On ‘Holy Lies’ (Column 21)
With God’s help
Today (Wed.) I received by email a question from a longtime acquaintance:
First, thank you for the clear and candid writing.
Nadav Shnerb wrote (I think in an interview with Makor Rishon) that he increasingly understands that Orthodoxy and modernity are bad for one another, and that “modern-Orthodox” is a compound akin to “anteater,” in the sense that modern conceptions gnaw away at the Orthodox conception. My question is: in writing the theology book you are working on, do you take into account considerations of the theology’s durability/robustness?
In your view, just as secular “theology” is based on useful fictions (responsibility without choice, humanism for lumps of matter, etc.), should religious theology wrap its core in intellectual equivalents of protective fences and custom?
I answered him that since the question is so important and fundamental, and since it touches on religious thought and conduct today in general, and in particular on my somewhat revealing writing (“candid,” in his terminology), it has public significance, and so I would answer it in a special post. Here it is.
On candor, outspokenness, and ‘holy lies’
In the forum Stop Here, We Think, in which I participated years ago, the term “holy lies” was coined, meaning the concealment of the truth in order to prevent theological distress and questions and to obtain spiritual (in the concealer’s eyes), social, or psychological benefit. See, for a tiny taste, for example, here and here, and see also an illuminating thread on forum terminology here. An abbreviation was even proposed there for this term: HL, and I will adopt it here as well. Among other things, proposals were raised there to identify various elements in our tradition as HLs—for example the Garden of Eden and hell, Messiah and redemption, individual providence, miracles, the Exodus, angels and demons, and of course let us not forget God Himself, the revelation at Sinai and the giving of the Torah, the Jewish people (who invented it anyway?! There is no such people), and so on and so on.
As the questioner rightly described above, the technique of HLs is not used only in the Jewish religious tradition, or only among the Haredim, or even only among religions and religious people in general. Many societies (some would say all) use this technique to protect themselves. Thus materialist society continues to cling to the dignity of the human person (and, for the especially scrupulous: the image of God) and to humanism, as well as to moral responsibility, although on its own view these are really nonsense. The reasoning is clear. Without this, what will become of us? How shall we preserve morality and society from these new ideas (and, some would mistakenly say, from new scientific information)?
A particularly amusing example
Against this background, it is especially interesting to look at the collection of pompous nonsense and ignorance here on the Alaxon website. I simply cannot restrain myself from quoting selected passages from this revolting drivel:
[…] Saul Smilansky, head of the philosophy department at the University of Haifa, wrestled with this question throughout his career and reached a painful conclusion: it is not worthwhile for people to internalize the truth regarding the issue of free will.
Smilansky is convinced that free will does not exist in the traditional sense, and that it would be very bad if people understood this. “Imagine,” he told me, “that I am deliberating whether I should fulfill my duty—for example, parachuting into enemy territory—or alternatively do something more banal, like reporting some irregularity at work and risking my job. If everyone agrees that there is no free will, then people will say, ‘Whatever he didn’t do, he had no choice—he cannot be blamed.’ Therefore I know they will not condemn me if I choose the selfish option.” In his view, this is a danger to society, and “the more people adopt the deterministic point of view, the worse the situation will become.”
How good it is that there are those who struggle on our behalf (as it says, He shall bear their iniquities.—he shall bear their iniquities). Truly Promethean, no? And how good that this threatening scientific knowledge is found only among noble souls like him, who are not suspected of misusing it, Heaven forbid. But as for us common folk, who have not merited the light of lights of scientific truth (the writer, and perhaps Smilansky too—though I once heard some wisdom from him on this matter—understand it about as well as I know how to write Chinese), please, the world must be protected from us.[1]
Let us continue:
According to Smilansky, determinism undermines not only the concept of blame but also the concept of praise. Imagine that I do decide to risk my life and parachute into enemy territory in order to carry out a daring mission. Afterward, people will say that I had no choice, that my achievements were nothing but an inevitable result, and therefore do not deserve praise. And just as undermining the concept of blame legitimizes immoral behavior, undermining the concept of praise removes the incentive to do good deeds. Our heroes will no longer be as inspiring as before, Smilansky claims; our achievements will no longer be as noteworthy as before; and we will soon descend into moral degeneration and despair.
Smilansky supports an approach he calls “illusionism,” the belief that free will is an illusion that society must preserve. We must imprison belief in determinism, and the facts that confirm it, in the ivory tower. Only a select few are supposed to dare “look the dark truth straight in the eye” behind the tower’s walls. Smilansky says he understands that there is something extreme, even terrible, about this approach, but if we must choose between truth and the good, then we must cast truth aside for the sake of society.
Let us ascribe greatness to the academic nobility, whose kindness is no less than its daring. It looks the dark truth in the eye, and despite its certain knowledge of this threatening truth, keeps it hidden within and does not reveal it to the many. It fights it for us, the simple people in the fields. Moreover, do not be afraid. This terrible truth will not lead those noble spirits of intellect and science to the same terrible conclusions, for they are ministering angels and not ordinary mortals like us.
The writer does not even blink, and immediately continues:
Smilansky’s arguments may sound strange at first, because he believes that there is no free will: if we do not really decide anything on our own, why should anyone care if this information spreads? But new information is sensory input like anything else, and it may change our behavior even if we do not consciously produce that change. In terms of cause and effect: even if belief in free will does not inspire us to behave morally, it does provide us with a stimulus to do so.
What does not trouble him is the condescension. Certainly not the ignorance (no wonder, since the chief ignoramus here is he himself). The only thing that seems strange to him is that anyone should fear the spread of the information.
Let us move on to the next pearls, which cast a ray of light on what goes on in the dark halls of academic knowledge and nobility:
Illusionism is a minority position among philosophers, most of whom still hope to reconcile the good with the truth. Yet it does reflect a longstanding intellectual approach. Nietzsche said that free will is “a theologians’ trick” that allows us “to judge and punish.” And many thinkers believed, like Smilansky, that without institutions of judgment and punishment we would descend into barbarism.
So not all members of the ruling class think that we live by illusions and need to be protected from them, but it is both an established and an ancient opinion. In any case, how noble are the thoughts of our rulers, whose little finger is thicker than our loins, and seeing far ahead they established for us institutions of judgment and punishment. At least they know the truth and do not misuse it; on the contrary, they save us from ourselves (all members of Knesset are thoroughly versed in the latest findings of neuroscience, about as much as Smilansky and the writer).
But do not worry; you may breathe easy. See how abundant is the kindness of our noble and benevolent ruler, who does not support Orwellian means of control:
Smilansky does not support Orwellian means of control. Fortunately, he argues, we do not need them. Belief in free will comes naturally to us. Scientists and commentators need only show a little restraint instead of gleefully telling people that the foundations of their lives are nothing but an illusion. Most scientists “do not understand what effect these ideas may have,” Smilansky told me. “It is dangerous and irresponsible to encourage determinism.”
Needless to say, if it were ever necessary, Smilansky would of course take a harsher hand with us common folk. The Gulag Archipelago is right here. Solzhenitsyn, if only the dust could be removed from your eyes—and from those of your colleague George Orwell! But for the moment he sees no need for that, thank God. The writer, the mouthpiece of the aristocratic scientific world (did someone say something about the “Church of Science”?…), on behalf of the common people, sees it as his duty to bring crumbs of information to our attention, taking the risk that we may misuse it.
You may ask: what does one do when a few ignoramuses dare point to difficulties, and suggest that perhaps there is a holy lie here? That is the subject of the next section.
What do you do when the ignoramuses are getting close to discovering the truth (Heaven forfend)?
When claims arise from common folk who wonder whether the emperor has no clothes—that is, whether there is perhaps something implausible here, perhaps a hint of an HL—the speaker is denounced as a heretic against the fundamentals. Just try saying that there is no such thing as secular morality. What then takes place will not be a debate, but mockery, humiliation, and denunciation (about paternalism, primitiveness, lack of scientific and philosophical sophistication, and so on). Almost like saying that homosexuality is a disease or a deviation, or that it is wrong to approve a gay pride parade. The HL is a very powerful tool in the hands of the politically correct—religious, secular, national, or atheistic. It is everywhere. Note that the concept of political correctness itself is nothing but another term for a holy lie. Its meaning is: what you are saying may indeed be true, but politically it is forbidden to say it. What is that if not a holy lie?!
Moreover, even those who take the trouble to deal substantively with such claims and defend the attacked ideas on the merits sometimes produce learned articles full of hair-splitting arguments cloaked in sophisticated terminology (and empty of content) in order to buttress the HL. One of the clearest examples I know is the compatibilist thesis (which “reconciles” determinism and free will), in which so many philosophers and scientists in our time believe, and for which entire rainforests are felled merely so that they can print articles and books about it, despite the fact that it is intellectual nonsense. All this is nothing but the translation and application of the HL technique for intellectual ears. This teaches you that the technique of HLs is not addressed only to simple or uneducated people. It is common among many diverse strata of society, including intellectuals (and in certain cases especially among them). As we have seen, it is also not unique to one particular kind of society. Religious and secular people suffer from it, materialists and dualists, right and left alike, and more. Think about where the expression “political correctness” is chiefly found, and you will realize that it is not among the common people or the less educated classes. Quite the contrary.
As emerges from the questioner’s remarks, this technique sometimes becomes a conscious ideology, and people feel obligated to it. There is a demand to speak the language of HLs, that is, of political correctness. Whoever does not use HLs, or tries to expose HLs as such, is perceived as a heretic, or at least as deviant, and the burden of proof is placed on him. After all, one must preserve __ (the tradition, morality, society, science, culture, the nation, equality, gender, and so forth—fill in the blank). Here I would like to touch a bit on this popular technique and discuss several of its aspects.
Types of HLs: why use them?
At first glance, despite all the refined reservations, there seems to be no escape from HLs and political correctness. Is it better to give people who, God forbid, have been captured by materialism legitimacy to behave immorally? They may murder us all, no? Should we allow people exposed to problems in the theory of evolution to become skeptical and lose confidence in science? They will not go to doctors and will die (or will oppose funding for scientific research and development). Should we allow people who are exposed to problems in Jewish, Christian, or Hindu theology to abandon their faith, and thereby lose their world and ours? These are serious concerns (at least for someone who believes in the values under attack), are they not?
Of course, if I use HLs to defend a thesis that I myself think is false (in order to preserve positions of power and the like), that has no justification at all. A pragmatic argument like the one above can justify my use of HLs only where the thesis under attack is, in my eyes, true. The danger it poses arises because of others’ error, and since I cannot convince them of their mistake, I must address the danger by means of HLs or political correctness. Where there are no arguments, there are HLs—and this is not an insult. There are situations in which it is clear to me that I am right, and perhaps I even have good arguments for my position, but they fall on deaf ears, and I fear the practical implementation of dangerous and mistaken conclusions.
In our case HLs do something slightly different. Up to this point we have dealt with cases in which the thesis under attack that forces us to use HLs is either true or not. But there are also more complex situations. Sometimes the thesis is genuinely doubtful, and I fear the consequences of that doubt. Sometimes doubts about it threaten, for collateral reasons, another thesis that is true. So, for example, in the case before us, where the claim is made that incorrect parts of our tradition should be protected (or at least not exposed to public view) in order to preserve its wholeness and confidence in it as a whole. This is the package-deal method: either you believe, or you are a heretic. Therefore one must protect ungrounded and nonessential parts of the tradition lest confidence also be lost in the parts that are correct. After all, it is certainly true in fact that there are people who, once they realize that parts of our tradition are unreliable and nonessential, conclude that the whole enterprise is dubious and abandon it. The way to deal with this is to resort to HLs.
What is the Torah basis for HLs?
To reinforce the point, I will cite here a ruling of the Magen Avraham on Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chaim sec. 156. He writes that it is permissible to state a point of Jewish law in the name of a great authority so that people will accept it from you. Here we have a holy lie for a beneficial purpose. I think it is forbidden to open bottles on the Sabbath, and my interlocutor does not think so and may come to desecrate the Sabbath (in my view). I tell him that Rabbi So-and-so, a great authority of the generation, said that opening bottles is forbidden because of the prohibition of putting the finishing touch on an object—even though none of this ever happened, nor anything like it. According to the Magen Avraham this is permitted, and thus we have a Torah-sanctioned HL.
And yet one can point to several problems with HLs, and I will perhaps divide them into two kinds: normative problems and tactical-factual problems.
The normative problem with HLs
On the normative plane, it is important to remember that truth has value in itself. HLs are problematic simply because they are lies, even if useful lies. The use of HLs must be some kind of last resort. Moreover, the burden of proof lies on the one who wishes to use them, not on the one who insists on speaking the truth. Concerning this our sages said: one who advocates HLs should have his testimony held suspect (ibid., ibid.).
Still on the normative plane, there is value in a person forming his position honestly and by himself. When I feed him HLs, I deprive him of the possibility of examining the matter and forming a view. Who am I to take control of other people’s minds? Not only in the moral sense, but perhaps also because there is always a concern that I am not the sole and ultimate wise and righteous person in the vicinity. HLs involve excessive hubris. A little humility—or really, self-awareness—would lead us to suspect that the truth we have come to defend by means of HLs is not so clear and correct. It is important to examine it honestly in order to form a position about it.
Moreover, perhaps a person who embraces the tradition because of HLs is not truly a believer. After all, his belief is based on error (as in the famous parable of the elephant in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed), and it is a kind of mistaken transaction. Had he known the truth, he would not have believed. So what have we gained by using HLs?
The tactical-factual problem with HLs
To understand the problem on the tactical-factual plane, I will begin by recommending that the reader go and check me. Perhaps I am relying on the Magen Avraham even though he never really said this?[2] And even if you find it printed in black and white, it is worth checking old editions, because perhaps the printer inserted the words there for reasons of his own. And even if not, who knows—perhaps the Magen Avraham cited a Talmudic passage that does not exist? And perhaps in the Talmud itself those words are brought with no basis?[3]
Do you understand the problem? HLs yield local tactical benefit, but in the long strategic run their costs are heavy. We cause a loss of confidence in the tradition. If it becomes clear to us that parts of the tradition are based on HLs, we have no way of knowing what in this whole matter is nevertheless true, if anything. The package-deal approach carries heavy costs. Whoever abandons part of it abandons the whole deal. By contrast, if one is willing to give up part of the package, it may be that those who lose confidence in certain parts will remain committed to the rest (which may in fact be the true part of the system as a whole).
Add to this the global village in which we live, which makes concealment very difficult. Tell people some HL, and that very evening they will already find on the internet the counterarguments and the people making them, together with solid sources, and they will understand that neither you nor your words can be trusted. From then on they will not listen even to your good and correct arguments. This means that the Magen Avraham’s method is a double-edged sword, or a boomerang. Its purpose is to ensure that people listen to you and accept what you say, but in the long run it may achieve the exact opposite. This is the tactical problem with HLs. The justification for HLs, if it exists at all, lies in their protecting the credibility of the tradition (or the nation, or morality, or science…), but in fact they do not necessarily do so. Therefore the tactical consideration is very important. If we are paying for the tactical benefit of HLs in strategic currency, it is important to consider whether it is right to use them.
This can be seen in an aggadic midrash of the Sages. When the Holy One, blessed be He, commands Adam and Eve not to eat from the tree of knowledge, Eve reports the matter to the serpent and says that God forbade touching the tree. The Sages noticed this point (see Rashi on chapter 3, verse 3), and inferred from the verses that the serpent pushed her against the tree, and when nothing happened to her, showed her that she had not correctly understood the divine command. In the end this led her to eat from the tree in defiance of the command. She thought to add to the command in order to protect it (=HL), but the moment the addition failed the test she lost her commitment to the command as a whole. The addition caused a subtraction, or in the language of the Sages, An extra part is considered as if it were removed. (an excess is as though removed). HL additions that come to protect our entire tradition as a package deal are less able to withstand the test of reasonable credibility and the test of the sources (because of the less reliable parts), and when they collapse people lose, boomerang-like, their commitment to the whole system. Therefore it is important to weed out the less plausible and less reliable parts, and to focus belief and defense on the rest. And this is not only a tactic of defense, but also a matter of the truth in which one believes.
I will only note that in earlier periods the use of HLs was probably easier tactically, since knowledge was not decentralized and was not accessible to everyone as it is today. But in our time the technique of HLs becomes problematic even on the tactical level.
The same is true regarding halakhic stringencies and the deplorable practice of decisors not distinguishing between Jewish law and good conduct, between what is obligatory or forbidden and what is merely desirable. When people come and ask questions on charged subjects, such as egalitarian minyanim, the status of women, and the like, many decisors find it convenient to use HLs and simply say: forbidden! Even in cases where the truth is that there is no halakhic prohibition, or that we are dealing with a nonbinding custom. If something does not seem proper in the eyes of the decisor, it is easier for him simply to say that it is forbidden. Especially if he thinks that if he tells the truth—that it is not proper—perhaps people will not listen to him, and so he prefers to resort to HLs. But the result is that even if in the short term this is sometimes useful, in the long term people lose confidence in the decisors and do not accept from them even instructions that are genuinely forbidden by Jewish law.
Therefore nowadays, it seems to me, it is forbidden to answer questioners in this way. One must tell the plain truth: what is forbidden and what is permitted, and one may of course add what, in the respondent’s view, is desirable and undesirable. This is both truer and strategically sounder (even if not tactically). It is true that in our tradition sages often made use of just such halakhic concealment (such as It is the law, but one does not instruct accordingly.)[4], but as stated, the situation has changed, and here too one must adapt one’s approach to reality. Broadening the front in the ways I have described here usually causes harm in our day.
Unwitting HLs
I must add and note that many who use HLs do so without being aware of it. They accept the tradition as it is and pass it on. They do not dare examine what in it is reliable and whether some kind of filtering is needed, and thus they present everything as pure divine truth. Sometimes they use language of self-nullification (“Who are we compared with our great rabbis, whose little finger is thicker than our loins”) as justification for not examining the tradition, that is, for treating it as a package deal. In this way HLs are passed on with the full and sincere confidence of those transmitting them that this is pure truth that came down to us directly from Sinai. This is unwitting HL.
An expression of this approach is found in the mixing of substantive considerations with labels and epithets. When some unusual argument arises that seems to contradict the tradition, especially when those being asked have no good answers to it, they move to discussing whether this is “heresy” or not. The label serves as a substitute for substantive discussion. Again, in many cases this is done in good faith and not as a demagogic trick. A person truly thinks that if something is heresy, that itself constitutes a worthy counterargument, for how can we little ones criticize the Holy One Himself. What is being ignored here, of course, is that most of what has come down to us did not emerge directly from the Holy One, but is a product of the interpretation and reasoning of sages throughout the generations. Our sages were flesh-and-blood people and could err, and therefore the mere fact that Rabbi Akiva, Rav Ashi, Maimonides, the Kuzari, or Rashba stands against me is not in itself an argument (one must distinguish between Jewish law and theology on this point, but I will not enter into that here). In fact, using labels like “heretic” or “Reform” and the like is a kind of unwitting HL (and sometimes a conscious one). It too is an expression of the damaging broadening of the front described above.
Conclusions
The obvious conclusion is that, in principle, the correct policy today is to confront questions courageously and not to use HLs. Perhaps in very extreme cases there is justification for using HLs, but this must be weighed with great care. The burden of proof lies on whoever does wish to use them.
My feeling, and I think that of many others as well, is that the system handed down to us by tradition contains too many HLs. And even if once this was justified and useful, today it is no longer justified. First and foremost I see it as my duty to know the truth, and in principle it is also my duty to say it. Sometimes one may consider, at a second stage, after we have reached the truth, whether it is worthwhile to say it. But certainly not to subordinate the truth to tactical considerations. Moreover, even on that second plane I hardly see a case in which this is justified conduct, morally or factually. I am not prepared to tell people that there is a Garden of Eden if I think there is none, just because otherwise they will not keep commandments—both because of the value of truth and because of the strategic costs, as I explained above. But above all, with respect to myself, I feel that I must conduct an honest clarification of my beliefs: to know what I believe, and not to fear abandoning some principles of faith (with or without quotation marks).
Sometimes I am accused of being a heretic or a Reform Jew. These labels do not particularly impress me, for two main reasons: 1. In most cases I think that is not true. 2. Even if it is true, names are not supposed to determine essence. At most, I am indeed a heretic or a Reform Jew. So what?
If we return to the questioner’s words, even if Modern Orthodoxy is like an anteater, the question is what that means: must I give up Orthodoxy or modernity? It seems to me that a person should strive to do what he believes is right. If the result comes out modern and not Orthodox, or Orthodox and not modern, then that is what it is. It is not right to begin with the box in which I am placed (modern-Orthodox, Reform, or something else), and from that derive my conclusions. I must draw my conclusions, and afterward let whoever wishes decide into which box to put me. There is no holiness in these terms, and they certainly do not constitute an argument on the merits. By contrast, truth itself certainly does have value. As several of our rabbis already wrote (see Chavot Ya’ir no. 9 and no. 220, and many other sources cited there):
The chief of the Greek philosophers wrote: Socrates is beloved, Plato is beloved, but truth is more beloved. (The chief Greek philosopher wrote: Socrates is dear, Plato is dear, but truth is dearer.)
At the end of the day, my general feeling is that I am quite tired of writing in a politically correct way. I am tired of having to accept a system of which, in significant percentages, I cannot believe. It seems to me that other people too are tired of hearing this, and I give them a voice. The book I am writing on theology is meant to answer them and to show that one can be a rational believer, and need not choose between faith and rationality (whether to be a stupid righteous man or a clever wicked one). In what I have been writing in recent years (which drifts more and more in radical directions) there is an attempt to answer those whom the HLs themselves push out and cause to lose confidence in the system (myself included). For them, telling the truth—however unconventional it may be—will provide a real answer and preserve their religious commitment. The others can always continue, as usual, to read conventional writing and not be “heretics” or “Reformers,” Heaven forfend.
Explaining the Magen Avraham’s ruling
I cannot refrain from ending with the explanation I proposed for the Magen Avraham’s words cited above, because it seems to me that it completes the picture described here. The assumption of those who wonder at the Magen Avraham’s words is that when someone hears something in the name of a great authority, he must accept it as is even if he disagrees. On that approach it is indeed hard to accept the Magen Avraham’s ruling (if he really said it). But precisely because of this, it seems to me that the assumption underlying his words is the opposite. It is precisely because people are not supposed to accept the words of a great authority uncritically that it is permitted to use HLs in this context. You may say: what is the point of such an HL if it will not persuade the listener to accept the claim? I suggest explaining that we are dealing with a situation in which a person feels that his arguments are not receiving proper consideration. People dismiss what he says and do not weigh it on its own merits. When he presents the matter, with reasons, in the name of a great authority, it will receive respectful treatment and substantive consideration. That does not mean that people will accept it as is, but they will consider it on its merits before forming a position about it. For that purpose, the Magen Avraham rules, it is permissible to resort to HLs.
The conclusion from this is rather surprising. The permission to use HLs exists only where the point of saying the words is to enhance people’s judgment, not to lead them to the correct conclusion. Notice the complete reversal that this interpretation makes in the conclusions implied by the Magen Avraham’s ruling. In its original sense, the HL comes to prevent autonomous judgment on the part of the listener, so that he will not deviate from the truth (as understood by the speaker). But the conclusion from the interpretation I have suggested here is that although there may sometimes be permission to use HLs, this is only when the goal is specifically to enhance the listener’s judgment and autonomy, not to diminish them.
[1] To tell the truth, I do not know how the author of the article allows himself to write this information freely on the internet, when it is a case of It is the law, but one does not instruct accordingly.. With his own hands he is bringing the world to chaos. See on this the note below.
[2] There is a well-known quip of the famous Jerusalem preacher Rabbi Shalom Schwadron, who once told his listeners that he had received from the Chazon Ish that it is permissible to say things in the name of a great authority so that people will accept them from you, and immediately added a request that they not ask him whether the Chazon Ish had really said that.
[3] For readers with logical sensitivities, I will only note here that this is a loop. If the permission to use HLs is itself an HL, then there is no such permission and it cannot be applied even to the HL itself. But this is not necessary, for someone who independently thinks, on the basis of his own reasoning, that there is permission to use HLs, may say that there is a source for such permission in the name of a great authority or an authoritative source so that people will accept it from him.
[4] Rules that, for some reason, were written explicitly in the Talmud and in Maimonides, even though One does not instruct accordingly.. Which shows an ambivalent attitude toward the approach of HLs and halakhic concealment already among the Sages and the decisors. They were evidently not prepared to carry HLs through completely. In the note above I already pointed out that the author of the aforementioned article on the Alaxon website also belongs to those who reveal to us common folk the HLs.
Discussion
Gadi:
It seems to me that in the post you are referring mainly to the question whether it is right to tell a beneficial falsehood to another person, but perhaps the subtler question is whether it is right for a person or for a society/culture to lie to itself.
It may be that a culture of beneficial falsehood is one hundred percent self-aware. If you push the politically correct person into a corner, he will admit to you that blacks (on average) run faster and think more slowly compared to whites, that his wife is not the most beautiful of women, and that Beitar has not been champions for many years. But these are beliefs that no cultured person can allow to rise to the threshold of his thought and/or his speech, because the meaning would be undermining the existing order and anarchy. Perhaps it is better for us as human beings to create a partition between our logical-rational perception and the beliefs that guide us day to day.
Why should one lie to oneself? Fear and anxiety, and perhaps an intuitive understanding that the derivative of one’s logical perceptions is destruction.
The duty of caution, in Edmund Burke’s formulation: “A man must proceed with infinite caution before he ventures to pull down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up again, without having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes.”
If you ask by what psychological mechanisms a person will lie to himself—there is no shortage of such things. Most of us live in a world made up of perceptions of ourselves and of the society around us that would not stand up to careful reality-testing.
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Rabbi:
Hello Gadi.
These things certainly also touch on the beneficial falsehoods a person tells himself. What I called an unconscious beneficial falsehood is an example of this (though there the person telling the beneficial falsehood is not aware of it).
Even in the examples of political correctness that you gave, I oppose beneficial falsehoods. They do more harm than good, and we certainly could manage without them.
Burke’s words should be interpreted against the background of his conservative outlook. He is not arguing against telling the truth and in favor of beneficial falsehoods, but rather against overly quick and rash revolutionism. So in my view this is not relevant to us. It may be relevant to the earlier stage in which a person has to decide whether this is a beneficial falsehood at all. There he should not be hasty.
I seem to recall that there is a short article by Rabbi Shach in the book his grandson published on the weekly Torah portions. On Bereshit or Noah (I don’t remember), where he explains that Cain was deceiving the Almighty (=lying to God, even though he knows very well that God knows everything), and he explains it nicely, similarly to what you say here.
M80:
Rabbi Michi, hello,
You wrote wise things, and with your permission here are a few references on the subject.
It is worth looking at Shadal’s commentary at the beginning of the Book of Genesis, where he argued that nature in itself speaks to human beings by means of illusions, without which human society could not exist.
To hang one’s words on a great tree so that people will accept them is an ancient rule, both in Israel and among the nations of the world, mentioned in several places in the Gemara, and a number of interesting commentaries were also written about it—for example, that in Torah matters, the very fact that sages attributed things to a great person means that they were certain he truly held that view, even if he did not say it explicitly. But it was not only sages who hung their words on a great tree; professional liars did too, and quite a few books, musical works, and paintings were attributed to great trees and therefore were very successful over the generations, although their content had only a tenuous connection to the author to whom they were attributed.
And of course one cannot fail to mention the groundbreaking book Persecution and the Art of Writing by Leo Strauss, which deals with the connection between philosophy and politics, and with the theory of esoteric and exoteric writing, which is also significant for books such as The Guide for the Perplexed, The Kuzari, etc.
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Rabbi:
Thanks for the references. Esotericism is a broad question that I did not enter into here. And the same goes for hanging one’s words on a great person. The clearest example in the Torah world is the forgery of the Jerusalem Talmud (and also to some extent the book Besamim Rosh). But the forgery of the Jerusalem Talmud really is a problem, since the Jerusalem Talmud is a Talmud and therefore a source of authority. And according to my interpretation, it is forbidden to forge a source that one is actually obligated to accept what is written in. Just as it would be forbidden to say something in the name of the Sanhedrin, since one really is obligated to accept its words.
I also recall a short discussion of esoteric writing in Aharon Katzir’s book At the Crucible of the Scientific Revolution. There it is about obscure and difficult-to-understand writing, not about outright concealment.
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M80:
Ever since the Oral Torah began to be written down or to take on written form, it has been accompanied by a kind of obscurity. For example, sometimes Rabbi would teach the view of a lone sage as an anonymous mishnah, as though it had been taught by the many, in order that it be accepted as halakhah. Another example: the Jerusalem Talmud is attributed to Rabbi Yohanan, even though Rabbi Yohanan belonged to the first generation of Amoraim and the Jerusalem Talmud was never redacted. Another example: the redaction of the Babylonian Talmud is shrouded in mystery and continued into the Geonic period.
In my humble opinion there is a kind of writing and a kind of reading that may be accepted as legitimate forms of literature, yet can lead to mistakes:
A. Anachronistic writing in an ancient style. For example, Sefer ha-Yashar (the historical one), written in a quasi-biblical style, where one cannot know whether the story written in its introduction about its discovery as an ancient book is true or fictitious. Another example, though of a different kind, is the book Sha’arei Taharah by Rabbi, the gaon Shlomo Goren, written in the form of a Talmud—and does writing in such a form not arouse readers to treat it as some kind of authority?
B. Attributing importance to books on the basis of their author’s name rather than their content. For example, the Jerusalem Targum on the Torah and the commoners’ Targum on the Writings were mistakenly attributed to Yonatan ben Uzziel, and were printed that way in many books. This caused confusion between what he actually wrote (his Targum to the Prophets) and things he never wrote.
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Rabbi:
As I wrote, esoteric writing is a different subject. The formulation depends on the question of whom the book is addressing. But esotericism is not a lie but a code. A code can be deciphered, but a lie cannot.
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M80:
Where is the boundary between “holy lies” for some benefit and esotericism for its own sake? Maimonides, out of his aspiration for clear and lucid truth, wanted to explain the aggadot in the Talmud, but discovered that he had to interpret the sages’ parables with parables of his own or respect the sages’ wish to speak specifically in an esoteric form. Note that until the last generations of the First Temple period, esoteric writing like that found in the Talmud and in aggadic midrashim was not regarded by Israelite scribes as something proper. Nevertheless, Strauss claimed that the entire Bible is written esoterically.
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Rabbi:
Hello.
I do not know where the boundary lies between “holy lies” for some benefit and esotericism for its own sake. I oppose both. And even if Maimonides or anyone else did this, that does not mean they were right. And even if they did it and were right, that does not mean it is right for our times (as I wrote in the body of the column).
I would add that sometimes esotericism is not motivated by a desire to conceal but by an inability to express what one wants in simple prose. A poem can express certain messages that prose cannot express. And so can aggadah, or a parable. This is esotericism (if that term is even appropriate in such cases) for the sake of the matter, not in order to conceal. The question is whether the aggadot of Hazal are meant to conceal, or whether this is simply a case of the medium is the message.
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M80:
Maimonides’ rule is: your words should not require remote interpretation and excessive contemplation before the hearer understands them. The overwhelming majority of writers over the generations did not keep this rule, and therefore prose usually contains more persuasion (rhetoric) than statement (poetics). Writers who nevertheless wish to write good prose have two options. One is to write simple and clear prose with the utmost precision through constant condensation and revision of the words. For example, Rashi and Maimonides, and in a somewhat less meticulous measure, Rabbi Jonathan ha-Kohen of Lunel and Meiri. The second is to write esoteric prose that has an internal logic. For example, the language of the philosophers, English euphuism, Spanish culteranismo, Jewish-Lithuanian lomdus, French post-structuralism, etc. Esoteric language is meant to arouse students to listen and study carefully what is written. But usually esoteric languages, as they expand and become more complex, move away from the instruction and simplicity of the source.
Orel:
If the rest of the book is as witty and enlightening as this article alone—sign me up!!
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Rabbi:
The wit is a secondary matter. What matters is the content. I’m also working on myself not to make the wit the main thing, but rather a tool for conveying the content. I don’t always succeed at that.
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Orel:
Granted, but philosophical books, and especially theological ones, often tend to be boring, and so splendid Torah ends up in a vessel that’s, well, not really splendid. What is a good book worth if you can’t keep reading past the first chapter? The article was very enlightening, but the wit helped one get through it without losing interest halfway through.
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Rabbi:
That is indeed the intention. Thank you.
Avi:
Hello Rabbi Michi,
Thought-provoking as usual. One comment for now:
I don’t think there is a necessary connection between “the law is so, but one does not instruct accordingly” and beneficial falsehood. I don’t recall anyone saying to rule the opposite way, only simply not to reveal the leniency (“this is not said because of the ignoramuses”). If someone asked directly what the halakhah is, I assume they would tell him the truth. I see this as a way of creating “soft” halakhic fences which by their nature apply only to the ignoramuses (since scholars will learn the source itself). In other cases there may even be an implicit assumption that a halakhah does not acquire practical force unless it is explicitly ruled, even if it follows from the sources, and that too is a way of creating fences.
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Rabbi:
Hello Avi.
Indeed there is a distinction here, but even so, not revealing a leniency is also a kind of lie, or at least concealment. In any case, this is only an example of a much broader phenomenon, so it is not really important to enter into these distinctions.
See, for example, here that there are laws one does not teach even when asked:
https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%94_%D7%95%D7%90%D7%99%D7%9F_%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9F_%D7%9B%D7%9F
But a Talmudic ruling is in any case unimportant for our discussion, since the Talmud also has the authority to enact an ordinance and even uproot the law itself, and certainly to refrain from ruling it. Beneficial falsehood is a tool of those without authority (who cannot determine the halakhah and therefore present it as if it already were such).
See also here:
http://www.etzion.org.il/vbm/archive/beshiv/beshiv214.doc
Yuval Sh.:
Hello Rabbi Michi,
Thank you for the article; it is well written and interesting!
I felt an educational angle was missing. You dealt with the plane of truth and practicality vis-à-vis adults capable of independent thought. You did refer to a kind of educational consideration in the last paragraph, where you did not accept the Magen Avraham’s beneficial falsehood as a permit for beneficial falsehood in implementation, but rather only for giving increased weight to the claim itself.
But is it not a different question when we are talking about someone who cannot think for himself? I mainly mean children, who are in a temporary state of inability for deep independent thought.
I recall that when you had just moved to Petah Tikva, you said that your children were studying in certain institutions, whereas in Yeruham they had studied in more closed Haredi frameworks. You explained that in your opinion (at that time) one should educate a child in an educational institution with a closed and conservative approach and gradually instill the path to independent thought in adulthood from within the home. Your conclusion at that stage was that this was the right path, but in retrospect it turned out that Haredi education was too problematic, and therefore not the right place for implementation.
I do not know what your opinion is today regarding the proper educational path. But are there not temporary situations in education, for someone unable to understand and think deeply, in which beneficial falsehood is permitted or even required? (Of course, this is on condition that we believe in the path that we are trying to instill through beneficial falsehood and see value in its being adopted by the person to whom the beneficial falsehood is directed.) Reality is complex and complicated, and knowing it at certain times and in certain situations may be confusing. One cannot educate for full complexity from age zero. On the other hand, as you wrote, this has the drawback that in adulthood one understands the beneficial falsehood, and this may cause a lack of trust in the system.
Thank you,
Yuval
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Rabbi:
Hello Yuval.
Indeed the educational questions are important, but it is no less important to separate them from the substantive questions. My feeling is that usually people do not distinguish between them, and the fear of the unusual and the new—which may have some basis with regard to young people being educated—seeps into the thinking of adults as well.
I have no possibility here of presenting a systematic educational doctrine, and perhaps I will dedicate a post to it later. As a general rule I will only say that I stand by my opinion that children and adolescents should be exposed gradually to complexity and difficulties, and not overprotected. This certainly applies to difficulties that they themselves discover and raise. It seems to me that outright beneficial falsehood is really never worthwhile, even for small children. If I use the distinction Avi raised (below here), at most there is room for laws that one does not rule according to, but not for lies—and even that only very sparingly.
Yossi Yaari:
A few comments:
A) I felt that you did not put enough emphasis on the internal contradiction between the sense of paternalism and the importance of censorship, and the essence of true determinism, in what you brought from “Alaxon.”
B) Regarding the analysis of the Magen Avraham’s words (or anyone else among the Rishonim or the Amoraim):
It is very hard to compare the “freedom of information” we have today to what existed 200 years ago and before.
The absolute availability of information, as well as everyone’s ability to access and check, is an enormous innovation, and changes the rules of the game precisely at these points.
Not only can ordinary people check your quotation in the Magen Avraham with a simple search, but even the Rishonim themselves, the greatest of the great, had a very meager library compared to the average Torah library that a scholar has today. And that is before projects like the Responsa Project and online repositories of sacred books.
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Rabbi:
Hello Yossi. My topic here was concealment and paternalism. Determinism was only the medium through which I illustrated the matter. If you want a detailed discussion of determinism itself, go to my book The Science of Freedom. I did not understand your comment on my remarks about the Magen Avraham. After all, that is exactly what I myself wrote.
Mordechai:
Hello Rabbi Michi.
In principle I agree about the problematic nature of educational lies, holy lies, or politically correct lies.
But I was surprised to find the following argument in your words:
Who appointed me to take over the minds of others? Not only in the moral sense, but perhaps also in the sense that there is concern that I am not the only and ultimate wise and correct person around here. Beneficial falsehood involves excessive hubris. A little humility—and really, self-awareness—will lead us to worry lest the truth we have come to defend by means of beneficial falsehood is not so clear and correct. It is important to examine it honestly in order to formulate a position about it.
Where does this postmodern approach come from? Is it not possible that you believe in something with certainty,
and therefore want to defend it? (I am ignoring the other arguments you raised for the moment.)
Is the supreme value to allow a person to formulate his position independently,
even if his position will ultimately be false?
Is there no room for paternalism on the part of those who understand toward those who do not understand?
Humility is always a good thing, but is it supposed to make me give up
a truth of which I am fully convinced?
There is no doubt that the position I am presenting (in extreme form, of course) is not politically correct,
but is it not true?
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Rabbi:
Hello Mordechai.
You are conflating several different planes, and this is a typical conflation.
First, there is nothing postmodern or pluralistic here. Suppose for the sake of argument that I am an out-and-out monist, that is, I advocate one single truth. Still, my claim is on two planes:
1. That truth is not necessarily found with me (this is clear-eyed humility, not pluralism and not blind arrogance). Even if I am a monist, is it not possible that I am mistaken? Is monism necessarily identical with arrogance? Monism does not mean certainty. Never (except certainty about that itself).
2. On the moral plane, a person has the right and the duty to formulate his decisions by himself, even if he is mistaken. What is the worth of a belief based on mistaken judgment and biased, tendentious data? That is not faith (a mistaken transaction in faith: under such conditions I did not believe).
Therefore, even according to my monistic view of truth there is no room for paternalism, except where there is almost certain and irreversible harm. So in principle there may be a situation of legitimate beneficial falsehoods, but the burden of proof lies on the liar, not on the one who rejects beneficial falsehoods.
There is no doubt that your position is not politically correct, and yet it is not correct. I already wrote here that the fact that they are persecuting you does not mean you are not paranoid (a paraphrase of the opposite saying).
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Mordechai:
Hello Rabbi Michi.
I was glad to see that you “admit in part,” and agree that in principle there may be a situation in which beneficial falsehood is legitimate.
But what follows? You limit this only to a case where there is “almost certain and irreversible harm,” and you also placed “the burden of proof” on the liar.
But even according to your own words, if I believe with complete faith that God is truth and His Torah is truth, and I am able to persuade someone of this by means of equidistant letter sequences in the Torah (even though in my eyes this is utter nonsense)—why should I not do so?
After all, we are speaking here of “certain and irreversible harm”—a person who will live his whole life in error without recognizing his Master and His Torah and commandments!
I found in your words two arguments against such a possibility (apart from the practical argument that the lie will eventually be discovered):
1. Whence the certainty? “Monism never means certainty.” And since there is no certainty here, we return to the point: a person’s right and duty to formulate his decisions by himself.
2. There is no value to a faith based on a lie, and therefore we have gained nothing.
It seems to me that both arguments stem from the same source—your conception of faith. Apparently faith is perceived in your eyes as at most an intellectual cognition. Obviously, as such it can never be certain, and it also has no meaning if it is based on a lie.
But my conception (and in my opinion this is the accepted conception, not only among the masses but also among the sages of Israel) sees faith primarily as a relationship with the Holy One, blessed be He. Of course this includes certainty in the existence of the Holy One, blessed be He (beyond all ordinary intellectual certainty), but the question of how the person arrived at this recognition is almost meaningless.
A few additional footnotes:
A. One should not infer from my words that I am enthusiastic about such lies. They certainly should be minimized as much as possible, both because “the seal of the Holy One, blessed be He, is truth,” and because falsehood has no legs. Certainly when it becomes a whole method. I only object to the approach that rational truth is the supreme value.
B. I used the example of equidistant letter sequences only as an illustration. I do not understand the field well enough to know whether there is something there or whether it is nonsense.
C. The truth is that even according to your own approach I did not fully understand why a true cognition based on a lie is worthless. Is the discovery of America of no value because Columbus thought until the end of his days that it was India?
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Rabbi:
Unfortunately I deny the whole claim and do not admit in part. What you wrote here is what I wrote originally. Beneficial falsehood is almost never justified regarding anything on earth. The atheist is sincerely convinced exactly like you that he is right and that you are hallucinating. What do you think—that according to his view he should sell you and your friends a bill of goods in order to save you from your nonsense? Do you not understand the meaning of such a wicked and absurd approach? Even though ostensibly its purpose is positive (which is exactly what we said: “holy” lies).
1. Indeed we are fundamentally divided. The fundamentalist conception that you have the ability to reach certainty about something, and the naivete that there is something above reason, are the root of all evil. But even on your own assumption, beneficial falsehood does not create believers but pseudo-believers, and that is fairly worthless. It is certainly not worth the beneficial falsehood.
A. Rational truth is not the supreme value, if only because truth is not a value; it is the truth. Rational truth—by which I understand you to mean truth reached through the considerations of ordinary human reason—is the only truth and there is none besides it. This has nothing to do with higher or lower values.
B. There may be consequential value to a discovery based on a lie, but not value of the discovery itself. If the discovery has value and the person deserves credit for it, the discovery of America has no such value. A baseless comparison, if you’ll pardon me.
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Mordechai:
A. I did not understand why your “almost” does not make you someone who admits in part.
Let me ask it differently—can you give an example in which beneficial falsehood is permitted?
B. I find it hard to understand the source of your certainty about the lack of certainty.
Is that not a paradox? (Likewise regarding the assertion that rational truth is the truth and there is none besides it, which is really just another formulation of the same claim.)
B. Your comparison between the believer’s certainty and the atheist’s certainty
stems from the fundamental disagreement between us, and therefore adds nothing.
D. The same applies to your claim: “Even on your own assumption, beneficial falsehood does not create believers but pseudo-believers, and that is fairly worthless.” You added nothing beyond what you wrote in the original article,
and as stated—that is exactly what we disagree about.
The “mistaken transaction” claim you raised only sharpens my point: suppose a man married a woman on the understanding that she got 800 on the psychometric exam, and until the end of his days he never discovered the truth—that she got
only 700. Perhaps halakhically they were never married at all, but are all their shared years worthless?
E. Presumably you will elaborate on these issues in your theology book. When is it supposed to come out?
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Mordechai:
What I forgot to mention is this: in my words I claimed that the approach which sees faith
as more than ordinary rational cognition is the accepted approach among the sages of Israel.
Is your silence regarding this claim an admission?
In other words: in your opinion, are most of the sages of Israel fundamentalists?
(Of course, even if so, you are capable of disagreeing, but I see in that
some indication regarding the question of which of us is right.)
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Rabbi:
A. This is not admitting in part because that was my claim from the outset. Admitting in part is partial admission to the claim of the opposing litigant.
The possibility of beneficial falsehood exists in my view only in very extreme cases with immediate and clear consequences. A person is about to commit suicide because of unrequited love, and I tell him that his beloved has changed her mind so that he will climb down from the roof.
B. I myself noted this. If you press it, you may say that even about this I am not certain. But it is probably truer than any other truth.
The assertion about rational truth is not another formulation of the same claim, but simply a definition. My claim is that we have no tool except reason for reaching truth. Any other talk is nonsense and misunderstanding.
C-D. Indeed I repeated what I wrote. That is what I think.
D. Indeed, if he married her only on that understanding, then they are entirely worthless. This is the parable of the elephant in Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed about someone who worships God, but it is not the right God, but something or someone else. You are conflating what you see as value with the value from his standpoint. Would you not annul a transaction when a mistake in the mind of one of the parties is discovered? What is the argument here about?
E. I do not know. We are working on it.
My silence is an “admission” that there are quite a few people who think that way, but they are mistaken. But this is an “admission” and not really an admission, since the dispute is not in the factual realm (whether there are people who think this way and how many), but whether it is true.
Indeed, in my estimation most of the sages of Israel are fundamentalists in a certain sense (not willing seriously to consider that they may be living in error).
As for who is right, each person will decide for himself.
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Mordechai:
1. I now saw that you noted the theoretical possibility of beneficial falsehood also in the original article, and so I admit that you do not admit…
2. Regarding the example of suicide—I wonder who appointed you to decide for another person whether it is justified for him to commit suicide or not? On what certain values do you rely in order to impose your outlook on him? (And also from the standpoint of utility—when he discovers that his beloved did not really come back, he will go back up and jump off the roof again…)
3. Regarding Maimonides’ elephant parable—I do not see how it is connected to our matter. For the sake of clarity I will focus on my example—why is faith in God formed by means of equidistant letter sequences in the Torah faith in a different God? Maimonides is not talking about the motivation for faith, but about the content of faith with respect to the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself. Mistakes and nonsense concerning other details (equidistant letter sequences by way of parable) are very regrettable, but they do not touch the basic content of the faith.
4. Regarding the sages of Israel—I mean the sages of Israel in all generations, not only the sages of our own generation. If (and I emphasize—“if”) your conception of faith is fundamentally different from the accepted conception among the sages of Israel in all generations, those on whom the Torah in our hands rests, and in your opinion their conception of faith is simply incoherent nonsense—my advice is that you examine yourself again. Perhaps, after all, the certainty about lack of certainty is not so certain…
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Rabbi:
2. Regarding the suicide example, that decision is based on my assessment that he is not now in a state where he is thinking in a balanced way, and that afterward he will probably regret it (and will not go back up onto the roof again as you estimate; otherwise there really is no point). There is no certainty about anything, and not here either. But there is enough conviction to decide for him. As in the case of a child, for whom I decide and do not respect his autonomy. These are ordinary reductio ad absurdum arguments that, in my opinion, are not serious.
Besides, if he remains alive, that is consequential value. The service of God has no value unless it is done out of conscious decision and real deliberation.
3. This is like “they forced him and he sold”; a sale under coercion is a valid sale only if the assessment is that, taking all considerations into account, he really agrees. But here he does not agree—he does so by mistake. The fact that by mistake he reaches the correct conclusion does not make it correct from his standpoint. Even a person who enters into a transaction that is objectively good for him, but he does not think it is good for him and did it on the basis of mistaken information—the transaction is void. The service of God is a transaction between a person and his Creator, and if it is done on the basis of mistaken information, there is no transaction.
4. I accept your advice, and indeed have done so. In the meantime I still adhere to my position. By the way, here is an example of a correct conclusion (=faith and commitment to the Torah) that was arrived at through wrong tools (reliance on fundamentalist thinking). That does not invalidate the conclusion as long as I think it is truly correct. But if I rely only on them, then my conclusion is not worth much.
I will only add one correction: the halakhah in our hands rests on them (and even that not entirely), but not faith and not thought. I will discuss that too in my aforementioned book.
Mordechai:
1. I will try to summarize how I understand your position so far. I would be glad if you would confirm or correct:
A. The only way to arrive at truth is by means of rational thought.
B. Conclusions reached by means of rational thought will never be absolutely certain.
C. Therefore, there is no justification whatsoever for bringing another person to a correct conclusion (in your view) by means of a lie.
There are two problems with that: 1. the violation of his autonomy (and therefore in cases where his autonomy
is impaired anyway there is some justification for it—a child or a suicidal person).
2. There is no meaning to recognizing any truth if that recognition is based on a lie.
(Of course all this is in addition to the practical problem that the lie may be discovered.)
D. Every approach that claims absolute certainty is fundamentalist (Heaven forbid).
2. A few clarifying questions:
A. I’ll begin with the marriage analogy above, since I’m fond of it: Anita and Juan (complete gentiles) have been married
very happily for many years. Juan is convinced that anyone who scored below 800 on the psychometric exam is
a bad and corrupt person, and Anita does not reveal to him that she herself scored lower.
On your next visit to Spain, would you trouble yourself to reveal Juan’s grave mistake to him, so that he may reconsider
his love for Anita (for in your opinion it has no value at all, being based on a mistake)? In my eyes this
would be a wicked act. Their love is entirely real, even if it is based on Juan’s
mistake. This is what I meant when I said that recognition of rational truth is not the supreme value.
[You assume that faith is a transaction, and consequently the formal rules of a transaction apply to it, such as
mistaken purchase. This formalistic conception seems strange to me. If we see faith as an entire
relationship, then it is not nullified even if there was a mistake along the way, as above.]
B. Is prophecy also subject to the constraints of rational reason, and therefore is the sword of uncertainty also raised over it?
C. “What is the way to love Him and fear Him,” when His very existence is not absolutely certain? (Perhaps it is precisely
toward such an approach that the Torah said, “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart.”)
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Rabbi:
I confirm everything except C2. It depends on what kind of recognition is involved. If you recognize some fact in a distorted way, you still know the truth. But a recognition that has evaluative significance (such as recognition of God and commitment to Him) cannot be based on a lie, and if it is based on one, it has no value.
A. If his love for Anita really is based on that and not on daily contact with her, I would consider revealing the truth to him. Why would I not definitely reveal it to him? Because Anita would be harmed here, and so concern for Juan at her expense is not necessarily the right step. And beyond all this, the recognition here is without evaluative significance. Why should he not love her by mistake? What do I care? Again, the example is not of the same kind.
B. I do not know prophecy, and therefore I have no position on it. I am speaking about us ordinary mortals.
C. See my remarks on love of God in column 22. In any case, the problem is not the lack of certainty. Why should that affect love?
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Mordechai:
1. The distinction between recognition with evaluative significance and recognition without such significance is very vague. It is clear that a decision to buy a car is not affected by what led to it. But why is commitment to married life different from religious commitment? It is beyond me.
2. The purpose of my question regarding prophecy was to examine whether you allow even a theoretical chance for the possibility of true, supra-rational, certain recognition. Your somewhat evasive answer reveals that apparently there is no such chance.
3. Regarding love—I read the column (I have not yet read the comments). It is amazing how far you are willing to go (interpretively and substantively) in order to establish the unshakable exclusivity of reason. Indeed, if love is like a correct answer on a test, it really should not be affected by lack of certainty.
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Rabbi:
1. Because commitment to married life is not undertaken because it is a value that matters in my eyes, but because I want it. It is a contract in every respect. But the service of God is a moral or religious duty that is implemented by means of a contract. And if the contract was entered into by mistake, it has no value (moral or religious). I feel we are repeating ourselves, and I have nothing further to add. If you do not agree, we will remain in disagreement. That is perfectly fine.
2. I do indeed tend to evade giving an answer to questions about which I have no information at all (that is, not to answer, if that is what you call evading). I can only recommend that you adopt this bad trait as well. Even if you ask me how to reconcile quantum theory with general relativity (an open question in physics today), I will answer that I do not know (=what you call: evading).
3. I am happy that I managed to amaze Mr. I also plead guilty. Indeed, I am willing to go very far (so far that I even dare to propose a logical and plausible interpretation of Maimonides’ words, one that also follows from his language), all in order to push my strange agenda (=that one should think with one’s reason and not by playing tarot cards or standing on one foot asleep).
As stated, it seems to me that at this stage we really have exhausted the discussion.
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Mordechai:
All right, let us conclude the discussion.
It is important for me to add that I see with sorrow how mostly infantile messages
are disseminated in the name of religion [such as apocalyptic visions by autistic people,
“salvation packages” (a candle + 150 psalms + a donation to institutions X = guaranteed salvation),
and the like], and therefore I am glad there is someone fighting the battle of reason.
As stated, in my view this is done in an exaggerated way, but we already agreed to conclude the discussion…
Yonatan:
Hello Rabbi Michi,
Could you please elaborate on your opinion regarding beneficial falsehood in relation to children? It seems to me that the normative consideration applies less with respect to children—whose worldview I shape in any case and for whose peace of mind I am responsible—and as for the tactical consideration, that depends on how and at what stage one stops telling the beneficial-falsehood stories.
I am asking practically, for immediate application.
Yonatan
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Rabbi:
Hello Yonatan.
There is a prohibition even with respect to children. In my understanding, you are not supposed to shape their worldview but to help them shape it.
It is hard for me to give you a systematic doctrine. It depends on the child and on what lies are involved. As a general rule, in my opinion it is very desirable to avoid beneficial falsehood altogether even with respect to children. If you have a specific example, we can perhaps discuss it.
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Yonatan:
The two examples that concern me especially are divine providence and the persistence of the soul. Personally, regarding the first I am skeptical, and regarding the second I am a disbeliever. Even so, I see the positive value they added for me as a young person being educated, and I assume that their influence on my child (first grade) is likewise positive.
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Rabbi:
Hello.
I would not use beneficial falsehood here. Also because you are bringing your children to observe the commandments for the wrong reasons, and aside from the problem of lying, this may also come back to bite you/them in the future (when they discover the truth). And also because technically, if you do not believe in it, then it seems to me you will also not be able to educate about it in a credible way (from my experience, as someone who sent his sons to Haredi education while the home looked and functioned differently).
As I wrote to you above, if as a result of telling the truth they do not keep the commandments—that is their fault and not yours. A person has to formulate his worldview, and he and only he is responsible for that. I would add that if in your opinion there is no persistence of the soul—then apparently you have not even really harmed them.
By the way, I disbelieve in the first and am skeptical about the second.
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Yonatan:
Thank you for the ruling. In the context of the persistence of the soul, it seems to me that there is psychological value to beneficial falsehood here—I get the impression that it makes it easier for children to cope with the loss of a close person, and that it is almost cruel to tell them things as they are (according to the disbelieving view).
By the way, if you disbelieve in divine providence, do you nevertheless relate with a sense of holiness to Jewish texts incorporated into the prayer liturgy that teach the principle of “He guards the feet of His faithful ones,” and the like? If you elaborated on this elsewhere, I would be happy for a link.
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Rabbi:
Hello Yonatan.
First, I assume and hope that you used the term “ruling” here jokingly.
Second, telling a child that Daddy is up above is not, in my opinion, beneficial falsehood. It is a kind of metaphor that, I would guess, even complete atheists use. It is not like teaching them directly and systematically that all souls go upward, etc.
Third, I relate to all sections of the prayer liturgy with some feeling of holiness (to the extent that an autistic person like me has feelings), including these mistaken ones, since they served people in their prayer and were instituted by great figures. Metaphorically one could say that these are accessories of a commandment. And still, in my opinion this is a mistake, at least in our times (perhaps in ancient times it was different). I elaborate on this somewhat in my theology book (the trilogy) that I am currently laboring over. You can find a little here:
https://mikyab.net/%d7%9e%d7%90%d7%9e%d7%a8%d7%99%d7%9d/%d7%97%d7%99%d7%a4%d7%95%d7%a9-%d7%90%d7%97%d7%a8-%d7%90%d7%9c%d7%95%d7%94%d7%99%d7%9d-%d7%91%d7%a2%d7%95%d7%9c%d7%9d/
By the way, before you ask me about “He guards the feet of His faithful ones,” ask me about the prayer in which a person asks God for his needs every day and thanks Him for supplying them.
I addressed that here on the site in several Q&As. It is worth searching the site for “providence” or “prayer,” or simply scanning the titles.
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Yonatan:
I thank You, for You have answered me. I will study the book when it comes out, God willing. For the time being I have read the things in the link. The existential approach you propose there is that part of the regularity that God created in our world is normative-ethical (for example: “revelation through the laws and natural order, and through norms and values”). How does this square with your denial of divine providence? That is to say, the practical meaning of this position is that there is divine providence, except that it operates by way of regularity rather than by way of God’s chaotic caprice and a change in His will (?)
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Rabbi:
What about “and may it be for me salvation”? I get the impression that the main thing is missing from the book. 🙂
There is no such thing as divine providence through laws. When there are fixed laws, that means that what happens is dictated mechanically by the circumstances and is not arrived at by a momentary decision in real time. Divine providence in its usual sense is that the laws do not operate and God has to intervene. Otherwise you have emptied the distinction of content. For example, the question of evil in the world would not receive an answer in such a way, since the laws are the form of providence and so the blame still rests on Him. By contrast, in my opinion evil is a necessary and not pre-planned product of the laws. It is, as it were, forced upon God (assuming He wants conduct according to laws).
When conduct follows laws, at most you can speak of just and perfect laws (and then what about evil?), but not of “providence.” In any case, if you want to call that providence, I will not deny it on that level (I will only deny that the laws are perfect and that there is no unjustified evil in the world).
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Yonatan:
– Indeed, it should have been “You have answered me,” etc.
– I do not see how providence in the usual sense solves the problem of evil (and the prophets did not see it either). In any case, I was not referring to providence in the sense of intervention when regularity fails, but in the more basic sense of “Do good and it will go well with you (in some world),” and that is possible even in a world with regularity. Rabbi Kook expanded the idea to “Pray and it will go well with you (in this world)” (and even claimed that whoever understands prayer otherwise is blaspheming), and tried in several places to describe the mechanism in a lawful mechanical way.
– My existential experience is that such a mechanism exists, but I do not know whether it is self-delusion [and I do not know what difference it makes if it is. In short, we still have not fulfilled our obligation with “and may it be for me salvation”].
– Of course I could elaborate and spell out my doubts, but for now I will apply to your words: “Have you found honey? Eat only enough for you.”
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Rabbi:
As for solving the problem of evil, I would prefer to wait for the book. In my opinion there is a satisfactory solution according to my approach, but it is a bit lengthy.
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Yonatan:
Yashar koach, thank you very much
Nadav:
So which principles does the rabbi tend to think are reasonable, and which principles does the rabbi not “adopt”?
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Rabbi:
Nadav, I understand that you want the whole picture in a nutshell. But that’s difficult. That is precisely why I’m writing the theology book mentioned in the question. There I will try to sketch the full picture as I see it (including the methodological basis, which is no less important).
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Yitzhak Sh.:
And yet…
I saw an article in which the rabbi declares himself to be someone who “definitely believes in the coming of the Messiah”…..
On the other hand, the rabbi argues that from experience it appears that God’s policy in the world is one of non-intervention (“The Lord has forsaken the land”)…
If so, then belief in the Messiah also has no meaning. What could justify it? Perhaps it is the promise about this (which should be discussed interpretively), and that means that at some point God will change His policy?
Or perhaps that was an earlier position?