On Discrimination Against Women and the Essence of the Chief Rabbinate (Column 725)
This week (Mon.) the High Court of Justice (Bagatz) ruled that the Chief Rabbinate’s policy preventing women from sitting for rabbinic ordination exams is discriminatory and must be annulled. The panel was headed by Deputy President Justice Solberg, himself a religious man. The expected condemnations promptly arrived (to my delight, there were also other voices). No need to elaborate: interference by a secular authority in matters of halakha and religion, progressivism, ignorance, lack of fear of Heaven, and so on. Rabbi Ze’ini outdid himself, explaining with his renowned moderation and “good taste and sense” that obeying the High Court is a case of “be killed rather than transgress.” I can already foresee what will happen next. The Rabbinate will dig in and look for workarounds (they’ll define the women’s exams differently); eventually things will calm down and everyone will carry on as before.
This, of course, recalls the example I’ve cited more than once: the Shakdiel case. There too, a petition was brought to the High Court against the Chief Rabbinate, which opposed appointing a woman to the religious council in Yeruham. You might have gathered there was a wall-to-wall rabbinic consensus—Haredi and non-Haredi alike—that the matter was forbidden (for it is, as “everyone knows,” a grave and explicit prohibition in the Torah; and it is also “known” that the men there are all paragons of Torah and piety). There too, Justice Menachem Elon, an observant Jew and Torah scholar, chaired the panel, and those heretics ruled that women must be allowed to be elected to religious councils. The predictable outcry was heard there as well, but immediately afterward women were appointed all over the country and everything was fine. I’ve mentioned before that when I lived in Yeruham, the Haredi community insisted on appointing from its slate a secular woman to the religious council over a religious man. The “die rather than transgress” prohibition evaporated into thin air. The difference now is that in our case the step must be taken by the Chief Rabbinate itself, so here—unlike in Shakdiel—there will first be evasion, and then the grave prohibition will dissipate.
I should note that Justice Solberg (whom, like Rabbi Ze’ini, I’ve known since his childhood in Haifa. One more disclosure: my son, Moshe, clerked for him at the Supreme Court. Another disclosure: we have no personal relationship), is not only a religious, God-fearing man but also a judge with a distinctly conservative jurisprudence (not for nothing is he the great hope of conservatives and the right at the Supreme Court). That is, he does not tend to interfere with decisions of government bodies unless strictly necessary. That, too, says something about the nature of the decision reached there.
Instead of explaining my own view on the matter—for anyone who needs an explanation at all—I’ll address Rabbi Ze’ini’s preposterous claims, whose underlying logic stands in inverse proportion to the forcefulness with which he asserts them (as is usually the case), one by one.
Secular Coercion
First and foremost, Rabbi Ze’ini explains that this is secular coercion. Perhaps it’s worth reminding him of a few basic things he seems to have forgotten. Most citizens of the State of Israel are secular and not bound by halakha. Even if a minority were so bound, in a democracy you do not coerce citizens into religious norms they are not obligated to observe (and even those they are). The Chief Rabbinate, therefore, is sinful in its very conception and existence. Explicitly, its entire purpose is to coerce the secular public into religious norms it does not want. Implicitly, its entire purpose is jobs for cronies, corruption, and maximizing the desecration of God’s name and the wrecking of religion. In any case, this body was established by the (secular) state and derives its authority (to my regret) from the state and its laws. The Chief Rabbinate is not a religious body in any sense. It is a secular state office charged with a few functions—each unnecessary—that the state decided upon under pressure from self-interested religious actors. Needless to say, its officeholders are not selected on the basis of fitness for the job but by connections and party affiliation. No one considers their suitability, Torah stature, or any other substantive criteria, God forbid. On the contrary, my impression is that care is taken to place unworthy people there precisely to ensure the body remains forever irrelevant and continues to provide employment services for the in-group. Contrary to what many think, gilded robes do not transform unlearned folk lacking all skills and character into Torah sages. Therefore, any assertion that this body has religious standing or authority—let alone talk of “do not deviate” or “the greats of the generation” and other Torah-demeaning phrases used in these contexts—displays a complete misunderstanding. This is a “by-appointment” rabbinate (mat’am), in the lowest sense of that term in Haredi literature (where it is often used in a highly tendentious way and divorced from the facts). In our case, the “by-appointment” rabbinate—once a phrase that reeked of carrion up to the establishment of the state and beyond—has become, among Haredim and their partners (and associates), a sublime ideal.
The rub, within this ugly religious coercion just described, is that this corrupt and unnecessary body is granted state-sanctioned monopoly powers to grant rabbinic certification and appoint rabbis (at the last minute, the “Rabbis Law”—the employment law for the draft-dodgers and the corrupt of Shas—was averted), and of course to register marriages and recognize or not recognize them, a monopoly over kashrut, veto power over conversions, and so forth. Any sensible person knows that these exams and appointments mean nothing and attest to nothing. Yet the law granted appointments and approvals of this corrupt body legal standing. Thus, those examined there can receive various appointments (unless they have a Haredi workaround, of course—the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted), and these exams were granted the status of an academic degree, which also grants pay scales and other consequences in Israel’s labor market. Likewise, at the Higher Institute for Torah at Bar-Ilan University, they asked me repeatedly and recommended that I take the Rabbinate’s exams (it’s a requirement there—unless you have a doctorate; that’s what saved me). Needless to say, I refused. By the way, I gave permission to students who studied halakha with me to sit the Rabbinate’s exams. A testament to their marvelous consistency.
Hence, the entire essence of this corrupt, God-desecrating body is, of course, religious coercion. As for Rabbi Ze’ini’s claim that High Court intervention in its dark conduct is secular coercion—the most generous thing I can say is that it’s infantile. Apparently, Rabbi Ze’ini expects the secular public to hand authority over its life to a benighted rabbinic body representing perhaps ten percent of the citizenry, which will decide who gets state money and when, who is married and who is not, who may marry and who may not, who is Jewish and entitled to citizenship under the Law of Return and who is not—and after all that, to give it these powers absolutely, without the ability to supervise its conduct or voice an opinion on these matters. Bow down and keep quiet.
To sharpen the point, I must add that in principle the High Court has the authority and right to intervene even in decisions with a distinctly religious-halakhic character. This is not interference in religious affairs but in the affairs of a government ministry. Anyone unwilling to accept the High Court’s secular decisions (especially those of the “secular heretic” Solberg) is welcome to conduct his affairs privately, not via state institutions. The High Court should not be intervening in the activity of religious courts of one community or another (unless red lines are crossed), but when it comes to a secular government ministry like the Chief Rabbinate, the Court must intervene to prevent discrimination and improper conduct (that is, to shut the institution down; proper conduct has not been observed there for some fifty years).
If such bowing does not occur—Heaven forbid—i.e., if the High Court dares to set proper norms for the state’s religious-coercion office, then, according to Rabbi Ze’ini, we have secular coercion. Hard to believe, but that is his claim. Lest we forget, this is an intelligent person, a clear Torah scholar, highly educated, a PhD in mathematics—by all accounts someone who should understand something about logical and halakhic reasoning, and no doubt he does. On such things and the like, our master and chief rabbi George Orwell the elder, of blessed memory, said: there are claims so stupid only intellectuals can make them.
Preliminary Note on the Core Question
Beyond the question of authority and who is coercing whom, we must discuss women’s rabbinic status as such. I’ll preface by noting that the discussion is not about appointing them to a rabbinic post but about the exam itself, especially the bonuses it confers even on one not appointed as a rabbi. The question is whether they may sit for the exam, not whether they may serve as rabbis. The Court itself notes this, assuming (wrongly) that barring women’s appointments is certainly a halakhic decision and, as such, is left to the Rabbinate. They seem to think there is a halakhic bar to appointing women to the rabbinate.
I’ll comment on that below, but here I’ll emphasize again that this concerns appointing women to the position of a government functionary, not a rabbi. A city rabbi or neighborhood rabbi is a state bureaucrat and has nothing to do with being a “rabbi.” Where do we find a prohibition on women serving as bureaucrats? Have we returned to a ban on conferring public office upon women? Even if such a ban existed (it does not), perhaps first abolish the High Court, since women serve there; not to mention women’s testimony in the courts (not just in religious courts); indeed, shut down the courts and replace them with rabbinical courts. Likewise for women in positions of authority—Heaven forbid—throughout the economy and the civil service. As for politics, thank God we are on the right path to great salvation: the few women now in office in this government are on their way out (though as for the particular women currently there—perhaps it is indeed good if they disappear).
Is the Discussion Halakhic?
This discussion is plainly not halakhic. Rabbi Ze’ini himself does not raise a single halakhic argument—because there isn’t one. If so, even by his own lights it’s far from clear why the decision should be left to the Rabbinate and a religious body. This is the policy of several men in black suits (some of whom recite Hallel on Independence Day), but it is certainly not the position of halakha and/or the Torah. On this matter there are at least differing rabbinic opinions. So why should a benighted state-religious body, which does not represent the religious public and certainly not the secular public, decide policy for us all—and coerce it upon us? Is this the body the religious public would want defining what is right and what is not?
Up to this point, Rabbi Ze’ini essentially argued that irrespective of the substantive question—whether women may serve and/or sit exams—there is an issue of authority and coercion. It cannot be, he claims, that a secular body decides such a matter, even if it decided correctly. In his view, this is secular coercion, and I’ve explained why that is nonsense. Now let’s turn to the issue itself.
Rabbi Ze’ini’s Claims: Unity
Rabbi Ze’ini offers several arguments why women should not sit for the Rabbinate’s exams (I address only what appears in the article).
Schism of the people:
“In addition, I’m amazed he doesn’t understand the inevitable result of this ruling: a rift among the Jewish people into mutually hostile streams—as in the past, Pharisees, Sadducees and Boethusians. This will dismantle the Chief Rabbinate of Israel and divide the people—and I know that national unity is dear to Justice Solberg.”
This is truly wonderful. It seems that, in his view, the current situation—excluding 50% of the public because of the tastes of 10%—is a state of marvelous unity. This is the demagogue’s way since time immemorial: calling everyone to unity, meaning “all of you join me—my path and my views—so as not to harm unity.” In that sense, Korah too yearned for unity. I am sure that if Moses and Aaron had agreed with him and met all his demands, he would not have stirred any dispute.
Rabbi Ze’ini’s Claims: Time-Bound Positive Commandments
Now we arrive at a truly surprising and wondrous claim:
“First, halakhically, a woman is not obligated in all the commandments; she is exempt from time-bound positive commandments and barely obligated in a quarter of the mitzvot. How can a person not obligated in the commandments presume to judge and decide in all halakhic matters?! Have you ever heard of a judge who is not obligated by all the laws?!”
Where’s the line? If she were obligated in 80% of the commandments—then yes? Why would she be allowed to rule on the remaining 20%? By this “sound” reasoning, an Israelite cannot sit on the Sanhedrin. Do you know how many commandments concern a priest’s impurity and the Temple and its sancta? Quite astounding, isn’t it? And this is his main, first argument on the issue. I won’t even get into the fact that the Chief Rabbinate does not rule on any matter involving time-bound commandments. It deals with personal status (marriage and divorce, conversion) and with kashrut. All of these are areas in which women are certainly obligated. By the way, may men rule on the laws of niddah, zavah, and mikva’ot? But it seems Rabbi Ze’ini is not troubled by such trifles. When drafting make-believe arguments from wherever, one lacks the luxury of checking them in detail. And this is the central argument he presents first and most elaborately. Unbelievable.
Rabbi Ze’ini’s Claims: Appointing Women to a Rabbinic Post
His second argument is:
“Second, the Torah disqualified a woman from heading a rabbinic system, so it is incomprehensible how a judge who is not a halakhic decisor interferes in halakha and determines what it should rule?!”
I’m truly curious to see where the Torah disqualifies a woman from heading a “rabbinic system.” What “rabbinic system” is there in the Torah at all? To head the Sanhedrin? By that same (non-existent, in my view) law, a woman could not serve as even a regular judge. And in any case, the Rabbinate’s exams are not “heading a rabbinic system.” We are dealing with granting a license to render halakhic rulings, not a license to head any system, and certainly not to serve in it de facto.
Beyond that, the very assumption (also shared implicitly by the justices) that appointing women to the rabbinate is halakhically prohibited is, in my view, incorrect. There is no barrier to appointing a woman to any position of authority, including halakhic ruling. True, Maimonides, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:5, writes this about women (as well as converts). But in my view that is only because it was once socially accepted that a woman would not hold office. In my article about the status of the convert (about whom the same law is stated—and I am truly eager to see Rabbi Ze’ini and the Chief Rabbinate as a whole come out against appointing a convert to a state position, or even against his sitting for the Rabbinate’s exams), I explained that this is not a law but a social norm that received halakhic imprimatur—and rightly so, given the social reality at that time—and I proved this in several ways. The same holds for women.
I would note that in Column 712, where I discussed the links between religion and culture, I showed how cultural norms enter the corpus of religious-halakhic norms and unjustifiably acquire binding, timeless status. I think women’s status is a prime example of this. Even where there is a clear, agreed-upon halakha—where it is crystal clear that we are dealing with halakha proper—there may be room to hesitate before changing the law due to changed circumstances (see my article on annulling and changing regulations, and in Columns 475–480 on Modern Orthodoxy). All the more so where there is no real halakhic bar, there is certainly no reason to fear change.
Just as it is now obvious to any sensible person that women can study Torah—despite Hazal’s harsh statements on the matter—there is no reason not to appoint someone worthy (but not to appoint her just because she is a woman, in the name of sacred equality, as is the current tendency) to the position of “rabbanit.” In my view, there is no bar to appointing a woman as a rabbanit, even to head any system whatsoever. By the way, for the position of judge, there is already a Tosafot stating that women are qualified (Niddah 49b; 17a; and elsewhere, learned from Deborah the prophetess), though many disagree; it is worth relying on that view when it seems correct and when circumstances require.
The Hard Question
The interview with Rabbi Ze’ini ends thus:
“The Chief Rabbinate of Israel is a state body; it cannot refuse to obey a High Court ruling. What do you propose it do?”
If the Chief Rabbinate agrees to carry out this ruling, it will immediately forfeit its status as the Chief Rabbinate. Every religious Jew will be entitled to disagree with it on any matter, since it becomes secular! That is exactly what the Haredim have done for decades, and now a religious judge is giving them the imprimatur.
Rub your eyes in disbelief. Is it not already the case that any Jew may, and in fact does, disagree with it? Look—Rabbi Ze’ini himself disagrees with it here (and later). The man lives in la-la land, as if we were dealing with a Sanhedrin about which it is said, “Do not deviate,” rather than a gang of corrupt bureaucrats. His fear that the Rabbinate will “become secular” is a joke. As I’ve explained, it is entirely secular, since it was established by and derives its authority from secular law. Somehow, Rabbi Ze’ini presents here a naïve religious-Zionist conception, as if the Chief Rabbinate were the restoration of “your judges as at first,” as though a Sanhedrin were here drawing its mandate and power from on high. Unbelievable.
Here is the continuation:
“So you’re saying the Rabbinate must not obey the High Court’s ruling?”
There is coercion here upon all Israel against halakha; therefore, the principle of “be killed rather than transgress” applies!
Unbelievable. This nonsense—which is not only non-binding but also untrue—becomes, for him, a fundamental principle so severe that one must give one’s life rather than violate it. Virtually a decree of religious persecution.
No wonder even the interviewer couldn’t stay indifferent:
“To that extent?”
If the rabbinical courts do not invalidate this ruling, they are tantamount to courts of the secular system, disqualified from ruling any matter of Torah law. We do not want a “by-appointment” Rabbinate, as in exile. This is coercion at the heart of post-modernism, which seeks to erase every difference of any kind—between men and women, between Jews and gentiles—there is no greater antithesis to the entire Torah.
Rabbi Ze’ini explains that we do not want a “by-appointment” Rabbinate; therefore, we established with our own hands an institution that is nothing but that. Not only did we establish it—we will fight with all our might, even to the point of martyrdom, to preserve its standing and not harm it. Once again, one cannot avoid another Orwellian gem: “War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength.”
And he adds:
The claim that this is discrimination is an expression of terrible ignorance of Judaism, for the entire Torah is about distinctions—between priest and Levite, Levite and Israelite, Jew and gentile, even between a regular gentile and an idol-worshipping gentile, and many more! When the Temple is rebuilt, will the High Court bar us from disqualifying a gentile to serve as High Priest?! And why not obligate a woman in circumcision to avoid discrimination? We are indeed on July 14, Bastille Day, which blindly made everyone equal, but that is not our way. If anything—why not allow a gentile to sit the exam as well, even a violent man who sunders us? And why not appoint a gentile as a rabbi?
Here too we see a truly embarrassing collection of misunderstandings. No one claims the Torah is egalitarian. Reality isn’t egalitarian either, since women have different sex organs (apropos the foolish example of female circumcision) and less physical strength than men. The question on the table is not equality per se but what we should do when equality is attainable. Should we then fight inequality as if it were an ultimate value? Is inequality, in Rabbi Ze’ini’s view, a Jewish value? At most, one can claim that where necessity dictates and there is no choice, we will not act equally. But to turn inequality itself into a binding value is conceptual confusion. Needless to say, for me this is merely a lower bound: the principle of equality is a democratic and moral value, and therefore every Jew should be committed to it (not merely “not necessarily oppose it”), except where there is a halakhic or other impediment (and even there we should seek a way out if one exists; in not a few cases, it does).
As an aside, I’ll add that there is no bar to a gentile taking the Rabbinate’s exam. On the contrary, the principle of equality says that if he passes the exam, he possesses halakhic knowledge and is entitled to all state-conferred benefits. Appoint him as a rabbi in practice? That is a decision left to the various communities (in my view he is no worse than an LLM bot).
He concludes:
The ramifications of such a ruling could be far-reaching, for if religious Jews feel that the apex of the judicial system harms their religious lives and coerces brutal secular coercion upon them—how will they feel?!
I’ll repeat what I explained above: at most, this mitigates religious coercion; it is certainly not secular coercion.
Closing Words
The question that arises here is: how is it possible that someone who is an unmistakable Torah scholar, so educated and intelligent, comes to say such nonsense? How does it happen that he reaches such extreme, preposterous conclusions based on arguments that don’t hold a drop of water? The Orwell line above (about the nonsense of intellectuals) doesn’t seem sufficient as an explanation.
I think I’ll borrow here from Dawkins. He writes that in every group there are good people who behave well and bad people who behave badly. But only in religious groups will you find good people who behave badly (because they believe their religion compels them). In the next column I’ll approach this from a different angle; here I’ll only say that this statement is infuriating and imprecise—but we must honestly admit there’s something to it. For my part, I would replace “religious” with “zealotry” or “fundamentalism/dogmatism.” Now, paraphrasing Dawkins, I will say that in every group there are wise people who say sensible things and fools who speak nonsense. Only in an extreme, agenda-driven, biased group (a church) will you find wise people who speak nonsense.