“The People Are with Elor” (A letter I sent this morning. Column 46)

The people are with Michael Abraham

Finally, a sane voice in the madhouse of fools in this country (including the leaders!!)

Well, so here is an open letter to Shlomi
[…] 🙂

Though it should be noted that Elor acted in the spirit of the times; hundreds of terrorists were eliminated in those months, as dozens of videos attest, and it was not always self-defense (to put it mildly).
And there is a public feeling that they went after Elor because the incident was documented by "B'Tselem," and if we don't convict him we'll be disgraced in the eyes of the world…
In short, there's a bit of hypocrisy here, and the masses don't like that.

That is exactly the problem. If the perception had been that he did a moral act (= killing a terrorist) but he was an offender because he violated orders, the whole thing would have ended within the unit like any other breach of orders. The fact that Elor was convicted of manslaughter proves that killing a terrorist is, in the eyes of the establishment, a moral crime. One need not view Elor as a hero, but the public protest is simply a backlash against the establishment treating him as a criminal who killed a person who did not deserve to die. In that sense, there is no doubt that the people are with Elor.

Exactly as Yosef says!
And see more here:https://youtu.be/hfqIWi725vY

The claim that this is a moral crime is not far-fetched (though I am not inclined to agree with it). When there is no justification for killing a person, killing him is a crime. It is possible that the early authorities disagreed about this in the law of killing a pursuer when he could have been saved by injuring one of his limbs. It is clear that one was forbidden to kill him, but the dispute is whether the killer is liable to death for it or not.
Killing a person without justification is brought before a military court. This cannot be closed at the company commander level. The public discourse around it fanned the flames, but that happened from both directions. It seems to me that most people speaking in this discussion, even from the left, are not talking about a moral crime (except perhaps in the sense of an unjustified killing, as above—not in the sense of the harm done to the terrorist himself).
In any case, even if the public is justifiably angry, it is still important to clarify the distinction between the moral dimension and the legal-disciplinary one.

Regarding what you said, that "the fact that Elor was convicted of manslaughter proves that killing a terrorist is, in the eyes of the establishment, a moral crime"—here is a quote from Wikipedia regarding the offense of manslaughter in Israeli law:
"The offense of manslaughter is applied across a broad range of cases, from cases resembling murder, in which the prosecution has difficulty proving the mental element of intent to kill, to severe cases of negligence. These include drunk driving or driving under the influence of drugs that ended in death, holding a car race that ended in death, and transporting an illegal resident who was a suicide bomber, where the court determines that warning signs were apparent to the driver."

That is, it is not necessary that the establishment sees this as an offense morally equivalent to ordinary manslaughter (in its usual sense).

Precisely because of the moral and legal dimension of the case, I would have been very glad if Elor had argued that the terrorist did not pose a danger, but nevertheless had to die, because there is no weight to the sentences of terrorists if they are released from prison in one deal or another and then murder again. In my humble opinion, he had a moral duty to kill him in the current reality.

Rabbi Michi, I think the sign is correct, and you too are included in it. There are people like you who hold that "Azaria should have been judged on the disciplinary and military plane without involving moral aspects that naturally arise once the discussion becomes public." And there are others with different views, whom you also mentioned, that may justify him more. But this whole range is pro-Elor in the sense that they think he should not have been tried the way he was tried and convicted of this particular offense. And there was plenty of room and many ways to close the story differently, for the good of the people of Israel. So yes, I think there is factual truth in the sign in question.

A similar claim came up on the Garin board in Lod. I responded to it: by the same token, the meaning of the sign could also be 2+3=10.4. In the age of deconstruction, every interpretation is possible.
By the same logic, you could also write: The people are with Yigal Amir, or The people are with Moshe Katsav—according to someone who thinks he received a punishment or public treatment that was disproportionate.
By the way, if we are talking about the good of the people of Israel, it seems to me that the more noise there is, the more it serves the good of the people of Israel in several respects. The problem is that there is no justification for sacrificing a person on the altar of the good of the people of Israel. So leave the good of the people of Israel out of this.

So, in your view, each of us has a moral duty to kill anyone whom he believes will not receive an adequate punishment from the legal-governmental establishment. For example, are you in favor of anyone who sees a known criminal shooting him on the spot (since once he gets to trial he'll hire a good lawyer and get off lightly)? You won't get far with that anarchy. That is roughly what happens in the Palestinian Authority and in Gaza. Maybe for them that's paradise, but if so – I prefer life in hell.

To the best of my understanding, the main protest all along—the protest of the many, which according to the polls was also 65%-70% of the Jewish public who are "for him" – is not in favor of justifying every nuance of what he did; they are in favor of not treating a soldier like this when he acted in the context of a terror incident, even if he himself did not act properly, because this causes enormous damage to all of us and is an injustice to our commitment to back the soldier we sent to defend us.

This soldier whom we sent to defend us acted against the orders he was given and caused great damage with the weapon placed in his hands. Therefore I do not see why he should be given backing. I see no logic in giving him backing in any way. You back a soldier who made a mistake, not a soldier who deliberately committed an offense. Someone who deliberately committed an offense should be tried and punished with no backing whatsoever.

No. The point is that if the murderer carries out his plot in the future because of a failure of the legal system, I have a responsibility to prevent that if I can. If the scenario that he will be released and murder is plausible, then I must do whatever I can to prevent it. In cases of other crimes that do not involve taking the lives of innocents, the probability would have to be much higher before you would be permitted to take the law into your own hands.

I asked whether, on this reasoning, you think gang members or careless drivers should also be murdered. There too there is concern for human life in the future. Taking authority into one's own hands is very dangerous, because you do not always know all the considerations involved—especially policy considerations and international relations, which are of course less visible to an ordinary citizen. These are strategic decisions that a soldier cannot decide on. The public has not authorized him to do so.

I would suggest something to all the speakers here: just imagine it was your son. Then we'll see whether one can think coldly, with sharp analysis and distinction between moral law and disciplinary-legal law. I was a combat soldier in the army, and I know there are rules of engagement, and I agree that it may be that he did not act in accordance with them. But there are cases where one must take into account what the implications are of going all the way with the truth, and what consequences it brings. How will this now affect our soldiers who are standing in difficult situations? I don't think Elor is a hero—don't misunderstand me. I truly think he may have erred, and soldiers must be educated toward responsibility because weapons are placed in their hands and that has significance. I am not sure this should be taken to such a place where this soldier is presented as a base and immoral person. It's somewhat complicated, but that's what distinguishes us as human beings who know good and evil. We are required to use judgment. We are not computers into which data are fed and results are spat out. Food for thought…

I tend to agree with the rabbi about the practicality of anarchy. Personally, I am not drawn to anarchism at all. Precisely for that reason, when the law itself—or more accurately, the legal and governmental system—ignores the law and chooses to treat terrorists as it sees fit, the citizen has a duty to prevent them from having that option. It seems to me that my position stems דווקא from a revulsion toward anarchism. As for other possibilities of individuals taking the law into their own hands—well, each person should act according to what he thinks is the right thing to do, where in that equation the law is of course one variable. If, after all the considerations, you see that you ought to act in a certain way, then you should do so even against the law (again, the law is a very significant parameter in my considerations, but not the only one). Of course, you must accept the judgment upon yourself—but with pride, not regret.

Can the rabbi explain what he means by saying that there is no moral problem in what Elor did, and that the terrorist's life is worth less than a dog's life?
For the sake of discussion, let us assume that the terrorist definitely will not return to terrorism, and that no future deterrence will be created by killing him.
Now, is the terrorist still someone liable to death?
How, and is there any way at all, for the terrorist to leave that presumption of being liable to death?
What would the rabbi say if someone entered the security prisons and killed several terrorists with blood on their hands? Where is the boundary?
Is there a difference between a terrorist who tried to kill, one who succeeded in wounding, or one who succeeded in killing?
Does the rabbi think Azaria should receive the sentence of an ordinary murderer? Or should one take into account that the offense is only legal and does not include the moral dimension?
Thanks in advance.

The point is that this is a very harsh interpretation of what he did, and I do not understand why there is any need or obligation to adopt it. The reality of the period of the incident—with a stabbing attack every day—and the incident itself, in which his friend was wounded, led him to a mistake, not to "deliberate criminality." That is exactly the interpretive choice that determines the entire attitude. And I do not think it can be proven beyond all doubt—as the court indeed tried to do—that this was deliberate criminality and not a mistake resulting from the situation.

I think he means that although according to the law he should be punished, since there is a gap between the real offense and the one he is being charged with – one should act not according to the law (a pardon?)
Quite apart from the theoretical discussions on the subject, but practically speaking.

With God's help, 7 Tevet 5777

In the discussion about animal suffering, Rabbi Michael Abraham called on us to check the data ourselves whenever possible. I recommend doing the same regarding the Elor Azaria affair. I recommend reading carefully the series of articles by Moshe Ifargan on the Mida website:

* 'The company commander's testimony leaves no doubt: Elor Azaria is innocent' (28.6.16).
* 'The testimonies prove it: the prosecution collapsed in the Elor Azaria trial' (9.7.16)
* "The Azaria trial: all the red lines were crossed' (21.7.16)
* "The facts they forgot to tell about the Azaria affair' (30.11.16)
* 'Neither innocent nor trustworthy: the company commander who created the Azaria affair' (3.1.17).

In light of the facts presented in the above articles, the verdict finding Elor Azaria guilty of manslaughter seems to me very puzzling. The verdict is itself online as well, and the reader is invited not to believe me but to examine it himself and ask whether his guilt of manslaughter can really be established 'beyond any reasonable doubt.'

As for the charges of 'illegal use of a weapon' and 'unbecoming conduct' – in my humble opinion there is more room for those charges, since when a soldier's commander is present on the scene, the soldier must act according to the commander's orders, to whom he is bound both by his military duty and by the fact that the commander is far more experienced than the soldier, and 'there is no wise man like one with experience,'

Regards, Sh. Tz. Levinger

Moshe, we have a deep disagreement. Even if you are right on the substance (and that is aside from the present discussion), the authority to make such considerations is not entrusted to an ordinary citizen/soldier. A state cannot be run that way. By the way, that was exactly Yigal Amir's reasoning (in his view, the governmental and rabbinic establishment were afraid, and he was sure he was acting for everyone's good, in everyone's name, and with everyone's tacit consent). The next step is that left-wing people will murder you as a settler who threatens the lives of Israelis and soldiers.

By the way, I write this as someone who tends toward anarchism (but understands that it is not realistic or workable). In cases where there is an existential threat to the state, perhaps I could accept a decision made by some individual (who would then answer for it, like a conscientious objector). Perhaps Yigal Amir thought that was the case, but it certainly is not the case here. That terrorist posed no existential threat to the state, and it is doubtful whether he even threatened the lives of individual citizens. In such situations I am willing to accept the judgment of a particular person. But making such a judgment about just one ordinary, neutralized terrorist is complete absurdity. That is anarchy with no real need whatsoever.

I have mentioned before my favorite stanza from The Ballad of Reading Gaol (Oscar Wilde, in Jacob Orland's translation):
Yet each man kills the thing he loves,
By each let this be heard.
Some do it with a bitter look,
Some with a flattering word.
The coward does it with a kiss,
The brave man with a sword.

Tzvika, apparently you have information that was not before the court. But they determined unanimously, unequivocally, and on the basis of evidence, that you are mistaken. But of course, against the holy spirit that issues determinations and interpretations while ignoring facts and evidence, I have no tools to contend.
I must say that for me the opposite is actually harder: for some reason they charged him only with manslaughter and not murder (and it is not entirely clear to me why. It seems to me that the distinctions made between murder and manslaughter are not sharp, and judges do with them whatever they please. But that is only an unverified feeling on my part).

1. Under that hypothetical assumption that the terrorist repents, there is certainly room to consider it differently.
2. I would have had no moral problem with that. Only a legal problem. Exactly like Elor Azaria. In fact, there we are talking about convicted terrorists, whereas Azaria killed a terrorist who had not been convicted.
3. There is no distinction according to what he did, only according to what he wanted and wants to do.
4. There is certainly room to mitigate his sentence because of the moral consideration (somewhat similar to a person who shot a cat with his military weapon. He too made unlawful use of a weapon, and there is a disciplinary offense in his act. Of course, the impact on our foreign relations and political standing is different). Another mitigating consideration is that Elor Azaria apparently did it because his heart was hot within him (his friend had been stabbed). Still, it is important to show that such an act—taking the law into one's own hands and using an IDF weapon for personal purposes and out of personal considerations, in violation of orders—will not go unpunished.

I tend to agree with the rabbi about the practical side of anarchism. Personally, I am not at all drawn to anarchism. Precisely for that reason, when the law itself—or rather, the legal and political system—ignores the law and chooses to treat terrorists as it sees fit, it is the citizen's duty to deny them that possibility. It seems to me that my position stems precisely from a revulsion toward anarchism. As for other possibilities of individuals taking the law into their own hands—well, each person should act according to what he thinks is the right thing to do, when within that equation there is, of course, also the variable of the law. If, after all the considerations, you see that you ought to act in a certain way, then you should do so even against the law (again, it is a very significant parameter in my considerations, but not the only one). Of course, you must accept the judgment upon yourself, but with pride and not with regret.

The manslaughter charge comes long before the judges. It is in the hands of the prosecution. They choose under which section to prosecute. And regarding the determinations and interpretation: when we are talking about people's testimony concerning the interpretation of a person's state of mind after the event, it is a priori clear that we are dealing with interpretation, where the evidence is support and not absolute determination. The heart of the verdict was to establish the approach that what led him to act was the statement that witnesses testified he said in those moments after the shooting (again, after the shooting!): "The terrorist stabbed my friend and this is what he deserves" – and on that basis the judges said: all the other post-factum versions, which add justifications for the reason for the shooting, such as that he moved (a proven fact) and he had a coat and there was fear (can one know whether the person truly feared?) of an explosive device – can be dismissed by conjecture, in my understanding only by conjecture, and there cannot be 95% certainty here, based on analysis of the testimony, and the fact that they did not move the people away and so forth; all of this is considered calmly in court and not at the time of the event when adrenaline is sky-high. Even if we want to make crystal clear to the whole army that the soldier did not behave properly and this must not be done, we do not have to choose the interpretation of deliberate criminality when there is even, say, a 10% possibility that perhaps he erred out of pressure, confusion, and fear for life.

I am disappointed, as someone who knows not a few texts from your pen—not that you should care… I just noted it. Clearly it is not literally the whole people, every last one of them. Rather, it is a significant part of the people, and about that there seems to me to be no dispute.
Another point is that one cannot discuss this issue with pure considerations based on lofty moral values and the most logical philosophical conclusions. In the end, we want to live, even if we are not necessarily morally, philosophically, and perhaps even halakhically right. In addition, it is hard to expect a soldier in those circumstances to weigh all these considerations within a very short time and arrive at a decision that meets all the lofty standards. And as has often been said, soldiers do not fight with a lawyer at their side. All this leads to the conclusion that the soldier should not be judged over what happened, but at most there should be an operational inquiry with lessons learned. That's all.

I think one can say "the people are with x" even if not everyone is with him, so long as the overwhelming majority is.
Of course, now one can argue about where the overwhelming majority lies, but the fact that you are not with him does not undermine the poster.
As for the substance, I am with Lior (although this is not well defined… I think that by many definitions you are with him too), not because I think he should have done what he did (I actually do think that what he did ought always to be done morally), but because I think this whole carnival is completely exaggerated and driven by agendas of the left. What he did is a bit less serious than a soldier breaking stance in formation in order to step on a cockroach. I believe nobody would be tried for that, and therefore he too should not have been tried. If they had merely confined him to base for Shabbat, I would not have been "with him."
To sum up, I am with him, and in my opinion the people who are with him are with him because he became a scapegoat.

Michi, hello:

A response to your words:

A few comments following today's verdict:
A. What was clear from the very first second the video came out, and from the first testimonies heard, that Azaria said the terrorist had to die—was clearly established in a detailed and meticulous verdict by the court, contrary to the stories that Azaria and his lawyers told later. Azaria acted מתוך a desire for revenge and not out of any self-defense. The IDF cannot allow a soldier to take the law into his own hands when his commanders are on the scene, and when he has no need at all for self-defense.
To remove any doubt, in my view, the decision during last year's wave of attacks that terrorists should not leave the scene alive while the event is unfolding was a good and correct decision, even when it concerned confused child terrorists who picked up a knife on a moment's impulse or בעקבות Facebook incitement. But once the incident was over and the terrorist was lying badly wounded and neutralized—no soldier, and certainly not a medic, who is supposed to treat human beings—may come and in cold blood kill a neutralized person, even if he is a terrorist whom it would have been better had he died earlier.
B. Also, the verdict that was foreseeable from the outset—as I told my students immediately after Azaria's killing—will be relatively light for manslaughter: a relatively short prison term of between one and three years. I assume that in light of the parents' difficult condition, the court will reduce the prison term to the minimum possible.
C. The State of Israel had an excellent defense minister—serious, balanced, a man of integrity—Moshe Ya'alon. The State of Israel has a chief of staff with extraordinary personal qualities: serious, methodical, diligent, decent, and humane. He even gave up becoming chief of staff in the previous round, because he thought his rival had more experience and deserved to be chief of staff before him. A surreal act in the hedonistic and egotistical world of our usual leaders. The State of Israel has a legal system of exceptional quality, including within the military framework.
D. By contrast, the State of Israel has a prime minister who was revealed in all his wretchedness in this affair. At first he clearly stood behind Defense Minister Ya'alon and the army, but when he saw where public opinion was, he hurried to fall into line and show "sensitivity and concern" toward the shooter and his family, culminating in the absolutely forbidden act of calling the shooter's family out of understanding and empathy. Did he call every criminal's parents who suffered terribly because of their son's crime? Also the defense minister we have, Liberman—the opportunist and perhaps corrupt in various affairs that did not lead to indictment—whose Machiavellian statement today on the one hand gives backing to the chief of staff and the IDF, and on the other hand declares dissatisfaction with the judges' decision, which he did not like—is the wrong man in the wrong job.
E. The call of many politicians to pardon Azaria, led by the prime minister, the education minister(!!!!!), and politicians from various parties, is extremely grave. An offender convicted of manslaughter must sit in prison for a certain period. After that one can think about a pardon in light of the unique circumstances and his family's suffering. But if heaven forbid a pardon is granted now (as was once corruptly given by two prime ministers and a president of the state to the corrupt Shin Bet men who killed a terrorist and then framed Yitzhak Mordechai), such an act will symbolize to the whole world that there is no law and no judge in Israel. It will gravely harm the rule of law, the standing of the military authorities, and the military courts. The criminal soldier must sit—even if not for a long period—in prison if he was convicted of manslaughter.
F. The incitement in the street against the chief of staff, the judges, especially the presiding judge, and others—is another expression of the severe pollution that has gripped Israeli society in recent years. This pollution is spreading throughout social media and is a real threat to the future of Israeli democracy if nothing is done against it.
In this context one must mention with disapproval the former Knesset member, the racist, inciter, and harasser Sharon Gal, who made the chilling statement that the court stabbed the soldier in the back. I would not be surprised if some delusional fanatic tried to translate those words into reality.
G. On the other hand, I do not accept at all the understanding that Azaria is merely a child who made a mistake and is "the son of us all." The chief of staff is absolutely right that portraying soldiers as children—an approach that reached its peak in the media campaign to free Gilad Shalit as the "child of the state"—is a real danger to the functioning of the IDF. Soldiers are not "children" who need protection from the "bad guys," namely the law enforcement people and commanders.
Some make the foolish argument: "What would you do if it were your son?" To this one can easily reply that if Azaria had not received extreme right-wing, Kahanist, racist education, he would not have come to do what he did. A left-wing person, or a right-wing person with values, would not have violated the military code and killed a wounded person lying on the ground, even if he was a terrorist.
H. As for the claim that a trial could have been avoided and the punishment handled within internal military frameworks, that is not relevant once the video came out and everyone saw it. Avoiding a trial would have turned the IDF into an army about which Breaking the Silence would be right in everything they say. Holding the trial was a supreme Zionist duty. Beyond that, even if in the past the military system often "covered up" cases of unjustified harm to Palestinians—and that was often the case—that does not mean what happened was just. But in the present case, all that was irrelevant because of the video. That is also why the chief of staff and the defense minister had to come out immediately with the statements they made at the beginning.

Tzvika,
I know that the charge is determined by the prosecution. So what?
On the substance, according to your approach there is no meaning at all to the offense of murder in the law. According to you, one can never convict a person of murder. We can never know whether it was not manslaughter, since it is always a matter of interpretation. That is utterly absurd.
I recommend you study the commentators on the Mishnah regarding "judge every person favorably." It seems to me you will be surprised. The early authorities there write that one judges a person according to what is most probable. Only when there are two equally plausible possibilities does one choose the more lenient. Mark this well. See on this here: https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%93-%D7%91%D7%A2%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%AA%D7%A2%D7%A8%D7%95-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%90%D7%95%D7%A7%D7%94%D7%90%D7%9D/

Hello Hirsch.
I definitely do care. As I wrote here in one of the comments, this is not a numerical question. Most of the people are also not for keeping the commandments and are also in favor of speaking slander, so why didn't the girls write a sign saying the people are with secularism? Is that sign meant to inform us of the results of a poll? The sign expresses support and identification, and that is what I objected to.
In addition, the issue can certainly be discussed in terms of values and morality, like any other issue. If not this—then what will we discuss in moral questions? At most, you can say that under pressure there are mitigating circumstances, and therefore after the moral discussion that leads to conviction, the punishment should be reduced. But that does not touch the conviction itself, and that is what is at issue here.
If you have information that was not before the court, then it is a pity you did not bring it before them. Because from the verdict it emerges that the soldier did not hesitate and did not need to arrive at any decision. He simply shot intentionally, for no real reason, and with no danger. So enough with this nonsense about pressure and judgment calls. At most, one can argue that he was heated because his friend had been hurt. That is a mitigating circumstance within the sentencing arguments. But as I said, that is not what I was discussing here. No soldier needs to fight with a lawyer. That is stupid and false demagoguery. During the last intifada, soldiers killed about 160 terrorists (some of whom probably did not really threaten life), and not one of them was convicted. Enough with this paranoia.
When there is such a murder, a trial must be held, though not necessarily in a court of law. The army cannot simply let this pass.
That is my view, and if it disappoints you, I can only regret it and be disappointed myself.

Hello Rani.
Regarding the numerical question, I answered the person above you. See there.
I am really not with him. He acted improperly and in a very serious way (not morally but disciplinarily). The carnival is not driven only by agendas of the left, just as the counter-carnival is not driven only by agendas of the right. Carnivals have a property: they arise for various reasons because people like carnivals. I also do not really like these carnivals, neither from the left nor from the right, because within them you will never find rational arguments. Only the gut speaks—really, it shouts—and when it shouts, the muses fall silent.
But on the substance, this discussion is not important. Because with or without criticism of the carnivals, and with or without understanding why they arise—there still must be order, morally and intellectually. It must be clarified what is right and what is not, and it makes no difference whatsoever whether one can understand people's anger. That is not the discussion. An adult can be angry and still speak rationally and reasonably. Anger, even if justified, does not justify saying nonsense, identifying with an offender, and turning such a miserable and confused fellow into a hero of Israel. That is all.

Hello Binyamin.
I read your words attentively, and I definitely found them sensible. I just do not think they are a response to my words, but rather a response to the events themselves.
I agree with almost everything you said, and I wrote similarly myself. But I disagree with you regarding the conduct of Ya'alon and Eisenkot in this affair. In my opinion they acted and spoke incorrectly. That does not mean they contaminated the legal process, though that could have happened. My impression is that it did not. But just as one cannot judge Azaria mercifully outside the courtroom, one cannot condemn him there either. That is the court's job, and Ya'alon and Eisenkot should have restrained themselves from their hasty statements until after the verdict. At most they could have stated what the proper norms of the IDF are, but not commented on the accused soldier himself.
By the way, Liberman and Bibi cannot be judged outside the courtroom either. And that is already a comment to you.

Moshe,
I will begin by saying that the description you gave here is entirely agreed upon by me. A person himself makes his decisions, with the law being only one of the factors. In fact, one could say that this is what anarchism means. The important point is that it is not right for a person to make an independent decision irrespective of the law in every situation. Only in extreme situations do I think it is right to decide to act against the law. Again, the person himself is always the one who makes his decisions; the only question is what his decision really ought to be, with the law or against it.
I wrote above that in extreme cases, when there is a threat to the state and society, I am willing to accept independent decisions. But by all views, that was not the situation here. In the end, we are talking about eliminating one terrorist among many, and it is very doubtful what he could have done in the future; and even if so, he might have harmed this person or that. That is not a situation that justifies taking the law into one's own hands and ignoring the decision of the authorized institutions. If such a situation justifies it—then we are back to the anarchy that you said you do not accept (at least in practice).

A very strange reaction! My impression is that the "establishment" was in favor of Azaria. The establishment is first and foremost the system of government, isn't it?

The only one in the system who did not lose his head was, oddly enough—or perhaps not—Avigdor Liberman.
I am now reading a very interesting book, The Other God, which alongside various insights talks a great deal about "the demonic." That figure who is both evil and wild, and yet sometimes good, or amusing—the demon figure. Different from God, who is the embodiment of good and order, and different from Satan, who is the embodiment of evil; and it has great charm, which also stems from the freedom it allows itself—sometimes to be evil, sometimes subversive, often mysterious.
Apparently Liberman is something like that.

When I read the first sentence, for a fleeting moment I thought the writer was referring to the shot terrorist. In all the learned discussion, it was "in the absence of one side." And here, one righteous man reminds us that in addition to Elor Azaria there is another anti-hero here: the terrorist.
"Freedom fighter," "murderer."
A human being!

(If I were the father of the Arab lying wounded and bleeding on the ground, and an Israeli soldier approached him with a rifle and shot him in the head, I would go mad. Literally. A young man, wounded, shot in the head, and dead.)

When a wicked person comes to harm me, I will do what I can to prevent him. And if that prevention has a price, I will do my best that he be the one to pay it.
Other than that, killing is forbidden.

Killing is forbidden.
Killing is forbidden.
Killing is forbidden

Michi,

Blessed shall you be above all peoples.

Binyamin

It seems to me this is an unfair comparison between the interpretation proposed here by the commenter and the mathematically false statement.
Personally, I agree with the rabbi, and I can absolutely identify with the sign even though I do not think what he did was proper legally or practically.

A) So if I understood correctly, no terrorist (not even a convicted one) is inherently someone liable to death; rather, only because deterrence is needed, and perhaps he will return to terrorism.
Did I understand correctly?
B) The rabbi said his sentence should be mitigated. What does "mitigated" mean? To judge him exactly like someone who shot a cat? I think someone who shot a cat would not be punished with more than a month in prison, certainly not years.
Besides, shooting a cat has a moral flaw, while shooting a terrorist does not.
I would be glad if the rabbi would clarify his words.

I will only say that they spoke as they did because they felt it was their duty to prevent imitation of Azaria's deed.

I don't understand. The declaration that killing is forbidden is an empty slogan. And what the terrorist's father would do is of no interest to me. The question whether there is justification to kill him or not depends on the law of the pursuer. There is no categorical prohibition on killing, certainly not in self-defense.

A) Indeed.
B) To mitigate means manslaughter with mitigating circumstances. Do you want me to tell you how long the prison term should be? That depends not only on how much moral problematicity there is, but also on what the implications are for army discipline and for the state in general (and its international standing).

As stated, one could have said what the army's policy is without entering into the specific act that was under investigation and trial.

K.:
Hi Michi, thanks for sending this to me.

I thought it was interesting that you are offended that your opinion is not counted as part of what is called "the people." I understood long ago that I am very much not considered part of the people. I am glad to discover that today that is also true for chiefs of staff, defense ministers, and many others. On the other hand, of course Gopstein and Ben Gvir are really-the-people.

I find it hard to accept the sentence saying that in your eyes the terrorist's life matters less than the life of an alley cat. I want to believe that in your eyes even the life of someone like Yigal Amir or the murderers of the boy Muhammad Abu Khdeir is worth more than the life of an alley cat (though perhaps in a moment of anger I might say, "I wish they would die"). Perhaps this is connected to the previous discussion we took part in, on the subject of animals, about the lives of human beings—even those who are terrible criminals—as compared to those of animals. To my taste, killing some criminal, when it is not done in self-defense, is much more than a legal problem or a deviation from army orders; it is a profound moral problem. Would you say of Yigal Amir that in your eyes his life matters less than that of an alley cat? Would you say that "you would have no problem with there being an order to kill" someone like Yigal Amir even after he no longer poses a danger?

In any case, it is important that you wrote to them, and I would be glad to read their reply if there is one. The drift happening around us is very troubling, and everyone who still has a voice and can influence should definitely do so.

See you soon
———————————–
The rabbi:
Hello K'. Only now did I get to my email and see your response.
Here is a link to my site (I uploaded this letter there as well), and you can see responses in the talkbacks.

There were also responses sent to me by email through the Garin in Lod, but there is nothing especially interesting there. I estimate that the responses do not necessarily teach us much about the public mood either (this is true of the internet in general), since usually the respondents are primarily those who disagree, and even more so those who rant. Others are less inclined to respond, and even when they do, they are less conspicuous. Anyone who speaks publicly and gets hit with online responses knows this from experience. It may well happen that an overwhelming majority of readers liked what you said, and yet the atmosphere online will be that you are utterly loathsome (perhaps on Facebook it is different, because there one can easily click Like without actually writing a response. I do not know that medium).
In general, my impression is that most of the public here feel a certain empathy for Elor Azaria, but do understand that he had to be tried and convicted. What they mainly oppose is the carnival around it and the fact that the matter was not closed at the command level without a criminal trial (in a military court). Therefore, although these statements and this uproar also disturb me, I take them in a different proportion. I am not alarmed by them. I think most of the public are fairly level-headed.

As for your remark about the value of the terrorist's life: because of what you wrote, I was a bit alarmed by my own wording, but I sat and thought about it again, and it sharpened a certain distinction for me, which I will now try to explain briefly.
First, as I wrote to you around the post on animals, I fully accept the essential difference between human beings and animals (it is almost embarrassing for me that I need to say this). So obviously the value of the terrorist's life, by virtue of his being a human being, is completely different from that of an animal. Even so, in my opinion he ought to be killed (in an orderly way and by an institution authorized to do so). This is an enemy who will probably continue to dedicate his life to harming the lives of soldiers (and perhaps civilians as well), and therefore I see no reason whatsoever to keep such a walking landmine alive. Putting him in prison is no solution, because many of them are eventually released, and even from prison itself they continue to do harm.
It seems to me that one should distinguish between two planes of addressing this issue: 1. The value of life—which is determined solely by the kind of object involved (animal or human), regardless of his actions and the danger he poses. 2. The need and duty to kill him (which is determined by his actions). On the first plane, of course there is no comparison between him and an animal, but on the second plane the relation is entirely reversed. I regard the killing of an alley cat as serious even though its life does not have great value, because there is no justification whatsoever for harming that life. By contrast, in my view there is a duty to kill that terrorist despite the value of his life (because of his actions). In that sense, and only in that sense, he is worse than an alley cat.

Indeed, there is room for me to work on myself so that I feel sorrow when such a person is killed, because after all he is a human being. I admit that in practice I feel no such sorrow at all (though perhaps if I had to kill him myself in practice it would be different), whereas over an alley cat killed for no wrong of its own I certainly would feel sorrow. There is something about the alley cat that is more than the human being, because the alley cat is not wicked and does not deserve to die (it does not choose to be this way or that), whereas a person is guilty of his condition and therefore bears responsibility for it. Precisely the higher value of a human over a cat creates a situation in which killing him is accompanied by a less difficult feeling than killing the cat.
Well, these are my reflections following your remark.

See you,
——————————
K.:
Hi Michi,

I read what you write and it makes me very sad.

So that we do not get to places I do not want to get to, I will only say that it is terrible in my eyes that you speak of the need to kill a human being outside self-defense as though he were a bug. It is not surprising that you did not answer me about the comparison to Yigal Amir or the murderers of Abu Khdeir. In the end it seems to me that the issue is that one is a Jew and the other is not. Even in the few comments I read on your site one can feel the complete dehumanization toward the Palestinian who was killed (a 17-year-old boy?).

The fact that Elor Azaria came out of such an atmosphere (along with dozens of others who were not filmed at the exact moment by a camera) is not surprising. So it is no wonder that he and his supporters are so surprised, and justifiably so, by the reaction of the legal system. If "the people" as a whole thinks this is the killing of a bug, then even if he did not act according to the proper bug-extermination statute, what is the connection between that and putting him on trial for killing a human being?

Just as I finished writing, Naomi uploaded Asaf Harel's monologue from yesterday. It is as though he had read our correspondence, and he says much better exactly what I am trying to say. Here is a way to access it.

http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001170388

In friendship,
———————————
The rabbi:
I saw what he wrote, and once again, as every time, I am newly disappointed by the quality of the arguments and the analysis. I am really amazed that this seems sensible to anyone. In my opinion this is not a question of disagreement but of emotionalism versus reason. In my view morality belongs to the head and not to the heart, and it seems to me that this is one of the differences between left and right (quite apart from dehumanization).
Briefly, I would say this:
1. What was in my remarks was exactly the opposite of dehumanization. I explained that the terrorist is fully human on plane 1. And precisely because of that there is a duty to kill him (plane 2). The fact that someone is human does not say anything about my right and duty to defend myself against him. What does that have to do with dehumanization? Can my enemy only be a cat? Can a human being not be an enemy? Is it not true that one must defend oneself against one who threatens him?
I repeat again that in my opinion, precisely because we are talking about human beings, I have demands of them. And if they dedicate their lives to killing my soldiers and civilians, I must kill them. For me he is like a bug—not because such a person is a bug, but because his whole life's essence is to kill Jews (soldiers or civilians). He and his society chose and keep choosing this all the time (from the moment of the Partition Plan until today). For me war is not a duel between knights with right of way assigned by lottery. In war one must win and stay alive.
I also do not share his optimism that in the end there will be a state here and there will be peace. I do not know on what basis he prophesies this, but I have no such information. One thing is clear: I am trying to make sure we reach that time, and then we will see. For that, we need to stay alive.

His mistake (and in my opinion yours too) is the same mistake as those who see in the attitude of many Jews toward Arabs racism. In my view this is not racism in any sense (it seems to me I explained this as well in the past in a post on the site). The reason is that behind this attitude (which I also do not share and do not like) lies national rivalry, terrorism, a war of over a hundred years, and unjustified threats from their side against us. Hatred of them and discrimination (when it exists—and usually it does not) are not the result of race but of the Arabs' ongoing attitude toward us. What does that have to do with racism? About as much as there is between Bibi's words or my words and dehumanization. There are some who really are racist, like Gopstein and La Familia. But their words fall on receptive ears because of the political-security background and terrorism, not because of racism, and this is strengthened much further by logical errors of the sort in the piece you sent me. It is very frustrating for people who are not understood and are dismissed, and therefore they react with even more ranting and sometimes violence. If people said to them: friends, you are right that terrorists should be killed, but this must be done in the proper way—there would not be such outrage and violence.
The connection between this attitude and racism or dehumanization simply does not withstand the test of logic, and in my estimation it stems from emotionalism. This emotionalism, which leads to absurd conclusions and strengthens enemies and does "over-humanization" to them, contributes greatly to that frustration and violence. Would you also relate that way to ISIS people? They too are human beings.
A landmine that threatens me deserves to die. A neutralized terrorist threatens me completely. If not now – then later. Therefore, in my view he deserves to die. But such a decision must be made by the authorized institutions and not by a soldier in the field. And that is what I wrote.

Unfortunately, apparently we will not agree on this. But it was important to me to clarify what I think is very mistaken in your words, if only because it is typical.
————————————-
K.:
Michi, it indeed seems that you truly understand nothing.

For me, the sentence "his whole life's essence is to kill Jews" says it all.

What on earth do you know about the essence of the life of the boy who attacked soldiers in the city where he lives? Do you even know who he is? Do you know what he might have become ten or twenty years from now if he had sat in prison? You are apparently guessing what he will be, but are already prepared to execute him on the basis of that guess? Or perhaps ready to execute him so that he will not be released. In general, you seem rather obsessed with executions as a long-term investment. Just not of animals, heaven forbid, because we are moral people.

You would never write such sentences about a Jewish murderer, and it is no wonder that for the third time already you are unwilling to address this. Why? Because he is an Arab, and an Arab's whole essence is to kill Jews? What Harel tried to say was precisely to answer the question of the "essence" of the person opposite you, and to remind you that a few decades from now the situation may turn upside down, and what seems to us today to be his "essence" may in the future be the opposite of what it is today. But apparently that is not a sufficiently logical argument. Next time we will ask him to wrap it in a small Talmudic pilpul.

And as for racism, it would be worthwhile to read a bit about its history. You have found your favorite defensive wall of "this is not racism but a justified fear of the enemy." Except that it turns out that even the greatest persecutors also believed that the Jews were cruel enemies whom one had to harm in self-defense. Blacks in the U.S. and South Africa too were seen as dangerous animals one had to beware of. And of course the Native Americans in the U.S. were primitive and dangerous creatures, and the reason they killed the white settlers was their essence, their animality. Racism is always accompanied by fearmongering, which not infrequently is also completely justified (indeed, many Jews lent money at interest and were directly responsible for the poverty of not a few gentiles in Europe. In that sense they too were real enemies of many gentiles. Perhaps even "their whole essence was to drink the money of human beings".).

Your inability to put yourself, even for a moment, in the shoes of the other when he is not a Jew, is exactly the dehumanization I am talking about.

I suggest we stop this discussion because, as I feared, the more I hear, the more I regret. I promise to be more logical from today on and to avoid all discussion of these issues.

Shabbat shalom
———————————
The rabbi:
Indeed, you are right. I truly, truly understand nothing.
You claim that this fellow woke up in the morning and simply decided to kill Jews, and in your arguments you also assume that he probably would not do it again. In your view it was just a passing fit? Does his organizational affiliation say nothing? What he and his comrades declare and do does not matter? Does not the act itself express views and essential dangerousness? Are you serious?
Usually these guys are motivated by ideology (and a violent religion), and therefore the assessment that he will again kill is, in my eyes, highly reasonable (though as noted I understand nothing). Someone who belongs to a terror organization that repeatedly declares that its aim is to kill Jews and indeed does so, has inherent dangerousness. I see no reason whatsoever to assume that the fellow will change his outlook after the first murder or after sitting in prison. There is of course some chance of that, because every person can change, but it is not a reasonable assumption. My working assumption is that this will remain his direction in the future as well, and therefore there is justification to kill him in order to prevent the danger. I see no connection between that and dehumanization. On the contrary, as I shall now explain once more.

I must say that in my eyes arguments like these are themselves the height of the dehumanization that you and your friends repeatedly impose on Arabs. From your words it emerges that they are not human beings like you and me. What they do is merely incidental and they do not really mean it (he's just a 17-year-old boy—what do you want from him?). They have no ideology, only wretchedness (and of course someone else's guilt. Real Stockholm syndrome). They are always acted upon and never decide. And therefore they are of course never responsible for their deeds and decisions. What do we want from them at all? Only we (Western Ashkenazim?) are responsible for all the natives around us here in the Orient, and therefore we must take them into account and make concessions to them without regard to their actions. And of course they must not be held responsible for what they do. On the contrary, we should take the responsibility and the blame upon ourselves (cf. Stockholm syndrome). If that is not condescension and dehumanization, I do not know what is. If that is not seeing them as alley cats, I do not know what is.
By contrast, I see this fellow as a human being and take him, his declarations, and his actions completely seriously, and therefore also see him as responsible for them—exactly like you and me. That, in my opinion, is the essence of humanism: all human beings have a high value of life, all have choice and make decisions, and therefore all are responsible for their deeds and their fate. And just so you know, for me, a Jew who poses a danger of murdering human beings (including innocent Arabs) deserves exactly the same treatment. For me they should kill him just like the terrorist—provided that he poses dangerousness. This is, as stated, unlike left-wing people: I am a humanist and do not distinguish between one blood and another, between one person and another.
Within this dehumanization, one can ignore the problematic Arab culture, which has an important role in the phenomena of violence, murder, and terror. Within political correctness it is forbidden to mention this, because that is dehumanization. Hamas, Fatah, al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra, Hezbollah, Boko Haram, and ISIS, and other murderers-for-pleasure around the world, most of whom are Muslims, are merely marginal and accidental phenomena and are not connected to Islam and Arab culture. In my eyes, such an approach is blatant dehumanization, and it fits very well with the view you presented regarding this fellow (who only murdered by chance, but will not do it again).

And in general there is a basic mistake in the whole discussion and in the comparisons made within it (as in Asaf Harel). The justification for killing a terrorist that I spoke of is not punishment. The justification is not based on the fact that he murdered or stabbed. Therefore the discussion whether what he did justifies it, and the foolish comparison to Yigal Amir and the recourse to the question of pardons for Jews, are not to the point at all. Both the justification for killing and the question of pardon are unrelated to the gravity of the act, because this is not punishment. Even if he had done nothing, there would be justification to kill him and it would be forbidden to pardon him, so long as he has plans to do this in the future. What determines the matter is his dangerousness, not what he did. The killing is prevention, not punishment. As stated, for both Jews and Arabs.

To conclude, I truly and sincerely must say that Asaf Harel's short essay seems to me really foolish and emotional. There is hardly a sentence there that holds water, apart from dime-store psychologizing about the right, apparently within the framework of the dehumanization to which he is devoted (but of course Jews are allowed to dehumanize, since more is expected of them; only Arabs may not, because after all they are from the Orient and are not responsible for their actions). It is a distilled expression of emotion, devoid of any connection to facts and reason. And that is exactly what I meant in my previous letter.

But as I said, I understand nothing…

Well, apparently we will not belong to the same political party anytime soon… 🙂

With God's help, 11 Tevet 5777

Following today's attack on the Armon HaNatziv promenade, I retract what I wrote in the last paragraph, that in the presence of the commander a soldier should not act without an order.

It stands to reason that in a situation where a soldier identifies behavior that appears dangerous, he must react quickly even without the commander's order in order to neutralize the danger. All the more so when מדובר in a terrorist who is known to have come to do harm, whose every movement must be suspected and responded to accordingly. 'If there is doubt—there is no doubt'!

The deterrence should be against the terrorists, not against IDF soldiers, who should be given full backing even if it turns out, in the 'wisdom after the fact,' that their response was unnecessary,

Regards, Sh. Tz. Levinger

Hi Michi,
The dispute is about the very killing of terrorists.
Part of the people feels an ongoing moral wrong in the courteous treatment given to its enemies.
That erupted in the discussion about Elor Azaria.
And therefore what must be done is to distill the dispute and 'drag' it to its real place,
and not dismiss it.

I agree. And precisely for that reason I oppose support for Elor Azaria, which only interferes with the essential struggle and muddles it.

Y.:
I agree in principle with everything the rabbi wrote.
But it does seem that there is indeed an effect of soldiers being afraid to shoot.

According to the reports, the soldiers waited long seconds for authorization to fire from the company commander. The civilian instructor was the one who shot after he himself was wounded.
https://soundcloud.com/glz-radio/crwdlmhiy3zg

From the verdict:

"…The defendant's mistaken interpretation, according to which it is permissible to shoot in situations where 'if there is doubt, there is no doubt'—especially when this leads to shooting intended to kill—stands in explicit contradiction to the open-fire regulations. Doubt justifies, if not requires, taking all possible actions to clarify the suspicion and not leave it vague. But so long as the doubt has not been removed from the cloud over identification of the explosive device, or the means, that doubt does not justify gunfire whose purpose is taking life… Henceforth say: permitting gunfire intended to kill based solely on suspicion is forbidden. Such an act would harm the moral resilience of the army and its soldiers, and would also harm its professionalism. One must not permit gunfire that causes human life to be taken lightly, without adhering to the finest edge of the rules of engagement… In light of all the above, even had the defendant's version concerning fear of an explosive device been accepted, that would provide no justification for lethal gunfire based entirely on an unexamined and unsubstantiated suspicion."
—————————-
The rabbi:
Just now I received this WhatsApp message, and it prompted me to think. In my opinion, the required conclusion is not that we should have exempted Elor Azaria, but the opposite.

In my view this confusion was caused by a wonderful cooperation between right and left. Critics from the left demand that soldiers be tried for justified actions and operational mistakes just as they would be for taking the law into their own hands. But critics from the right do exactly the same thing: they demand that soldiers not be tried either for operational mistakes or for taking the law into their own hands. What the critics from right and left have in common is that neither distinguishes between the cases.
What is the result? Soldiers lose the confidence to make decisions when necessary. The solution is precisely to sharpen the distinction between the cases very, very clearly, and to try soldiers for taking the law into their own hands and for offenses like Azaria's, while giving them full backing for operational mistakes. By the way, that is usually what the army does, and it does well, contrary to its critics on both sides.

After all, by the same logic one could also say that we should not try soldiers for anything whatsoever. That way they would have complete self-confidence when they shoot and would not hesitate for a moment. I assume we would all agree that this is absurd. Every soldier understands that distinction. So he also understands perfectly well the difference between: if he simply shoots with no danger, he will not receive backing; if he makes a mistake, he will receive backing. Soldiers are not idiots, despite the attempts to portray them as such.

See also this video:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwJAdMjYRm7IT0Q3c2hGS1VnY2s4U2xLaF8xQkJEZVotdVhn/view?usp=drivesdk
——————————-
Y.:
Good morning,
It is impossible to know exactly what happened yesterday, but it may be that soldiers, at least according to the polls a large part of whom believe Azaria, will indeed be afraid to act.
Note the quote I brought from the verdict. According to the court, even if there is a real fear of an explosive device that a terrorist who just attacked and wounded someone is about to activate, one may not act without 'approval and substantiation.' That is a dangerous and immoral statement.
According to this ruling, soldiers may not be satisfied with the suspicion that the terrorist will continue his killing spree and may wait for 'approval and substantiation.'
—————————
The rabbi:
This quote lends itself to several interpretations. After all, in the case of an ordinary person (not a terrorist), it is clear that not every suspicion justifies shooting to kill. You need a well-founded suspicion (not certainty; even in the case of a pursuer there is no full certainty). And certainly, if the problem can be solved without shooting (through further clarification, or by shooting to wound and neutralize), there is no permission to shoot. It is a fine line, but the principle is that one shoots to kill only when there is a well-founded danger to life and no other way to solve the problem.
Now one must take into account that we are dealing with a terrorist. It seems to me that under the law this probably does not change the substantive situation (that is, the status of a terrorist is still that of any ordinary person; I personally do not accept this, as I wrote in my remarks). What does change is that if it is a terrorist, the question of intent and motivation does not exist. But the questions of means and ability still remain (as defined there in the verdict).
I have no doubt that if there had been a real danger and it could not have been resolved without killing, no one would have convicted Elor under any interpretation of the law (even under the interpretation I do not accept, which does not see a terrorist as exceptional). It is obvious to everyone that if there is a possible threat to life and only shooting to kill can solve it, one must shoot.
One must remember that every situation involves doubt; the only question is what level of doubt. I do not think anyone disputes that if there is a feared danger, one must shoot, certainly when dealing with a terrorist.
I would be glad to hear of even one case where a soldier was convicted for shooting in an uncertain situation with genuine fear (even if there was an error in operational judgment). Therefore all these wording pilpuls do not really change much. The situation on the ground is that those who are guilty are charged.
In any case, the verdict clearly established that in the Elor affair this was not the case.

Hello Rabbi Michi. We just wanted to make absolutely clear that we do not completely agree with his actions, and we did not say that!.. But as girls who also dedicate a year/two years for the state, we think a legal injustice was done, together with crazy, disproportionate, and nationally damaging shaming. This case could have been handled, even in full severity, within the military framework and not taken out to the whole country, and especially to the hostile world and the terrorists' friends. Because this is a military-legal matter, and even according to the honored critic himself, he has no moral problem with killing a terrorist!
And that is why there is a legal system in the army, precisely for matters like this.
He could have 'gotten his head bashed in' without involving an entire country and opportunistic politics.
Even if he did something severe, IDF soldiers need to know that there is a state backing them.. and not as happened in the attack at Gitai Junction, when a female terrorist came to stab a soldier at the bus stop and he shamefully retreated backward because he had to think 10 times before even cocking his weapon.
There is no doubt that this is one of the grave results of all the shaming they did to Elor, and because of the lack of any feeling of support from the state. Thank God the attack ended without casualties and the soldier was not hurt, but this is one case among many where one cannot know what might have happened.
The state has become irrationally addicted to distorted moralism… it seems more comfortable hearing about an injured soldier than a dead terrorist. A terrible moral distortion that, with every event, immediately deals with the morality of the victim who was attacked, and not with the beasts attacking him… because there is nothing moral about preserving and protecting the life of someone who came to murder us. It was humiliating to see the footage of the soldier who is afraid and recoils from harming the female terrorist only because of a case like Elor's.
My brothers are soldiers and serve the state beyond what is needed and required; they risk their lives for us. The least the state can do for them is to give them backing and confidence in the face of murderous terror.
And again, we did not justify the act, and perhaps the rabbi understands more than a bunch of service girls with "courage and decisiveness," but in our opinion this is not the way the trial should have been conducted.
And we believe (or at least want to believe) that you too have enough human qualities to know that humiliation before an entire country, and mixing politics with a legal aspect, is not the way.
And if we may say so—we felt a bit dismissed by you… after all, we are still young, and true—sometimes we do not know the story in depth. But one can comment in a way that is less cutting and dismissive than 'our service girls' with 'courage and decisiveness.'

Thank you, Service Girls 5777.

Hello dear service girls, and thank you for your response.

First, if my words conveyed a tone of condescension toward you, I apologize. I sometimes express myself with sarcasm, but that is only a critical manner of expression, not disrespect.

As for the substance of your words, it seems to me that several considerations are getting mixed together here, and it is important to separate them (that was in fact the main message of my remarks): 1. Is it proper to kill a neutralized terrorist? 2. Factually, what did Elor do? 3. Was he handled properly (in a military court, at command levels, or not tried at all)? 4. Should he be given backing?

1. I wrote in my remarks that I do not see a moral problem in killing a neutralized terrorist.
[By the way, once one reaches the conclusion that he had no authority to kill the terrorist, it is possible that a moral problem also arises here. For example, in the issue of "be killed rather than transgress" regarding murder, there is a situation where Reuven is threatened that he will be killed if he does not kill Shimon. In such a case, Reuven is forbidden to kill Shimon, but that is only because Reuven's blood is no redder than Shimon's blood. That is, it is a principle of passive non-action, a default position (for Shimon's blood too is no redder than Reuven's). And yet, if Reuven violates the halakhah and kills Shimon, he is considered a murderer. We see that killing without authorization, even if it can be justified or at least morally equivalent to not killing, is still considered murder.]
2. The facts as established by the court are that the soldier took the law into his own hands and shot a man to death on his own initiative, with no danger posed to him. In effect, he executed another person with no authority to do so. Therefore, even if one does not see the act as morally problematic, the soldier committed an extremely grave act from a legal and disciplinary standpoint. This is similar to a person who thinks some criminal deserves the death penalty and then goes and executes him on his own initiative. And in our case it is even more severe, because there are also social and international implications to this act, which are entirely outside the soldier's authority.
3. Therefore there is no doubt that such a case deserves serious legal treatment. A soldier who does such a thing deserves to stand trial and bear a severe punishment. The claim that he should not be put on trial requires proof and justification. Let us examine the possible justifications.
I do not know military law, but it seems to me that in a case of unjustified killing this should not be closed at the command level but should be brought to trial in a military court. Nor do I see any mitigating circumstances in Elor's case that would exempt him from the law and from trial. Why does he deserve that? He is simply an offender who took the law into his own hands and caused us as a state endless trouble. What did he do that gives him a right to special consideration?
Even if we ignore military law (which, as stated, I do not know precisely), it is important to understand that the question of how to handle such a case involves a rather complex system of considerations. First, taking the case into the public sphere (the publication of the video), especially accompanied by statements from public figures in all directions (right and left), left the army authorities almost no choice but to transfer the matter to a military court that would examine the issue thoroughly and decide. There are significant advantages to a proper examination of the act in a military court. Had they chosen to close the matter at the level of company or battalion commander, all sorts of doubts would have arisen—and justifiably so—about a unit investigating itself. Confidence in a court is much stronger than confidence in a company or battalion commander who closes matters internally.
Also in terms of our standing in the world (and in the internal Israeli debate, against Breaking the Silence and so on), it is very important that such cases be tried in full seriousness. If we close matters internally, then Breaking the Silence are right when they accuse us of that. If we defend a soldier for whom there is no justification to defend, why should our argument be accepted when there are soldiers who truly deserve defense?
In addition, one should know that international law expects a state to handle such cases itself; otherwise a very real threat is created that the matter will be handled by international institutions. I would not belittle that difficult arena, although many among us tend to dismiss it (because we citizens are not the ones threatened with being taken to The Hague, unlike IDF officers and the prime minister. We are brave from the armchair and expect backing for every soldier at their expense and the expense of the state).
4. Your expectation (like that of others) to give backing to a soldier who did such a thing amazes me very much. I do not see what justification there is for identifying with this soldier-offender. What does this have to do with the backing that should certainly be given to IDF soldiers? There is no reason in the world to give backing to a soldier who went astray and took the law into his own hands. Backing is meant for a soldier who made an operational mistake or an error of judgment within the framework of his role. Such a soldier absolutely should receive backing, and every soldier should know there is no impediment to carrying out his role even if he makes a mistake. But that is not the case here. Here you expect backing for a soldier who deliberately committed an offense and did not make a mistake during operational activity. In your opinion, is it important that every soldier know he can do whatever he wants so long as he is wearing a uniform? The purpose of backing is to enable soldiers to fulfill their mission, but that was not the case here. For example, would you give backing to a soldier who shot his comrade out of anger? The fact that Elor is a soldier does not automatically grant him a right to backing. Why does he deserve such backing? He is simply an offender. It is certainly possible that there were mitigating circumstances (after the event he was heated and angry), and it is also possible that there were not. But even if there were, those are at most considerations for sentencing, not for conviction and backing.
It is important to understand that the military command and the government must think about coping with two slippery slopes: on the one hand, hasty and unjustified shooting and excessive violence by soldiers (not all violence toward Palestinians is justified either, and we all know there are quite a few such cases), and on the other hand, the creation of hesitation and fear to fulfill missions. The balance between these two is delicate, and in your words you considered only one of these slopes. The commanders and government, who bear responsibility, must consider both. The proper balance says that when a soldier carried out a mission, he deserves backing even if he erred. But a soldier who uses unnecessary and unjustified violence without authority will not receive backing. It seems to me this is the right way to navigate between these two opposing fears, both of which are dangerous and both of which must be guarded against. This is the difference between someone who bears responsibility and must worry from all directions, and someone who expresses an opinion from the armchair without responsibility (it is worth seeing the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon in the Mishnah, Makkot 7a).

To conclude, I would add that insistence on backing a soldier in such a case is also very damaging on the tactical plane, because if one defends and backs a soldier for such an act, the world and the Israeli public will not accept, and rightly so, backing for soldiers who act properly and make mistakes (who truly do deserve backing). Therefore it is very important to make the distinction and not give backing to soldiers indiscriminately. The purpose of backing is to give soldiers confidence that when they carry out their mission they will not be harmed, even if they made a mistake. But there is certainly no justification to give them the sense that they are all-powerful and have permission to execute people according to their own understanding and feelings.
Therefore, although I have criticism of statements by public figures (from both sides) on this issue, it is not because of the backing allegedly due to the soldier. He deserves no backing whatsoever. Rather, because one must wait for the court to finish the proceedings and render judgment, and only then speak. One may express a principled view about such an act, but not refer to the specific case as long as it has not been finally determined what happened there.

If you had worded the sign as: "The people demand that a terrorist who goes out to carry out an attack not return home," I would have joined you. But I see no justification whatsoever for supporting this soldier. He is simply an offender and does not deserve a drop of identification. I cannot understand the meaning of the public mobilization on his behalf. I do not see any place in the world to identify with an offender who takes the law into his own hands and executes a person on his own initiative, making decisions for an entire state with no authority.

And one final point. I assume all the service girls agree with the sign and with what was written here in the email, and I must say that this in itself seems troubling to me. I do not know to what extent you conducted a discussion and clarified the various aspects among yourselves. But even if you did, it amazes me that all the members of the group hold the same opinion, whereas among the people around me I at least do notice disagreements (so far, most people I speak with agree with me). It is worth checking whether the discussion is indeed being conducted in a sufficiently open and deep way before adopting positions on such issues. It is quite likely that in an open discussion at least disagreements would emerge, and not all of you would agree on the same position. Today there is a troubling herd phenomenon in the public regarding this case and in our public discourse in general, and it is very important not to let ourselves be automatically swept into it, but rather to weigh our positions and form them independently and soberly.

All the best,

Yes Elor, no Elor – the people are with the service girls. Rise and succeed!

Regards, Sh. Tz. Levinger, as one of 'the people'

Hello, honorable rabbi.
I have pondered the article for a long time and I cannot understand why, despite my agreement with your words, my conclusion is different.
I agree with what the rabbi wrote:
A) There is no moral problem in what Azaria did.
B) There is a legal and disciplinary problem in what he did.
I cannot understand where the rabbi's intense eagerness and desire to punish Elor with the full severity comes from.
Let us assume that no political damage was caused by the act. (Or: political damage exists because of a defect in the nations, not because of Azaria's act. The settlements also cause political damage, and we do not refrain from them.)
The intuition of most citizens and many politicians (not necessarily from the right side of politics) is that Elor should be pardoned, and somehow the rabbi claims that Elor should be punished in the regular way (I would say: ten years in prison?).
I wonder what the rabbi would say in a case where a Jew killed a neutralized Nazi and there was a German law stipulating that the Jew should go to prison. Is the law there too so sacred and supreme that even though it does not distinguish between morally justified killing and killing that is not, one must follow it through fire and water? I am not claiming he should not be judged in the regular legal process, but that in the end one should use a pardon to overcome the defect in the law.
After all, we are talking about a vile terrorist whose death we all long for; we are talking about a Nazi. So because there is a defect in the law (it is forbidden to kill a neutralized Nazi), the soldier will have to sit in prison for years even though he did a moral and noble act?
Now, even though his act was wrong, because we do not want to reach anarchy and there must be discipline in the army, what is the connection between the offense of which he was convicted and what he actually did?
He shot a dead cat, and the army forbids shooting dead cats, so why should he be punished as though he killed a person? Because legally the army forbade it?
As for concern about similar cases in the future, reason suggests that after what this soldier went through, no one will do as he did, if only so as not to go through what he and his family went through in recent months.
I think the slogan: "A soldier must not sit in prison" is the embodiment of healthy common sense, saying that we must not reach an absurd situation in which a soldier sits in prison because he killed a Nazi (a terrorist), even if the warped German law (the Israeli rules of engagement) says so.
One need not trample the law in order to free him. There is a pardon precisely for cases in which the law does not reflect the truth.
So morally his act is superior.
Legally he broke the law, because the law is flawed and immoral (it is forbidden to shoot a neutralized terrorist).
There is no political damage.
There is no fear of recurrence of such cases in the future because of the pardon.
So I would have expected the rabbi, who is moral (who knows that one should shoot a neutralized terrorist), to desire a pardon for Elor, or at most a light punishment for breach of military orders (without the dimension of manslaughter).
Especially since Elor did not know what he was getting into, and there was no precedent that should have deterred him.
This is a classic case in which there is an easy decision that has heavy consequences (after all, he did not enter a prison and murder someone there).
So in the next Elor Azaria case one should indeed be stricter.
But in the first case, where we are talking about a moral act and a broken law, he should be judged as a lawbreaker and not as a killer (for the problematic aspect of his act lay in disobeying the law, not in the killing itself).
And if we are already speaking of concerns, there are quite a few concerns if Elor does sit in prison: lowering of national morale, anger and lack of trust in the authorities in general and in the army in particular, and fear among soldiers of opening fire in borderline cases.
Therefore I do not understand why the rabbi so desires and longs to see the soldier spend years in prison and ruin his life.

Hello.
Although I have already explained everything, I will briefly return to a few points.

I will preface by saying that I do not know where you learned that I am eager to punish Azaria. I do indeed think he should be punished severely, but that is a position, not eagerness. I also think that 2+3=5, but I am not eager for that to be true. By contrast, I am eager for the proposition that eating cream cakes freely is beneficial to health to be true, but I do not think it is.

1. Even if no political damage was caused by the act, soldiers who take the law into their own hands may cause damage, and they must be deterred (see the last column on punishment). The example of the settlements is not of the same kind in several respects, and I will present two main ones: 1. There is a dispute whether this causes harm or rather great benefit. 2. It is a decision and policy of governments, not citizens taking the law into their own hands like Azaria.
2. Now let us move to Godwin's law (https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%97%D7%95%D7%A7_%D7%92%D7%95%D7%93%D7%95%D7%95%D7%99%D7%9F):
If a Jew killed a neutralized Nazi against German law, I would say he broke the law and should be punished. The law is not sacred or supreme, and an anarchist like me is the last person to see it that way. But there is an obligation to obey the law not because of its sanctity but because it is the social contract we are signed onto, and because not doing so is harmful (except in edge cases).
You think there is a defect in the law, while someone else thinks there is not (I myself, for example, am not sure there is a defect in the law. There is no moral problem in killing a terrorist, but there are political and other problems). You are not the one who makes the decisions. All the more so when we are talking about an issue that has implications for state policy and for all of us (which is not the case in killing the Nazi). In short, if this example were even a little similar to our case, I would say the same things about it. But it is not similar in any respect (and therefore bringing it is a fine illustration of the above-mentioned Godwin's law).
3. I already explained the difference from shooting a cat. It is not that difficult to understand. The implications are entirely different, and killing a person is not like killing a cat, even if it is morally justified (I said that in my eyes his life is equal to that of an alley cat, but see the clarifications and distinctions in my reply to the service girls and in my reply to K.).

With God's help, 13 Tevet 5777

According to the rules of engagement, one may and must shoot if there is concern for immediate danger to life. In Elor Azaria's case, it is clear that the terrorist began to move after they thought he had been neutralized; near the terrorist lay the knife with which he had stabbed a soldier; and there were cries on the scene warning of an explosive device that might be on the terrorist – so it is clear that there was concern that the terrorist was not neutralized. Elor's response to the situation was therefore entirely reasonable,

There is only one problem with Elor's response: the platoon commander was present on the scene; he too noticed the terrorist's movement and he too was aware of the danger of an explosive device, but he thought it was enough to station a soldier to watch the terrorist and prevent any attempt to cause harm. In my humble opinion, Elor's reasoning was more correct—that one does not take chances when with a slight movement the terrorist could reach the knife or activate an explosive—but from the standpoint of military discipline it would have been preferable for him to rely on the platoon commander's judgment. In any event, there is nothing criminal here.

There is no basis whatsoever for a manslaughter conviction on the assumption that he intended an act of revenge. Elor's conduct is fully explained in light of the existing concern that the terrorist was not neutralized.

The claim of T.M. that 'it seemed to him that Elor said the terrorist should die' has no basis whatsoever. The company commander said in his first Military Police investigation that Elor told him he shot the terrorist because he moved (only after T.M.'s version was shown to him did the company commander's memory 'refresh' itself…), and so too testified the paramedic who met Elor shortly after the event, saying he had shot the terrorist because of fear he would take the knife. Even from the battalion commander's rebuke, in which he told Elor he was lying, it is proven that he explained the shooting by the danger posed by the terrorist.

The judge's claim that the slowness of Elor's response proves he did not feel threatened – is irrelevant. It is reasonable that a soldier shooting 'in real time' for the first time would do so very carefully in order to hit accurately. Precisely a sense of danger requires acting carefully and deliberately.

I am astonished at the conviction and very much hope that the appellate military court will fulfill its duty to bring justice to light and acquit Elor!

Regards, Sh. Tz. Levinger

I already mentioned above the articles by Moshe Ifargan on the Mida website, showing that the facts and testimony unequivocally support Elor's innocence.

The rabbi so adamantly refuses even the granting of a pardon and firmly demands imprisonment for years, despite the fact that experienced politicians from right and left presumably do not see the danger threatening our state if the soldier is pardoned.
That is what I call eagerness. I mean a principled position that treats a certain concern almost as an existential threat. (I would illustrate this with the example that it seems that if the rabbi had the time and energy, he would travel to the politicians and the president in order to persuade them not to sin against the child and, heaven forbid, grant him a pardon that would bring the state to its knees, ruin all international relations, and cause the killing of dozens of Palestinians in the future—for there are no countervailing concerns of the people's alienation from their army and lack of identification with it. Therefore it is fitting to ruin the life of a soldier and his family (true, an offender) who did not use his head for a few especially heated minutes, did not think about the heavy consequences (for himself and for his state), and shot a person whom truthfully he ought to have shot.)
I see no plain meaning in the rabbi's words when he compares this to the statement 2+3=5, which involves no practical action.
1) Intentionally, I spoke of a case where there is no political damage, in order to understand precisely the rabbi's intention.
So the rabbi only went halfway with me and said: even if there is no political damage, there is concern that future soldiers will act similarly and then cause such damage (not an exact quote).
I want to neutralize what seems to me peripheral in order to understand what your main claim is.
So I will repeat: I am speaking of a situation in which there is no political damage whatsoever, and no concern that future soldiers will behave similarly and then cause political damage.
2) I do not know what the rabbi saw fit to bring in Godwin's law for.
As I understand it, the law speaks of comparing actions or discussion participants to Nazis, not of confronting the Nazi in the form of the enemy under discussion (something the rabbi himself does when explaining the commandment to blot out Amalek. Why bring in Amalek? Isn't a Palestinian enemy enough to understand? Apparently not.).
Second, I did not understand the rabbi's words. On the one hand you argued there is no room for the comparison, and on the other hand that if there were such a German law, the Jew would have to be punished.
And I ask: if you were the president of Germany, would you grant the Jew a pardon or let him rot in prison in the name of the sacred law?
I agree that one should preserve the law, which is why I am talking about a pardon and not a legal waiver. A pardon is anchored in law.
A pardon preserves the law.
The rabbi claims there is no defect in the rules of engagement and yet that terrorists should be killed—what is the explanation?
Again I ask the rabbi to ignore the political implications for the moment; let us assume there are none.
Now, all this person's offense is that he killed a Nazi and took the law into his own hands.
There are no political implications.
There is no concern for recurrence of such cases.
There were no precedents that could have deterred the soldier.
It happened out of heated emotion because of his friend's injury.
How does the rabbi derive from this whole equation ten years in prison and the destruction of the soldier's life?
When it would be legally possible to grant a pardon, in addition to a small punishment within the army.
I did not understand what use there is in the point that the terrorist's life is not like that of a cat in the object itself, but only in relation to the subject.

Hello.
Either my explanatory ability is fatally deficient, or you are simply being obstinate, or I do not understand what all this extra circling is about. You keep repeating the same things, and I can only explain again what I already explained. I will try once more, and let us finish with that.

Again you put words in my mouth. Where did I "adamantly refuse" a pardon? As far as I remember, I wrote that I tend to think it is not right to pardon him and I do not see a reason to do so. The "adamancy" is about like the "eagerness." But that is a sterile discussion.

There is no existential threat here (rather, concern about cumulative damage), and nevertheless it is proper to punish him, just as a murderer does not pose an existential threat to the state and yet should still be punished.

Regarding 2+3=5, if you reread my words you will find both plain sense and midrash there. My claim is that one must not confuse a position with eagerness. That is all (not terribly difficult, to the best of my understanding).

If there were no future harm from him or from others, then indeed there would be no reason to punish him. The same is true of any other offense (not only in Azaria's case). I am not a formalist who thinks that if a person broke the law he automatically deserves to suffer. Forgive me, but this is a foolish question, and I do not understand why it must be repeated.

I brought in Godwin's law because the Nazi example was completely unrelated to the discussion from every angle. It is a textbook case of it. I have nothing against examples, even from the Nazis (or Amalek). But I am in favor of examples that are relevant to the discussion.
I already answered that I would act the same way in the case of killing the Nazi. How many times do I need to repeat everything I write?

As I explained, there is no moral problem in killing a terrorist. The question whether it is practical and correct to legislate such a law is a different question. That is why I wrote that I am not sure there is a defect (and I did not write that there is no defect) in the law.

Regarding the value of the terrorist's life (in the object or in the subject), see my explanations to K'.

All the best.

Thank you for the response despite my lack of understanding (for the rabbi explained that the flaw must lie either in his inability to explain—which of course no one doubts—or in my lack of understanding), because I am responding again. If this is burdensome to the rabbi, he need not answer; I will understand that (though I would still be glad for one final response).

1) To sum up: the rabbi thinks he should be punished because of the future damage that would be caused (or has already been caused) because of the soldier, and not because of the act in itself (for it was proper and moral).
That point mattered to me because the rabbi mixed the two things together in his words—the very criminality and the future damage. A sentence like "he is an offender and he should be punished" caused me, justifiably, to think that the rabbi punishes because of the act itself and not because of the concerns the rabbi mentioned around it. If the point is the concern, then I agree.
2) In parentheses—would the rabbi not put in prison even for one day a murderer who murdered and now no longer poses any danger (and whose conviction would add no deterrence)? Does the rabbi argue that the function of human punishment is always deterrent-protective, and not retributive?
I do not understand why this is a foolish question. There are people who think the soldier should be punished because of the act itself and not because of future concerns.
3) Regarding the "adamant refusal to grant a pardon," as I understand it this is reflected in the sentences here. As far as I remember, it did not say something like "I tend to say that…" but rather a sentence like "he is an offender, and he must be punished with full severity." In my opinion that does not reflect a gentle nuance of "tend to say," but a firm stance that he should be treated like any ordinary offender (who clearly does not receive a pardon).
What does "eagerness" mean if not a clear-cut position to punish him without a pardon, to the point that the risks involved in not doing so are not even seen as a matter worth discussing?
The claim of eagerness is that anger over the soldier's criminality causes the rabbi to dismiss the risks involved in convicting him, to magnify the risks in pardoning him, and to ignore the fact that he entered into this out of heated passion because of his friend's injury (with no precedent and without the mindset of "this is what I am doing it for").
4) Regarding the Nazis, I truly do not understand. The rabbi would not pardon a Jew who murdered a neutralized Nazi? (I understood you to say so; I am simply amazed.) What is that if not formalism and devotion to the law?
By the way, I am sure that this is only on paper, and if the rabbi were president of Germany, he would grant a thousand pardons to a Jew who killed the Nazi who killed his entire family. I have no doubt of that.
(Again I will clarify: the rabbi says that in the Shoah he would do the same thing, and yet that the Shoah is entirely unrelated to the subject. I request clarification.)
4) What is the difference between the Shoah and our case? That there is harm to the state and the law is in the hands of the authorities? If so, that is a formal difference, not a principled difference that authorizes killing the Nazi (which is forbidden by law). How does that reverse the outcome?
Again I would be glad for clarification of the difference between the Nazi there and here, and how exactly that difference generates the different result (or whether there is no difference…).

1-2) I discussed the theory of punishment in the last post. The main purpose of punishment is protection and deterrence. Atonement, retribution, and punishment are the role of the Holy One, blessed be He, not ours. If someone thinks retribution and punishment are also our role (and there are such people), then let him add a bit more punishment of his own. But still, the main and more important thing is of course the needs of society, not the metaphysics of the offender. Therefore in every offense this is the consideration, and not because Azaria was morally okay. All this is true even לגבי someone who acted in a blatantly immoral way.
I wrote that it is a foolish question because I explained that I am not a formalist, and yet you kept attributing to me a notion of the sanctity of the law. But I explained again and again that the law is not at all sacred in my eyes, and therefore the mere act of violating it is not terrible to me apart from the implications. There is importance in keeping the law, but that is not a commandment or a biblical decree. The importance is mainly because of the implications. There is value in keeping the law even apart from the implications, because a person ought to keep his commitments, and there is a social contract that every member of a society signs. But punishment is not about educating a person to be morally elevated; it is mainly about fulfilling the needs of society.
3. There are no risks in convicting him—no more than in convicting any other offender. If you mean the possible hesitation of soldiers, see my reply to Yishai.
4. I would not pardon anyone who committed an offense unless there are special circumstances and unless there is no importance in punishing him. In my opinion, here there are mitigating circumstances, and therefore there is room to consider them in the sentencing arguments. But a pardon is not connected to the leniency of the act; it is connected to special circumstances and implications.
I would do exactly the same regarding someone who killed a Nazi. If it is a violation of the law and it is harmful (has problematic implications), then I would punish him accordingly. In the sentencing arguments I would take the mitigating circumstances into account.
I already explained that the Shoah is unrelated to the matter for countless reasons that you can understand on your own. A Jew's killing a Nazi does not have any implications similar to the present case. Here we punish the terrorist (even if not severely enough in your view). We have an army to protect us (unlike in the Shoah). And so on and so forth. Therefore there it is simply a legal offense under entirely different circumstances. So what room is there to compare the cases? If you ask about a theoretical case that for some reason is similar (that killing the Nazi would bring problematic implications for society and the state as a whole, and that there are those to protect us, etc.), then of course we are not talking about killing a Nazi but his cousin, who also happened to be called Nazi (like the joke about Shakespeare). Everything depends on the matter at hand.
4 (the second one). If harm to the state is, in your eyes, a formal difference, then I do not know what a non-formal difference would be.

A) I am very puzzled that the rabbi does not see that many of the discussions in the comments could have been avoided had you explained more clearly to people that what you meant is that Azaria should be punished because of the implications and the damage he caused, and not because of the very act of violating the law, which in itself supposedly warrants punishment even though there is no moral problem.
In my opinion, even in the last post this is not made clear enough.
B) The comparison to the Shoah was definitely relevant and natural in light of my mistaken understanding that the rabbi wanted to punish in the name of the sanctity of the law. I brought a case in which presumably the sanctity of the law would not prevail, and I argued that here too it should not be given supremacy (because we assumed there is no harm and no future damage. And the circumstances are mitigating, even if not at the level of the Shoah).
C) By "formal difference" I did not mean harm to the state, but rather taking the law into one's own hands.

I cannot do more than write my intention clearly. The letter I wrote is fairly short and therefore not exhaustive, but here are the relevant sentences:

It is a very serious deviation from army orders. I assume that although our service girls did not serve in the army, even they can surely understand that an ordinary soldier cannot make strategic decisions on behalf of all of us, and certainly cannot decide to kill people, even if his decisions are completely justified and moral.

This paragraph places the main weight on the violation of the law and not on the implications.
"a very serious deviation from army orders"
"he cannot make decisions on behalf of all of us."
Would it not have been simpler to say: "His actions have grave implications"?

The comparison between killing a terrorist and killing a Nazi was made by Judge Yaakov Bazak; I do not recall whether in the Shkolnik case or in the Islamic College case, in both of which he convicted the defendant of murder. Judge Bazak noted in his ruling that even if a Jewish Holocaust survivor had killed Eichmann during his trial, the court would have had no choice but to convict him of murder and sentence him to life imprisonment, and presumably the president would have pardoned him.

In any event, in the Elor Azaria affair I have already shown above that the prosecution's and the judges' claim that he shot the terrorist out of revenge is incorrect. The facts and testimony clearly prove that there was concern that the terrorist was not neutralized and might continue to do harm.

As for the political damage, it was caused by the eagerness of the defense minister and the chief of staff to publish an immediate public dissociation from the 'wayward soldier' without any serious examination of the soldier's claims. Thus they erred in the Muhammad al-Durrah affair, where the IDF hastened to take responsibility at once, and in the end it turned out that the whole thing was 'hot air.' And thus they erred in the Duma affair, where without any knowledge the defense minister involved himself and said they knew who carried out the attack, and in the end it turned out they knew nothing, and they arrested innocent people 'like a blind man groping in a chimney' until they found someone who could not withstand torture and confessed.

The unfounded statements of the chief of staff and defense minister constitute, on their face, the criminal offense of obstruction of investigative and judicial proceedings, but because of their great work and years of self-sacrifice for the security of the state, in my humble opinion it would be sufficient if they apologized and were not put on trial for their attempts to obstruct the investigation and judicial process.

Regards, Sh. Tz. Levinger

Well, at least the conclusion is that the chief of staff has already received a pardon. So why shouldn't Elor receive one?…
I only wonder how you allow yourself to propose a pardon before the legal process against him (= against the chief of staff) has ended? 🙂

Regarding my suggestion not to put senior officials on trial when their statements amounted to 'obstruction of investigative and judicial proceedings,' and to suffice with an apology – in the 'Coastal Road' affair, pardons were given before legal proceedings had even begun, and the president's authority to do so was approved by the High Court. One can prevent or halt legal proceedings also by a decision of the attorney general to stay proceedings out of public-interest considerations.

As for Elor Azaria, there is a problem with a pardon in the middle of legal proceedings, and therefore Defense Minister Liberman proposed that he wait until sentencing and only then request a pardon.

But the main problem with requesting a pardon is that it constitutes an admission of guilt and prevents the possibility of an appeal to the appellate court that might lead to acquittal. A request for pardon that constitutes admission would also expose Elor to a high civil damages suit filed by the terrorist's family, against which no pardon could help. In short, in my humble opinion the young man should be acquitted!

Regards, Sh. Tz. Levinger

Y.:
You wrote in your correspondence with K' that as far as you are concerned, if there is a Jew planning to harm and murder innocent Arabs, he too should be killed.
But Jewish law, it seems to me, distinguishes between blood and blood, between a Jew who murders and a gentile who murders? (That too is something that deserves explanation.)
—————————
The rabbi:
In my opinion halakhah does not distinguish (except that for murdering a Jew one violates "You shall not murder" and is liable to death, whereas for murdering a gentile one violates "Whoever sheds the blood of man" but is not liable to death. In my opinion there is an explanation for this, but this is not the place to elaborate). But in every practical respect there is no difference. Much could be said about this, but it is obvious to me that the law of the pursuer applies also to a Jew pursuing a gentile.

The rabbi noted above several times the distinction between morality and law, and since Elor committed a moral act but contrary to the regulations, Elor Azaria should be judged for the severe deviation from the regulations. The rabbi also argued earlier that a bound terrorist does not pose an existential threat to the state, and therefore killing a bound terrorist amounts to anarchy with no real need whatsoever.

These points are clear. But it is important for me to sharpen something here and of course hear the rabbi's response.
I believe that in Elor Azaria's case there is a head-on collision between morality and the law. What has happened in recent years is that the political policy of the IDF is that there are no enemies, only criminal offenders (and therefore we fight rockets and tunnels, not enemies).
Not killing an enemy and instead bringing him to criminal trial gives room (and perhaps even legitimacy!) to the claim that one may come murder Jews because they are Jews. As do the "ceasefires in order to recharge the munitions of legitimacy" that were made in Operation Protective Edge and in whose wake many fallen soldiers died.
In other words, in the current situation, instead of the law protecting soldiers and civilians (as in the social contract), the law causes the opposite. The current state of affairs is that a Jew or a soldier is allowed to fight only in order to defend himself from being harmed. Heaven forbid he attack in order to deter or fight enemies, because he is the sovereign. (This situation differs fundamentally, for example, from the situation ten years ago, when there was a consensus for an Israeli strike on Iran.)

Therefore, in my opinion, in Elor Azaria's case – separating the legal aspect from the moral aspect is mistaken. If this were a "softer" case, fine. And indeed, in most cases it is reasonable to defend the law so that anarchy is not created. But unfortunately (and this of course depends on one's analysis of reality, and perhaps the rabbi sees things differently), here it is the law that creates the anarchy.

I would be glad for the rabbi's response,

Regards,

Yitzhak

Hello Yitzhak.
I disagree with you on both counts:
1. Your description is greatly exaggerated. There certainly is a difference between an enemy and a criminal offender. I too agree that sometimes the policy is too soft, but your description is far from reality.
2. Even if that were the situation, Elor Azaria's act would not help change it. Therefore his act would still be unnecessary and unhelpful (except for eliminating a future danger from one person).