The Third Path: On LGBTQ, “Liteness,” and Harmful Critique (Column 728)
With God’s help
Today I was sent a post by Yael Mishali responding to a letter from the Binyamin Rabbis’ Council. The Binyamin Regional Council decided to invite the gay singer Eden Hason to perform. In response, the Binyamin Rabbis’ Council published the following letter:
Right at the outset I must say that I very much appreciated the inevitable call for unity—namely, to set the matter aside from here on so that there not be division. That is, after their demands were accepted (“henceforth to jointly refine the summer shows”), we are all called to remain united and prevent disputes. How lovely and how typical. Truly Torah scholars who increase peace in the world (like Yasser Arafat, who could be considered the world champion in the number of peace agreements he signed).
On this painful issue, Yael Mishali published the following response. I won’t copy it here due to its length, and will only say that Mishali explains to them that they are irrelevant and calls on the public to ignore this benighted approach and to embrace their many LGBTQ children, as the sand on the seashore. Needless to say, I agree with the spirit of her words and that we are dealing with a problematic rabbinic approach. And yet this response jarred me, and I think its harm outweighs its benefit. As I will explain, it exemplifies a broader, more general phenomenon, and thus it is worth analyzing.
Inviting the Artist or Attitude Toward the LGBTQ-niks
Mishali slid—without quite noticing—from the specific question of inviting a gay artist to perform (which was the trigger for her post) to a discussion devoted entirely to the general question of the proper communal and familial attitude toward LGBTQ people. That shift matters for what I want to say here.
The question of inviting such an artist seems to me far simpler, and it is much more reasonable to oppose the rabbis’ stance on it. The rabbis’ committee relies on slogans about harming the values and sanctity of the family in Israel. I didn’t understand why or how this harms anything. Will there be children in the audience who are not LGBTQ who, after the performance, will be persuaded to become so? Or might there be those who are LGBTQ who, if such an artist is not invited, will be persuaded to return to being straight? Perhaps there are a few teens in some intermediate state, but I seriously doubt that in a religious society anyone who has a choice will choose to act as LGBTQ “just because.” Generally, we are dealing with people who are simply that way and not because of some artist’s influence. They have no real choice. I think the opposite concern—that such calls push LGBTQ people into a corner and cause them severe distress—is far more serious.
Beyond that, in their view is it permissible to invite an artist who publicly violates Shabbat, or who eats non-kosher food? I assume there would not be such objections to that. In any case, I haven’t heard comparable objections to such artists. Among the rabbis there is a taboo regarding LGBTQ phenomena, partly perhaps as a reaction to the culture war that some LGBTQ activists wage, at times with aggressive and silencing tactics. Still, I don’t see a substantive justification for the taboo. On the contrary, the fear of influence and of granting legitimacy to Shabbat desecration—something that is up to the youth’s decision—exists far more than any “influence” that would turn someone into LGBTQ, which, as noted, is generally not up to them. Even regarding the artist himself: being LGBTQ is not up to him, whereas desecrating Shabbat certainly is. The LGBTQ artist is simply that way and has little choice (he is coerced), and therefore he is surely less culpable and less wicked than the artist who desecrates Shabbat.
In short, by every parameter I can think of, there is much less logic in inviting a Shabbat-violating artist than in inviting a gay artist. So why is everyone fighting for “family sanctity”? In my estimation, even though they dress it up with values and lofty spiritual declarations, this is essentially a mere social taboo that, naturally, takes longer to change in a religious society. It is very convenient to drape these primal feelings over the halakhic prohibition. I think the “Hardal” (national-Haredi) rabbis in general obsess over LGBTQ phenomena and wage hopeless holy wars against them; this too, in my view, stems from taboo and psychological fixation, not from moral or spiritual reasoning.
Mishali’s Response
If one truly chooses to focus on attitudes toward LGBTQ people rather than on the question of inviting the artist, I would expect a few words about the halakhic prohibition. The elephant in the room isn’t mentioned at all in her piece, and I get the impression it does not interest her in the least. She treats the phenomenon as though it were just another hobby of children, and the rabbis’, parents’, and religious society’s fuss as mere madness. Hello! There is a severe biblical prohibition (sexual prohibitions—“be killed rather than transgress”) on male-male intercourse, and this is undisputed. I would expect that before preaching to the rabbis, Mishali would open with something like: “Although it is clear that we are dealing with a very serious halakhic prohibition,” and only then go on to describe the reality, the distress, and the need and duty to relate to the phenomenon and to the people with inclusion.
Why does this matter? Because my concern here is not Yael Mishali herself nor her response. It is a symptom of a mode of discourse that severely harms the just struggle for the proper attitude toward LGBTQ people. Responses like Mishali’s present the picture exactly as the rabbis wish to present it: on one side stand the rabbis, God-fearing and uncompromisingly committed to halakhah and Torah, courageously and firmly battling for Torah values and sanctity against the winds of the times; opposite them stand a few “lite” types shouting liberal and progressive slogans as if these were Torah values. The real religious versus the lites. Note that this is precisely how those Hardal rabbis wish to frame the struggle, and in that sense Mishali plays into their hands.
How Should One Have Responded?
So, you’ll ask, what should she have done? As noted, one cannot argue about the very existence and gravity of the prohibition. It stands, in black fire upon white fire, in the Written and Oral Torah and in all the halakhic decisors. I wrote above that, in my view, one should have started by acknowledging that we are dealing with an extremely serious prohibition accepted by all decisors, and that there is no counsel against God. After that preface, it is crucial to explain that fear of Heaven does not mean callousness, nor does it mean ignoring reality and its complexities. Despite the prohibition, a person endowed with such inclinations cannot overcome them. He is coerced in every respect. I don’t think there is any compulsion greater than this. I customarily cite here the Talmud in Ketubot 33a–b, which discusses whether lashes are more severe than death:
If you say they are, whence do we know that death is more severe? Perhaps lashes are more severe, for Rav said: Had they flogged Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, they would have worshiped the image! Rav Sama son of Rav Assi said to Rav Ashi (and some say: Rav Sama son of Rav Ashi to Rav Ashi): Do you not distinguish between a beating that has a limit and a beating that has no limit?
Note well: although death is certainly more severe and more painful than lashes, unending lashes throughout one’s life, until one surrenders, are more severe and more painful than a threat of death. Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, who offered their lives and entered the fire rather than serve idolatry—had they been flogged in such a manner, they would certainly have yielded. Why? Because an ordinary person, and even an extraordinary one, cannot endure constant suffering with no light at the end of the tunnel. In the end he gives in. Likewise, one can demand that a person restrain himself and refrain from sexual relations for a certain period (e.g., during his wife’s niddah), but a person cannot refrain from sexual relations for his entire life. Here he will certainly break; this is absolute compulsion. Thus, even though there is no way out and no halakhic permit regarding this grave prohibition, the appropriate attitude from a halakhic-Torah perspective toward such people is as toward fully coerced individuals. Certainly more coerced than Shabbat violators, niddah violators, and eaters of pork. Yet, for some reason, the conservative side treats all of those with marvelous inclusion and outreach, while LGBTQ people merit a crusade—unyielding and uncompromising.
A response along these lines would cast the dispute in a very different light from what I described above: all of us are committed to Torah and fear of Heaven; all of us value family sanctity and halakhic norms; and yet there remains a debate about how one should act. This is not “liteness” versus fear of Heaven, as conservatives and Hardalim are happy to portray it (and as emerges from Mishali’s response), but rather a debate over what fear of Heaven and commitment to Torah and halakhah actually mandate. The claim is that the Torah and halakhah themselves require us to accommodate the phenomenon and to give these people a place in the community like anyone else. That is a wholly different statement, and it presents a genuine alternative to the conservative approach expressed in the letter above. Such a claim also stands a chance of being accepted (in my estimation they too will eventually tire of the jihad against LGBTQ people and will grasp what the rest of the world has already understood. It takes them time to adjust, since rabbis—and religious people in general—tend toward conservatism and clinging to social taboos and fixations. Among them/among us, change always takes longer; but it is already here, and I am fairly sure it will continue apace).
A Theological and Meta-Halakhic Note
One can, of course, wonder: if this is indeed the situation, why does the Torah prohibit it? If one truly cannot withstand this prohibition, what is the point of prohibiting it? Take, for example, the prohibition of theft. There are those who suffer from kleptomania (a tendency to steal). The prohibition applies to them as well, of course, although they likely cannot withstand it; if they transgress, they would presumably be considered coerced. So why prohibit it at all? Here the answer is simpler. The prohibition was indeed given for ordinary people who can withstand it. Were we all kleptomaniacs, the Torah would likely not have prohibited it. Therefore the prohibition exists, and once it is established it applies to everyone, kleptomaniacs included—though they are considered coerced regarding it. What about homosexuality? There the situation seems different, for unlike kleptomania, everyone for whom this prohibition is relevant is someone with such an inclination and therefore cannot withstand it. So what is the point in prohibiting it?
I have cited in the past R. Moshe Feinstein’s claim that the Torah does not place a person in a trial he cannot endure (and it is difficult to square this with kleptomania). From this he infers that homosexuality cannot be an inborn and natural inclination; it must be a choice by people who can choose otherwise. In his view it must be the counsel of the evil inclination; otherwise the Torah would not have prohibited it. Now consider the implications if we understand that he erred about the facts. In most cases we are indeed dealing with an inborn and natural inclination (I am not entering here into the question of whether it is genetic; that is irrelevant to the discussion). But if we reject RMF’s factual premise, then his meta-halakhic premise—that the Torah does not set before a person a trial he cannot withstand—leads us inexorably to the opposite conclusion: the prohibition does not exist regarding those who have such an inclination. It was stated only regarding those who do so out of lust while having another option (straight people with desire, or bisexuals). This line of reasoning could lead to an actual halakhic permit for the act itself, at least for those whose inclination is such.
As for me, I do not know whence RMF derived his meta-halakhic premise. It seems to me entirely unfounded; precisely for that reason I cannot justify a permit for the act, even for those whose inclination is such. Therefore I wrote above that, in my view, the prohibition applies to them as well, but they are coerced.
Yet even if one asks all the questions and finds no answers, good questions do not change reality. For our purposes, even if one adopts RMF’s meta-halakhic premise (that the Torah does not demand of us what we cannot endure), I do not see how one can derive from it factual conclusions (that it is mere desire and not an ingrained inclination). Reality owes us nothing. To understand and know it, one must observe and examine it with open eyes, rather than doing casuistry based on theological assumptions. Difficult theological questions, however good, are not a sufficient basis for making factual determinations about reality—certainly not when they contradict experience and what we see with our own eyes. Therefore, even if one adopts RMF’s stance, the conclusion that it is always a matter of desire and not inclination is untenable and there is no rational reason to accept it. At the same time, as noted, there is no genuine justification for the approach that for such people there is no prohibition at all.
Broader Implications: The Third Path
I have tried to explain why “lite” critiques of the standard rabbinic approach to LGBTQ issues can greatly harm a justified struggle. I have shown that there is a better and more effective way to critique the conservative approach—on the basis of halakhic and Torah arguments (and, of course, factual ones). This principle applies to debates over changes in halakhah more generally.
In many cases, critics and innovators advance “lite” arguments—that is, they explain that something is not moral or not ethical, ask how it will be received in the world, and point to problematic consequences (see the series 475–480 on Modern Orthodoxy, and in particular column 478, where I explained the difference between it and Reform. The main difference concerns whether one relies on consequentialist considerations), etc., etc. In doing so, they effectively play into the conservatives’ hands and shoot their own just struggle in the foot. Conservatives insist on portraying their opponents as “lite,” and such criticism really is lite. Instead, arguments for change should be framed in halakhic terms and based on halakhic reasoning. Morality can be a motivation, but the justification must be halakhic and Torah-based. The non-lite critic argues that the conservatives are halakhic offenders, not merely that they are immoral. We must understand that the identification of everyone who is not conservative/Hardal with “lite” is a manipulation by the Hardalim and conservatives, and we must not cooperate with it. The manner of criticism (justified in itself) exemplified by Mishali is an excellent parable for this point, and it teaches about the general rule. One could almost say that with such defense attorneys, there is no need for prosecutors.
The Third Path raises a flag of a Torah and halakhic alternative—not a flag of “morality” set against the halakhic flag. Our goal is to show that there is another Torah, and not to attack the Torah and commitment to it in the name of contemporary morals and values. It is important to understand that this mistake is embedded so deeply in all of us that many who do not identify with Haredi/Hardal approaches nonetheless conceive of themselves (!) as “lite,” and thus do not allow themselves to break free of the deeply flawed and problematic models of Torah and halakhah.
I have often said that, in the Enlightenment period, young people were confronted with an impossible dilemma: to be wise and wicked, or righteous and foolish. It is no wonder that most of the public chose to be wise and wicked—thus secularism was born. The other side of the coin is those who chose to be righteous and foolish, and thus were born conservatism and Haredism—that is, foolish, disconnected, and benighted religious conceptions. Framing the discussion and the dilemma in this way causes double harm: we lost the wise, who left and walked away; and those who remained hold to a benighted Torah. The same is happening in our day, partly due to conservatives and their way of conducting the discussion, and partly due to the modes of criticism leveled against them. The critics themselves cause the Torah and halakhah to remain on the benighted side, and anyone moral and rational is therefore non-religious or non-Jewish, or at best “lite.” In this way, by means of this problematic form of criticism, we ourselves lend a hand to the terrible desecration of God’s name carried out by conservatives, turning Judaism as a whole into a benighted and repellent Torah, as is happening today.
This is why the conceptualization of the Third Path is so important. Our aim is to say that it is not the “lite” version of one of the two existing paths, but an alternative path. Without such conceptualization, true change in Torah and Judaism is not really possible, and we are condemned to live within the horrific dichotomy I described (where to be a Jew means to be foolish, divorced from straight thinking and from facts, and immoral).