On the New Critique of the Talmud: A General Introduction (Column 674)
I’ll begin with a fairly long preface, since it has importance in its own right. Lately I’ve been invited quite a bit to podcasts and various debates, and in many cases I’ve agreed. I’ll explain here why, and through that present the motivation for this column. After that I’ll give a general introduction to critical discussions about the Torah, halakha, and the Talmud, and in the coming columns I’ll enter into a discussion of specific critical arguments.
Yaron Yadan and Conservative Education
A few weeks ago I had a debate with Yaron Yadan. Yaron was a baal teshuva, a kollel head (or kollel director, I’m not sure), Haredi, in Rechasim, who decided to abandon his commitment to Torah and mitzvot. Since then he has been engaged, in various forms, in disseminating critique of the Written and Oral Torah and of religious tradition and society, all within the framework of the organization ‘Daat Emet.’ I’ve known his critiques for many years, and I even share some of them. My impression of him and his arguments has always been that he assumes Haredi (or conservative) dogmas and identifies them with Judaism, and therefore his arrows are aimed primarily at them—somewhat justifiably (as the saying goes: “I too do not believe in that God”).
To me, Yadan has always been an example of the damage wrought by conservative education. Although its goal is to keep the student in a “pure worldview” and not expose him to difficulties and alternative positions, the result is that when that student nevertheless encounters critiques, he has no tools to deal with them. The conservative student is educated on naïve conceptions detached from reality, and that apparently keeps him a charmingly devout and pious fellow (just not exactly devoted to the right thing). But in our open world it often happens that such a person eventually meets the very arguments that were so strenuously kept from him, and still—Heaven forbid—he may engage his mind about them. In such a situation, precisely because he has no tools to cope, he can react in one of two ways: either repress the critiques and continue in the rut, or abandon his religious commitment altogether. This is an excellent example of the midrash cited by Rashi in Parashat Bereishit regarding Eve and the serpent. She chose to expand the divine command not to eat from the Tree of Knowledge and told the serpent that God also forbade touching it. The serpent pushed her against the tree, and when nothing happened to her he convinced her to eat as well. These are the harms of “expanding the front” in legal jargon, and this is precisely what happens in our case as well. As the Sages said: adding is like subtracting; whoever adds, detracts.
In any case, in this sense I very much appreciate Yadan’s integrity in deciding to use his mind and draw the conclusions that, according to his approach, are required. But unlike him, when I encountered these arguments and difficulties I also thought it appropriate to keep a straight attitude toward them, and over time I understood that these difficulties oblige me to examine the assumptions on which I was educated, and then my religious conceptions changed. That’s how an apikores is born. The encounters I’ve had for many years with people who raise questions, difficulties, and arguments are not, in my view, intended only to supply them with answers, but also to examine my own positions—similar to Yadan. But unlike Yadan, because of these difficulties I decided to reject the conservative dogmas. The fact that I was educated on something doesn’t mean it’s necessarily the right thing. On the other hand, such a solution prevents the supposedly necessary conclusion of abandoning religious commitment altogether. I do not identify Judaism with the prevailing conservative tradition, and therefore for me these critiques are not an assault on the Torah and Judaism but on Haredism, or perhaps on conservative Judaism in general. That’s with regard to the part of his critique that I share. Other parts I do not share at all.
The Significance of Debates and My Attitude Toward Them
For some time now I’ve been asked (see for example here, here and here) why I shouldn’t do a debate with him in order to clarify his claims and address them, and my answer has always been that I don’t see much value in a debate or panel like that, because in any case neither of us is likely to be persuaded. Anyone who wants to learn and examine these arguments and form a serious position regarding them needs to delve into the matter, read, think, consult, and then reach their own conclusions. A debate or panel is at most a gladiator match whose aim is mainly to entertain the public and spare it the need to think. They are intended for those who don’t want to dig into the questions themselves. One indication I received for this, in retrospect, is the responses of viewers after my debate with Yaron (and others). Those who think like me are certain that I had the upper hand, hands down. Others declare that I was defeated by a knockout. Everything depends on one’s stance. Somehow such a debate gives every viewer what they had to begin with and usually doesn’t change positions—so what’s the point?!
In any case, after the debate with Yaron I was asked why I changed my position and nevertheless agreed to participate. My answer was that recently Divine Providence arranged—by Its own holy hands—for several critiques of the halakhic tradition and the Talmud to be released into the public sphere almost at the same time (I assume that those who think this is connected to the contemporary critiques of yeshiva students, and particularly their exemption from military service, won’t be far off the mark). Some of them also stirred noise and no small measure of embarrassment among believers, and it seems there’s a need to address and contend with them.
I must broaden the canvas and say more generally that religious speakers online, in most cases, are not particularly impressive, and my sense is that in many confrontations between them and their critics, religious faith comes out quite embarrassing and even ludicrous. I’m not talking only about the likes of Amnon Yitzhak or “Hidabroot” and the like. That’s obvious. This happens also with believers whose intellectual level and integrity are beyond doubt. The examples are myriad, but for me you can see a striking example here, in an interview Yadan conducted with Rabbi Shlomo Aviner. Precisely because he is a Torah scholar and an educated person by all accounts, it was difficult for me to watch how he tries to circumvent the problems and doesn’t really manage to provide a reasonable answer to them. Truly embarrassing. As I explained above, in my opinion this stems from conservatism and clinging to accepted dogmas, as I’ll explain later when I address those questions and offer my own responses.
For these reasons I ultimately decided to participate in such a debate in order to present a systematic position and responses to his critiques. This is part of a change in policy that led me to accept several such invitations lately. After we finished, the moderator told me that the recording was accompanied by noise and therefore he didn’t think to upload it online. Readers on my site who heard about this protested and immediately offered help in post-production. In the end they removed the editing segments but didn’t touch the noise (which apparently isn’t disturbing). You’ll see that although this debate wasn’t posted on a popular debate channel but rather on my own YouTube channel, it garnered relatively many daily views, and this strengthened my understanding that it was indeed needed. This does not mean I recommend debate as a way to form a position on any issue. Beyond entertainment, it can be an initial step in such an inquiry, but it must be followed by more serious study.
The Two Examples to Be Discussed Here
The two examples I’ll focus on are those that caught my attention in recent weeks: this lecture by Dr. Yitzhak Isakov as part of the series “Coming to the Professors”, and an article by Dov Elbaum in Haaretz. A few words about them.
Isakov, according to his own testimony, has no Torah background whatsoever. He is a very veteran ophthalmologist, and he speaks before the “Agassi Club,” which is made up of professors (apparently mainly from Tel Aviv University), and it’s evident that they too don’t really have a background in the matter. The subject of his talk was embarrassing issues in the Talmud. He describes how he was exposed to these materials (he was the doctor of several well-known rabbis), and they repeatedly tried to present to him the light of Torah. He became curious and impressed, and therefore decided to delve into the heart of the matter and study it. After years of research, he discovered to his astonishment that the Talmud is full of very embarrassing phenomena. He ultimately emerged with a collection of critiques about several Talmudic topics and about the Talmud in general, which he presented in that forum.
Already as I listened, the description struck me as entirely implausible. It was hard for me to believe that a person without background conducts independent research over several years while working intensively as an ophthalmologist (you can find his professional record online), and reaches meaningful proficiency in studying Talmud and halakha, even managing to gather examples from all over the Talmud and analyze those sugyot while consulting the commentaries and critical literature. I don’t know him, but if I may hazard a guess, if I give him a page of Gemara with its commentaries he won’t really be able to grapple with it. Incidentally, I also didn’t find other publications of his on the subject. Someone here on the site mentioned that his examples are taken from Yaron Yadan, and that explained everything.
Of course, even if I’m right, that’s not an answer to the difficulties themselves, since such difficulties require substantive engagement, not ad hominem critique. But this background is important to understand the diffusion of Yadan’s arguments and their significance in public discourse. Isakov’s professor-audience behaved as expected, like a uniform Greek chorus. You could see how all those “broad-minded” and “critical-thinking” people join in unison with Isakov’s mockery, all without having any idea what the subject is and without any ability to critique anything he said. This is very characteristic of the “intellectualism” and “openness” of our academy. I’ll only note that listening to this lecture really irritated me, and I approached them with a request to come and present a different position before them. For some reason, after initial contact we scheduled a Zoom meeting and the person didn’t show up, and since then the connection was cut off. Apparently they’re not looking for a second voice for the Greek chorus.
As for Dov Elbaum, the picture looks quite similar. True, in his youth he studied in yeshivot (Itri for younger students and Hebron), and his public “ticket” is as one who learned and left—the apostate of our generation. I thought that unlike Isakov he should have Talmudic knowledge and proficiency. But reading Wikipedia I found that he left the yeshiva world and religious commitment already in high school (it says there that he completed studies at the Rene Cassin High School in Jerusalem). Therefore I began to doubt, regarding him as well, to what extent he can really grapple independently with a Talmudic sugya with the requisite depth. After all that, I wasn’t particularly surprised to discover that the leading example in his article is also closely tied to Yaron Yadan, and it’s quite possible that he too drew it from him.
From these two examples and similar ones I understood that Yadan’s words are percolating and troubling many. Many critics use them to attack Jewish, halakhic, and Talmudic tradition, while believing people are left without an answer. This apparently requires a proper Zionist response. I don’t know how successful I can be, but I thought to myself that my chances of making the current online situation worse are slim, since from here one can only go up. That’s the meaning of the policy change I described, and my decision to accept invitations to debates.
Methodological Prefaces
In the final part of the column I’ll briefly present several points that underlie dealing with critical arguments of these kinds. Some address conservative assumptions that thwart anyone who comes to engage with these claims, and others are methods that, for some reason, people are unaware of. This list is a framework and a toolbox for the approaches I suggest for dealing with these critiques, and you can also find here an explanation of why many fail at this.
It’s important for me to stress that I am not conducting here a polemical and apologetic seminar to train lecturers for “Hidabroot,” “Arachim,” and the like. The assumption of such organizations is that it is permitted and even desirable to lie and distort the picture, to present it selectively and tendentiously, all for the lofty goal—that is, to win the argument, bring people back to observance, and sanctify God’s name. I disagree with them on this (and I’ve had no small number of arguments on this topic with people who take these approaches). I’ve written more than once that I oppose “holy lies” (a lie with a positive aim), partly because a lie does not stand (nowadays, when all the information is exposed and accessible, such lies are easier to uncover), but even if it were useful I am fundamentally opposed to basing a correct position on lies. I’d rather a person hold an incorrect position that he reached through honest inquiry.
Therefore, I preface by saying that my goal here is not to arm people with arguments to win a debate, to bring someone back to observance, or to “sanctify God’s name.” I have nothing against winning a debate, and certainly not against bringing people back or sanctifying God’s name, but I don’t see these as ends in themselves. They should be the result of charging and forming a straight and fair position, and if one doesn’t arrive at that result—then so be it.
For me, then, the tools presented here are required first and foremost for the person himself as he comes to form an honest position in relation to such critiques. I believe that despite the persuasive force of these critical arguments, when examined on their merits they fail. Their strength stems from people being unaware of those failures, and therefore if we use these tools there’s a chance of getting closer to the truth, and perhaps also to achieve de facto the coveted victory or return to observance. But that is not the goal. As stated, this is not a school for “Arachim” lecturers.
- Scientific Errors
Many of Yadan’s critiques deal with scientific errors in the Talmud. He of course assumes, like many believing Jews, that the Talmud is supposed to possess exalted, sanctified knowledge and therefore be free of errors. But although this is the portion of most (not all) of the sages of Israel in all generations, this is nonsense. There are quite a few errors in the Talmud, and whoever denies this denies the facts.
In every generation the sages relied on the scientific knowledge of their time. Today it’s obvious to all of us that the sages often err, even regarding scientific knowledge already extant in the world, and certainly they don’t know beyond it. So why assume it wasn’t the same in the previous century, at the dawn of modernity, in the Middle Ages, and in the time of the Geonim? Why not assume it was also the case in Talmudic times? If the Talmudic sages had exalted knowledge that could not err, when exactly along history did that get lost? Regarding prophets one could at least say they have another source of exalted knowledge (directly from the Holy One, blessed be He), but the sages who are not prophets have their own intellect and observation and the knowledge of their contemporaries—like any reasonable person. That’s all. The sages of the generations were people like you and me, and they could err like you and me, and from time to time they indeed made use of that ability.
From here it follows that the defenses that seek to show that Talmudic knowledge is nevertheless correct (by way of more or less forced answers) are not necessarily wrong but are necessarily superfluous. There is no reason to assume there are no errors there, and therefore I don’t even try to reconcile the Talmud’s statements. Exactly as I don’t try to reconcile the statements of a fifth-century sage with the science of our time. Note that I don’t even accept the assumption that the Talmud is right unless proven wrong. It doesn’t even have such a presumption. If the Talmud contains a claim that fits the spirit of the time and the knowledge that existed then, that is probably what it means—even if I’ve found a forced reading that reconciles its words with the knowledge of our time. That is simply not the correct interpretation of the Talmud. On scientific and factual questions, the Talmud’s words have no status beyond that of any person of its era. Therefore, I’m not looking for answers to such attacks—not because there are no answers or because the answers are wrong, but because answers are unnecessary. I’m simply not troubled by the questions.
- The Authority of the Sages
From this follows a consequence for the question of the sages’ authority. Yaron Yadan, like his conservative opponents, assumes that the sages’ authority depends on their being fiery beings endowed with the holy spirit. They assume what I’ve often called here “substantive authority” (search the site for “substantive authority” and “formal authority”), like that of a physician. This is the authority of someone that derives from expertise—that is, from the assumption that he doesn’t err. Therefore it also allows critique and rejection of his words. But Yadan and his opponents alike err here. The authority of the Talmudic sages is “formal authority,” and it does not depend on their spiritual charisma or on their being free of error. It derives from the fact that we accepted their authority (and when there was a Sanhedrin, its authority derived from the Torah’s command “Do not turn aside”). As is known, religious education attributes exalted wisdom to the Talmudic sages. We were taught that each of the Talmudic sages could revive the dead—even though somehow that ability evaporated with the sealing of the Talmud and doesn’t seem to have existed beforehand either. Moreover, since the sealing of the Talmud was a prolonged event, apparently over hundreds of years we had partial dead-revivers (even Geonim like Rav Aḥai—who per Tosafot is Rav Aḥa in the Talmud—who apparently revived the dead now and then when they slipped into the Talmudic corpus), until finally, for some reason, it dissipated entirely.
Young children need such explanations to ground the authority of a person or institution, for if he can err, why should I listen to him?! But adults understand that formal authorities can exist even for a person or body that can err (parliament, a court). Moreover, formal authority is limited according to its own principles. It exists only with respect to halakha (not ethics and not thought), and it is entrusted only to those who actually hold the office or are part of the institution that has formal authority (the Sanhedrin). Not every sage in every generation has formal authority, whether miracle-tales are spun about him or not (hence also the legends of “Daas Torah” and other fables). On the contrary—since the sealing of the Talmud, there is no formal authority in the halakhic world at all. This is yet another failure of conservatives when they come to grapple with Yadan’s claims, for he and they share the premise and that childish notion of authority. The sages could err, and that means two opposite things: on the one hand, in certain cases their authority exists despite the concern that they erred; on the other hand, there is always the concern that they erred and therefore it’s important to apply critical thinking to them (and sometimes also to act accordingly).
- Morality
Other critiques of Yadan deal with moral questions. Here we must distinguish between critiques of the Torah and critiques of the Talmud and halakha. Regarding the Talmud and halakha, there is no necessity that their moral pronouncements be up-to-date for our times—that is, that their moral principles be identical to ours. That’s not because I am a moral relativist—I’m not. My claim is that the sages could err regarding morality as well, and it’s plainly evident that in these matters too they absorbed the spirit of their time (attitudes toward women, gentiles, and slaves; attitudes toward family members and children; and the like).
Regarding the Torah, however, the situation is seemingly different, for from the Holy One I would expect morally correct, absolute principles. But it’s important to understand that what appears in the Torah usually does not say something clear and unambiguous, and almost always the hands of flesh-and-blood interpreters are involved. Therefore, even in matters that are de-oraita one can make the same claim. In not a few cases the sages also take the Torah out of its plain meaning—that is, they themselves did not view it as the final word, and bent its words to their moral, interpretive, and rational conceptions. Here too, a conservative person will not be able to make these claims against Yadan, since for him the sages are fiery beings and their holy spirit causes everything they interpreted in the Torah to have been necessarily its original intention as well.
Beyond this, in this area there is another point where conservatives will fail. They, just like Yaron Yadan, assume identity between halakha and morality. For them, halakha must be moral, and when they encounter contradictions between halakha and morality they resort to the familiar contrivances about exalted and incomprehensible morality, “Jewish morality” as opposed to the paltry (and progressive) morality of the gentiles, and so forth. All of this is truly embarrassing, and the interview with Rabbi Aviner above can demonstrate this quite well. In contrast, I make two opposite claims: 1) Unlike Yadan’s religious disputants, I claim that morality is by definition universal—precisely as Yadan himself assumes. There is no “Jewish morality” versus another morality. 2) Unlike both Yadan and his religious disputants, I claim there is a disconnect between halakha and morality (see about this in column 541 and elsewhere). Halakha strives for different (religious) goals than those of morality, and therefore there’s no place to evaluate halakha by moral categories. This picture solves, in one fell swoop, all such difficulties, and from here you can understand why Yadan fails and also why religious apologists do not succeed in dealing with his claims. Of course this requires an internal reworking on the believer’s part regarding his attitude to morality and halakha, and therefore innovators will go with it and conservatives will stumble over it.
I have explained in several places that morality nevertheless enters halakha in several ways. I’ll list three here: 1) Sometimes the sages incorporate it as a rabbinic enactment. 2) Sometimes they impose it even without incorporating it into halakha (compelling someone against midat Sodom). 3) When there are several legitimate interpretive paths in halakha—we will choose the path most consonant with morality (sometimes even if it is more forced, so long as it is possible).
Another conservative mistake that can hinder such discussions is the assumption that the entire Written and Oral Torah was given to us from on high at Sinai. If so, then indeed we would expect universal and eternal truths, and that opens the door to quite a few difficulties. But regarding the Oral Torah it’s clear that this is nonsense. A negligible minority of it was given at Sinai; the overwhelming majority developed over the generations through the sages. It is the product of human creation. And even regarding the Written Torah, the assumption that no verses or words were added over time is implausible. Therefore, errors or non-moral statements in the Torah can also indicate that we are dealing with a later human addition.
- Embarrassing Questions
Other critiques of Yadan deal with embarrassing and unimportant questions that halakha and the Talmud address. As I explained to him in the debate itself, he of course assumes that the importance of a halakhic topic is determined by his yardstick (I showed there that he is simply begging the question in a very tendentious way). But that assumption is baseless. Just as we saw above that halakha strives for goals other than those of morality and therefore should not be judged through the eyes of morality, so too with any other human eye. To determine what the importance of a matter is in halakha is a presumption for which I see no real basis.
Here it might seem that the conservative can actually deal with him well. However, a conservative believer who confronts him will sometimes tend to accept Yadan’s conception, for he too identifies halakha with ordinary modes of thought and with morality, and therefore again he must resort to contrivances and explain why these are very important topics.
- Okimtot (Constrained Readings)
As is known, at times the Talmud construes a Mishnah or other early source in a way that appears very forced and at odds with its original intention. In my article on okimtot I explained the matter and showed that to get to the root of the logic of okimtot it’s important to understand the principle underlying the source being interpreted (which is always a general rule and not a specific case). When you grasp that principle, the okimta usually becomes crystal clear.
There I explained that engagement with esoteric matters is, in most cases, a tool for clarifying an abstract halakhic concept, with the laboratory case that illustrates it being an esoteric instance. When the Talmud discusses a person who has intercourse with himself (engaging in sexual relations with himself)—an utterly impossible situation that certainly would never come up for practical halakhic ruling—the Talmud’s intention is not to issue practical halakha in this grave topic, but to try to clarify the mutual status of the active and passive parties in the halakhic definition of forbidden sexual relations. The same applies to warning an offender by way of a demon, a flying camel, wheat that descended in the clouds, an elephant that swallowed an Egyptian basket, and the like.
- “Two Dinim”
One of the most common methods in the lamdanut discourse is to divide the sugya being studied into different aspects. In most cases, a practical situation consists of several theoretical aspects, each of which requires its own clarification. In my aforementioned article on okimtot I explained that the aim of theoretical analysis is to break the situation down into these aspects and discuss each one on its own. I showed there that each theoretical principle is discussed in an abstract, general situation that doesn’t involve other aspects, and therefore it’s easier to analyze and understand it. The complexity of practical situations stems from the combination of several different theoretical aspects.
I won’t elaborate here on this topic, and will only note that R. Chaim of Brisk expressed this through his style of analysis called “two dinim” (in fact there are several types of analysis that fall under this heading), showing these decompositions and using them to resolve contradictions and distinguish between similar things. Many critiques of the kinds I mentioned are based on a lack of lamdanic proficiency—that is, on a failure to distinguish between different dinim. Therefore, once you recognize this decomposition, they disappear of their own accord.
Discussion
It is important to note that there are reasoned approaches that disagree with you, and they do not necessarily come from the Haredi sector. Rabbi משה רט wrote an entire book on Torah morality, and everything is explained in an astonishingly logical way. The problem with the Haredim is not necessarily that they hold incorrect claims and lie, but that they have not honestly investigated the issue in depth, and therefore do not know how to explain their side properly.
A wonderful article. I watched the debate, and indeed the feeling was of a lopsided fight: a defeated indentured servant against a terrifying, unrestrained gladiator. You were dynamite!! And as for the recording: better to get the next guy a quality microphone, and then eat his head off without mercy. The power of reason crushes with astonishing force! More power to you.
More power to you!
Additional questions I’d be glad to hear your opinion on:
1. What about cases of chasurei mechsara (“the text is defective [and should be supplemented]”) and other forced readings in the language of the Mishnah?
2. There are cases where the derashot seem extremely forced—not the 13 hermeneutical principles or some other logic, but rather inferences from isolated letters here or there, etc.
3. Stories about demons and things of that sort—it is hard to say these are only abstract ideas, because at times this appears right in a halakhic sugya (for example, whether testimony from a demon counts, etc.).
1. I gave a general answer about ukimtot. But every forced reading requires separate discussion.
2. Same here—it requires case-by-case discussion. I tend to think that such derashot usually serve as support for a law whose basis is reasoning or tradition.
3. In the past people believed in their existence and attributed various phenomena to them. Some wanted to claim that they really did exist once and have now disappeared (just as miracles and prophecy ceased). It seems more likely to me that they never existed. The fact that this appears in a halakhic sugya is irrelevant. See point 5 in the post above here.
Many thanks, though the superlatives are exaggerated. Check my note in the post about viewers’ attitudes toward this kind of debate. 🙂
Thank you for the answer. With your permission, I’ll ask a bit more:
1. I’m not talking about cases where the missing wording narrows the text to a more specific case (thus creating an “idealized” reality—as brought in your article), but about cases where it seems they simply altered the wording in order to solve a linguistic difficulty, for example.
2. So why is the derashah needed at all in such cases?
3. And what about cases where everyday encounters with demons are described? That is not merely a belief that such beings exist, but an actual description that someone met them.
Your lips deserve a kiss.
Another point should be added for thought: who says our way of looking at the world represents absolute truth? Quite apart from religion, if many intelligent people once thought something, they probably had a good reason for it, and the assumption that everyone who thought differently from what is accepted today is stupid is nothing but baseless arrogance. After all, in a few hundred years they will think the same thing about us…
The only thing that has changed is the knowledge accumulated through the experience of the generations, and therefore in all matters of knowledge we have an advantage over earlier generations. But that does not mean they were less intelligent—only that they had less information. Likewise, a substantial part of the criticism has nothing to do with knowledge but rather with conventions, and in that we have no advantage at all. Anyone who mocks the sages of the past (Jewish and non-Jewish alike) is no different from someone who mocks a sage from another culture. Narrow-mindedness, nothing more.
It doesn’t really matter in the present context; it’s just that you repeat this at every opportunity, so I think it’s worth noting that the flying camel is not a mythical creature but simply a rare camel that is very fast.
Strange, my comment disappeared here.
Absolutely not true. See, for example, Mishnah Shevuot 3:8, and others.
This is not about mockery, but about the claim that they had incomplete knowledge, while the (mistaken) assumption is that they were supposed to have perfect knowledge.
I don’t think what you said about the reactions is accurate. There were completely atheistic people there who know Yadaan and are part of his fan base. They didn’t even understand what you said; instead they made claims about your “dragging things out” (no patience to hear introductions and definitions of the discussion, etc.). It’s a familiar phenomenon.
By contrast, those who praised you give the impression of people who do not necessarily belong to that group of listeners and simply enjoyed hearing you. Personally, I’ve read articles of yours; I don’t agree with many things you’ve written, but I can’t deny the fact that in this debate Yaron Yadaan himself did not understand what you were saying and did not know how to respond, and most simply: he came attacking Haredi conceptions while you presented a different theological conception—about that he didn’t know what to say, and he had no claims against it. Yaron Yadaan is good for trolling Haredim with childish conceptions…
1. As I said, each case on its own merits.
2. Either it is an asmachta, like any other asmachta. Or some kind of anchor is needed to support the reasoning. See my article on scriptural decrees about this.
3. They could be parables. But I don’t know.
I don’t recall anything like that. Could you post it again?
I actually wasn’t impressed by some of Michi’s arguments. He claims that he does not examine the content of the Torah, because it seems plausible to him that it was given by God. What would he say if the content of the Torah contained corny jokes—would he still believe it was given by God?
In other words, part of the conclusion about the nature of the Torah comes from reading it.
I am a believing person; I just think that the Holy One, blessed be He, did not dictate the Torah, and that is why it is written the way it is.
Rabbi Michi, well done on the debate. It was useful and thought-provoking.
Regarding what you said—that the Torah does not deal with morality, and that a person himself must decide when to obey morality and when to obey halakhah.
The very fact that there is one book of laws,
namely the Torah, and not a second book of morality, also from God, does not fit with what you said.
I didn’t understand the claim. First, even in this one book there is morality and halakhah. These are two categories, both within the book. In my personal opinion, one should not learn morality from the Torah at all, and not only not from halakhah. Morality is not learned from a book but from the conscience planted in us by the Holy One, blessed be He.
This question was asked here in the comments several times, and I answered it.
Rabbi Michi, greetings and blessings,
You wrote:
“But adults understand that formal authority can exist even for a person or body that can make mistakes (parliament, a court). Moreover, formal authority is limited by its own principles. It exists only with respect to halakhah (not morality or thought), and it is entrusted only to those who truly serve in the role or institution that has formal authority (the Sanhedrin).”
Well then, an interesting and fascinating discussion took place between you and Rabbi Yehoshua Enbal here on the site, and if I recall correctly, he answered you properly and presented your view as fundamentally mistaken. His words did not receive a response from you, which leaves me with the impression that you had nothing to answer him (a kind of silence implying agreement). And now I see that you have repeated those same things around which the argument revolved. I am puzzled.
I too heard Dr. Yitzhak Iskov, and it really pained my heart that he ran into a few idiotic conservatives who caused him to distance himself from the Torah.
First, thank you for this post and for the posts still to come; the topic is truly fascinating (aside from the critical barbs about conservatism—that one view is nonsense and another childish). The post is very long (certainly in quality), so please forgive me for the long comment.
1. This phenomenon whereby anyone who has a doctoral degree in some field—whether dentistry or ophthalmology—feels free to express opinions on matters he understands nothing about, and as you have mentioned several times, professors of physics for example speak nonsense in philosophy, (I am trying very hard to follow in your ways, so I will add here: 😊) and as was seen very clearly in the hysteria over the judicial reform (regardless of whether the criticism was justified), is an old disease. Maimonides defined it well in his essay on Galen, who was exactly like them: a physician for bodily illnesses who considered himself an expert in religion and philosophy!
2. I do not think the assumption of Hidabroot and the like is that lying is permitted. These are simply lecturers of a very low intellectual level (though sometimes with much knowledge…). Take Rabbi Fanger, for example, who believes in all sorts of Chinese and Buddhist nonsense! (Wikipedia—see there.)
3. The myth that there is no scientific knowledge in the Talmud is mistaken; this is not the view of most Jewish sages, and certainly not in all generations! On the contrary, the further back you go, the percentages of great Torah figures who held this view drop dramatically. It is something born in the last generation. Online there is a pamphlet by someone named Avigdor Amiti, “The Scientific Knowledge in the Words of Hazal: Its Validity and Source,” in which he surveys this matter well, and also briefly in his book Pure Faith, p. 463 and onward. (Keep this rule in hand: anyone who proves with signs and wonders that Hazal knew the new discoveries is presumed to suffer from one of three things—and many times all three together… A. he does not know contemporary science; B. he does not know what is written in Hazal; C. the words of Hazal were not exceptional in their time, and Greeks and Romans said similar things as well.)
4. You wrote that you are not even interested in reconciling the words of Hazal with reality. I too understood things as you do all my life, but in Guide for the Perplexed III:14: “Do not ask of me that everything they mentioned concerning astronomy should conform to the way the matter truly is, for the mathematical sciences were deficient in those times, and they did not speak of these things by way of a tradition from the prophets, but because they were the sages of those generations in these matters, or because they heard them from the sages of those times. Yet because of this I do not say that statements I find in agreement with the truth are untrue or happened by chance; rather, everything that can be interpreted from a person’s words so as to agree with a reality demonstrated by proof is more fitting for an excellent person who acknowledges the truth to do.” Do you have a way of explaining his position? (“The principle of charity”?)
5. The relation between halakhah and morality. Now, all obligation to the Torah is only by virtue of morality: why should I be obligated to obey God? Rather, because morality tells me so—whether the gratitude of Hovot HaLevavot or whatever else. Now when there is a conflict between halakhah and morality, it is a conflict between morality and morality! One could say one of five things: A. I am mistaken morally, meaning I have a poor moral perspective. B. I lack knowledge that changes the whole picture; for example, if God had commanded me to kill Hitler when he was an infant in the cradle, I would say that was immoral because I did not know what monster would come out of him. (Assuming God knows in advance what Hitler will choose.) C. The moral obligation to obey God overrides the other moral obligations. I think the third approach is mistaken, especially since it cannot be that God commands us to do immoral things if we are obligated to morality even before we are obligated to Torah! D. The reason to act morally is that it is “right,” because God implanted the moral sense in my conscience (and therefore an atheist has no reason to act morally), and I know this even without the Torah, but there are also other criteria besides morality that determine what is right and wrong, and the Torah tells us those; therefore the value of halakhah may at times override the value of morality. In other words, morality is more of a sign that something is right than a reason. If I understand correctly (from here and from post 541 and elsewhere), this is the fourth approach you support. E. In truth, when there is a conflict between halakhah and morality, we should not be led astray by the Torah’s command. This opinion seems absurd to me, if only because if so, why did God command it?
6. (Perhaps it is improper to say this, but I cannot restrain myself: regarding Yaron Yadaan, it is hard to accept any moral claims from him, while he behaves very wildly and immorally in his missionary activities—things upheld in court (cutting off his children’s sidelocks despite their screams and protests / his people’s break-in at the Yeshivat Chachmei Lublin, and other matters of a modesty-related nature that were published about him and upheld in court)—and he has already been ordered to pay compensation several times (see Wikipedia). And this does not seem to me an ad hominem, because from this we see that his motives are not necessarily pure, and hence his biases, whether inadvertent or deliberate (and this does not exempt us from exposing the flaws in his arguments, but it does show that it is certainly plausible that such flaws exist). Yehoshua Enbal, in his “Case Against Yadaan,” in the introduction “Between Different Views and Polemic,” sharpens this point very well.)
Several Rishonim wrote that demons are a parable or something of the sort (see Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides, Essay on the Aggadot; Meiri on Sanhedrin 92b; and see Professor Havlin’s introduction to Beit HaBechirah on Avot, and more). It is rather forced, and I have always suspected that they did not really believe what they were writing, and that their writing was esoteric only because they did not want to disagree with Hazal.
And I always make a point of replying to people like you: no one [except you!] said that Hazal knew everything and had no scientific errors. What was said is only that something written in the Talmud, insofar as it is part of the Torah, cannot be mistaken—and even that is the minority opinion among all the Torah greats throughout the generations, while most held that they indeed could err; see what I wrote in response to the post. So in any case, your crushing proof really is on the level of Yaron Yadaan. Keep it up!
The Mishnah there specifically intended it as an example of something impossible, which has nothing to do with the matter under discussion.
And in Makkot and Yevamot Rashi explains: “flying camel — there is a kind of camel that is as swift in its running as a flying bird,” as I wrote.
And the language of the Mishnah is one thing, and the language of the Gemara another.
Correct—I am speaking about critics who mock the sages of the Talmud by claiming that they dealt with foolish things and held immoral views. My claim about this is that there is no reason to assume that the sages in the past were all stupid and immoral, and that only today has the light of knowledge and morality suddenly dawned upon the world, because this is not about knowledge but about outlook. Logic says that they had a line of thought different from what is accepted in the modern world, and it is fitting to try to understand it instead of mocking it.
Hello,
I do not remember what this is about. I responded to him more than once on different topics, so I very much doubt that the lack of response in the case you are referring to was because I had nothing to say. I assume it was because I saw no need to respond, since the matter had been exhausted (Enbal is usually an apologist, so there is no point in too much ping-pong with him). If there is a specific claim you would like to hear my response to, you are welcome to raise it, and I promise I will address it.
These are not barbs but assessments. I wrote them in complete seriousness.
2. What I wrote is information. I have had arguments about it more than once. That does not mean all of them are like that, but many are. It is always a dilemma how to judge someone favorably: is it better to think the other person is a liar/evil, or stupid.
3. It is indeed the possession of the overwhelming majority throughout all generations. I know the pamphlet in question. Go and see what the halakhic decisors wrote about lice on Shabbat.
4. First, even if Maimonides thought otherwise, that makes no difference to me. I think it is unreasonable to say this about information that clearly was not available then. Perhaps regarding information where there is room to judge favorably (such as the Pythagorean theorem and the like).
5. This is casuistry based on a mistake. First, obligation to the Torah is not based on morality, and certainly not on gratitude (see my article on philosophical gratitude). Second, even if it were based on morality, it does not follow from this that halakhah is an expression of moral principles. How did you make that logical leap? But I have exhausted the question of the relation between halakhah and morality elsewhere. See there.
Your interpretation of my words—that when there is a conflict one should follow morality—is pulled out of thin air. I don’t know where you got it from. What I wrote and said more than once is that sometimes one follows morality—that is, that one does not always follow halakhah.
6. I am not familiar with Yadaan’s biography, and I do not usually judge arguments by the arguer. But to accuse him of immoral and violent activity when it comes to his treatment of Haredim is a bad joke.
Well, speaking nonsense with great certainty does not make it true. I saw what you wrote, and you were mistaken.
The Mishnah there deals with a flying camel because that was a myth common in antiquity (see Wikipedia). Therefore there is no problem understanding that gamla parcha really is something impossible that was brought up only in order to clarify a halakhic principle. Rashi also explains about wheat that descended from the clouds that this refers to a ship carried heavenward in a storm, and the like. So does that make it possible? Is the discussion there in order to determine halakhah for that reality? What are you trying to claim? Do you know of camels that are as swift in their running as a flying bird? I certainly do not.
You said two contradictory things. Fine, we’re done.
Hello,
I wanted to ask: if, in your view, “there are quite a few errors in the Talmud, and whoever denies this denies the facts,”
what about the halakhot based on those same errors of Hazal—what is the point of keeping them?
And I will list a few out of many that I know of
(P.S. I should say that some of the examples I bring are from Yaron Yadaan’s Da’at Emet website, after I studied the material there in depth.)
1. Spontaneous generation of life from inanimate matter –
Maimonides, in Sefer HaMitzvot, among the negative commandments, no. 177, counted creeping creatures that do not reproduce sexually as a separate prohibition, and established a special commandment for this among the 613 commandments, in his words: that we were warned against eating creeping creatures generated from putrefaction, etc.
If we nullify this commandment because it is based on an error, then instead of 613 commandments we currently have 612, and all matters dependent on that count collapse,
for example, the gematria of tzitzit together with the five knots and eight threads equaling 613; see Rashi, Menachot 43b,
and also everything connected to the combination of 613, such as 248 positive commandments and 365 negative commandments, which add up to 613, no longer stands.
2. Laws of terefot and errors of Hazal concerning the anatomical structure of animals:
An error in the structure of the heart – the Shulchan Arukh ruled in Yoreh De’ah 40: “The heart has three chambers, etc.” And the Rashba in Torat HaBayit wrote:
“The heart has three chambers: one large one in the middle and two small ones, one on its right and one on its left.”
Poison in the (front) claws of cats – and the laws of derusah ruled accordingly.
According to Hazal, per Rashi, the trachea branches to the lungs, the liver, and the heart. (Hullin 45b)
3. Hazal thought that the earth is flat and the firmament is a dome, and from this mistaken reality they ruled the times of Shabbat’s entrance and exit:
The Gemara in Pesachim 94b.
Based on this error of Hazal, Rabbenu Tam ruled incorrectly.
And 400 years after Rabbenu Tam, the Shulchan Arukh also ruled in the laws of Shabbat, Orach Chaim 261:2, that the time of the appearance of the stars is four mil after sunset
(72 minutes).
And today we know that the firmament is not a dome, it has no thickness, the sun does not pass through it, and the lengths of day and night are determined by
the speed of the earth’s rotation, etc. etc.
Another example – mayim shelanu (“water that stayed overnight”) (Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chaim, siman 5, סעיף א) was ruled on the basis of Hazal’s mistake that in spring the sun warms the water in the springs because it is closer to the flat earth.
4. Hazal erred regarding the structure of the woman’s womb – and ruled incorrect laws of niddah.
An example regarding the law of from where a drop of blood must emerge for the woman to become impure is explained in the Mishnah on 40a: “All women impart impurity in the outer chamber, as it is said: ‘her discharge of blood shall be in her flesh’”; and in the Gemara 41a: “What is the outer chamber? … Rabbi Yohanan said: up to between the teeth” (and Rashi explains: there are, as it were, teeth inside the womb—fleshy folds), “and Rav Yehudah said: up to the place where the sun treads.” And although no two “fingers” are alike, it is well known that there are no such fleshy folds anywhere along the woman’s vaginal canal.
And in the responsa of the Hatam Sofer, responsum 167, in explaining the location of the outer chamber, he wrote: “But in truth, all this was written by Tosafot according to their understanding, and likewise Rashi of blessed memory explained, etc.—all according to their own intellect, but after begging the forgiveness of our holy teachers, their words were not correct.”
The difference between the birth of a boy and a girl in the laws of the woman’s impurity after childbirth—its source is in Hazal’s mistake that they thought there are physiological differences between the birth of a male and female infant.
In addition to all of the above, I would note that there are also errors and contradictions in the Torah itself.
For example, the cud-chewing of the hyrax and the hare.
And what is the source of the error? God, when dictating to Moses, or Moses when writing it?
And if the Torah is eternal—are we to live with this error forever?
I would also be glad to know the rabbi’s opinion of Reform Judaism. Is it not more suited to today’s reality?
Thank you for your time
Wonderful! I actually like the sentence you wrote: “Speaking nonsense with great certainty does not make it true. I saw what you wrote, and you were mistaken.” I just have some thoughts about whose assertions are being referred to, and which arguments are nonsense…
“Demons” in the Talmud describe, in pictorial language, a cluster of phenomena that today would be assigned to various academic fields:
A. Explanations for natural phenomena, such as wear and tear on clothing (tractate Berakhot), deterioration of houses (tractate Bava Batra), and perhaps even ketev meriri, which can easily be understood simply as sunstroke.
B. Anthropological phenomena of people living outside the law and the social order. Maimonides describes Cain this way—as a demon—in Guide for the Perplexed I, chapter 7. Whether these are savages living on the horizon of hunter-gatherers, or underworld mafiosi, murderous dictators of the type of Putin, Assad, Nasrallah, and Sinwar, or just murderous gentiles—they are all placed under the heading of demons. S.Y. Agnon describes how, in the forests of Eastern Europe, Jews were regularly murdered by gentiles with no law and no judge. Sadly, not much has changed with our “cousin” neighbors in the State of Israel. The prohibition against going out alone at night because of fear of harmful beings can be interpreted in light of this reality. Even the question of testimony from a demon can refer to such people.
C. Psychological phenomena. Rabbi Nahum Eliezer Rabinovitch gave a masterful explanation of the story of Solomon and Ashmedai, king of the demons, as describing a psychological side of Solomon that refused to subordinate itself to the Torah of Moses.
D. And of course, various supernatural phenomena that people believed in at that time.
When one encounters demons in the Talmud, one should examine each case on its own and understand whether we have here a simple description of a natural phenomenon, or an anthropological description of people without law and morality, a psychological phenomenon, or finally some supernatural phenomenon.
Thank you.
3. It is hard for me to argue about this; to the best of my knowledge, most halakhic decisors in the last two hundred years did not address the issue of lice at all (unless that is actually your argument—that silence is admission together with Hazal—and I simply think they were not up to date with the scientific information, unlike the Pahad Yitzhak, who was the first to raise it; he was an Italian sage and knew secular knowledge, and even studied medicine himself). And in general, it is hard to build on a single example. (Allow me to remark: do you actually want the accepted interpretation to be this way so that you can attack it? For some reason I get that impression.)
4. I know it makes no difference from your perspective. I asked whether you understand what Maimonides wrote, because I have never understood his words.
5. My finger-sucked interpretation? I think you gave a finger-sucked interpretation of my words. Did I write that in your opinion one should follow morality? Quite the contrary! But if I truly do not understand your words, there is no point arguing about this in a comment; I will leave it for another venue.
6. I did not accuse him, and certainly did not mean it as a joke! I wrote that when I hear his arguments about morality, it seems to me hypocrisy and a lack of sincerity, which increases the likelihood that everything he says is nonsense. Still, I wrote that this does not exempt us from exposing the flaws in his arguments; it only shows that it is certainly plausible that such flaws are there.
Who said there is any point in observing them? If there is a halakhah based on a clear error, it is void and there is no need at all to observe it. On the contrary: it is forbidden to observe it, and whoever does so violates halakhah.
1. This halakhah does not exist. As for the count of 613, in any case that is never a practical consideration for anything. It is always a retroactive calculation. No one who disagrees with someone else in the Talmud or among the Rishonim raises the question of which commandment will enter in place of the one he removed. That happens only in Nahmanides’ additions to Maimonides’ Sefer HaMitzvot.
If the count has not changed, then the gematria of tzitzit remains as it is. But even if it had changed, gematria is devoid of any significance. That is not the reason for the laws (at least not the ones that are indispensable).
What does the combination of 613 have to do with 248 positive commandments and 365 negative commandments? What practical difference comes from these homiletic ideas?
2. If there are clear errors, the halakhot are void. Maimonides himself already addresses this, and see the article of Rabbi Rabinovitch z”l on this topic.
3. The ruling does not depend on the astronomical explanation. That is only a certain language for describing the phenomena. Even if the earth is a sphere, the phenomena are still the same phenomena and the times the same times. Regarding Rabbenu Tam, I did not get into the issue. In mayim shelanu too, we are dealing with simple factual claims that the water is cold or hot in the morning and at night. The explanations are not important. By the way, that is an error in the Gemara itself, not in the Shulchan Arukh.
4. You yourself brought that the Hatam Sofer already noted it. So what is the problem?
5. I do not know these distinctions. The differences in the days of impurity are written in the Torah, and the explanations are those of commentators. Therefore the halakhah does not depend on those explanations.
The cud-chewing issue has been discussed in various places and answers have been proposed. I have not checked it, so I cannot answer.
I do not discuss what suits today’s reality. The important question is who is right and what is true. Reform Judaism does not propose changes; it is simply not committed to halakhah and therefore is not in the game at all.
3. You should read some surveys on the matter.
Who am I to come after Michi, but I think I do have something to add.
I genuinely believe you that you studied it there in depth; it remains for us only to wonder what depth you mean (“The children of Israel have deeply rebelled” — Isaiah 31:6).
1
. Are you serious? First of all, Maimonides is not Hazal; this is his interpretation of the prohibition of eating a certain creeping creature, and it is based on a sugya in Makkot 16b about eating a putita, and I won’t elaborate, and several Rishonim disagree with him. B. You are seizing on aggadic matters that change nothing (and you missed the main argument that the wording of leshem yichud is “and the 613 commandments dependent on it”—what will become of that?) and in any event the hint in tzitzit is an asmachta, as has already been written; after all, only the first knot is biblical. C. Above all: in the Torah creeping things are prohibited many times and referred to in different terminologies; from this came Maimonides’ position that we are dealing with different types of creeping creatures. So even if we refute his opinion as mistaken, that says nothing except that we need to find another distinction, so we certainly still remain with 613 commandments… (and I will continue to say the wording of the leshem yichud properly).
Reform Judaism. An oxymoron. Not for nothing did it flourish in the U.S., where religion is more psychological than real. With regard to Conservative Judaism, ostensibly things are different, and Michi himself has already written this several times. But go and see what David Golinkin, one of the movement’s prominent leaders, writes regarding the question: if biblical criticism is correct, then what sanctity does the Torah have? (In: The Voice is the Voice of Jacob, chapter 18, a responsum on biblical criticism; available on JSTOR.) “The sixth conception says that the sanctity of the Torah derives from the fact that our fathers and our fathers’ fathers saw in it the holiest book in Judaism. They studied it, never placed another book on top of it, kissed it, fasted when it fell, and even sacrificed their lives to study the Torah and keep its commandments […] The same applies to the Torah. The Torah was sanctified by 3,000 years of study, expressions of love, self-sacrifice, and observance of commandments, and this sanctity does not change in light of new knowledge about the formation of the Torah thousands of years ago.” Brilliant indeed. Postmodernism incarnate.
Could you direct me to specific surveys on the matter? Because in the past I read a lot about it and did not know of a single decisor from earlier generations (before the Holocaust) who addressed it besides the Pahad Yitzhak. In light of your words I tried searching again and found only a brief reference in the author of Havot Yair in Mekor Chaim 316, and in the book Torat Shabbat (Weil, Karlsruhe 1839) 90:1 and 316:16. The others who addressed it were Rabbi Pinchas Eliyahu of Vilna, author of Sefer HaBrit (14:8), who truly did not know his right hand from his left (for example, he launched an all-out war against Copernicus and more nonsense scattered throughout his book, and it has no value either Torah-wise or scientifically). Do the words of Rabbi Dessler and Rabbi Herzog, in your opinion, represent the thinking of all the great halakhic decisors? (And don’t tell anyone, but from checking the words of the “sages” [halakhic decisors] of our time I really understood the source of your frustration. See for example Shevet HaKehati 3:126: “And certainly Hazal surely knew this, for everything would be revealed before them”… and that is really just like Itai Blaly’s understanding at the beginning of the comments here… And he is not the only one. But that is probably a product of present-day Haredi thinking—or non-thinking—and does not represent the traditional view.)
And even if you are right about the lice issue, we still need to distinguish between three different approaches, none of which is the same as the others, even though in your view all three are incorrect.
A. Hazal knew everything about the entire universe, and through their holy spirit did not err in anything in their lives. This approach was attacked by Itai Blaly with ridicule about vaccines and the like, and I remarked to him (in his own style) that he was attacking a straw man: no one ever said that! (Perhaps Rabbi Shamai Gross.) By the way, I was rather offended that you dismissed my comment there so offhandedly; I do not feel that is fair. Was I not right in what I said there? Do you know anyone who said Hazal knew all the latest discoveries? B. Hazal did not know everything, but what is written in the Talmud is definitely correct, and there are no errors in it at all. This approach stems from the view that as part of the Oral Torah, errors cannot exist in the Talmud. C. Even in what they said in the Talmud, they sometimes erred, but only in matters that have no halakhic relevance; in halakhic matters no error whatsoever is possible. The source of this approach is like that of the previous one, except they disagree over what enters into the category of Torah that cannot be mistaken, along the lines of the Hazon Ish in Yoreh De’ah 5:3 about the two thousand years of Torah.
You assumed that the overwhelming majority of the sages of Israel in all generations held the second approach, but the example of lice on Shabbat proves (if it proves anything at all) only the third approach, and in my opinion there is a great difference between them.
What I enjoyed most was the end of the discussion with Yadaan, where he declares his desire to impose religious coercion from the liberal side. I hope those who survived to the end of the discussion are sharp enough to notice that sting in the tail.
Even if the claim is that no mistake occurred in matters touching halakhah (and that is not the common claim), it is still incorrect and baseless. And as for the Hazon Ish’s words about the two thousand years of Torah, I am sure he himself did not believe that nonsense.
Hello and blessings.
“This picture resolves all these types of difficulties in one stroke” — it seems that perhaps you meant “with one distinction” rather than “in one stroke.”
I saw in one of the comments here that you replied that our obligation to keep the Torah is not based on morality (your wording: “This is casuistry based on a mistake. First, obligation to the Torah is not based on morality, and certainly not on gratitude”), and your words are not so clear to me. As I understand your understanding, “morality” means the conduct intuitively expected of me and not from another source, so even if we say that my obligation to the Torah is not based on gratitude (which is a moral value), it still must be based on some value, and that itself is the moral value. In your article regarding the obligation to serve God you called that value “philosophical gratitude,” and that itself is moral, so I did not understand your point.
And this connects to another question. I once saw a debate of yours with some professor of morality in general, and there you argued that the validity of my obligation to keep morality is divine. Here too I did not fully grasp your view, because the initial thing itself—to listen to God—is philosophical gratitude, so it cannot be that God provides the validity for it.
Also, I would appreciate if you would sharpen this point for me: granted that halakhah and morality are two categories, etc., but is this defined that way only for the sake of discussion, so that the word morality will not be empty of content for us, while one could always argue that male homosexual intercourse destroys 999 worlds, and therefore just as it is moral to forbid someone a certain pleasure if it would cause an atomic bomb, so too regarding male homosexual intercourse—except that when we come to discuss contradictions, etc., we do not treat it that way?
And by the way, regarding debates: I really think they are very critical for people who are in an “educated” secular environment where people are condescending and express contempt for anyone not like them. When they hear someone with a doctorate defending the religious side, it lowers some of that contempt (in the last two years I have come to understand that the admiration left-wing secular university-educated people have for doctors and professors is insane, really). And this also helps religious people in that same environment, giving them something to answer with, etc.
No—“in one stroke.” See, for example, here: https://he.wiktionary.org/wiki/%D7%90%D7%91%D7%97%D7%94
Indeed, philosophical gratitude is not morality.
This is an artificial identification of halakhah with morality. Not everything aimed at some purpose is morality. If I do something in order to make money, that is not a moral act.
Hello to the honorable rabbi
I would be glad to ask the rabbi about the debate: how long will it take Yaron to become religious again after the debate?
Seriously though, a few of us sat together to watch the confrontation, and we thought there really was no contest here: an average kollel fellow with mediocre Talmudic education, plain and simple (with claims like “but the Hazon Ish said”…), against a rabbi who is a doctor and philosopher. And honestly that is how it is in all the debates the rabbi participates in (except perhaps against David Enoch): you are simply too good.
But here it was transparent. In my opinion, the moment the rabbi separated Torah from morality, Yaron could have wrapped up the debate, because his claims were not built against such a worldview. He seemed stunned by your framework and method; right from the start he was left only dribbling and stalling for time.
Wouldn’t it have been fair to prepare him beforehand, or at least make sure he understood what claims he was dealing with?
This is not a matter of preparation. Each person states his position and the viewer forms his own. We do not have the time and resources to do a full production and preparations and the like. My views are available under every green tree, and if he had wanted to prepare, he could easily have done so.
As I said in the post, in my opinion the superlatives are exaggerated. Every viewer judges the debate from his own point of view, and naturally is convinced that “his” speaker knocked the other one out. Presumably, objectively, that is not the case.
I already read the rabbi’s article, and I still could not understand why it is not morality. What is your definition of morality? And then, what set of values obligates me to that gratitude, according to your view?
I also didn’t really understand the connection to acting for money. If I do an action or refrain from an action in order to save someone, that is certainly a moral act—and here too I am “saving” worlds, etc.
Your debate with Aviv Franco—there are no different points of view there.
Regardless, it shows that many times, even if secular people are proven wrong, they simply will not be able to believe.
There too I am saving money. Not every saving of something is morality. Likewise, preserving the sanctity of the priest is not morality but a religious value.
Morality is a value whose purpose is helping others or not harming them. A proper society.
There is no set of values that obligates me to philosophical gratitude. It is itself a value (and therefore it is not reducible to another, more basic value), but it is not a moral value.
I brought there examples of a person’s intellectual property (works, ideas), where by virtue of the fact that they came from him, he has ownership over them. This is not a moral principle, but there is reasoning behind it.
Exactly the same as among religious people. They’re all fanatics.
I understand. I was including all forms of behavior that stem from rational consideration under morality. And it seems to me that intellectual property and the like are also connected to a proper society. In any case, I think you reduce morality only to “kindness,” whether interpersonal or social, while excluding “justice.” And in my humble opinion, both together make up morality, meaning the behavior one ought to behave with (without external sources such as Torah, etc.), composed of combinations of kindness and justice.
Still, even according to your view, why is saving a world not called moral behavior? Surely you agree that the intent is not specifically saving human beings, but also animals, etc. So what is the distinction? It seems forced to say it is because of their feelings…
Because this is not saving the world, but bringing it to the purpose for which it was created. It is God’s interest and not necessarily the world’s.
I think we’ve exhausted this.
Hello Rabbi Michi. Let me preface by saying that I haven’t been here on the site for a year, and I checked what’s new. Mainly I like the podcasts or public arguments. I think I haven’t missed a single one until today, including the filmed and written debate with the late Zvi Yanai {not to mention the confrontation with Professor Eyal Gross}. And I was happy this time to hear the confrontation with Yaron Yadaan {by the way, I too suggested this to you by phone about 10 years ago, maybe a bit more}. I liked the sharp analysis {which comes, as usual, from your analytical ability; by the way, I’d be glad if you could direct me, if you know, whether any of the commentators also support this—I seem to recall you mentioned there that it has some precedent}. Now to the point: I thought to challenge you and bring a refutation from the Bible itself. If this division is correct, then according to your view Abraham our father should not have obeyed God in the trial of the binding, even though he heard explicitly and beyond doubt from God, who told him to offer his son as a sacrifice. According to your view, Abraham should have included in his considerations this distinction of yours between the two values. And in fact I saw in a Midrash that this is one of Satan’s arguments to Abraham to dissuade him from carrying out the act {even if in the Midrash’s talmudic idiom and not in your modern wording, but in my opinion it amounts to the same thing}: that this itself was God’s test of Abraham—to see whether he was an unrestrained fundamentalist to the point of rising and violating the most basic inner moral command of a human being, “and carrying out such a blatantly illegal act, namely getting up and murdering his only son,” solely because of the religious, or in your terms, “halakhic,” command {in our day after the giving of the Torah, but it amounts to the same}. Abraham should at least have feared that God Himself was testing him precisely in this way, expecting him to prefer the moral consideration and act accordingly, and not fall into the trap of blind obedience when facing the most basic and powerful moral command not to do it. And I’ll say even more than that: I’m certain that if we did not know the end of the story, then the Michi of 5785 would write a post warning us not to follow supposedly “such a dangerous and total person.” And what you hinted in the discussion, namely that Abraham understood and decided that the value and loyalty of obedience overrides the value of human life, in my opinion will not hold water, because the moment there is even some possibility that all this is itself part of the test, it is impossible to decide in favor of the horrific murder of the son. Necessarily one would have to say that there is no such thing as anything besides the divine command (religious / halakhic), and that this whole distinction is fiction {even though personally this is a brilliant idea that I connected with, and perhaps it solves a few issues, so I would be glad if you would answer the difficulty, so that we can continue to hold on to this brilliant idea}.
You got a bit overexcited. You are already determining what the Michi of 5785 would write, etc. So slow down. It seems to me that the focus on the podcasts you described is what tripped you up. I explained my view of them very clearly in the post.
I have dealt extensively with dilemmas of halakhah and morality, and if you want to study my position on them, go to my lectures and posts, not to podcasts or debates ף.
Among other things, I explained that an explicit command from the Holy One, blessed be He, certainly overrides any other consideration, and therefore a command in the Torah that involves a moral problem certainly overrides it, for the Holy One Himself made the calculation and nevertheless commanded it.
Only when the clash is not essential but incidental is there room for the claim that morality can override it. And when the command is not direct but the result of interpretation, the situation is even worse, since it is not clear that this really is the halakhah. Perhaps the interpreter erred?
And finally, even if there is a clash between morality and halakhah, why do you assume that morality overrides? What I said is only that it can override. Each situation on its own merits.
It’s a good thing you wrote only “it seems to me,” and didn’t get overly excited, since I’ve read almost all your books and most of your blogs, up through the trilogy and beyond; and ever since my Judaism was exposed to “thin Judaism,” in your phrase, the diet affected me and even applied to the book you published afterward {to my many sins}. But to the point: give an example of an incidental clash?
Saving life and Shabbat. Saving a gentile on Shabbat.
Thank you!
And to complete the matter, I would add that there is no room to ask why Abraham found no place to doubt that perhaps God was testing him in this very thing, because when God commanded him he did not know that it was only a test, but thought it was a real command like any other command. {And still, where did the word of God and His command to Abraham disappear to? The answer is that God only told him “offer him up,” and did not say “slaughter him,” meaning only raise him up, and afterward bring him down, (and He concealed this simple nuance from Abraham), and then everything falls into place: God’s command was fully carried out, Abraham proved his loyalty, and in the end Isaac remained alive and well.}
I want to comment (or shed light) regarding the separation between halakhah and morality. I heard a different explanation from Moshe Rat, and it appealed to me because it presents a more harmonious picture than yours.
According to his explanation, one can definitely say that halakhah comes to express a moral statement. God gave man the ability to make moral judgments, and also gave him the Torah, which makes a clear statement. Since the ability to judge is vague, and as one sees from the differences in conceptions regarding morality, then when the Torah makes a statement we will accept it as the correct morality. On our own it is hard to ascertain moral truth, and therefore when the Torah reveals it to us, that will be the truth. When the Torah has no statement, of course we will do our best on our own to arrive at the moral truth.
The motivation for such an explanation, instead of determining that these are religious but non-moral statements, is, as I understand it, that in practice when we read those statements our initial understanding is indeed that the Torah is coming to express morality.
Such an explanation reduces the severe tension involved in saying that the Torah sometimes uproots morality for the sake of religious goals. If we accept the Torah as a bypass route to that difficult-to-attain moral truth (without denying that there are also matters that are purely religious), then harmony is created.
Harmony always appeals to people, and certainly the easing of tensions. Sometimes people even confuse these with simplicity and attribute to them Ockham’s razor. The problem is that when there are good considerations against thesis X, it should be rejected even if it is marvelously harmonious. In post 541 I explained my considerations and arguments. When I hear an alternative explanation, I will consider it, regardless of how much harmony it contains.
It is roughly like someone rejecting electromagnetic theory because it contains both an electric field and a magnetic field, whereas a theory with only an electric field is simpler and more elegant. That is entirely true, but what can one do—the facts indicate that both fields exist. About this Michio Kaku (a Japanese physicist) already said that quantum theory is a terrible theory, utterly illogical and full of defects. It has only one advantage: it is true (it matches the facts).
I read the post you referred me to.
A. When Moses describes the giving of the Torah as “life and good,” is it not thereby being said that the Torah is moral? That is, that it is measured in terms of good and evil?
B. I read an argument that there are ideas or principles whose significance for society is at the macro level rather than the micro level; that is, their value is not measured in relation to the individual person or the individual case, but in relation to society as a whole or to the conduct of the collective. I think I read this in Rabbi Dr. Eliezer Berkovits. That is to say, even if we do not find a reason for the private individual to keep kashrut, for example, the very existence of permitted and forbidden with respect to food is something that has significance in shaping society. This is a kind of moral claim from the second approach you presented in that post. I distinctly remember that he wanted to say that the prohibition of eating meat and milk together can be a social tool to teach restraint, which is an important trait for every person. However, the central drawback here would be the arbitrariness of the commandment, since many other possibilities could have achieved the same goal.
Are you familiar with his approach?
C. Your rejection there is somewhat puzzling. Especially if you believe in the prophet who said, “For My thoughts are not your thoughts,” which certainly can explain a reality in which there is a moral statement that we fail to decipher. Especially if you are able to accept the claim that there is some obscure religious purpose of rectifying worlds and sefirot. If disagreements in morality and our ability to understand different moral conceptions were all so simple, then fine—it would be preferable to argue for an amorphous spiritual purpose. But since the situation is not at all so simple, a supra-social or undeciphered moral purpose could actually be better. It is less far-fetched.
“The authority of the sages comes from the people accepting them”—from which verse in the Torah did you learn that halakhah is a build-your-own program?
I was reminded of one of the spearheads of the post-Zionist historians, Ilan Pappé, who, when asked where the almost religious zeal to dismantle every Zionist myth came from, even at the cost of lies and distortions, answered something along the lines of: the kindergarten teacher fooled me. I think that’s what’s going on with Yadaan and others like him as well. The kindergarten teacher really did fool them and presented them with a tendentious and distorted picture of the world, and ever since then they’ve been on a crusade to dismantle it and make it look ridiculous, while using the very same tactics they accuse the kindergarten teacher of using.
I always say: if Hazal had all the scientific knowledge, past and future, then why didn’t they develop vaccines or discover antibiotics and sanitation and redeem humanity from thousands of years of suffering?