah and is therefore more significant than other preparations for a commandment that are not written in the Torah. Making a sukkah and writing tefillin and mezuzot are not comparable—for it is written, “and you shall write them,” and similarly guarding matzah, regarding which it is written, “and you shall guard the matzot”…—to binding the lulav or preparing the shofar and the like, where no preparation at all is mentioned, only the body of the commandment itself.

And I learned this from Rashi on Makkot 8, regarding the Mishnah, “and who goes with his fellow into the forest”… Rashi explains: “Even now—when he did not find wood already cut, the chopping is not a commandment; rather, the making of the sukkah is.” Thus Rashi distinguishes between chopping wood and the actual making of the sukkah: the actual making of the sukkah is certainly considered a commandment, for even if he found one already made, it is still a commandment that he make it himself, because it is better to perform a commandment personally than through an agent. Chopping wood, by contrast—if he found wood already cut—it certainly is not a commandment.

He argues that chopping wood for the sake of a sukkah is not considered part of making the sukkah, but when one actually builds the sukkah, the building itself is considered a commandment.

C. The status of a preparatory act for a commandment that is written in the Torah

Interim summary: what is a preparatory act for a commandment?

We should consider what the status of a preparatory act for a commandment is in general. Up to this point we have seen two approaches: one can view it as a neutral action that is required only because of the necessities of reality. As we saw above in the Meiri, there is no value in engaging in it. At most, it is a necessity that cannot be avoided. By contrast, one can view the preparation as an action in which Jewish law has an interest, and perhaps even as the beginning of the performance of the commandment itself.

A preparatory act for a commandment that is written in the Torah

This discussion gains special force in cases where there is an explicit Torah command regarding the preparatory act. There are several examples of this, some of them discussed in Maimonides' tenth principle, and see my article on the tenth principle. For example, circumcision—if the commandment is to be circumcised, then the act of circumcision is a preparatory act upon which the Torah nevertheless imposes a commandment. Likewise tending the lamps, which is ostensibly a preparation for lighting, and yet the Torah commands it. And perhaps also the commandment of procreation, for one who understands it as a result-commandment; see my book BeNativ HaMitzvot, Parashat Tetzaveh.

Of course, the cases must be distinguished. The commandment to tend the lamps is counted as a commandment in its own right. Therefore, even if here we are dealing with a preparation toward the primary value, the lighting of the lamps, the halakhic definition here is the definition of a full positive commandment. Only the conceptual content is the content of a preparatory act. By contrast, there are cases, such as making the incense—Take for yourself spices, and so on; see the tenth principle—in which the commandment is the burning of the incense, but the preparations leading up to it appear explicitly in the Torah. They do not have the status of a full commandment—they are neither counted nor treated as a full commandment—but this is a preparatory act whose performance the Torah commands. This is unlike blowing a shofar, where we do not find a Torah command regarding the making of a shofar, and therefore the making is a preparatory act for a commandment that is not written in the Torah. As we saw, the making of the sukkah as well is interpreted by the Sages as a preparatory act whose performance the Torah commands.

One engaged in a commandment

We find in Jewish law that even one engaged in a preparatory act for a commandment is exempt from a commandment. Agents engaged in a commandment, such as those who are going to redeem captives, are exempt from the commandment; see the sugya in Sukkah 10b, and also 25b-26a and elsewhere. One who goes to redeem captives is engaged in a preparatory act for a commandment, and yet he is exempt from the commandment. At first glance, this is proof that a preparatory act is truly the beginning of the commandment itself, for otherwise why should one engaged in it be exempt from another commandment?

But this is not conclusive proof, since it is possible that one engaged in a preparatory act is merely considered as one who is engaged in the commandment itself. When one engaged in a commandment stands before two commandments, he must decide which of them to engage in; that is, the discussion concerns which commandment takes precedence over the other. It may be that only for this purpose it was said that if he has already begun to engage in one of them, it is regarded as the first, and therefore it takes precedence over the other. But one cannot necessarily infer from this that engagement in a preparatory act is engagement in the commandment itself.

In another formulation: if we did not exempt him from the second commandment while he is engaged in the first, he would lose the first commandment, because without the preparatory act it would not be fulfilled. If so, what pushes aside the second commandment is the concern for the nullification of the first, not the fact of engagement in the preparation for the first commandment as such.

To be sure, some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) maintain that one engaged in a commandment is exempt from another commandment even where both can be fulfilled. For example, the view of the author of the Or Zarua (laws of sukkah, no. 299), cited by Hagahot Ashri (Sukkah ch. 2, end of no. 6) and in the Darkhei Moshe (Orach Chayim 640:7), is that even if the second can be fulfilled without any difficulty to the fulfillment of the first, it is nevertheless pushed aside before the first. The Ran, who is somewhat more stringent (novellae of the Ran on the Rif, Sukkah, 11a in the Rif pagination, s.v. 'VeIka,' 'Umihu'), still maintains that even when both can be fulfilled, the first pushes aside the second, unless the second can be fulfilled without any exertion at all.

According to those approaches among the medieval authorities, who hold that the exemption exists even where both can be fulfilled, it is much harder to understand how engagement in a preparatory act for a commandment can push aside a second commandment. Here one can no longer say that what pushes aside the second is the fulfillment of the first itself, because without the preparatory act it would not be fulfilled, for here the first will be fulfilled even if he performs the second. The very engagement in the preparatory act pushes aside the second commandment. From here it does indeed seem to follow that the preparatory act is part of the fulfillment of the commandment itself.

Preparations for circumcision

A similar phenomenon can be found in the dispute of the tannaim (Mishnah at the beginning of the chapter of circumcision, Shabbat 130a, and the Talmud there). The tannaim disagree over whether preparations for circumcision override the Sabbath. Here too one must consider how the preparations themselves override the Sabbath if engaging in them is not like engaging in the commandment itself. To be sure, here too one may answer in the same way: if we do not make the preparations, the commandment itself, circumcision, will not be done, and that is what overrides the Sabbath.

At first glance, however, this depends on the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer regarding circumcision: whether the overriding applies only where it was impossible to prepare before the day. But according to most halakhic decisors, if he did not prepare before the day even though he could have done so, the preparation does not override the Sabbath according to Rabbi Akiva, even though in that situation the commandment itself will be lost. At first glance, this proves that it is not the commandment that causes the override; rather, the preparation itself is what overrides. Perhaps, however, there is room to say that this is a penalty and not the law at its core.

Disqualifying intention while gathering the coals

We likewise find in the sugya in Yoma 48b that the Talmud entertains a doubt whether an invalidating intention entertained at the time of gathering the coals for the incense also disqualifies there as well, and the commentators there disagree as to what exactly is disqualified—the incense itself or the coals:

If he intended [to fulfill the commandment] while raking the coals, what is the law? Are preparations for a commandment treated like the commandment itself, or not? Let it stand unresolved.

Gathering the coals is certainly a preparatory act for a commandment. From the very formulation of the doubt it is already clear that the Talmud took it for granted that gathering the coals is a preparatory act for a commandment, and the question is whether an invalidating intention also disqualifies during engagement in the preparation for the commandment, just as an invalidating intention disqualifies during engagement in the commandment itself.

At least according to one side of the doubt, the side that holds that the intention disqualifies even while gathering the coals, the conception is clearly that the preparation for the commandment is truly like engagement in the commandment itself. If the preparation lacked any halakhic status, there would be no room at all to deliberate about an invalidating intention that would disqualify there. Here we can no longer answer as we did in the previous examples and attribute it to the commandment itself, namely the offering of the incense, because if we did not disqualify the preparation, the commandment would be performed properly, and there is nothing here that harms the commandment itself.

To be sure, as appears from the sugya before us, the doubt was not resolved, and the sugya ends unresolved. Therefore, in conclusion it is difficult to bring proof from here to our discussion. However, according to Rabbenu Chananel's reading, and so Maimonides also rules, the law is that an intention entertained while gathering the coals does disqualify. If so, at least according to their view, the preparation for the commandment is considered in Jewish law to be the beginning of the fulfillment of the commandment itself.

Lighting Hanukkah candles and honoring father and mother

In responsum 102 in Terumat HaDeshen, he discusses the law of the Hanukkah lamp on Friday evening. The question is as follows:[4]

Question: We hold regarding the Hanukkah lamp that if it went out, one is not required to relight it. If it went out on Sabbath eve before the onset of the Sabbath—since they must be lit while it is still day—is one required to relight it in such a case or not?

The matter is as follows. As is well known, in practice we rule that if a Hanukkah lamp went out, one need not relight it. But on Friday evening the situation seems different. On Friday evening we light the lamps before sunset, whereas the ordinary enactment of lighting is, according to the author of Terumat HaDeshen, at the time of nightfall, since what use is a lamp in broad daylight?

The question now arises about a lamp that was lit on Friday evening—which, as stated, is a lighting before its proper time—and then went out. On an ordinary day, a lamp that went out does not need to be lit again, but here, if the lamp went out before the onset of the Sabbath, then this happened even before the commandment was fulfilled, and therefore at first glance there ought to be an obligation, according to all views, to relight it.

The author of Terumat HaDeshen writes as follows:

Answer: It seems that one is not required to relight it even in such a case.

A surprising answer: the author of Terumat HaDeshen claims that even on Friday evening there is no need to relight. He himself then raises the obvious difficulty:

And although Mordechai wrote there that the commandment of the Hanukkah lamp begins from the end of sunset onward—that is, from nightfall and not before—because what benefit is a lamp in broad daylight? If so, the essence of the commandment of the Hanukkah lamp is not at the time of lighting while it is still day; rather, the fulfillment of the commandment lies in its continuing to burn after dark. Therefore we might have said that if it went out before the beginning of the actual fulfillment of the commandment, one would be required to relight it.

Here the lamp went out even before the fulfillment of the commandment, so how can one say that there is no need to relight? The author of Terumat HaDeshen explains this as follows:

However, from the fact that we recite, while it is still day, “who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to kindle the Hanukkah lamp,” even though as yet there is no commandment [being fulfilled], it must be that the reason is because, since it cannot be done otherwise, it is considered preparation for the commandment. As Tosafot explained regarding the preparation involved in the commandment of honoring one’s father and mother, in the discussion in the first chapter of Yevamot (6a, s.v. since): “Slaughter for me, cook for me”—there is still no commandment until the later time when he feeds his father. Even so, the Gemara there wished to say that this should override a prohibition punishable by karet.

He proves that the lighting is a preparatory act for the commandment from the fact that even on Friday one recites the blessing over the lighting, although there is as yet no fulfillment of the commandment. It is not clear what exactly he means here. Obviously this is a preparatory act for a commandment, but apparently he wants to prove that there is already actual fulfillment of the commandment here, and not only a preparatory act. That is, in his view a preparation that is necessary for the fulfillment has the law of part of the fulfillment itself. This indeed seems to be his intent: such a preliminary act has the status of a preparatory act for a commandment in the sense of the beginning of the fulfillment of the commandment, as distinct from a remote preparation, such as chopping wood for a sukkah according to Rashi, which has no such status.

He also proves this from Tosafot, s.v. 'SheKen,' in the sugya in Yevamot 6a, who write in the name of Rabbenu Chananel that the preparatory acts of the commandment of honoring father and mother override a prohibition punishable by karet. To be sure, as we saw above from the sugyot of override, it is difficult to bring unequivocal proof from there regarding the status of a preparatory act for a commandment, but the author of Terumat HaDeshen understands that the override is because the preparation for the commandment is already the beginning of the fulfillment of the commandment itself.[5] Presumably this is also how he would understand all the sugyot we brought above.

It should be noted that it is possible that Rabbenu Chananel is here consistent with his own view, for in the sugya in Yoma too we saw that he holds that a preparatory act for a commandment is the beginning of the fulfillment of the commandment itself.

The author of Terumat HaDeshen concludes that passage with the following formulation:

Thus we see that preparing the commandment is considered fulfillment of the positive commandment just like the commandment itself, and that is why we recite a blessing over it. And for that reason too, if it went out, one is not required to relight it, for the commandment had already begun through the preparation.

His conclusion is that the preparation for the commandment is considered like the fulfillment of the commandment itself, and therefore one recites a blessing over it. From this he derives the far-reaching conclusion that if the lamp then goes out, there is no need to relight it even on Friday evening. Although the time of the commandment has not yet arrived, once we have lit it, the very fact that there is here a preparatory act for a commandment means that the commandment has already in some sense been fulfilled.

It should be noted that the innovation of the author of Terumat HaDeshen contains two distinct components:

• A preparatory act for a commandment has the status of the beginning of the fulfillment of the commandment.
• If a person performed the preparatory act for the commandment, he has completely discharged his obligation, even without the slightest trace of the result. This, of course, applies only to commandments whose content is the action and not the result, as with the Hanukkah lamp, where as a matter of Jewish law we rule that if it went out one need not relight.

It is important to understand that the second innovation is not a necessary conclusion from the first. It is entirely possible that Maimonides and Rabbenu Chananel, who understand the preparatory act as the beginning of the fulfillment of the commandment, would still obligate us to relight a Hanukkah lamp that went out on Friday evening. Despite their agreement with the first innovation, they can certainly reject the second innovation of the author of Terumat HaDeshen.

What is the meaning of the second innovation? It seems that this too touches on the conception of a preparatory act for a commandment. One might have said that the preparatory act has halakhic status and contains an element of fulfillment of the commandment, but it is not really considered part of the commandment itself, and certainly not its complete fulfillment. From Terumat HaDeshen we see that he understood the lighting as a fulfillment of the commandment itself. In commandments of action, a person who performed the preparatory act has discharged his obligation. In his view, he performed the required act, and thereby he fulfilled the commandment.

It may be that he intends this only for commandments in which the act incumbent upon us is only the preparatory act. In the case of the lamp, we can light it, but its remaining lit is a result that follows automatically from our action, even though the commandment concerns the result. Lighting is a preparation for the lamp to be lit, but it is impossible for it to be lit without lighting. His first innovation is correct with respect to every preparatory act, but his second innovation is correct only with respect to preparations of this type.

The tenth principle

The discussion of preparatory acts for commandments that are written in the Torah begins in Maimonides' tenth principle. He writes there that one does not count preparatory acts for commandments. But his explanations are given in two different formulations:

The tenth principle is that one should not count preliminaries that serve a single end among the ends themselves. Sometimes commands appear in the Torah, but those commands are not themselves the commandment; rather, they are preliminaries to the performance of the commandment, as though Scripture were describing how that commandment is to be carried out.

A similar example is the statement (end of Emor), “And you shall take fine flour,” etc. For it would be improper to count the taking of the flour as one commandment and making it into bread as another. Rather, what is counted (positive commandment 27) is the verse “And you shall place on the table showbread before Me continually” (Exodus 25). The commandment is simply that bread be before the Lord continually; only afterward does Scripture explain what kind of bread this is and from what it is to be made, saying that it is to be of fine flour and that it is to consist of twelve loaves.

In this very same way, it is likewise improper to count the verse “And they shall take for you pure olive oil” (beginning of Tetzaveh); rather, what should be counted is “to raise up a continual lamp” (positive commandment 25), and this is the tending of the lamps, as explained in Tamid. And in this same way, the verse “Take for yourself spices” (beginning of Ki Tisa) should not be counted; rather, what should be counted is the burning of the incense every day (positive commandment 28), as Scripture states (end of Tetzaveh): “Every morning, when he tends the lamps, he shall burn it; and when Aaron kindles the lamps,” etc. That is the commandment that is counted. As for “Take for yourself spices,” it is a preliminary command, meant to explain how this commandment is to be performed and of what this incense is to be made. Likewise, “Take for yourself choice spices” (beginning of Ki Tisa) is not to be counted; rather, what is counted is the commandment (positive commandment 35) by which we were commanded that High Priests, kings, and sacred vessels be anointed with the prescribed anointing oil.

In this way, infer the same for everything similar to it, so that you do not multiply what ought not to be multiplied. This is our intention in this principle, and it is clear.

We mentioned this and called attention to it because many also erred in this matter and counted certain preliminaries to commandments together with the commandment itself as two commandments, as will become clear to anyone who understands the count of the sections mentioned by Rabbi Shimon Kayyara, of blessed memory, and by all who followed him among those who enumerate the sections in their count:

The highlighted formulations seem to point in two directions. The first indicates that there is no commandment here at all. This is a neutral act, and therefore there is no place to include it in the count of the commandments, which deals only with acts of commandment. But the second rationale implies as though the preparatory act is itself also a commandment, and the reason it is not counted is only that it is included in the primary commandment, which it prepares, and therefore should not be counted separately as a distinct commandment. Of course, this whole discussion applies only to preparations that are written in the Torah itself, since Maimonides' position is that what does not appear in the Torah is not counted at all.

Let us bring one example of this from Maimonides himself. At the beginning of the laws of the Temple vessels, Maimonides rules that making the anointing oil and the incense are positive commandments. His language is as follows:

Chapter 1, halakhah 1: It is a positive commandment to make the anointing oil so that it be ready for the things that require anointing with it, as it is said: “And you shall make it a sacred anointing oil,” etc.

Chapter 2, halakhah 1: The incense is made every single year, and its preparation is a positive commandment, as it is said: “And you shall take for yourself spices,” etc.

The author of Kin'at Soferim on the tenth principle objects to these words of Maimonides on the basis of his own words in that principle, where making the anointing oil and taking the incense are not positive commandments but only preparatory acts for a commandment, and are not counted because they have no halakhic status at all. Yet here we see that Maimonides regards them as actual positive commandments.

The author of Kin'at Soferim there explains it as follows:

The answer to this is that the beginning of the commandment is that prior act which is necessary for it. Since it is impossible to fulfill the commandment properly without it, it is included within the commandment itself. Accordingly, those preliminaries and preparatory steps that we mentioned are parts of the commandment, and are not counted separately; rather, only the completion of the commandment, which is the goal of the commands stated concerning it, enters the count…

He explains that making the oil and the incense are also commandments, for they are preparations for the commandments of anointing and of offering, especially because they are indispensable preparations, following the distinction of Tosafot Shantz cited above. As we saw, according to Maimonides the conclusion of the sugya in Yoma is that the preparatory act is part of the commandment. In this sense Maimonides agrees with the first innovation of the author of Terumat HaDeshen. If so, what Maimonides claims in this principle is that one should not grant them independent status, not that they are not positive commandments. Maimonides sees this principle as part of the principles of classification and categorization, and not as belonging to the category of acts that are not commandments at all. The preparatory act is not counted because it is included in the commandment, not because it is not a commandment at all. Here Maimonides is consistent with his own view, as we also saw above in the view of Rabbenu Chananel.

 

Conclusion regarding building a sukkah

Above we saw several possibilities for understanding the meaning of building a sukkah. Some see it as a neutral act, a mere necessity; others see it as an act of value that is not an act of commandment. Others see it as a truly independent commandment. Our discussion here suggests yet another possibility: building the sukkah is neither a commandment nor a neutral preparatory act for the commandment of sitting in the sukkah; rather, it is part of the commandment of sitting in the sukkah. We saw that this is the plain sense of the Babylonian Talmud's language, that making a sukkah 'is not the completion of the commandment.'

The dichotomous way of seeing things leads us to assume either that the preparatory act is part of the commandment itself or that it is a neutral act. But in my article on the tenth principle I explained that, at least according to Maimonides, a preparatory act that is written in the Torah has the status of a 'half-commandment.' It contains a kind of fulfillment of a commandment, but it is still not part of the execution of the primary commandment. An analogy may be brought from the law of a half-measure, at least according to the conceptions that see a half-measure as an independent commandment and not as a detail within the other commandments.

The remarks here are relevant because, at least according to the Sages, making the sukkah is a preparatory act that is written in the Torah, and therefore there is room to see in it part of the fulfillment of the commandment itself, or a half-commandment. But we would not necessarily say this regarding every ordinary preparatory act.

D. A prerequisite for the object of a commandment and a prerequisite for the act of commandment

Returning to Rabbi Chaim's definition

This claim brings us back to the words of Rabbi Chaim that we saw above. Rabbi Chaim explains that according to Maimonides the preparatory elements of the commandment of sukkah also become sanctified, since what determines the sanctity is the act of the commandment and not the object in itself. He relates to the walls as a preparatory element for the commandment that is part of the fulfillment of the commandment, for without them sitting in the sukkah is not a fulfillment of the commandment. Therefore, according to Maimonides, sanctity applies to the walls and not only to the sekhakh. If so, in order to define the sanctity according to Maimonides, which also takes hold on the walls, he finds himself forced to give up the relation between sanctity and the object of the sukkah, and he makes it depend on the act of the commandment. This, of course, departs from the simple intuition that the law of sanctity is a law in the object of the sukkah, especially since in the plain sense it is a Torah law derived from the festival-offering sacrifice; see Beitzah 30a, and not the law of something set aside for its commandment, which is a rabbinic law that relates to the act of the commandment.

According to our way of understanding the matter, however, perhaps there is no need for this. One can remain with the simple conception according to which sanctity is a law in the object of the commandment, and not in what serves the act of the commandment, contrary to Rabbi Chaim's definition; and at the same time one can also remain with the simple conception that the walls are only a prerequisite for the sekhakh and not the essence of the sukkah. Even so, one can say that the walls are considered a faint part of the sukkah itself, just as a preparation for the act of the commandment is considered a faint part of the act itself.

In other words: the relation between a prerequisite of the object and the object itself is similar to the relation we saw between a preparatory act for a commandment and the commandment itself. Here we give up the dichotomous picture that accepts only the two polar possibilities: either the detail is the body and essence of the thing, or it is something external to the essence. Just as the preparatory act for a commandment is not the act of the commandment itself and also not something external to it, but rather a bit of a commandment, or a half-commandment, so too the prerequisite of the object is not truly the essence of the object and not something completely external to it, but rather a faint part of the thing itself. The preparatory act is a faint prelude to the act of the commandment, in which there is already something of the commandment itself, even though it is not its essence. So too the prerequisite of the object, the walls, is annexed to the object itself, the sekhakh.[6]

Is it also necessary, regarding the prerequisite of the object, that the prerequisite be written in the Torah?

Regarding a preparatory act for the act of the commandment, we saw that at least according to Maimonides all this can be said only where the Torah itself commands the making of the preparatory act. But what about a prerequisite for the object? It may be that here too we should say that only a prerequisite for the object that is written in the Torah will be considered part of the object itself. But in truth there is no necessity for this.

First, there is an essential difference between a prerequisite for the object and a preparatory act for a commandment, because regarding commandments Maimonides' view, in the second principle, is that only what is explicitly written in the Torah can be counted as a Torah commandment. Even a law that is derived by exegesis is, in his view, not counted as a commandment; see there. It follows that a preparatory act for a commandment likewise cannot be considered a Torah obligation if it was not said explicitly in the Torah. But regarding a prerequisite for the object, there is no such necessity, for there we do not find a distinction between what is written in the Torah and what is not written there, although perhaps there is room for a conceptual argument that it should be so.

Let us explain this briefly. At first glance, the matter depends on the question whether the words of the Sages are said with respect to the object or with respect to the person; see Atvan DeOraita, principle 10, and much more. One must also consider whether, even if the words of the Sages are said with respect to the person—they do not have the power to create a new reality—perhaps their exegeses are like Torah law, which is said with respect to the object, and not like rabbinic law; or perhaps this is not so, especially according to Maimonides in the second principle, that exegeses are like rabbinic statements.

It is important to understand that the law of the walls is learned by the Talmud in Sukkah 6b from an exegesis and a halakhah given to Moses at Sinai, which establishes it as two walls and a handbreadth. And Maimonides' view is that even a halakhah given to Moses at Sinai is like the words of the Sages.[7] Therefore one must consider whether the law of the walls is a prerequisite that is written in the Torah, or whether it is like a prerequisite that is not written there, since it is learned through exegesis. In that case, the possibility of seeing it as part of the object of the sukkah depends on the question whether it must be written in the Torah in order for us to say that or not.

[1] The laws of the material and the manner of construction are stated only regarding the sekhakh. With respect to the disqualification of a stolen sukkah, it is not explicit whether it is stated regarding the walls as well. The same is true regarding the rule of 'you shall make it and not from something already made.'

[2] See Or Yisrael by Rabbi Yisrael Salanter, article 'Chok U'Mishpat,' on what he derived from here regarding Torah study undertaken in order to know and not in order to fulfill.

[3] See also the Jerusalem Talmud, Berakhot (1:2) and the Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat (1:2), where it is said that Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai would not interrupt his study even for the fulfillment of commandments. To this the Jerusalem Talmud asks: But does Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai not agree that one interrupts [Torah study] in order to make a sukkah and to prepare a lulav?. From here too one can learn that this question is, according to the Jerusalem Talmud, because the commandment is the making of the sukkah. But the commentators there explain that the intention is to sit in the sukkah.

And see Responsa Shevet HaLevi, part IV, no. 64, who disagrees with the Bi'ur Halakhah in understanding the Jerusalem Talmud.

[4] As is known, the questions in Responsa Terumat HaDeshen were formulated by the author himself.

[5] In Terumat HaDeshen itself there is a qualification that this is because it is impossible otherwise; see Chagigah 2. At first glance it appears that only in such a case is a preparatory act for a commandment like the commandment itself. However, it seems that his intention is that only indispensable steps are considered a preparatory act for a commandment in the first place, but once something is indeed a preparatory act for a commandment, it is always considered part of the fulfillment of the commandment itself.

Some explained that this rule is correct on Friday evening because already at the time of the enactment, the Sages knew that every Hanukkah would include at least one Sabbath, and the enactment for Friday evening was from the outset made with that in mind. Therefore, on Friday evening this is truly the time of fulfilling the commandment, for the original enactment was instituted such that on Friday evening the time is before sunset. To be sure, from the very fact that one recites a blessing over the lighting on Friday evening one cannot prove that the preparatory act has status, for this too can be explained in that way; but from the language of Terumat HaDeshen it is clear that this is not what he means, but rather as we explained above. See on all this the Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. 'Hanukkah.'

[6] According to this, however, it still requires explanation why the other disqualifications of the sekhakh do not apply to the walls by virtue of that same annexation. It must be said that the law of sanctity applies to everything that belongs to the object of the sukkah, whereas the other disqualifications belong only to the essence of the sukkah, which is the sekhakh. Of course, each one must be discussed separately, and the matter still requires further study.

[7] We will not elaborate on all this here. See my book Ruach HaMishpat for a detailed discussion.