Should a Fast Day Be Instituted in Jewish Law to Commemorate the Holocaust? (Column 4)

Yosef L.:
Don’t you think that even if one cannot find an orderly, systematic doctrine in halakhah as it was shaped over the generations, one can still find such a doctrine at least at the level of the Written Torah? In your book God Plays Dice I saw that you say the Bible does not deal with moral values but with religious values. That is, according to you (to the best of my understanding), all of Judaism—Written Torah and Oral Torah—belongs to the stratum that goes beyond man’s normative life and enters the category of “religion.” And I ask: what is this category of “religion”? What does that mean? Just something arbitrary with no logic whatsoever for the person who observes it? And doesn’t anyone who thinks the commandments have a reason thereby say that they should be placed in a stratum that is in fact normative and relevant to the individual/society/humanity? And, for example, can one not derive economic principles from the commandment of the sabbatical year, as Jabotinsky did?

It seems one should take the move presented here one step further. In my view, exile not only created an imperialism of religion; it actually created the very category of religion, a stratum absent from Scripture. The commandments were given first and foremost for national benefit—“to do so in the midst of the land.” I think that even the fast days we observe now should be treated exactly as you say Holocaust Remembrance Day should be treated today: on the national plane.

I would be glad to hear your response.
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The rabbi:
Hello Yosef.
It seems to me that first of all, as a matter of fact, one simply does not find it. The attempts being made are really not convincing. It is important not to ignore reality and subordinate it to our desires (even if they are worthy and good). It seems to me that even in the Written Torah it is quite amorphous. Of course, universal values that everyone agrees upon—you will find those everywhere. But, in my opinion, studying Torah or halakhah will not change in the least the views you have formed on your own (and this too is a fact, in my opinion: people find what they want).
I agree that among Hazal there was no distinction between morality and religion, and perhaps not among the Rishonim either. In a certain sense exile created that distinction (and in general, the history of halakhah is the creation of distinctions that did not exist before. The Gemara makes conceptual distinctions that are not in the Mishnah, and so on). But in my opinion this is an expression of the world’s progress (not regression). We now understand that there are two kinds of values, which many of our rabbis identified with one another. The indication of this (which helps us distinguish what they did not distinguish) is that today we see one can be moral even without religious commitment. So why think religious commitment is intended for moral purposes? On that view it is superfluous today.
As for the meaning of religious purposes, you assume there are no values beyond moral values. That is an assumption for which I see no basis, certainly not when one studies Torah and halakhah. For a very large portion of what is there, it seems to me one cannot find a moral rationalization. So why assume they are all intended for morality? In my opinion, here too there is an attachment to the heart’s desires and an ignoring of facts.
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Yosef L.:
1. Of course, according to biblical scholarship, if the Bible is nothing but different layers representing different schools and worldviews, then there is nothing to discuss. But if we do accept the revelatory dimension of Scripture, then in my opinion one really can formulate or sharpen a certain position in light of close study of the verses. For example, the Bible’s attitude toward monarchy is an issue that I think can definitely be discussed through rigorous interpretive analysis. For example, I think Maimonides, who saw the “law of the king” as a writ of appointment for the king in Israel, ignored the plain meaning of that entire chapter there. Perhaps we will not succeed in convincing someone else who is sure of his position (just as we presumably will not convince Dawkins), but certainly, I think biblical study can lead to new insights on many issues. In general, my view is that there should not be a contradiction between human morality and what is written in the Torah, as in Abraham’s outcry over the destruction of Sodom. Therefore I think that Scripture alone is indeed not enough to create a moral outlook from scratch, but it does assist in that.

2. I do not understand how the fact that one can be moral without religious commitment shows that there are two categories. I am not claiming that only the religious person is moral, but certainly that the purpose of the commandments belongs to that same category. The fact that we do not always manage to understand the reason for the commandments does not require adopting a “religious” category. Sometimes we lack the historical context to understand what the command was responding to, but that does not mean the moral reason does not exist. Especially since you have still not given me a positive definition of a “religious value.” At this stage, I have no reason to assume there exists a “religious” category that I do not know what it is, just in order to “fill the gaps.”
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The rabbi:
1. There should not be a contradiction, but the question is whether there is any possibility of novelty. Can a person discover through study of the Bible a view he does not accept, and then change his view בעקבות his study? In my opinion, that does not happen. Abravanel, who rejected monarchy, found his view in the Bible; and Maimonides, who did not reject it, found his view there. The same is true today.
Of course, any study in any field, and any book or film, raises questions and can change views. But the change will happen through an internal process and not by virtue of the authority of the Bible (such that because I found a different conclusion there, I force myself to change my position on some issue).
2. I have no definition for a religious value. But as an example I would say that the obligation imposed on a priest’s wife who was raped to separate from her husband does not seem to me an obligation for a moral purpose. Its purpose is preserving the sanctity of the priesthood. That is a religious purpose, not a moral one. Likewise, the prohibition on eating pork does not seem to me a prohibition whose purpose is moral. One can always say there is some moral purpose that none of us understands. That is an empty statement, and I see no reason to think so.
My argument was that if the purpose of the commandments is moral, then the commandments are superfluous (at least today). After all, the moral purpose can be achieved without them as well (and for this I brought evidence from moral people who are not committed to halakhah). So what is the point of keeping halakhah? Be moral, and that’s enough.
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Yosef L.:
1. But today I can come and decide between the dispute of Maimonides and Abravanel and determine that Maimonides’ view seems far from the plain meaning of the verses according to biblical interpretive tools. Of course, that does not mean I will automatically force myself, but as you taught us (as I understood it), according to the synthetic approach there is no such thing as changing one’s position directly through arguments, only through a rhetorical process. Therefore I think that studying the verses with the belief that this is an authoritative text can, at the end of the process, tip the scales toward a change in outlook.

2. Again, I do not understand why creating a category that has no definition is less empty than my argument that we have not grasped all the benefit of the commandments. “Religious value” currently tells me nothing; this really does seem like filling gaps. As for the question why observe commandments if one can be moral without them, I think one could answer either that through the commandments one can be more moral, or that this is what Hazal meant when they said, “The commandments will be nullified in the future to come.” I personally think that indeed some commandments have exhausted their historical role, such as slavery, while others are still awaiting their realization.
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The rabbi:
1. Then decide. The question is why this does not convince someone who thinks differently from you. That is why I am skeptical about the ability to formulate an outlook and values from the Bible and halakhah. To you it seems like Abravanel, but it is clear to me that this is because you are not a monarchist. Speak with monarchists and you will see that they derive, with signs and wonders, the opposite conception (which, contrary to what you write, in my opinion also has room). But the question of kingship is not a good example, since the Torah addresses it explicitly. I am speaking about meta-halakhic and ideological questions that are not explicit. By the same token you could also have brought me the claim that the Torah advocates belief in God.
Bottom line, the fact is that this does not bring about changes in outlook.

2. The fact that something has no definition does not mean there is no point in talking about it (contra the positivists). Well known are the words of Mr. Robert Pirsig in his book Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance on defining the concept of quality, and on how the Greeks (the wicked ones) messed up our minds with the idea that everything has to be defined. If you think about it, it seems to me you will conclude that you also do not know how to define the concept of a moral value. No basic concept can be defined. I gave you an example of a religious value: the sanctity of the priesthood, the sanctity of the Temple, and the like.
You brought the example of slavery, but you made life easy for yourself. I am talking about most of the Torah and halakhah. They did not exhaust their role; rather, they never had moral value to begin with. So what were they intended for? You make a theoretical statement that through the commandments one can be more moral. I see no indication of that. Not from examining the commandments and their content (most of them have no connection to morality), and not from observing reality itself. Therefore, in my opinion, these are at most heart’s desires and not a clear-eyed view of reality.

Oren:
As far as I know, you view the establishment of the State as a natural event (without intervention by the Holy One, blessed be He). If so, for what exactly should one recite Hallel to the Holy One, blessed be He, in this context?
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The rabbi:
Indeed, as I understand it, there is currently no involvement of the Holy One, blessed be He, in history—not only in the establishment of the State (and even if there is, I have no way of knowing where and when it happens). Therefore, when something joyful happens (=“a miracle”?) it is only an opportunity to say Hallel as thanksgiving for the creation of the world and for my own creation.

Shimon:
I couldn’t understand, according to your approach, what exactly is the difference between the obligation of “the law of the kingdom is the law,” which was anchored in and valid in halakhah even under gentile rule in exile, and the present situation. Perhaps you mean that the above rule was valid only for monetary law, whereas today, thank God, it can be extended to additional areas and universal values and the like?
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The rabbi:
I didn’t understand the question.
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Shimon Yerushalmi:
I will quote a passage from your words: “As part of that same matter, we became accustomed to the idea that everything is Torah and everything is halakhah. That there is no ordinary human life, and certainly no values, outside halakhah. That everything is supposed to be run and determined by halakhic decisors and rabbis. But today there is an opportunity to return to normalcy. The people of Israel have a secular national dimension, thank God (thank God not for the secularism but for the return of the secular dimension of all our lives. Some referred to this as our return to the stage of history). There is no reason to continue clinging to the format we got used to because of various historical pathologies.” And about this I ask: after all, halakhah even in the period when “because of our sins we were exiled from our land,” even then we were under some form of rule whose decisions (which also stemmed from values outside halakhah) had halakhic validity, insofar as this was included in the category of “the law of the kingdom is the law.” So what is the significant dimension that has been added nowadays?
I hope I have made myself clearer now.
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The rabbi:
I understand. But being ruled under another nation is bothersome and undesirable for us. True, dina de-malkhuta dina has halakhic validity—so what? Did that mean it was good to live under His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty Franz Joseph? The joy is that we have returned to managing our own lives ourselves, not that this has halakhic validity.
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Shimon Yerushalmi:
Thank you very much for clarifying things! May you merit commandments, and more power to you.

Orel:
If the fasts were only a national event, do you think they would have survived? Can a ceremony held in the civic sphere really replace a prayer recited in every synagogue?
The Holocaust is an event on an order of magnitude far more powerful than the Tenth of Tevet or the Fast of Gedaliah. In my opinion there is no doubt that the best way to transmit it to future generations is through a religious day of mourning, which customarily is a fast day. How many of your acquaintances (the religious ones) know King Jehu? And how many know Gedaliah son of Ahikam?
What can you do? Jews remember things connected to food well—whether a festival or a fast. History has proved that this works far better. And the proof is that not one of the Jewish national holidays survived (Megillat Ta’anit), except for the festivals that were accepted into halakhah.
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The rabbi:
That is an instrumental argument. I am dealing with the question whether halakhah obligates or expects the establishment of such a memorial day. The question of what is more effective is different and should be discussed separately.
As for the second question, my opinion is that if they are forgotten—let them be forgotten. At some stage events become distant and less relevant (it does not seem to me very important today to remember Gedaliah, nor Jehu). Your remarks are based on a common view that religion and halakhah are supposed to provide services for national and universal-human values. I do not agree with that.

Adiel:
I had heard much about you from the days of your teaching in Yeruham, from my friend Rabbi Uriel Eitam.
I eagerly read your article about establishing a fast day for Holocaust Remembrance Day, and I agree with the overwhelming majority of what you wrote.
I heard many times from my teacher and rabbi, Rabbi Amital of blessed memory: “Not everything is da’at Torah.” “Not on every matter must one say what da’at Torah is,” and more.
I am puzzled by your words regarding Hallel on Independence Day.
How is it possible to say Hallel for a miracle that occurred and say that it has no religious significance? Or perhaps I did not understand your words.
I would be glad for an explanation.
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The rabbi:
Think of reciting Asher Yatzar (to make a distinction) after going to the bathroom. Does thanking the Holy One, blessed be He, for opening my orifices have a religious dimension? Does my breakfast, over which I recite blessings before and after, have a religious dimension? As far as I am concerned, the State is like a bathroom or a breakfast.
As for Hallel over a miracle, that is another question. My view is that nowadays there are no miracles (or at least there is no indication that there are), and in general there is no involvement of the Holy One, blessed be He, in the world. When joyful events happen to us, like the establishment of the State, this is a trigger to thank the Holy One, blessed be He, for creating the world and for creating us. But I will elaborate on this, God willing (?) in the book I am currently writing on contemporary theology.
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Oren:
But do we have the authority to institute blessings on our own with regard to Independence Day?
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The rabbi:
This requires discussion. At least according to certain views (Meiri), there is an obligation to recite Hallel for every miracle of deliverance and thanksgiving, and then it would seem one should also recite the blessing even without a special enactment. Just as one recites a blessing over eating an apple every time one eats it, and there is no need for someone to institute a blessing for each apple.
In any case, regarding Hallel without a blessing there is certainly no restriction.
And there is strong reason to think that even with a blessing there is no restriction. If the people of Israel, after the Hanukkah miracle, had recited Hallel with a blessing on their own without a rabbinic enactment, would there have been any problem? According to some of the Rishonim one even recites blessings over custom, and there is discussion of this regarding the blessing over Hallel itself. But here I hesitate, and this is not the place.
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Adi:
It is hard for me to see the State of Israel as “a bathroom.”
The people of Israel returned to the land after 2,000 years. It is a shame the State was not established 20 years earlier….
Thanks to the State there is an ingathering of exiles. Independent rule has returned to the people of Israel. Expressions that Hazal call “the days of the Messiah.”
Hallel is not only for a miracle but for deliverance.
As for miracles:
A miracle is not only a violation of the laws of nature but also a violation of the laws of history or of logic.
Where else do we find another case in which a people scattered to the ends of the earth returns to its land after 2,000 years?
Settles it. Develops it. An ingathering of exiles takes place in it. What other example is there like this?
Is this not what the prophets longed for in their vision?
If 80 years ago one had said to Mordechai from Morocco and Leibish from Poland that they, their children, and their grandchildren would be together in the Land of Israel under Jewish rule and would build families together—would they have said that is like a bathroom?
I am astonished.
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The rabbi:
When I compared the State of Israel to a bathroom, I did not mean to say that the State is worthless or disgusting like a bathroom. I meant that the State is a means (an important one) for us, and no more than that. I am very happy that this means is available to us, and indeed for many years it was not so, and still I do not see in it a religious value. At most it is a national value. And indeed, the coming of the Messiah too is a promise, like the giving of rain. Even the messianic era has no religious value, since there is no commandment being fulfilled in it, but at most it is a means that will enable us to fulfill more commandments (the Temple, etc.). Being rich is also a means that enables one to fulfill commandments, and that does not turn wealth into something with religious value. A state, in its essence, is a means; and the fact that we lacked it for so long, wanted it, and suffered greatly without it confuses us (like a poor man who sees money as a value because of his distress).

As for miracles, there is a very common confusion. Any intervention of the Holy One, blessed be He, in the world is a miracle. Intervention means that something was supposed to happen without intervention (according to the laws of nature), and the Holy One, blessed be He, intervened and something else happens. That means a deviation from the laws of nature. In other words, a miracle. There is no divine intervention in nature that is not a miracle.
I know very well the uniqueness of our return to the land, and I agree with it. Does that mean there was a miracle here? I very much doubt it. It is an exceptional historical event.

I did not understand the difference. The Holy One, blessed be He, said He would send a prophet or bring rain. We performed commandments—when will you decide that rain did not come? After a week? A month? A generation? How will you decide whether commandments were performed or not? How many commandments must be done? By how many people? None of this is really falsifiable. It is more a matter of general impression than falsification. As I wrote, my conclusion that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not intervene is not the result of a clear falsification but of an impression.
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Adi:
I now understand what you mean by “religious,” and from this I understand the wording that the State of Israel and its establishment have no religious significance. I see the word “religious” in a broader sense, and therefore in my eyes the ingathering of exiles etc. has great religious significance.
The same applies to the messianic era, and I am not entering here into the question of whether it is clear that there will be a Temple when the Messiah comes; that is not at all simple.
As for miracles, I share the view that “tomorrow the sun will rise”—that is not a miracle. The realization of the laws of nature is not a miracle.
I fully share the position that not everything is a miracle, as some people like to say.
But the ingathering of exiles and our return to the land after two thousand years—a phenomenon with no counterpart among other peoples—is not a natural phenomenon.
True, there is no splitting of the sea here or “sun, stand still over Gibeon,” but there is here a phenomenon that is not natural, unique in its kind and type. Apparently on this point too we do not agree.
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The rabbi:
One must distinguish between two claims: 1. The establishment of the State and the ingathering of the exiles were a miracle. 2. These two have religious significance. There is no dependence in either direction. There can be a miracle with no religious significance (like the opening of the bodily orifices, for one who thinks that is a miracle), and of course there can be religious significance even if it is not a miracle. I claim that there is no indication that this is a miracle (exceptionality is not a miracle), and also that it has no religious significance (I am a secular Zionist). As stated, one can disagree with either of these two claims separately or with both together.
Moreover, it is entirely possible that this state will become the beginning of our redemption (inshallah), and that a Temple will be built in it and redemption will come through it. And still, in my eyes it has no religious significance. This is a secular platform, made for secular purposes and out of secular motivations. Acts of that sort have no religious significance.
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Adi:
That is, in your opinion does religious significance require religious intention?
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The rabbi:
A human act has religious significance only if it is done with religious intention (see Leibowitz). True, commandments do not require intention, but that is only for commandments (because of a contextual rationale, like an unspecified act being presumed for its own sake). And especially since I proved in an article (in Tzohar, “Causing a Secular Jew to Sin”) that according to all views commandments require faith. Draining swamps, when not done for the sake of Heaven and for the sake of a commandment (settling the Land of Israel), lacks religious value. It has national value.
This is of course only a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. The act itself must also have religious value, and that is defined only by the Torah. If a person stands on one leg for a religious reason he invented from his own mind, that has no religious value.
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Adi:
Maimonides in the Guide, part III, chapter 51, distinguishes between a person who acts “with his limbs” and a person who acts with intention and purpose.
It is clear what the higher level is.
The question is whether we should define as non-religious every act a person does without intention. I agree in principle, but this is an obligatory lesson for very many in Israel; still, there is some leniency and value to work done “not for its own sake”….
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The rabbi:
In my article on Ockham’s razor I explained that action not done מתוך אמונה, out of faith, is not an action done not for its own sake. It is not a religious act at all. See Maimonides at the end of chapter 8 of Hilkhot Melakhim. Someone who believes and acts without intention—that is where one must distinguish between commandments and what is not defined as a commandment. Judging favorably is a beautiful thing, but it is not a working tool for clarifying the truth. And see the commentators (Maimonides, Rabbenu Yonah, and others) on the mishnah in Avot, “Judge every person favorably,” who wrote that one judges favorably only where it is reasonable, contrary to the common view. I wrote about this in my article in Bedad on Ockham’s razor.
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Y.N.:
Hello, honorable rabbi,
If the rabbi could explain in more detail what he means by saying “religious value.” That is, is a religious value only the fulfillment of the commandment itself (a definition which, forgive me, Rabbi, because I understand you do not love it, is Leibowitzian), or is it anything that assists fulfillment of the commandments when done with religious awareness? And beyond that: what practical difference does it make whether something is a religious value or not?
Thank you, and sorry if I am dragging the rabbi back into old, forgotten discussions.
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The rabbi:
Greetings. A religious value means a value within the framework of worship of God. A religious value is not only commandments, since worship of God is broader than halakhah. Even going beyond the letter of the law has religious value. And indeed the condition is also required that it be done for the sake of worship of God.
To the best of my judgment, the state has no religious value in any sense. The state is a need of mine/ours, not a value. I want to live among my people and in the Land of Israel, which is our historic homeland. That is all.
As for a state that is run according to halakhah, one can discuss what value it has (since a state is always only an instrument for its citizens), but a state like ours has no religious value whatsoever.
As for the practical difference, I do not know what practical difference you are looking for (aside from betrothal formulas). These are two completely different things: this is a need and that is a value. What practical difference is there if something is beautiful or good? They are simply two different things.
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Y.N.:
What I meant to ask is: what is the significance of religious value beyond the definition you set out? What is supposed to constitute the difference between a commandment, or a religious value, and that which helps me fulfill it? Or perhaps I did not understand the rabbi and this too is a sterile question, since the concept has no meaning beyond its definition? I think one can explain the difference between good and beautiful, even if not in words, and the practical difference between them. (For example, it does not seem to me that I would find someone who would give his life for beauty, whereas for goodness yes, because beauty does not have sufficiently important meaning, at least in my opinion.)
P.S. You view the state (as I understand it) as something of national value only, and not even as helping one keep commandments. (Even though you say that what helps one fulfill commandments is not necessarily considered a religious value.) According to your approach, why in fact say Hallel? A trigger for thanksgiving for the creation of the world could also be that I got a raise or that another Harry Potter book came out, but no normal person would say Hallel for that. If indeed the state has only national value and no overlap at all with the system of worship of God, then in your place I would not see in it a good trigger for Hallel. Can the rabbi explain what he thinks and where the boundary lies?
Thank you, sorry, and happy new year.
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The rabbi:
It is hard for me to conduct a discussion at such intervals.
Something with religious value is not meant to exclude a commandment. Quite the opposite: a commandment is an example of something with religious value. But a moral act too has religious value and significance (since it is the fulfillment of God’s will). By contrast, the fulfillment of a mere need has neither moral nor religious value. A person wants a state just as he wants breakfast or a house. That is fulfillment of a need, not a value. When a significant need in your life is fulfilled (such as your life being saved), that is an excellent reason to say Hallel. I do not see what is unclear here or what needs explanation.
Does the state make it possible to fulfill religious values? Perhaps yes. But breakfast and a salary do as well.

Moshe:
Following the discussions above, I would like to ask a number of questions that in my opinion arise both from the article and from the discussions that followed it.

A. As I understand it, you do not believe in providence in the sense of the Creator intervening and creating “miracles” like the State of Israel, the ingathering of exiles, etc., and certainly not “small miracles” that “happen” to a private person, like money “falling into his lap” from an unexpected place to get him through the month, and the like.
My question is this: [based on a topic you often present], regarding evolution you wrote that atheists look at evolution from within the laws, whereas you stand on the side and look from outside the laws and ask, “Who created these laws?” And when you see that the law is built in such a way that it leads to creation, you conclude that God created the law in such a way—that is, that God created the “law of evolution.” If so, with regard to miracles as well, isn’t it true that on a “superficial” and simple view everything appears natural to us, and the course of the people of Israel through the generations has natural explanations, like the establishment of the State of Israel; but if we look as one standing outside and ask who created this entire process and why this process so closely resembles what the prophets and the Torah foretold, perhaps we can say that the Creator planned and directed this entire “natural” process toward a purpose, and the perspective from outside the process and the natural laws within it can give a picture of providence? [One could adopt this angle of vision regarding smaller miracles as well.]

B. Another question: does this mean that you do not believe in the miracles written in the Torah and the Prophets, which at a superficial glance seem to violate the laws of physics, such as a staff turning into a snake, bread descending from heaven, water turning into blood, a chariot with horses ascending heavenward in a storm, and many more such things, which seem to a person outside the system like a collection of legends?

C. In addition, what does this mean regarding your belief in God’s knowledge of human actions? Superficially, it seems that lack of providential intervention does not negate divine knowledge, but it seems that on a deeper level these two beliefs have implications for one another, too much to elaborate here; and if so, then the whole concept of “reward and punishment,” according to your view, does not exist. And so it seems from your words that “the World to Come” is a rabbinic belief that has no support in the Torah [I agree entirely, but in the Prophets and Writings there is plenty of clear support]. Not believing in this principle is a reprise of Leibowitz’s words, namely that the whole “obligation” of commandments is only because I accepted upon myself to do so—is that what you mean? If so, I hope it is clear to you that not many will be eager to join this religion. Why enter a system of outdated laws that does not update [you yourself also admit that many decrees and commandments have lost their rationale ages ago]? Why not “accept” upon yourself only part of that system of laws, only the relevant ones? What is wrong with the laws of the State of Israel—why add a burden beyond what already exists?

D. It sounds from your words as though you believe in the concept of “Torah from Heaven” [within certain limits, since I understood that you accept some of the claims of biblical critics], and if so you must believe in the concept of “prophecy.” My question is: why here too do you not use the same logic [which in my opinion too is logical], that if I do not see something I have no reason to assume it exists? After all, for close to 2,500 years no one has seen prophecy, what it is, and how it is supposed to look, and you believe based on rather unimpressive prophecies that once existed [in the past prophecy amounted to this move: do good and it will be good, do evil and it will be bad; all the processes that came afterward do not deviate from the course of nature]. So why not simply assume that there is no such thing as prophecy, and that it is the imagination of people in the ancient world—and just as it does not exist today, it did not exist in the past; and just as people once imagined there were spirits and demons and sorcery and astrological influences and other nice legends, they imagined there was prophecy. In fact I am making your arguments against your own words: I have no reason to believe in prophecy if a. I do not see that it exists today. b. I can explain all prophecies according to the natural order. c. I have reasonable grounds to assume that in the past people did not have good distinctions and invented that they were prophesying, or imagined it.
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The rabbi:
A. First, I do not know what “your honor” believes or does not believe; I am closer to what I believe (or do not). As for what I believe, indeed I have no indication that any miracles are occurring in our world. Maybe there are such things, but I cannot discern them. This is not similar to my arguments regarding evolution, because there there is an argument that compels the existence of a directing (creating) hand, whereas here this is only a possibility.
Beyond that, a miracle is defined as intervention of the Holy One, blessed be He, in the world—that is, a change from its ordinary course. Meaning: according to the laws, the course was supposed to be X, and the Holy One, blessed be He, changed it to Y. As long as I have a natural explanation for what is happening, I do not see why I should assume there was intervention. And if we are talking about the One who generates the natural course of events, that is exactly what I am talking about. That is the creation of the laws.
B. In my book I will detail my approach to supernatural descriptions in the various sources. In general, it is certainly possible that in the past the Holy One, blessed be He, intervened more (then there were miracles and there was prophecy). Today I do not see indications of such involvement by the Holy One, blessed be He.
C. Here I did not understand. What does lack of involvement have to do with lack of providence? There is passive oversight of human actions, but no intervention (at least not on a frequent basis).
The obligation to Torah and commandment is not rooted in reward and punishment, but in the duty to do what the Holy One, blessed be He, commands. Maimonides already wrote in chapter 10 of Hilkhot Teshuvah his view of those who serve out of hope for reward and fear of punishment. Perhaps beliefs about the World to Come were created for such people. And perhaps they are true, but I do not know.
The question of ratings—who will join and who will not—is irrelevant to the issue of truth. The question is whether I am right, not whether I will be popular. I oppose pious lies (saying something untrue in order to bring more people to the service of God). If only because of Maimonides’ parable of the palace. Those who join the service do so on the basis of an error, and therefore they serve the wrong God, and their joining is of little value.
What does this have to do with the laws of the State of Israel? Does someone who keeps them thereby discharge his religious duty? Why didn’t you speak about FIFA rules (the football association)?
D. This too will be explained in my book. Part of it is also discussed in my book Stable and Unstable Truth (on the argument from the witness of the day). Here I will explain briefly. True, the laws of nature operate in the same way all the time, but human beings change. Do people think today what they thought in the past? Do they do today what they did in the past? Do they wear today what they wore in the past? So why do you assume that the conduct of the Holy One, blessed be He, does not change? If I had to decide, I would compare Him precisely to human beings rather than to inanimate nature. There is no reason at all to assume He behaves the same way all the time. So if He decided to withdraw gradually from the world, I see nothing strange or incomprehensible in that. On the contrary, I even have a hypothesis why this is happening. Like a child who, as he grows up, his father leaves him more and more on his own to manage independently. So too the Holy One’s relation to us. His withdrawal is not the decline of the generations as they sell it to us, but the ascent (maturation) of the generations. Today we can already understand that there is a Master of the palace even without miracles. We are philosophically skilled enough to understand that a world governed by fixed laws testifies to a Creator far more than a capricious world does. So now miracles are no longer needed. At least if we behaved and thought as adults, as is expected of us. Indeed there are still people with childish thinking, but they too are apparently expected to grow up.
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Oren:
Following up on this response, you said that “it is certainly possible that in the past the Holy One, blessed be He, intervened more.” But there are verses in the Torah that speak of intervention for generations (“And I will give the rain of your land in its season,” “And I will give your rains in their season,” etc.). How can one say that the Holy One, blessed be He (who presumably knew He was going to cut off contact at some stage), wrote promises of “rewards” that at some point He intended to stop fulfilling? After all, if a parent promises his child candy in exchange for good behavior, even if the child grows up, the parent is expected to keep his promise, no? And if he wants to stop fulfilling it, at least he should explain why (that we have matured, etc.).
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The rabbi:
The Torah also speaks about prophets, prophecies, and miracles, and they too disappeared. The Temple and sacrifices disappeared as well. So too slavery, and more and more. We thus learn that sometimes the Torah speaks to the people of the time of the giving of the Torah, and there are changes to which the Torah does not relate. One can raise hypotheses as to why, but those are the facts.
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Oren:
As for prophets, prophecies, miracles, the Temple, sacrifices, slavery, etc.—those are things for which there is no promise that they will endure for generations. There are only examples that they occurred at some point, but why should we expect them to exist in the future as well? But regarding reward and punishment, the Holy One, blessed be He, explicitly wrote in the Torah that there is a relationship across generations between observance of commandments and some reward, so I have pretty good reason to expect that this relationship will also exist in the future. And if we have reached the conclusion that it does not exist, that constitutes a strong difficulty against the truth of the Torah, does it not? The only explanation I can think of for this difficulty is statements like: “There is no reward for a commandment in this world,” and then we would have to uproot the plain meaning of verses like “And I will give your rains in their season” and interpret them as a metaphor for reward in the World to Come. But that is still difficult, for Scripture does not depart from its plain meaning.
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The rabbi:
I did not understand. The matter of prophecy is bound up with a number of commandments. Are commandments not supposed to be for generations? Part of the service of God is listening to the prophet and his spiritual guidance for us. This is not some random occurrence in which we happened to have a prophet. The Torah promised this and also commanded us to test him and obey his voice. The prophet is also part of the mechanism for going out to war.
The promises that if we keep the commandments we will be given rain are interpreted by me as promises dealing with a period when rain depends on the Holy One, blessed be He. When it depends on Him, then it will be given as a result of commandment observance. Now He has decided to hand this over to us because we have matured, and obviously from this point on it is not relevant. He is simply explaining to us His policy: when I give something, it is for the sake of commandment observance.
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Oren:
Regarding the prophet, it says in Deuteronomy: “If there arises in your midst a prophet”—there is no promise here that one will arise. Meaning, all the commandments connected with testing a prophet are contingent commandments—if a prophet arises, then one must do such-and-such. Just as if one wears a four-cornered garment, one must put fringes on it. The commandment always stands, but it will not always be possible to fulfill it. But what is unique about the verses that speak about reward and punishment is that they contain a relation of if we do A—then the Holy One, blessed be He, will do B. The relation itself is not conditioned on any circumstances. Seemingly the relation always exists. The moment we reach the conclusion that this relation does not hold, there is seemingly a contradiction to the Torah. You could argue that not every claim in the Torah is necessarily true for all generations. But then we would have to say that perhaps the commandments themselves can also change.

Why not simply say that although this relation cannot be seen in reality, it exists in a hidden way (hester panim)?
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The rabbi:
You cited the verses dealing with the false prophet. But the verses that deal with the prophet are (Deuteronomy, end of chapter 18):
“A prophet from your midst, from your brethren, like me, the Lord your God will raise up for you; to him you shall listen. According to all that you asked of the Lord your God at Horeb on the day of the assembly, saying, ‘Let me not hear again the voice of the Lord my God, nor let me see this great fire anymore, lest I die.’ And the Lord said to me: ‘They have spoken well in what they have said. I will raise up for them a prophet from among their brethren like you, and I will put My words in his mouth, and he shall speak to them all that I command him. And it shall be that the man who will not listen to My words which he shall speak in My name, I will require it of him. But the prophet who presumes to speak a word in My name that I have not commanded him to speak, or who speaks in the name of other gods—that prophet shall die.’ And if you say in your heart, ‘How shall we know the word that the Lord has not spoken?’—when the prophet speaks in the name of the Lord, and the thing does not happen or come to pass, that is the thing the Lord has not spoken; the prophet has spoken it presumptuously—you shall not fear him.”
By the way, the precise definition is not a contingent commandment but a conditional positive commandment (like fringes). Almost every positive commandment is conditional. A contingent commandment is one that cannot be violated, only fulfilled. These commandments can be violated (if the circumstances arise—one wears a four-cornered garment and does not fulfill the commandment).

As for your last question, one can of course say that the Holy One, blessed be He, is constantly intervening, but whenever one checks He quickly ducks into a hole in order to confuse us. That seems improbable to me. Every time I examine what is happening in the world, things have a natural and ordinary explanation. The laws of nature work, and when we test them in the laboratory what happens is what we expect to happen. There is no reason to assume there is some strange game of hide-and-seek here. This is not a proof but a consideration of common sense. When I see a body moving, my assumption is that a force acted on it, not that the Holy One, blessed be He, decided to move it without a force. Moreover, I also assume there are no bodies that move without a force. This is the accepted scientific view, and it sounds entirely reasonable and workable to me.
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Oren:
These verses too do not indicate when the prophet will be raised up, or how often. In general, claims of the form “God will do X” are not falsifiable claims (since no time frame is specified for the claim). But claims of the form “If X happens then God will do Y” are falsifiable, given that X happens and Y is measurable. So there are three ways to handle the second kind of claim: either say that X did not really happen, or say that Y is not measurable, or say that the claim was falsified. But if it was falsified, that is no simple difficulty regarding the truth of the Torah’s claims in general.
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The rabbi:
Nothing here is falsifiable in the scientific sense. How many commandments must be done in order for rain to fall? How many people need to do those commandments? How much rain will fall, and until when is it supposed to fall? This is about as falsifiable as the matter of the prophet.
As I wrote, my impression that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not intervene is not the result of scientific falsification, but of a general impression (it does not look like He intervenes). The fact is that in our present situation, I claim that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not intervene, and many believers think He does. They think that when commandments are done rain falls, and I think there is no connection. You can see with your own eyes that the factual situation does not really constitute confirmation or refutation of anything here.
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Oren:
I understand that this is not falsifiable in the scientific sense, but a general impression is also enough for me for falsification (not in the logical-mathematical sense of the word).
The difference between the matter of the prophet and the matter of rain is that the connection between commandments and reward is supposed (by plain logic) to be relatively immediate. That is, if the people of Israel conduct themselves according to the commandments, the response from the Holy One, blessed be He, would reasonably come within a plausible period of time (say, within a number of months and not after 700 years). But in the matter of the prophet, there is no obstacle to the Holy One, blessed be He, sending one prophet once every 3,000 years. There is no conceivable “reasonable period of time” here.
What I am trying to understand is how you bridge the contradiction between your conception and the clear message that arises from the verses. You previously wrote an answer like this: “He is simply explaining to us His policy: when I give something, it is for the sake of commandment observance.” I can accept that explanation. But even according to your view it is difficult: why mention this policy if He does not carry it out?
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The rabbi:
He does carry it out. Whenever He gives something, it is because of commandments. Nowadays He does not tend to give; in the past He did. Nowadays He does not send prophets; in the past He did. This is a policy that changed (not the connection between giving and prayers, but the giving itself).
And beyond that, as I wrote to you, go and see that in the present state of affairs there is a controversy over whether He intervenes or not. So no one can claim that reality itself shows intervention—not even on grounds of impression and common sense. So apart from me, you can ask what the purpose of this statement is. Apparently a general declaration that is not meant to be empirically testable, and it teaches about the importance of the commandments. The importance of the commandments exists today as well. The facts change, but the lesson is eternal.

Gadi:
Hello and much salvation, Rabbi Michael,
Let us start with Mr. Cicero. If so, then the meaning of “worldly conduct precedes Torah” contains no novelty, and if this is not the meaning, then this is just some kind of rebellion [I have a personality beyond being a servant of my God].
Because what difference does it really make whether regulations are halakhic or civic, other than the feeling that civic laws are matters of reason [human], whereas halakhic laws are just annoying, unfortunately?
As for the rabbi of Ponevezh: supplication prayer is halakhah; not saying it is also halakhah. Clearly he did not say Hallel because of halakhah, and he also did not say supplication for the same reason, in his opinion.
It is also clear that you recite Hallel because that is how the halakhah was decided, just as you would not recite it if there were no such ruling.
As for publicizing the absence of providence in Israel—again, how does that help, and whom does it help?
“Prayer is not answered”—that surely brings the people of Israel very close to their God and binds them to their Creator….
And where do you get this from? And even if you find sources, why decide like a lone view and deny a simple, necessary faith? Because that is what Leibowitz decided? Did it help him himself?
I weep over such provocations. You are a wise man; tell me about your opposite experience.
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The rabbi:
I do not argue with feelings. To each his own feelings.
Even if, as you say, everything is halakhah (and that is not true), the question is still what that halakhah reflects. What assumptions are embedded in it.
Publicizing the absence of providence helps very much those who feel that they are being duped, and therefore abandon the whole tradition. I meet dozens of such people. Those who accept the conventional content will continue and spoon-feed themselves the usual messages. My feeling is that someone also needs to provide an answer for those who think straight. That too is a sector worth addressing. The very claim that truth is unimportant and all that matters is concern for the village fools, and the policy of pious lies—not publishing the truth—is what causes us to lose the best of our sons and to remain with those who swallow these tall tales. That is my opposite experience. You asked, so I told you.
As for clinging to ancient sources against the truth because of concerns like yours, I can only cite the Gemara in Yoma 69b:
“For Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Why were they called the Men of the Great Assembly? Because they restored the crown to its former glory. Moses came and said: ‘The great, mighty, and awesome God.’ Jeremiah came and said: Foreigners are carousing in His sanctuary—where is His awesomeness? He did not say ‘awesome.’ Daniel came and said: Foreigners are enslaving His children—where is His might? He did not say ‘mighty.’ They came and said: On the contrary, this is His mighty might, that He suppresses His inclination and shows long-suffering to the wicked. And these are His awesome deeds—that were it not for the fear of the Holy One, blessed be He, how could one nation survive among the nations? And how could the rabbis do this and uproot the enactment enacted by Moses? Rabbi Elazar said: Because they knew of the Holy One, blessed be He, that He is truthful; therefore they did not lie about Him.”

I am accustomed to giving reasons for my claims and not drawing them from various sources—Leibowitz (with whom I agree on almost nothing) or anyone else. If you find a resemblance between them and Leibowitz, that is your choice, but it has nothing whatsoever to do with the discussion itself. It is a shame that someone who preaches forming worldviews by others’ slogans accuses others of such an approach. The pot calling the kettle black.
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Gadi:
Rabbi Michael, good week.
The thing is, I do not think providence and prayer are in the category of pious lies,
so that is why I asked: where do you get this from?
I completely agree that people ask or struggle over whether to tell the truth [and dozens of such people do not justify the publicity at all, and regarding providence in particular and prayer in particular, at a time when the overwhelming majority of believers feel the watching eye and personal providence that everyone carries with him].
In general, I do not think personal providence and prayer are part of the questions about telling the truth or its absence, and not among the things that require exposure,
A] because there is no necessity whatsoever to say that this is so,
B] it contributes in no way,
C] if the Holy One, blessed be He, can help an innocent person and does not do so, then in effect you are accusing Him, conceptually, of “Do not stand by your fellow’s blood” [true, He is not your fellow].
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The rabbi:
Hello Gadi.
You need to decide whether your claim is about the matter itself—that what I say is not true—or whether you are claiming that I should tell a “pious lie” so as not to harm people’s simple faith.
I did not accuse the Holy One, blessed be He, of anything. He could have created the world not to operate according to laws, but He decided (and presumably He has His reasons) to make it operate according to laws. And in general, do you think He could not have helped in the Holocaust or in any other disaster? So why does He not help? Why do you think I accuse Him more than you do? Did I invent the fact that people suffer in the world?
But all these matters will be explained clearly in my book.
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Gadi:
I was quite clear,
First of all, I have not seen people making claims like yours that there is no providence at all,
and I also do not think this is a pious lie; if it indeed is such, then why not leave it that way?
As for laws—do you mean laws of creation that never changed, i.e. there never was providence, or laws with dates?
As for the Holocaust, etc.—if everything is according to the accounting, then indeed I do not know the accounting, but that would not contradict for me “a God of faithfulness and without iniquity,”
If there is no accounting [providence], the difficulty returns to its place,
You dismissed it with “presumably He has His reasons,” okay….
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The rabbi:
1. And therefore?
2. I explained why not leave it.
3. The laws of nature—when they were not known, the Holy One, blessed be He, allowed Himself to deviate from them more, and nowadays when they are better known, He presumably does not do so.
4. There was no difficulty, and it does not return anywhere. If, in your opinion, everything that happens is justified (you just do not understand it), then what are you objecting to in my view? After all, even according to my view, if everything is without providence, still what happens is exactly what ought to happen—so what is the difficulty against the Holy One, blessed be He, according to my view? After all, no one suffers beyond what he deserves.

Gadi:
Hello Rabbi Michael,
And therefore perhaps it is good that this is so. The problem is from the Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings, and the answer that it was only temporary is contradicted by long passages in the Talmud; the problem of trust in Hazal will no longer merely stand as a question mark,
I explained very well why one should leave it as is,
The question is what the meaning of “He has His reasons” is—some other logic? Or logic that is reasonable but that we have not yet grasped?
The first is absurd; the second—if it is not connected to reward and punishment in some way [is there reward and punishment?], and if there is no accounting [providence], then apparently not—so what in fact remains? I am trying to imagine a hypothesis and not succeeding,
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The rabbi:
Hello Gadi. I think we have exhausted this.

Gadi:
Here specifically I did not feel that we had exhausted it,
and in any case I would be happy for some response to this passage that I wrote.

The question is what the meaning of “He has His reasons” is—some other logic? Or logic that is reasonable but that we have not yet grasped?
The first is absurd; the second—if it is not connected to reward and punishment in some way [is there reward and punishment?], and if there is no accounting [providence], then apparently not—so what in fact remains? I am trying to imagine a hypothesis and not succeeding,
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The rabbi:
I am not sure I understood what these remarks are referring to. I assume this is speaking about the reason why the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world to operate according to regular laws. I can suggest one reason, for example, that He wants us to be able to orient ourselves in the world. If it did not operate according to regular laws, you would not be able to predict what will happen in any situation and you would not be able to live.
All the rest of what you wrote is really not clear to me. But please, unless there are genuinely new things, let us end here. My custom has always been to answer every email, but this website demands a great deal of my time, and much of it is repetition of things that have already been written and said.
Forgive me,

Gadi:
Rabbi Michael,
Apparently there really is confusion here between the emails, because I truly did not understand why you dismissed it with “we have exhausted this” when I had not repeated myself even once,
I will raise again what you wrote and respond. Here:
Rabbi Michael wrote, …
1. And therefore? [This was regarding a lone opinion.]
2. I explained why not leave it. [Regarding providence.]
3. The laws of nature—when they were not known, the Holy One, blessed be He, allowed Himself to deviate from them more, and nowadays when they are better known, He apparently does not do so. [A sentence I did not understand.]
4. There was no difficulty, and it does not return anywhere. If, in your opinion, everything that happens is justified (you just do not understand it), then what are you objecting to in my view? After all, even according to my view, if everything is without providence, still what happens is exactly what ought to happen—so what is the difficulty against the Holy One, blessed be He, according to my view? After all, no one suffers beyond what he deserves.

I answered,
1] And therefore perhaps it is good that this is so. The problem is from the Bible, which says the opposite, and to say that it was only temporary and only for certain periods contradicts long passages in the Talmud. The problem of trust in Hazal will no longer merely stand as a question mark.

2] I explained, and I will briefly restate it: I do not think personal providence and prayer are part of the questions and solutions regarding truth-telling or its absence toward those dozens whom you said feel they are being deceived, especially when there is no necessity whatsoever to say that this is indeed the case.

3….

4] You wrote that perhaps the Holy One, blessed be He, has a reason for His decision not to supervise, and that this would not contradict the question of responsibility incumbent upon Him.
I asked: if His reason is something we do not know, some o t h e r logic, that sounds absurd.
If the reason is something unfamiliar but reasonable, yet not connected to reward and punishment [and if there is no accounting and providence then apparently not], I do not see any possibility here.
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The rabbi:
You are repeating yourself.
1. I said it makes no difference to me that no one says what I say. Why should I have to give explanations?
2. And I explained why not leave it. I said I met many people for whom prayer and providence were precisely the issues. What is new here?
3. In the past science was not known and people did not know the laws of nature. Therefore it was more plausible and natural to deviate from them. Today we know them. For example, in the past one could think that rain falls because of commandments. Today we know in advance how much rain will fall and when, and that this depends on meteorological laws and not on commandments.
4. I did not understand where I wrote that the Holy One, blessed be He, has a reason not to supervise. I wrote that He does not supervise. The reason? Apparently that we are already grown children and there is no need to hold our hand. But regardless of theories, the factual question is whether it is plausible that in practice He supervises? In my opinion—no.

And again I write that we have exhausted this.
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Gadi:
Rabbi Michael wrote:
But He decided (and presumably He has His reasons) to make it operate according to laws.
Apparently it is because we are already grown children and there is no need to hold our hand.

So that is the answer to “Do not stand by your fellow’s blood”?? Grown children????
If that is the direction, then indeed we have exhausted it, but I do not suspect you of uttering meaningless lines, as I am accused here more than once….
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The rabbi:
Hello Gadi. You are again repeating things that have already been discussed ad nauseam.
I already explained to you the nonsense in the “do not stand by” argument, which applies equally to you.
It really is unpleasant for me, but as far as I am concerned, we are done.
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Gadi:
Hello Rabbi Michael,
Your honor surely knows how to read between the lines.
I answered: in my view this is a matter of reward and punishment; I am not expert in how the accounting is managed,
but not intervening when you are bleeding because you are a g r o w n c h i l d….??
If you made a siyum, then l’chaim….

Yuval:
Does the rabbi not see the return of the people of Israel to its land after two thousand years of exile, and only three years after the end of the Holocaust, as a deviation from nature? Should this not be attributed to God’s providence?
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The rabbi:
The return of the people of Israel to its land is indeed an exceptional event on the historical plane, but history is a complex thing and there is no way to know whether there was divine intervention here. All in all, it seems to me that one can understand this process quite well even without resorting to His involvement. Secular people see this process and their atheistic-scientific faith is not shattered.
Therefore drawing conclusions from a “historical miracle” is a very dangerous and unconvincing thing. That is unlike perhaps a physical miracle.
True, there may perhaps be some weight to the fact that the prophets foretold the return of the people to its land from the outset, and in that sense perhaps there is room to see this process as an indication of divine involvement. I do not know. I only know that even if this had not happened, almost no one would have shelved his Bible (at most they would have interpreted the relevant verses and taken them away from their plain meaning), and therefore it is hard for me to assign those prophecies very high statistical weight. A thesis that is not open to the test of falsification is also not terribly impressive when it is fulfilled (after all, there were prophecies that did not really come true, and no one was alarmed by that). Especially since those prophecies themselves took part in the process itself (thanks to them we returned here). It is a self-fulfilling prophecy, in the most literal sense.

Gezer:
It seems to me one should say/write “Kikero” in Hebrew. Also, the quotation in his name belongs to Publius Terentius Afer.
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Gezer:
Oops, I did not think this would be published immediately, but would be sent to the site editor. You may delete this comment and the previous one.
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The rabbi:
Hello Gezer.
Indeed, it reaches me, but my computer is barely responding. Therefore I approved the publication, and only now did I manage to send a response of my own. Here it is:

Why delete? Two comments from which all our readers should learn. As for the first, I am not sure. The name in Latin is Cicero, and I do not see why one should change the pronunciation of a name. If someone in the U.S. is called David, must I call him David in Hebrew? That does not seem right to me.
And in general I did not understand why to translate Latin C into a Hebrew kuf (as in “Keisar” instead of “Caesar” as in the original).
As for the second, thank you very much. For years I thought it was Cicero. Now you are my master, my mentor, and my intimate friend.

I sent your second comment too, but that is only for logical amusement. If you saw that the first one went straight to the site (or so you thought), then you should have understood that the second would as well. As stated, I approved them both for upload (that is how the software is built: everything comes to me). I approve everything, except for inappropriate things (which, thank God, have not yet occurred).

And finally,

We learned in Avot (ch. “Acquisition of Torah,” 3):
“One who learns from his fellow one chapter, or one halakhah, or one verse, or one saying, or even one letter, must treat him with honor. For so we find with David, king of Israel, who learned from Ahithophel only two things, and yet called him his teacher, his guide, and his intimate friend, as it is said, ‘But it was you, a man my equal, my guide, and my intimate friend’ (Psalms 55:14). Is this not an a fortiori argument? If David, king of Israel, who learned from Ahithophel only two things, called him his teacher, his guide, and his intimate friend, then one who learns from his fellow one chapter, or one halakhah, or one verse, or one saying, or even one letter, how much more so must he treat him with honor. And honor means only Torah, as it is said, ‘The wise shall inherit honor’ (Proverbs 3:35), and ‘the blameless shall inherit good’ (Proverbs 28:10); and good means only Torah, as it is said, ‘For I have given you a good teaching; do not forsake My Torah’ (Proverbs 4:2).”

Likewise in Bava Metzia 33a:
“Our Rabbis taught: ‘His teacher,’ of whom they spoke, means the teacher who taught him wisdom, not the teacher who taught him Bible and Mishnah—these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehudah says: anyone from whom most of his wisdom came. Rabbi Yose says: even if he enlightened his eyes only in one mishnah—that is his teacher. Rava said: for example, Rav Sehora, who explained to us the filth on a ladle.”

And is it fitting that a student should erase the words of his teacher, his guide, and his intimate friend?
🙂
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Gezer:
Thank you very much for the somewhat exaggerated compliments :). Perhaps I will take from this a lesson for myself to thank the rabbi dozens of times. Thank you very much for your lectures and publications, which opened for me a gateway to many fields and enriched my knowledge in many additional areas; further thanks that your words have often taught me a proper, and even healthy, mode of response (I am not referring to the rabbi’s favorite “contradiction” example—as it seems to me—which I would call “the proof from chocolate.” 🙂), broadened my point of view, and at times invented rest for my soul.

And precisely because of that, I did not want to “rule on halakhah” in my rabbi’s presence. I suggested deleting it because I thought it would suffice to correct the body of the article if the rabbi found it appropriate, and that the appearance of the comment itself had no importance. Also, as stated, I felt uncomfortable publicly pointing to an error, if indeed it was an error.

As to the substance, to the best of my knowledge the Latin pronunciation is actually Kikero (in modern English they may perhaps pronounce it Sisero). The question of David indeed presents a problem when we are dealing with a name whose origin is known but which is pronounced differently in different cultures, and also raises a problem regarding whether one uses a name as a sequence of syllables or as a term whose meaning the user also wants. But it seems to me that the appellation “Tzitzero,” if indeed that is how it is known in Israel, is not dominant and does not carry such cultural weight that using “Kikero” would be unintelligible to people or deprive them of the meaning of the name. It also seems that in light of today’s accepted transcription rules, use of the form “Tzitzero” is diminishing.

As for the logical amusement, as one who, as stated, also owes the rabbi thanks for no small part of my knowledge in logic, I hope I have learned enough not to fail in such a small matter. Indeed I assumed that my second response would be published automatically, but I knew of no other way to express my desire that the first be deleted, except by a reply to it in which I noted that originally I had not thought the mechanism was one of immediate publication, as an additional reason to honor the request that the notice be deleted. I assumed that in the end whoever was responsible for this would see them, and the deletion request mentioned in the latter.

And again, thank you very much.
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The rabbi:
I have received a tradition from my late father (who studied Latin) that the pronunciation in the original is Tzitzero (and Tzizar). So there, he too is my master, my mentor, and my intimate friend. 🙂

Mikyab
You argue that even if you can infer a broader evaluative statement from a collection of laws, you are not obligated by it.
I too held this view (and to some extent still do), and thus I do not feel bound by echoes of ethnocentrism or chauvinism that arise from Judaism (moreover, I used to—and to some extent still do—adopt interpretive minimalism and claim that halakhah contains no “evaluative statement.” There are only laws from which no statements at all arise—neither problematic nor positive; a somewhat analytic position).
But recently I have softened and I am inclined to acknowledge certain evaluative statements that may exist in halakhah (preventing loans at interest, aspiration to monarchy, establishing the Temple, the desire for all the inhabitants of the world to be subordinate to Judaism), and from this acquaintances have pointed out to me that to some extent there is a deficiency here in terms of intellectual honesty—if you think that God wants you to do something, even though He did not explicitly command it, why do you not do it? (That is, two things changed: 1. I recognized that an outrageous evaluative statement emerges. 2. I became convinced that between-the-lines statements are binding.)
And had the challenge against me been only from pure reasoning, I would have remained silent. But our rabbis, the heads of the yeshivot, have already established that God’s will is binding in itself even independently of the Torah—the obligation to obey the words of the sages, as is known (Kovetz Shiurim II, “Divrei Soferim” I, sec. 15 and on), “Why do I need a verse? It is logical,” (when in the end the logic is an estimate for clarifying God’s will).

That is, after I admitted that God’s will is binding, they argued to me that the thought of the sages as well—at least in the discipline of “musar” (not in the sense of ethics of course, but like the musar yeshivot)—is binding, since just as they are experts in understanding halakhah and the will of God underlying it, so presumably they are experts in understanding what God’s will is. (This belongs more to the literature of reasons for the commandments among the Rishonim than to the Tannaim and Amoraim, who apparently indeed did not try to infer a philosophical doctrine, though among them too one finds various evaluative statements.)

And now my soul asks: do you have any pretext for refraining from implementing God’s will as it is revealed to your eyes through reflection on the Torah?
4 months ago

Michi
If I can infer an evaluative statement from the Torah, it is certainly expected of me. It is God’s will even if it is not literally halakhah.
But an evaluative statement from Hazal is not binding. In my opinion Hazal are not experts (not as you wrote). The authority of Hazal does not stem from the fact that they are right but from the fact that we accepted their authority (see Kesef Mishneh, beginning of chapter 2 of Hilkhot Mamrim, and Rosh on Sanhedrin ch. 4 no. 6, and others). There are very good reasons for this, but it does not stem from their being experts. And now you will understand that we accepted their authority in halakhic matters but not in meta-halakhic or evaluative matters. Only if they decided to incorporate it into halakhah (like coercing against the trait of Sodom and the like) does it bind us. Of course, if we agree with their words, we will act accordingly, but if not—there is no necessity to do so. On the contrary, there is a necessity to do exactly the opposite because reason has binding status.
And the fact that God’s will is binding does not come from the heads of the yeshivot having established something, but from the Gemara and all the Rishonim; these matters are ancient. Although here too there are various mistakes—see my article here on the site about reasoning: http://www.mikyab.com/single-post/2016/06/21/%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%A1%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%9F-%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%9E%D7%93%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%99
4 months ago

With God’s help, 22 Sivan 5779

On the discussions among the rabbis regarding establishing a day in memory of the Holocaust—see the articles by Rabbi Shmuel Katz, “The Destruction and the Memory” and “The First Holocaust Day,” and the article by Rabbi Yeshayahu Steinberger, “The Wound Has Not Yet Healed.” All three are on the “Shabbat Supplement – Makor Rishon” website, along with my comments on those articles.

With blessings, Sh. Tz.

Hello,
I ask forgiveness in advance; this is the first time I am reading content on this site, and I do not know whether my questions or the answers to them have already appeared in articles or in the commenters’ questions here.
1. If in your opinion the Holy One, blessed be He, has stopped intervening in what happens in our world, could you briefly explain basic concepts in Judaism such as:
A. Providence.
B. Reward and punishment—as I recall, Maimonides (I am writing from memory, not after checking the book) argues that the natural course of the world proceeds as a result of the individual behavior of the Jews, such as “And I will give your rain in its season,” etc.
2. In your opinion, has prayer three times a day become superfluous because there is no one to talk to? Is all that remains a halakhic obligation emptied of perhaps its main rationale—to ask for your needs from the One who can provide them?
3. Can one dispense with Rosh Hashanah, on which all who enter the world pass before Him like sheep?
4. Does your honor hold—and I do not mean, God forbid, to compare—that like those who held that the Master of the House went to sleep? Or left His world?

If these matters have already been discussed on the site, I would be happy with a reference to the relevant places if your time does not allow you to respond.
Thank you.

Greetings.
You are asking many broad questions, and it is difficult to address them here. You can find my full doctrine on these and other topics in the new trilogy, and on these topics in the second book (No Man Has Power over the Wind). Beyond that, you can also search here on the site and find very many discussions of each of these questions.

1) Regarding the lack of uniformity in Maimonides’ rulings and the like, this has nothing whatsoever to do with meta-halakhah. Rather, the definition of halakhah is done with a certain method, but its ruling does not necessarily have anything to do with that (perhaps one can even say: necessarily does not).
For example: “Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina said: It was revealed and known before the One who spoke and the world came into being that there was no one in Rabbi Meir’s generation equal to him. So why did they not establish the halakhah according to him? Because his colleagues could not grasp the end of his reasoning, for he would declare the impure pure and show reasons for it, and the pure impure and show reasons for it.” We see that even though Hazal knew that Rabbi Meir was wise (and apparently more correct than they were), they did not rule halakhah according to him.
Likewise on the same page (Eruvin 13b) the reason is given why the halakhah was ruled according to Beit Hillel, even though Beit Shammai were sharper, and this is because of their humility. And it does not seem to me that anyone thinks humility necessarily always leads to the ultimate truth (though many times it does, by virtue of willingness to discuss the opinion of the dissenter, and thus the issues become sharpened and clarified).
In my opinion, the very fact that it is clear that the formulators (as distinct from the decisors…) of halakhah went in a clear and consistent way, yet we find quite a number of them for whom, in most cases, halakhah was not ruled according to them, and only in isolated cases it was. Meaning there is no significance to the statement that Maimonides lacks meta-halakhic consistency, because meta-halakhah has no significance in halakhic ruling.

2) The rabbi decided for some reason that a miracle is something that cannot exist without intervention. Where did you get this definition from??
The oddity in such a view is that anyone who ever held a Bible in his hand knows full well that despite all the miracles there, they sinned, denied, and rebelled (according to the rabbi, in their time miracles did indeed occur). If we say that miracles are something that could not happen, it is as though we said that all those generations were a bunch of idiots. Draw an a fortiori argument: even today tens of thousands return in repentance because of “miracles” of wonder-rabbis and charlatans, and even more than that there are religious people who do not sin out of fear of punishments they have never seen. All the more so, in those times they would not have sinned.
I think a miracle is something with low statistical probability that occurs, and therefore there is room for deniers (even in the time of the prophets) to claim that the thing is natural and not miraculous. According to this, in our generation too there are miracles. (I am aware of the difficulty with this claim, since it turns out that as science advances, things that once seemed miraculous because they were considered highly unlikely, today we know were necessary. But still there are many things—like the return of the people to its homeland—that would be defined as a miracle despite the natural possibility of their occurrence.)

3) The rabbi wrote: “But it seems to me that they did not descend to the depth of its meaning. The rabbi intended to say that he is a secular Zionist, just like Ben-Gurion.”
Our thanks to the rabbi for inserting humor and stand-up into his words. It softens the reading….
(I don’t believe you believe that).

On everything you wrote here I have elaborated elsewhere.
1. I no longer remember what this is referring to (which lack of uniformity). But regarding ruling like Rabbi Meir, I once brought this as proof that halakhah is not always the truth; there is also a value of autonomy (to rule as I understand, even if in my estimation that is not the truth). Regarding Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, the commentators disagreed about this. Rabbi Yosef Karo in Kelalei ha-Gemara explains that their humility led them to the truth (because they first considered the words of Beit Shammai before formulating their own position). I have elaborated on this at great length in several places.
2. I elaborated on this at great length in the second book of the trilogy (and also here on the site in several places). There is no such creature as a miracle within nature. Anyone who says that is simply confused.
3. I not only believe it—I am completely convinced of it. The rabbi of Ponevezh was a thoroughly secular Zionist.

Maybe you are right that “halakhah” has nothing to say about this, but what about “Torah”?
After all, if it turned out that capitalism is more efficient than socialism, how could it be that the Torah would not support that?
Even a sentence like “Its ways are ways of pleasantness” or something similar is enough to indicate that the Torah has an opinion on this. What the opinion is—we perhaps do not know, but ostensibly it certainly has one.

I would be glad if the rabbi could explain to me: even if indeed there are two kinds of systems, a Torah-Jewish one and a moral-human one, then how does it work that one takes something from the Jewish plane—in our case, a fast or Hallel—and uses it in the general moral plane, for there it would seemingly be like a broken shard, devoid of content and meaning.

I would also be glad if the rabbi could refer me to more sources for the idea that there is room for a Jew to act according to “universal morality,” let us call it. I also saw in the booklet that was sent together with the newspaper Makor Rishon that you mention this issue, and it seems it is very close to your heart.

Thanks in advance.

Do you mean that this is a moral principle? I do not see a moral issue in doing that.
I did not understand the question. You proposed taking it, not I.
What do you mean by sources? Gemaras? From the Torah? Every place where a moral duty is spoken of, the intention is universal morality. There is no other morality. From “And you shall do what is right and good” to the last of the commentators/decisors/thinkers.

What?

No, I meant that it is a utilitarian principle, that one of them succeeds more than the other.?
The rabbi said one can fast as a human-moral form of remembering the fallen, and I wonder how one can take a religious principle like fasting and use it as a symbol for something human.?
Yes, but perhaps “And you shall do what is right and good” refers to the Torah’s commandments, and therefore rules out other forms, in which case it would only contradict the rabbi’s words.?

I cannot respond at such intervals. If you write after a long time, write exactly what the argument/question is.
A fast is not a religious principle. Religion uses it, and one can certainly use it for ceremonial symbolic purposes. I do not understand what the question is here.
“And you shall do what is right and good” does not refer to the Torah’s commandments; otherwise it would be superfluous. It refers to going beyond the letter of the law.