Tazria (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help — Midah Tovah — Eve of the holy Sabbath, Parashat Tazria, 5765

Questions

1. What does it mean for something singled out from a general category to be “of its own kind” or “not of its own kind”?
2. What is the practical difference between these two principles?
3. What is the difference between leniency and stringency, on the one hand, and presence and absence, on the other?
4. Does the general category always teach about the particular case, or can one also derive in the opposite direction?

The principles

• A case that was included in a general category and singled out to state a different rule that is of its own kind.
• A case that was included in a general category and singled out to state a different rule that is not of its own kind.
• A case that was included in a general category and singled out in order to teach.
• A case that was included in a general category and singled out to be judged by a new rule.

“And if a person has on the skin of his flesh a boil, and it heals.”

(Leviticus 13:18)

“But if it spreads in the skin, the priest shall pronounce him impure; it is a lesion. But if the bright spot remains in its place and has not spread, it is the scar of the boil, and the priest shall pronounce him pure. Or if the flesh has on its skin a burn from fire, and the raw area of the burn becomes a bright white spot, reddish-white or white.”

(Leviticus 13:22-24)

“And the priest shall examine it on the seventh day: if it has indeed spread in the skin, the priest shall pronounce him impure; it is a lesion of tzara’at. But if the bright spot remains in its place and has not spread in the skin, and it is dim, it is the swelling from the burn; the priest shall pronounce him pure, for it is the scar of the burn.”

(Leviticus 13:27-28)

“And if a man or a woman has a lesion on the head or in the beard.”

(Leviticus 13:29)

(2) Every case that was included in a general category and singled out from the general category to state a different rule that is of its own kind was singled out to be lenient and not stringent. How so? “And if a person has on the skin of his flesh a boil, and it heals,” and it is also written, “Or if the flesh has on its skin a burn from fire.” Surely the boil and the burn were included among all lesions. When they were singled out from the general category to state a different rule that is of their own kind, they were singled out to be lenient and not stringent: to be lenient with them, so that they are not judged by the sign of live flesh and are judged only by one week of quarantine.

(3) Every case that was included in a general category and singled out from the general category to state a different rule that is not of its own kind was singled out both to be lenient and to be stringent. How so? “And if a man or a woman has a lesion on the head or in the beard.” Surely the head and the beard were included in the category of skin and flesh. When they were singled out from the general category to state a different rule that is not of their own kind, they were singled out both to be lenient and to be stringent: to be lenient with them, so that they are not judged by white hair, and to be stringent with them, so that they are judged by yellow hair.

(Baraita of Examples, beginning of the Sifra)

A Case Included in a General Category and Singled Out to State a Different Rule

Introduction

The next two portions, Tazria and Metzora, deal with the laws of lesions, that is, the impurity of tzara’at (the biblical skin-affliction) in its various forms, and with the impurities associated with abnormal discharge and childbirth. As is well known, no Gemara (Talmudic discussion) exists for tractate Nega’im. The Baraita of Examples brings, from these two portions, examples of five rare principles from among the thirteen hermeneutical principles. In this sense, the baraita functions as a kind of Gemara on those Mishnah passages, since it presents interpretive derivations that ground various laws in the area of lesions.

On this page we will discuss two of those principles, both of which belong to the hermeneutics of general and particular categories. Here too we are dealing with a particular case singled out from a general category, in two forms: it was singled out to state a different rule “of its own kind,” and “not of its own kind.” We will try to understand these principles, to see how they operate, and to understand what distinguishes them both from one another and from the other principles. The sources for the two derivations are drawn from Leviticus 13 in our portion, which deals with the impurity of tzara’at.

A brief introduction to the laws of lesions

For purposes of understanding the matter, let us preface a brief introduction to the laws of lesions, though we obviously cannot enter into details.¹ The Torah recognizes three kinds of lesions, classified according to the object on which the lesion appears: human lesions, garment lesions, and house lesions. The human lesions, with which we are concerned here, are themselves divided into three types:

1. ordinary skin lesions;
2. boils and burns;
3. lesions of the head and beard, namely netek, karakhat, and gabakhat.

1. Ordinary skin lesions are white patches on the skin. They render a person impure upon the appearance of one of three signs:

1. at least two white hairs in the area of the lesion;
2. healthy live flesh in the middle of the lesion;
3. spreading of the lesion after one or two weeks of quarantine.

2. A boil is an inflammation of the skin caused by a blow from wood or stone, or by illness. A burn is a burn.

The impurity of a boil or a burn exists only after the area has begun somewhat to heal, so that a crust forms over it, and yet a lesion is still visible there.

The Mishnah, Nega’im 3:4 and 9:1, rules that there are two differences between boils and burns, on the one hand, and ordinary skin lesions, on the other. They render one impure through one of two signs, not three as in ordinary skin lesions: white hair or spreading. In addition, they are quarantined for only one week, not two as with ordinary skin lesions, unless they heal completely and what remains is an ordinary skin lesion, in which case their law becomes that of ordinary skin lesions.

3. Lesions of the head and beard are connected with hair loss in those places. The medieval commentators disagree about the exact definitions there. Netek, which is the subject of our exposition, is a spot the size of a bean in which all the hair has fallen out from the root. Karakhat and gabakhat are loss of hair in the front part of the head and the back part of the head, respectively. Since those bald areas have no hair, the sign of white hair is obviously irrelevant to them.

The Mishnah, Nega’im 10:1 and 10:10, rules that all of these are adjudicated over two weeks, like ordinary skin lesions, and by two signs, similar to boils and burns. Netek renders one impure through the growth of thin yellow hair, or through spreading. Karakhat and gabakhat are treated like ordinary skin lesions, except for the sign of white hair, as explained above.

Preliminary note: the difference from the principle of “a case included in a general category and singled out in order to teach”

In the principle of “a case included in a general category and singled out in order to teach”—see the page on Parashat Tzav—we are dealing with a particular case that has nothing at all different from the general category from which it was singled out, as with kindling fire in contrast to the other Sabbath labors.² In such a situation, the singling out cannot “teach about itself,” that is, about the particular case itself, since everything is already known from the general category in which it is included. In that case the singling out is superfluous. It is therefore clear that it was singled out to teach about the general category, not about itself.

By contrast, in the two principles with which we are dealing here, the particular case is itself described in Scripture differently from the general category from which it was singled out; its laws are different. In such a case it is clear that it was singled out to teach about itself and not about the general category. In other words, it is written separately in order to teach us that something in it itself is different, and not as a revelation about the general category.

Boils and burns: a different rule of its own kind

The first derivation cited above deals with boils and burns. It determines that the verses about boils and burns singled them out from the category of all lesions.³ The conclusion is that this singling-out was meant to be lenient with them in two laws:

1. they render one impure after only one week of quarantine; this is a leniency, because if they appear pure they are not quarantined for an additional week, as with ordinary skin lesions;
2. they render one impure through one of two signs, not one of three, as explained above.

This singling-out is defined as being “of its own kind,” and the legal conclusion drawn from it is that its purpose is to be lenient and not stringent.

This derivation raises several questions that require explanation:

a. Why is this singling-out called “of its own kind”?
b. Why does singling out for something that is of its own kind lead to conclusions that are only lenient and not stringent?
c. How were precisely these two leniencies chosen?

Lesions of the head and beard: a different rule not of its own kind

The second derivation cited above deals with lesions of the head and beard—more precisely, only with netek, in verses 29-39. It determines that the verses about the head and beard singled them out from the category of skin and flesh.⁴ The conclusion is that this singling-out was meant both to be lenient and to be stringent with them:

1. lenient, in that they are not judged by white hair;
2. stringent, in that they are judged by yellow hair.

This singling-out is defined as being “not of its own kind,” and the legal conclusion drawn from it is that its purpose is both to be lenient and to be stringent.

This derivation too raises several difficulties:

d. Why is this singling-out defined as “not of its own kind”?
e. Why does singling-out for something not of its own kind lead to conclusions that are both lenient and stringent?
f. How were precisely these lenient and stringent laws chosen?
g. Why is it a leniency not to judge by white hair, when in any case there is no white hair here at all?⁵ And even if that is indeed a leniency, why is a special derivation needed for it? It would in any event have been impossible to judge here by white hair.
h. Why define the change in hair color as leniency and stringency, rather than as simple adaptation to the case at hand? At first glance this is not a matter of leniency and stringency at all, but simply that the hair-sign is of a different color. It is a change, not a leniency and stringency.

The Raavad’s approach

Let us begin with the definition of the two types of singling-out, that is, points a and d. In his commentary on the Baraita of Examples, the Raavad explains that in the first derivation the case is singled out “of its own kind,” because the specific law contains several elements that exist in the general law, and only some of them are missing. It differs from the general category, but it is still in the same subject area. In the biblical description of the specific law, that is, the boil and the burn, the second week of quarantine and the sign of live flesh are absent, but the rest of the laws of ordinary skin lesions appear there. The Raavad stresses that Scripture took the trouble to repeat the shared elements in the passages of boil and burn as well, and omitted only those two elements from the description. From this one may infer that the omission is not accidental, but is intended to teach that these indeed do not apply to boils and burns. Without this elaboration we would have thought that the omission was accidental, and we would have derived live flesh and a second week of quarantine from the general category to the specific case. We will return to this point below.

From here the exposition concludes that we must act exactly in accordance with the biblical description, that is, observe the two leniencies and not impose upon boils and burns the missing elements that exist in the general category from which they were singled out.

This is a straightforward answer to points a and c. It is clear what “of its own kind” means, and it is clear that the leniencies chosen are simply those elements absent from the biblical description of the specific case. But it still remains difficult why this sort of singling-out should be specifically lenient. If some particular case were singled out from the general category and the full description of the general category appeared in it together with one additional component, would we not act in accordance with its biblical description, which would now lead to stringency? Another difficulty, according to the Raavad, is this: what is novel in this principle? Scripture spells out exactly how we are to act with regard to boils and burns, so why do we need a hermeneutical principle to learn it? Why is this a hermeneutical principle rather than ordinary plain-sense interpretation?

As for the second derivation, the Raavad explains there that we are dealing with the impurity of netakim, which is not one of the four standard lesion-appearances. Apparently his meaning is that this is why it is called “not of its own kind,” since it is a completely different phenomenon. It seems that his intention is to say that with netakim no change in the appearance of the skin is needed at all; the hair loss itself constitutes the lesion. So too we find in Maimonides, Laws of the Impurity of Tzara’at 8:1; see the Raavad’s glosses there, and the commentary of Mishneh LaMelekh ad loc. However, from the Tosefta, Nega’im 1:2, cited by the Raavad there, it appears that a change in appearance is also required.

The reason for stringency with yellow hair is clear, since the Torah itself establishes it with regard to netek. The reason for leniency regarding white hair is also clear, since netek has no hair at all. Again, however, the question is why a special hermeneutical principle is needed for this derivation at all. One must also understand what distinguishes this from the previous principle, for there too we are doing only what the Torah itself says. In other words, it is still unclear what difference it makes whether the particular case was singled out to state a different rule “of its own kind” or “not of its own kind.”

Rabbeinu Netanel’s approach⁶

Rabbeinu Netanel, known as “the Holy,” of Chinon, whose words are cited in Sefer Keritut and Middot Aharon, takes a different approach here, apparently because of these difficulties. He distinguishes between two cases. If the particular case was singled out for leniency, as in our example, then the fact that it was singled out from the general category for leniency teaches us not to impose upon it stringencies found in the general category if they are not stated regarding it. Leniencies that exist in the general category, however, are imposed upon it even if they do not appear in its own section. By contrast, if the particular case was singled out for stringency, then we do exactly the reverse: we impose upon it the stringencies found in the general category, but not the leniencies.

According to this, the leniencies and stringencies written concerning the particular case are only laws that it has beyond what exists in the general category, for the rest of the leniencies and stringencies that also exist in the general category it receives from the general category itself. On this basis one can understand why a special hermeneutical principle is needed here.

By contrast, if the particular case was singled out “not of its own kind,” then it has separated from the general category, and therefore we do not impose upon it any stringency or leniency from matters that appear in the general category but do not appear in its own section. This is a new and separate section, and its laws are only what is included within it itself. The principle comes to teach that we must not compare the particular case to the general one because of some external similarity and transfer to it laws from the general category that are not written in it. His explanation of this principle appears to be similar to the Raavad’s.

According to Rabbeinu Netanel, the six main points concerning this principle, points a through f, are clear. It is clear what the difference is between the principles, and why these particular laws were selected. We still do not have an answer, however, regarding the relation between stringency and leniency, and why yellow hair in place of white should be considered stringency and leniency rather than mere change.

A proposal for resolving the Raavad’s approach

The Raavad’s approach we have still left unresolved. He apparently understands the second principle in accordance with Rabbeinu Netanel of Chinon, namely, that the section of the particular case is a new section detached from the section of the general category, and therefore only the laws that appear in it itself are observed. The novelty of the principle is that we do not derive from the section of the general category to the section of the particular case. But as we noted above, the first derivation according to the Raavad leads to precisely the same attitude. Here too we observe only what appears explicitly in the particular section.

From the language of the Raavad it appears that the basic difference between these two principles is that, in the case of “of its own kind,” the section of the particular case is still part of the section of the general category, unlike the case of singling-out “not of its own kind.” How is the fact that this section still remains connected to the general category expressed? Such a connection can be expressed in two ways:

1. with respect to laws that are not explicit in the particular section, but are only absent from it;
2. with respect to deriving from what is explicit in the particular section back to the general section.

We will now explain these points.

1. What is explicit and what is absent

Let us begin with the Raavad’s language in his commentary on the principle of “of its own kind”:

“They require only what was explicitly stated concerning them. And this is what is meant by ‘to be lenient and not stringent’—that they should not require what was not said concerning them.”

If so, the Raavad interprets the terms “leniency” and “stringency” in this context differently from the usual way. Leniency means following what is written explicitly. Stringency means taking what is not written in the particular section, “what was not said concerning them,” but only in the general section, and applying it to the particular section. Let us spell this out a bit more.

In the section of the particular case, various laws are written explicitly. Those certainly apply to the particular case, since the Torah explicitly indicates that this is how it is to be treated. As we have already noted, no hermeneutical principle is needed for that at all. But there is another way to express laws in the particular case: by omitting laws that exist in the general category, for example by omitting stringencies that appear in the general category without explicitly stating their opposite as leniencies in the particular section. What is the status of such laws? Shall we say that those stringencies also apply to the particular case, or is this a deliberate omission meant to teach us that they do not apply there? In his explanation of this principle, the Raavad says that those stringencies are not to be applied to the particular case. In other words, this principle teaches us that the omission is intentional.

The terms “leniency” and “stringency,” rather than presence and absence, are used here because when there is a general section in which various laws are set out, those laws will usually be stringencies, and their absence from the particular section will be a leniency. This is not necessary, but it is the case with boils and burns, and it is generally the case. Laws that the Torah introduces are usually stringencies; leniencies generally need not be written, since anything not prohibited may be treated leniently.⁷

So what, after all, is the difference between these two principles?

It should be noted that according to the Raavad’s conclusion, the practical application of these two principles really does yield very similar results. In both cases, the laws written in the section of the particular case apply, and stringencies that exist in the general category and were omitted from the particular case do not apply. In the principle of “not of its own kind” this is straightforward: there the section of the particular case is a section detached from the general section, and therefore nothing at all may be derived from the general section to the particular one. But in the principle of “of its own kind” there is a major novelty. At first glance, we ought to derive the stringencies from the general section to the particular section, since the two still belong to one another. The principle of “of its own kind” teaches us not to derive stringencies from the section of the general category to the section of the particular case, even though there is no explicit statement in the particular section that those stringencies do not apply there.

In our example, the additional week of quarantine and the sign of live flesh are two stringencies that are not written explicitly in the particular section, that of boils and burns. They appear only as stringencies in the general section of ordinary skin lesions and are absent from the sections on boil and burn. The Raavad understands that we do not derive them from the general section to the section on boils and burns.

Why indeed do we treat the matter this way? We mentioned above that the Raavad took pains to emphasize that the Torah repeats, with regard to the particular case, all the laws in parallel to the general case. The extended parallel description in the particular section, which repeats broad portions of the section of the general category, is meant to tell us that only what appears there is binding, and therefore everything absent from the description is not absent accidentally. By contrast, in the case of singling-out “not of its own kind,” the repeated detail is needed for its own sake. Since we learn nothing from the general section at all, because the section that was singled out is detached from the general section, all the laws that do apply in the particular section have to be stated anew there.

And yet this difference is almost only theoretical. In practice, in both cases only the laws explicit in the particular section apply. Still, there may be a difference between the two principles in situations where a legal detail’s absence from the particular section can be explained by some incidental reason, and not because it does not apply there. In such a case, it seems that with singling-out “of its own kind” we would apply the general stringency to the particular section as well. By contrast, with singling-out “not of its own kind,” we could not do so, since in the end we have no source for it; nothing may be derived from the general section to a particular section detached from it.⁸

2. What is the difference between the two principles according to the Raavad?

It seems, however, that one can nevertheless find a significant difference between the two principles, or the two situations—singling-out “of its own kind” and “not of its own kind”—and that there is a simple practical consequence to the question whether the particular section is detached from the general one or not.

Until now we have dealt with situations in which laws are written in the general section and absent from the particular section. We saw that in such a case there will be no essential difference between the legal conclusions of the two principles, apart from unusual situations of the sort noted above. But what happens in the opposite case, when laws are detailed in the particular section but not in the general one? In such a case, can one reverse the direction of derivation, from the particular to the general? This is what we do, for example, in the principle of “a case singled out in order to teach”; see the page on Parashat Tzav.

It seems that the Raavad addresses this point as well, though elsewhere. In his commentary on the principle of “a case included in a general category and singled out to be judged by a new rule,” in the Baraita of Examples, the Raavad asks what distinguishes that principle from “not of its own kind,” since both are singled out for a new matter, that is, something different from the general category. In his second possibility he writes as follows:

“Alternatively, it teaches us regarding netakim that although they are called a lesion of tzara’at, like the other lesions, we do not derive from them, since they were singled out to state a different rule that is not of their own kind.”

Thus the Raavad writes that the principle of “not of its own kind” is unique in that the laws stated in it do not in turn teach about the general category, since this is a new section detached from the section of the general category. From his words it appears that when the particular case that was singled out is indeed “of its own kind,” then, as we have seen, the particular case still remains part of the general category. In such a case there are certain laws in the particular case that can teach about the general category from which it was singled out, as in the principle of “a case singled out in order to teach.” This is a conspicuous difference between the situations, even though it does not appear in cases where the differences consist only in omissions of laws from the particular section, as in our example.

Resolving the remaining difficulties

According to our proposal concerning the Raavad, we can also better understand the remaining difficulties raised above, both those concerning the derivation of “not of its own kind,” namely points g and h, and those concerning the Raavad’s own approach. We asked why yellow hair in place of white is to be regarded as stringency and leniency rather than simply as a change. According to the Raavad, the answer is that it is indeed not a matter of stringency and leniency at all, but of change. We need the principle because we are applying here a non-plain-sense rule: when a given law is not mentioned in the section of the particular case, we do not derive it from the general category.

Footnotes