Bennett’s Dilemma, or: What Is More Important, Judaism or Mathematics and Science? (Column 28)

With God’s help

Today (Tuesday) it seems we are deep in the silly season. Already on the morning radio news I heard a lively discussion of Naftali Bennett’s statement that, in his view, Jewish studies are more important than the study of science and mathematics. I confess, without shame, that I was not especially surprised when all the little Pavlovians immediately jumped up and complained,[1] but I was surprised that this occupies anyone at all, and even makes headlines. Even insignificant little me was approached for interviews on the subject on major programs on Channel 2 and Reshet Bet. As in many other cases, I would not have bothered with this boring and nebulous topic were it not for the fact that I felt a need to explain why it is just that. Well, at least people are talking about Judaism ("you do not have a monopoly," "there are many ways," etc. etc.), even if they are talking nonsense (as is usually the case), and that too is something. I will only add that I am neither Bennett’s spokesman nor one of his ardent supporters, and yet it is worthwhile to examine the issue even if it should turn out that I am doing him some kind of public-relations service here (do not worry: none of his vehement critics will pay any attention to it).

A Logical Note: On the Dichotomy

A saying is attributed to Rabbi Kook that it is better to fail in baseless love than in baseless hatred. And I, insignificant as I am, have always thought that the best thing is not to fail in either. When you ask a person whether his sister practices the oldest profession in the world or is perhaps a contract killer, he sometimes forgets that there is also the option of saying that he has no sister. So too when one asks you what is more important, Judaism or mathematics, one forces you into a dichotomy that traps you intellectually. When the importance of Jewish studies is compared to that of science studies, one finds oneself compelled to choose a side: Judaism or science, and to determine which is more important. But why do I need to choose a side in such a bizarre question at all? Why must I decide what is more important? Below I will explain why it is very difficult (and perhaps impossible) to choose a side, and why, in this general formulation, this question is not really very important either.

An Interpretive Note: On the Hierarchy

At the beginning of chapter 46 of Genesis, the Torah describes:

And Israel set out, with all that was his, and came to Beersheba; and he offered sacrifices to the God of his father Isaac.

Rashi there cites the Sages’ midrash:

“To the God of his father Isaac” — a person is obligated to honor his father more than to honor his grandfather; therefore it attributes it to Isaac and not to Abraham.

These words were codified in Jewish law by the Rema, Yoreh De’ah sec. 240:24:

Some say that a person is not obligated to honor his paternal grandfather (Maharik, responsum 44). This does not seem correct to me; rather, he is obligated to honor his father more than his grandfather’s honor. Proof of this is found in the midrash on “and he offered sacrifices,” etc. (Genesis 46:1).

The meaning of this is that if a person tells you that thing X is more important to him than thing Y, the interpretation is that both are important to him, but that there is a hierarchy between them. The application to our matter is clear. Bennett is essentially saying that both subjects are important to him, but that in his view there is some hierarchy between them.

A Second Interpretive Note: Multiple Aspects[2]

Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman was a fierce opponent of Zionism. When he was asked how Zionism, led by wicked people, was succeeding in its path, he cited the following saying (Shevuot 18b)[3]:

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Whoever recites Havdalah over wine at the conclusion of the Sabbath will have male children, as it is written: “to distinguish between the sacred and the profane,” and it is written there: “to distinguish between the impure and the pure,” and immediately afterward: “If a woman conceives.” Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: children fit to render halakhic rulings, as it is written: “to distinguish and to instruct.”

The Sages promise us that whoever recites havdalah over a cup of wine will have sons, and perhaps also sons fit to render halakhic rulings. As is well known, throughout history there were some very great sages and righteous people who were not blessed with offspring at all, or were not blessed with sons. For example, the Hazon Ish had no children at all. Does this necessarily mean that he did not recite havdalah over a cup, or that this statement is false? Seemingly, it has been empirically refuted.

In the article mentioned above, I explained that this is not necessary. Failure to recite havdalah is one factor leading to the birth of sons, but there are equally other factors involved in the process that can change the result. For example, there may have been another reason that prevented the Holy One, blessed be He, from giving that person children. Perhaps because of the sin of vows he was not granted children (see Shabbat 32b).

Thus a person can say the sentence "A mass X always causes another mass Y located some distance from it to accelerate with acceleration a," but when you check you will discover that this does not really happen. Why? Because there is another source of force in the environment that also affects mass Y and therefore changes the result. Does that mean the sentence I quoted is incorrect? No; it only means that it describes one aspect of the situation, but the situation has several other aspects and angles. Thus one person can say that it is worthwhile to eat chocolate because it is tasty, and another can say that it is not worthwhile to eat chocolate because it is fattening. Who is right? Both. They are simply speaking about different aspects of the topic.

So too, when we are told that Judaism is more important than mathematics, this does not mean that we are dealing with a categorical and sweeping assertion. It may also be interpreted as meaning that there are aspects from which it is more important, and other aspects from which it is less important.

An Analytical Note: The Incommensurability of Values

In moral philosophy (analytic ethics), it is customary to say that values are incommensurable (lacking a common measure), and therefore cannot be compared.

Think about the following question: which is greater, the amount of water in the ocean or the kindness of human beings? This is a meaningless question. One cannot compare things that have no common measure. I can compare a large and small quantity of water, and perhaps also of kindness. But one cannot compare a quantity of water to a level of kindness.

When we come to compare values, for example saving life and the Sabbath, we must measure both on a common scale (measure), and then see which outweighs the other (build a scale of values). But these two values have no common goal and no other shared basis. So how are we to measure them against one another? How can we decide which is more important than which? Returning to Judaism and science or mathematics, I am truly curious to hear how the various sides built their scale of values. How important is Judaism? And how important is mathematics? And on what scale are they both measured in order to make the comparison?

A Relative Measure and an Objective Measure

So how does a person nevertheless make such a determination? If one cannot compare value X to value Y, what then is the meaning of a statement such as "Judaism is more important than mathematics"?

In many cases this is a momentary judgment from a particular angle, one among many others. Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman, in his booklet Divrei Sofrim, cites the midrash The conversation of the servants of the patriarchs is more precious than the Torah of the sons. ("the conversation of the servants of the Patriarchs is dearer than the Torah of their descendants"). The midrash comes to explain why the Torah dwells at length on the story of the deeds of Eliezer, Abraham’s servant, more than on severe and foundational prohibitions on which the whole Torah depends (such as the very brief You shall not murder in the Ten Commandments). The assumption here is that the biblical amount of space devoted to a given passage is an index that expresses its importance. Well then, how are we nevertheless to explain the fact that You shall not murder appears in such terse form, whereas other passages take up many long verses?

It seems to me that the importance of a subject is not determined only by its severity. It is also determined by the need to emphasize it. Thus, although the prohibition of murder is the gravest prohibition, the importance of its appearance in the Torah is not so great, because the prohibition and its gravity are obvious to everyone even without the verse. The need for elaboration derives from a combination of importance and the need to emphasize it. Therefore, even if something is very important, if it is obvious to everyone it will not receive extensive treatment in Scripture. And of course this does not contradict the general claim that there is a proportion between biblical space and importance.

If we return to our subject, when someone says that Judaism is more important in his eyes than mathematics, this does not necessarily mean importance in an absolute sense. It can also express a momentary feeling that at present he senses a greater deficiency among the students in Judaism than in mathematics. The comparison here is relative rather than absolute. He is not comparing the absolute importance of mathematics to the absolute importance of Judaism, but the degree of the students’ deficiency and need in the area of Judaism as against their deficiency and need in mathematics. Even if mathematics were far more important than Judaism, it might still be that the students’ attitude and investment in mathematics seem to him sufficient, or closer to what is required, than the situation in Judaism.[4]

Conclusions

Statements that compare values and their importance are imprecise statements, which are very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to formulate and judge. They are also vague and open to different interpretations, sometimes even opposite ones. It is certainly very difficult to quantify them. In many cases these are momentary and shifting intuitions that arise from different aspects, from a combination of needs, circumstances, and importance, which are very difficult to summarize and weigh. Therefore, when someone says that Judaism is more or less important in his eyes than mathematics, he is expressing a momentary mood or a particular angle of vision, not necessarily a sweeping statement.

A Note on the Criticism

These things are also true with respect to the position of Bennett’s critics, those who think mathematics is more important. That too can stem from a different scale of values, or from different assessments of the current situation and the needs. These sweeping assertions in themselves, so long as there is no specification, are almost meaningless. Empty declarations. Just as Bennett cannot make a sweeping determination of a hierarchy of importance in so complicated an equation, his critics cannot do so either.

To the best of my judgment, these reactions did not even try to do so. They are nothing more than a Pavlovian instinct against Bennett and against Judaism, and nothing more. In my view, there does indeed stand behind them a different scale of values, but not one that differs in hierarchy; rather, it differs at the absolute level. Most of the critics mean to say that they do not want Judaism at all (at least not Bennett’s version of Judaism), not to establish a different hierarchical order between Judaism and mathematics. Only thus do I manage to understand categorical and unambiguous statements on a subject about which, if one can say anything categorical and unambiguous, it is only that it is neither unambiguous nor categorical. Except that then it is not clear to me why they do not simply put that on the table ("you do not have a monopoly," "there are many Judaisms," and the rest of the worn-out and irritating slogans). What do they have against a little honesty?

Another Note on the Criticism: Philosophy and Practice

Since Bennett is not a moral philosopher, nor a mathematician or a great rabbi, I assume the discussion is not about a scale of values in some abstract sense, but about the allocation and distribution of resources (= money). But now the question naturally arises: if one cannot determine a scale of values, how are budgets nevertheless divided among the different values? Again, probably according to the relative measures I described above: more by deficiency than by importance. Everyone agrees that health and security are more important than culture, and yet the budget reflects needs and deficiencies and not necessarily relative importance. Criticisms claiming that culture receives too much or too little funding cannot suffice with pointing to the importance of the field, but must also point to the deficiencies and needs within it.

Accordingly, a relevant criticism ought to address the question whether Bennett devotes enough to mathematics. It seems to me that he certainly does (surely no less than his predecessors), but even if someone thinks not, let him criticize that and not vague general statements about its relation to Judaism. If indeed he devotes enough, then why is it relevant what, in his view, the relation between mathematics and Judaism is? Is this supposed to be a philosophical discussion?

I have already mentioned that in practice Bennett is known as someone who made mathematics a top priority. He even took quite a bit of criticism for that. So why does it bother anyone that he says Judaism is more important? Is it because he does not devote enough to mathematics? This is further evidence that what we have here is not a dispute about priorities but a dispute about the very importance of Judaism and the need for it.

Another Note on the Criticism: Excessive Focus

A comparison made between two items out of a budget basket that contains dozens of items is always demagoguery. Thus, for example, the mantra about settlements versus development towns or versus social budgets selects two items out of dozens and hundreds and for some reason assumes that one comes at the expense of the other. If one wants to speak about a scale of values, one must map the whole thing. Perhaps Judaism is less important than mathematics, and yet it should still receive budgetary reinforcement at the expense of education for democracy? And then perhaps we should reinforce mathematics at the expense of geography. In general, this is not one thing at the expense of another specific thing, but a different distribution of the overall budget. Criticism that focuses on Judaism versus mathematics resembles the infantile criticism of the settlements because of the development towns.

Yet Another Note on the Criticism: Deficiency or Excess

Suppose Bennett prefers Judaism to mathematics, but this preference does not come to expression through harming mathematics, but through giving Judaism additional budgetary reinforcement. Is such a preference problematic? Must every shekel, in some absolute sense, be divided between Judaism and mathematics according to the theoretical ratio of importance, for example 60-40? We have already seen that this also depends on needs and deficiencies. It also depends on the question of how expensive it is to educate in mathematics or in Judaism (science, for example, requires laboratories, whereas Judaism does not. Therefore distributing the budget according to degree of importance is folly, though this too is common in various fashionable critiques).

To sharpen the point, let us consider an example (which I will not go into here in detail). Many criticize Jewish law for a discriminatory attitude toward non-Jews. The question one should ask is whether this preference is carried out by harming the basic rights of non-Jews or by granting extra rights to Jews. After all, every state prefers its citizens to other people, and every family or community prefers its own members to others. So Judaism too prefers Jews to others. What is wrong with that?

The question is whether this preference is expressed in taking away the rights of the other or in granting extra rights to those whom I prefer. Parents devote a fortune to healing and educating their children, and do not devote that same fortune to others. Does that make them immoral? A state devotes a fortune to saving its citizens and helping them in various respects, which it does not do for others. Does that make it immoral? So long as we are not speaking of violating the other’s fundamental rights, but of preferring those close to me, there is nothing morally wrong in that. In the halakhic context as well, one must distinguish between harming the rights of the non-Jew and not granting privileges to the non-Jew. I will leave the applications and implications for another discussion.

If we now return to our matter, the criticism that Bennett prefers Judaism to mathematics sounds completely different if it means that mathematics is being harmed (not receiving enough), or alternatively that Judaism is receiving preferential treatment (but mathematics too is getting enough). But our critics, of course, did not enter into that either.

In the end, it seems to me that what I have said here is enough to show that this is just another bout of ranting, containing little beyond making the desert bloom (= tossing around slogans in the media’s silly season). Well, I already mentioned that this is what in these parts is called a "public debate." Try explaining even one point from all that is said here in a three-minute interview on a news program or in two minutes on television. No wonder this "public discourse" leads people to a policy of ignoring it. By tomorrow nothing at all will remain of it. It is therefore simpler simply to ignore it and not conduct a public debate (but rather make do with a "public debate" in quotation marks). Of this it may be said: the dogs bark and the caravan passes on (ibid., ibid.).

[1] I assume that the intersection between the group complaining today and the group of those who complained about the excessive emphasis he placed on mathematics (where are the humanities?) is not the empty set. Well, they are a bit weak in mathematics.

[2] On this, see my article on ukimtot.

[3] See Aharon Suraski, Or Elchanan, Jerusalem 1998.

[4] The problem of incommensurability also exists in relative comparison, but I will not go into it here.