Tzav (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Midah Tovah
Friday eve, Parashat Tzav, 5765

Questions

1. What is the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category and then singled out in order to teach”?
2. Is this principle universally accepted?
3. How does it relate to other principles — binyan av (derivation from a paradigm text), general and particular, and the principles of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean?
4. From what exactly did the particular case “go out”?
5. Is this not simply an ordinary analogy? What is its relation to binyan av from a single verse?
6. Is this principle linguistic or logical?

The principles

• A matter that was included in a general category and then singled out in order to teach.
• General and particular.
• General, particular, and general.
• Heqesh (textual comparison).
• Binyan av (derivation from a paradigm text).
• The common denominator.
• Singled out to teach about itself.
• Singled out to teach about its fellow.

And the person who eats flesh from the sacrifice of peace-offerings that belongs to the Lord, while his impurity is upon him, that person shall be cut off from his people. And if a person touches anything unclean — human uncleanness, or an unclean beast, or any unclean detestable thing — and then eats from the flesh of the sacrifice of peace-offerings that belongs to the Lord, that person shall be cut off from his people.

— Leviticus 7:20-21

Say to them: Throughout your generations, any man of all your offspring who approaches the sacred offerings that the children of Israel consecrate to the Lord, while his impurity is upon him, that person shall be cut off from before Me; I am the Lord.

— Leviticus 22:3

Rather, Rava said: Why are three penalties of excision written regarding peace-offerings? One for the general category, one for the particular case, and one for the case of impurity written in the Torah without specification, whose meaning I would otherwise not know.

— Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 7a

“Three penalties of excision regarding peace-offerings” — one concerns one who eats them in impurity, in the section “Speak to the priests”: “Any man of all your offspring who approaches the sacred offerings,” etc. And we say in the fourth chapter of Zevahim, 45b, that “approaches” here means eating. And what kind of approach is this? Something fit for offering, sanctified in a vessel. And two are in the section “Command Aaron”: “And the person who eats from the flesh of the sacrifice of peace-offerings,” and immediately afterward, “And if a person touches anything unclean”; and in both of them it is written, “that person shall be cut off.”

“One for the general category” — … This principle is expounded in Sifra at the beginning of the book: “A matter that was included in a general category and then singled out in order to teach,” etc. How so?… And if you ask: why are these not interpreted by the rule of “general and particular,” so that “the general includes only what is in the particular” — peace-offerings, yes; anything else, no? Because they are far apart, in two separate subject matters. And this is explicit in Menahot 55b: wherever the particular is distant from the general, it is interpreted by this principle, to teach regarding the whole category, etc. And if you ask: what is the difference between this and the rule of “general, particular, and general,” where you infer things similar to the particular? There is a great difference. The rule of similarity to the particular comes, through the final general term, to add to the particular other things that are not written in it. This one comes to reveal something about the particular, not to add to it. And many things are learned by this principle that cannot be learned by the rule of similarity to the particular — for example, kindling, where we say that it was singled out in order to divide liability. And there too it comes by this principle: kindling was included in the general category; why was it singled out? To compare the others to it and reveal about the whole category that just as one is liable for kindling on its own, so too one is liable for each principal category of labor included within that general category on its own.

— Rashi on Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 7a

The Master said: If one committed all of them in a single lapse of awareness, he is liable for each one individually. Granted, you cannot say that he is entirely exempt, for it is written in Leviticus 18: “For whoever does any of all these abominations… they shall be cut off.” But say instead: if he transgressed one, he incurs one liability; if he transgressed all of them in a single lapse of awareness, perhaps he incurs only one. Rabbi Yohanan said: That is why the penalty of excision was singled out in the case of his sister — to divide the liabilities. Rav Beivai bar Abaye challenged him: Say instead that because Scripture singled out his sister as a particular case, he is separately liable for her, but for all the others, since they were committed in one lapse of awareness, he is liable only once. But does Rav Beivai bar Abaye not accept what was taught: Any matter that was included in a general category and then singled out in order to teach was not singled out to teach about itself, but to teach about the entire category. How so? “And the person who eats flesh…” — surely peace-offerings were included among all sacred offerings. Why were they singled out? To compare the others to them: just as peace-offerings are offerings of the altar, and liability applies to them, so too all offerings of the altar entail liability; this excludes offerings dedicated for Temple maintenance. He said to him: That is no proof. Did you not say there that offerings dedicated for Temple maintenance are excluded? Here too, just as his sister is distinctive in that she is a forbidden sexual relation and can never become permitted during the lifetime of the person whose existence makes her forbidden, so too only those relations that can never become permitted during the lifetime of the person whose existence makes them forbidden; this excludes a married woman, who may become permitted during the lifetime of her husband. Rabbi Yonah — and some say Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua — said: The verse says, “For whoever does any of all these abominations…” Since Scripture made the comparison in that way, all the forbidden sexual relations were compared to his sister: just as for his sister one is liable separately, so too for each of them one is liable separately. And according to Rabbi Yitzhak, who said: offenses punishable by excision were included in the general category, and why was the penalty of excision singled out in the case of his sister? In order to judge her with excision and not lashes — from where does he derive the division of liabilities? He derives it from Leviticus 18: “And to a woman in the impurity of her menstruation you shall not approach” — to divide liability for each woman separately.

— Babylonian Talmud, Keritot 2b

A. A matter that was included in a general category and then singled out in order to teach

Introduction

On this page we will discuss the principle: “Any matter that was included in a general category and then singled out in order to teach was not singled out to teach about itself, but to teach about the entire category.” This principle is relevant when the Torah spells out a rule for one particular case from a broader group. We may then infer that this singling-out is meant to serve as an example that teaches something about the whole category.

In our Torah portion there are two verses interpreted through this principle. One, Leviticus 7:18, is discussed in Zevahim 13a-b with respect to piggul (disqualifying sacrificial intent). The second, Leviticus 7:20, is discussed in Keritot 2b. This second derivation also appears in the illustrative tannaitic teaching, and it deals with eating sacred meat in impurity. We will focus on it here.

The relation of this principle to “general and particular”

As Rashi notes in Shevuot, cited above, a case of this kind — where there is a general statement followed by a particular statement that specifies it — might have been expected to be interpreted through the rule of “general and particular.” However, the Talmudic discussion in Menahot 55b states that the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” applies in situations where the particular is distant from the general, and there we do not interpret the text by the rule of “general and particular”¹. The Raavad says the same in his commentary on the illustrative tannaitic teaching.²

As we saw there, if the general statement is distant from the particular, there is no guarantee that their order reflects the original order in which God commanded Moses. In such cases the rule applies that there is no fixed chronological order in the Torah. Therefore one cannot interpret the verses by “general and particular,” since perhaps the relevant structure is really “particular and general.” Yet in all such cases one may still interpret the verses through the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category,” because that principle does not depend on the order in which the commands were given, or on the order in which they appear in Scripture.

One must also discuss the relation of this principle to the other three cognate principles of “a matter that was included in a general category and then singled out,” and to the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth principles of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean — “singled out to teach about itself” and “singled out to teach about its fellow.” See Midot Aharon, chapter 13, and Encyclopedia Talmudit, from note 83 onward.

Eating sacred meat in impurity

In our Torah portion, two penalties of excision are stated regarding the meat of peace-offerings. One concerns a person who was impure and ate sacred meat, and the second concerns a person who ate sacred meat that had become impure. The Torah deals with this matter in one additional place, in Parashat Emor, as Rashi notes in the passage cited above. The Talmudic discussion in Shevuot asks why we need these three sources, and answers that one is required for the general category — the verse in Emor, which is formulated concerning all sacred meat — and the second for the particular case — the verse in our Torah portion, dealing with eating the meat of peace-offerings in impurity. The third is derived by the principle of “if it is not needed for the matter itself,” but that lies beyond our present scope. As noted above from Rashi, the Talmud does not mean here the rule of “general and particular,” but the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category.”

The derivation itself appears only in the discussion in Keritot, and also in the illustrative tannaitic teaching. Its wording is as follows:

As it was taught: Any matter that was included in a general category and then singled out in order to teach was not singled out to teach about itself, but to teach about the entire category. How so? “And the person who eats flesh…” — surely peace-offerings were included among all sacred offerings. Why were they singled out? To compare the others to them: just as peace-offerings are offerings of the altar, and liability applies to them, so too all offerings of the altar entail liability; this excludes offerings dedicated for Temple maintenance.

This formulation raises several questions, and we will address them in the course of our discussion:

1. Why is there a separate assumption in the first place that this verse was singled out “in order to teach”?
2. Where is it stated that peace-offerings are part of some broader category?
3. How do we know that this rule was not said only about peace-offerings? This question is tied to the previous one.
4. Why is there reference here to heqesh? At first glance this seems to be only a teaching about the general category by way of example.

Three possibilities for defining the biblical situation to which this principle applies

In our derivation, the Torah states that one who eats the meat of peace-offerings in impurity is liable to excision. The Sages derive from here, through the principle of “a matter included in a general category,” that anyone who eats any sacred meat in impurity is liable to excision. Finally, the singled-out particular teaches that this applies only to meat sanctified for the altar, and not to property consecrated only for Temple maintenance.

Conceptually, there are three possible ways to define the biblical situation in which this principle operates. We will present them and illustrate their meaning in our case:

1. There are two parallel commands: one deals with the group as a whole, and the other with a particular member of that group. In such a case, the second command is redundant. In our case, there is already a command with overlapping content applying to all types of sacred meat — the verse in Parashat Emor — and therefore the verse about peace-offerings is, at least apparently, superfluous.

This is indeed how Rashi explains the passage in Shevuot cited above. The verse in Parashat Emor is the general one, and it deals with all sacred meat. We may note that this also fits the plain wording of the Talmud there, since it states that an additional penalty of excision was written in the Torah regarding eating in impurity.

2. There is a biblical statement that includes the particular within a broader category. But on this possibility the command itself appears only regarding the particular, and not regarding the whole category. In such a case there is no duplication, and the particular command is not redundant. Even so, one must still ask why the Torah chose to formulate the command specifically with respect to that particular. In our example, there is a verse establishing that peace-offerings are included within the category of sacred offerings, but there is no verse imposing excision for eating sacred offerings in impurity in general.

This approach emerges from the versions of the illustrative tannaitic teaching in the Constantinople and Venice printings. According to that version, the following verse from later in the chapter, Leviticus 7:37, is added to the wording before us:

Surely peace-offerings were included among all the sacred offerings, as it is written: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, of the sin offering, of the guilt offering, of the ordination offering, and of the sacrifice of peace-offerings.”

According to this נוסח, it appears that the general category from which peace-offerings emerged is a verse that includes peace-offerings among all the offerings, without any concrete command about eating in impurity. This stands in contrast to the understanding that emerges from the Babylonian Talmud, where the verse of the general category is a command applying to the whole group — that is, a verse that also contains the penalty of excision. Here, by contrast, the general verse merely defines the group and the particular as belonging to it.

We may note that a similar version appears in the Vilna Gaon’s recension of the illustrative tannaitic teaching, except that he cites both verses: the one in Parashat Emor and the one found in the Constantinople version. According to the Vilna Gaon, the general category is the verse in Emor that commands the prohibition of eating all offerings in impurity, while this second verse merely adds that peace-offerings are one of the offerings and are not unique in this respect. If so, this fits the first possibility above.

3. There is no explicit biblical general statement at all. The command is stated only regarding one particular, but it is clear to the Sages, either by reasoning or by tradition, that this particular merely represents a whole category. Again, there is nothing redundant here, but it is not clear why the Torah chose to command specifically with respect to this particular.

In our case, one could say that peace-offerings are merely an example of sacrificial meat, and the prohibition against eating them in impurity is not unique to peace-offerings but applies to all sacrificial meat. If so, the question arises why the Torah formulated the command specifically regarding peace-offering meat rather than stating it as a command concerning anyone who eats sacrificial meat in impurity.

It should be noted that we have not found this approach among the commentators with respect to our derivation. However, in the passage in Zevahim 13a about piggul, there is certainly room to understand the matter this way. Thus, this remains a possible approach to the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category.”

Stylistic indications

The Raavad, in his commentary on the illustrative tannaitic teaching, comments on the wording “and then singled out from the general category in order to teach.” He argues that the derivation contains two novelties: first, that the verse which was singled out was singled out in order to teach; and second, that it was not singled out to teach about itself, but about the whole category.³ It is quite clear that the Raavad understood the matter in accordance with the first possibility, for according to the second and third possibilities, the verse was not singled out in order to teach but in order to exemplify something about the whole category. According to the first possibility, however, there is real redundancy in the command concerning peace-offerings, and therefore it is evident that the verse comes to teach.

The very formulation that the verse “was included in the general category and then went out” also points to the first possibility, for according to the second and third possibilities the verse was never truly part of the general category in the relevant sense. We may note that in Zevahim 13, where one of the later possibilities is probably the correct one, the wording is nevertheless similar.

According to Menahot 55b, which states that this principle applies when the general is distant from the particular, it would seem at first glance that this too assumes the first possibility, since there is a general category, only it is distant. On the other hand, if the two verses participating in the derivation under the first possibility were adjacent to one another, we still would not interpret them through “general and particular,” since these are two commands and not a general formulation followed by a particular formulation, as in the ordinary case of “general and particular.” At first glance, this specifically points more toward the second possibility. Still, anyone who studies the discussion there will see that the case under debate fits the first possibility: there too there is a general command and a particular command.

The character of the principle: linguistic or logical

Elsewhere we divided the hermeneutical principles into two kinds: linguistic and logical. A fortiori arguments and binyan av in its various forms are logical principles, because they draw their conclusions from the content of the verses rather than from their formulation. By contrast, the principles of general and particular are, at least at first glance, stylistic principles — although see the page on Ki Tissa — because they derive their conclusions from the Torah’s formulation rather than from the content of the verses. What, then, is the nature of the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category”? Is it linguistic or logical?

It seems that according to the first possibility, this is a linguistic principle. The conclusion arises from a redundancy in the Torah. By contrast, according to the third possibility — and probably also the second, though not necessarily — it is a logical principle, because it learns from content: from the character of the particular to the character of the general category. According to that understanding, we have here a logical generalization from one particular to the broader class that contains it. This is a kind of binyan av from a single verse.

In fact, this distinction raises a difficulty with respect to the second and third possibilities: what exactly is the difference between this principle and binyan av from a single verse? In binyan av we generalize from one example to a broader category that contains it. If so, that is precisely what we are doing here as well, and it is not clear why this should count as a distinct principle.

On the page for Parashat Shemot, in volume 2, we saw that the commentators disagreed about binyan av from a single verse. Some explained it as an analogy, or induction, from one place to similar places — the Raavad, Rashi, and their school. Others explained it as a structure of “the common denominator” stated in one context — Halikhot Olam and its school.

At first glance, that dispute may be reflected in the distinction we have drawn here. The Raavad, who holds that binyan av from one verse is an ordinary analogy, is forced to explain that “a matter that was included in a general category” is not a mere analogy but a distinct principle. By contrast, commentators from the opposite camp can interpret our case in accordance with the second and third possibilities, because for them binyan av is not an analogy but a structure of the common denominator.

It should be noted that the commentators of that second camp justify their view — that even binyan av from one verse is a structure of the common denominator — on the grounds that analogy as such, being ordinary human reasoning, does not require formal definition and legitimation within the system of hermeneutical principles. If so, it is clear that they will not ground analogy in this principle either.

The rationale of the principle

The Raavad explains our assumption that the verse was not singled out to teach about itself by noting that, in fact, the verse contains no novelty on its own.⁴ The fact that one who eats the meat of peace-offerings in impurity is liable to excision already follows from the verse in Parashat Emor — according to his view that this is the general category, in line with the discussion in Shevuot. Therefore it is clear that the verse was not singled out to teach about itself, but about the whole category.

What would it mean to say that the verse teaches about itself if it contains no novelty? Apparently, it would mean that the penalty of excision for eating sacred food in impurity applies only to peace-offerings. Note that this is exactly the result that would follow from a derivation by the rule of “general and particular.” But here, because the general and the particular are distant from one another, we do not conclude that the general includes only what is in the particular. On the contrary: the particular reveals some rule about the whole category, namely that the penalty of excision applies only to eating offerings sanctified for the altar in impurity. This is exactly what Rashi wrote in Shevuot, as cited above:

And if you ask: what is the difference between this and the principle of “general, particular, and general,” where you infer things similar to the particular? There is a great difference. The rule of similarity to the particular comes to add to the particular, through the final general term, other things not written in it, whereas this one comes to reveal something about the particular and not to add to it.

Application to other situations

In light of our discussion, one must ask what happens in a case where there is no general command at all, as in our case according to the Constantinople version, or as in the discussion in Zevahim. In such a case, the particular command is not redundant. True, the question still remains why the Torah chose to formulate the more general rule specifically with respect to peace-offerings. One might learn various things from that choice, but there is no special reason to conclude that the command is meant specifically to teach about the whole category rather than about the particular itself. More than that: in such a case, the operative principle should seemingly be binyan av, as we noted above. This is a basic difficulty with the third way of understanding this principle.

B. Two manifestations of the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category”

How does the derivation from kindling, which was singled out “for division,” differ from our examples?

On the page for Parashat Vayakhel, volume 1, we argued that the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” is a linguistic rather than a logical principle. There we understood it in the straightforward manner, corresponding to the first possibility above. Beyond that, we saw there that it is a principle of generalization, unlike heqesh, which is a principle of comparison among items in a list.

The example discussed there was the dispute about kindling. The Torah writes the verse about kindling separately from the other categories of labor, and the tannaim disagreed as to its significance. Rabbi Yose held that kindling was singled out only for a negative prohibition, that is, to assign a special prohibition to kindling and remove it from the general category of labors that incur stoning and excision. Rabbi Natan held that kindling was singled out “for division,” that is, to teach that when one performs several categories of labor in a single lapse of awareness, one is liable to bring a separate sin-offering for each category.

We noted there that Rabbi Natan’s derivation is not built on a comparison between kindling and the other categories of labor. That is, it is not a derivation whose subject is some feature of kindling that is then learned over to the other categories. The feature learned there is that when one performs several labors from the larger set in one lapse of awareness, one is liable to a separate sin-offering for each labor. Kindling does not teach a specific feature found in each labor taken on its own.

In the cases under discussion here, the situation is different. The element that is singled out from the general category teaches a specific feature that exists in every member of the category from which it emerged. In our case, peace-offerings teach that only offerings sanctified for the altar render the eater liable to excision when eaten in impurity, not items dedicated for Temple maintenance. Likewise, in Zevahim 13, the sprinkling of the blood teaches that piggul intent applies only to acts required for atonement. These are both examples of the principle of “a matter included in a general category” functioning like heqesh — that is, as a comparison between the singled-out particular and the other members of the category from which it emerged.⁵

Two manifestations of the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category”

We have therefore seen that there are two types of application of this principle:⁶

1. Generalization, which teaches about the relations among the members of the category — in other words, a property of the category as a whole — as in the division of sin-offering liabilities.⁶
2. Comparison, a similarity between the singled-out particular and the other members of the category — that is, a property of each individual member of the category — as in the case of eating sacred things in impurity.⁷

It is possible that these two manifestations are reflected in two different formulations that we have found for this principle. The usual text reads: “it was not singled out to teach about itself.” But in Midrash HaGadol, at the beginning of Leviticus, the reading is: “and it was not singled out to teach only about itself.” The difference is that according to the first reading, the main concern of the principle is precisely the other items in the category, whereas according to the reading in Midrash HaGadol, the central point appears to be teaching about the category as a whole, including the particular case itself. Eating sacred meat in impurity is an example of the first formulation, whereas the derivation “for division” is an example of the second.

The discussion in Keritot

The context of the discussion in Keritot is the interpretation of mishnayot that begin with a general number and then spell it out in detail — four primary categories of damages, thirty-six offenses punishable by excision, and so forth. The Talmud there explains that the number in the Mishnah in Keritot comes to teach that if a person committed all of the excision offenses unintentionally in a single lapse of awareness, he must bring a separate sin-offering for each one. What is the source of this law in the Torah? The Talmud explains that there is a general verse: “whoever does any of all these abominations… they shall be cut off” in Leviticus 18, and also a particular case singled out from that general category, namely “his sister,” regarding whom the Torah stated the liability of excision separately. From this the Sages learn that one is liable to a separate sin-offering for each offense, even if all of them were committed in a single lapse of awareness. This is a derivation by the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category.” The manifestation here is the generalizing one — “for division” — and not the comparative one, exactly as in the case of kindling.

A dissenting opinion appears there in the Talmud, seemingly parallel to the case of kindling. Rabbi Yitzhak holds that “his sister” was singled out to teach that offenses punishable by excision do not also incur lashes. In the case of kindling as well, we saw that Rabbi Yose held that kindling was singled out only for a negative prohibition, that is, to teach about itself and not about the general category. There is, however, an important difference between the two cases. Rabbi Yose held that kindling was singled out to teach something only about itself. If so, he appears in principle to reject the very principle of “a matter that was included in a general category.” By contrast, Rabbi Yitzhak agrees that “his sister” was singled out in accordance with that principle. He merely maintains that it teaches something else: that the feature of not receiving lashes applies to all the other excision offenses as well. This is, of course, a manifestation of the comparative type. That is, he rejects the first manifestation and proposes the second.

The dispute among the tannaim

It is possible that Rabbi Yose too does not reject the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” as such,⁸ but rather understands it only as a principle of comparison and not as a principle of generalization. If so, he would accept the application of the principle to eating sacred things in impurity, where it appears as comparison, but not to the division of sin-offerings, where it functions as generalization. If that is correct, his position does indeed parallel that of Rabbi Yitzhak in Keritot. The second manifestation of the principle would then be universally accepted, while only the first would remain disputed.

And indeed, in Sefer Keritut, in the ninth section, the author asks: how can Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Yitzhak dispute one of the thirteen hermeneutical principles? With respect to Rabbi Yose, he explains that Rabbi Yose does not regard the particular as truly having been singled out from the general category, and he gives a specific reason for that. But with respect to Rabbi Yitzhak, his remarks are highly puzzling. Why does he think Rabbi Yitzhak disputes the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category,” when in fact Rabbi Yitzhak employs it, only to derive something different?

The author of Sefer Keritut gives two answers there regarding Rabbi Yitzhak: first, Rabbi Yitzhak does indeed expound the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category,” but for a different purpose, not for division. He calls this “the other kind of ‘a matter that was included in a general category,’” which suggests that he senses there are indeed two types here, and that Rabbi Yitzhak accepts only one of them — exactly as we have proposed. Second, the case of “his sister” was not truly included in the entire category of forbidden sexual relations, whereas peace-offerings are truly part of the category of sacred offerings.⁹

What the two manifestations of the principle have in common

We saw above that Rashi in Shevuot — and following him the author of Sefer Keritut in the ninth section — distinguishes between the principle of “general, particular, and general,” which is also a kind of analogy and in which we judge according to resemblance to the particular, and the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category.” He gives as an example kindling, which was singled out for division and could not have been learned from the principle of “general, particular, and general,” because the latter comes to add to the particular things not written in it, whereas the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” adds nothing to it, but instead reveals something about the particular itself. We explained above, at the end of section A, that the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” does not add additional kinds of particulars to which the law applies; rather, it adds legal characteristics to the particular under discussion, whereas “general, particular, and general” is a principle that expands the scope of the law.¹⁰

This is a common feature of both manifestations of “a matter that was included in a general category.” In one type, we learn that even if the particular offense was committed in a single lapse of awareness together with other offenses like it, it still incurs a separate punishment of its own — and so do the others. In the second type, we learn that its stated feature applies only in certain cases — offerings of the altar, acts indispensable to atonement, and the like. See Sefer Keritut there, 63c-d, where additional examples are given.

Are both manifestations of the principle universally accepted?

We saw above that Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Yitzhak dispute the first manifestation of the principle — the generalizing one — and accept the second, the comparative one. At first glance, the second manifestation therefore seems to be universally accepted.

Yet later in the discussion in Keritot, Rav Beivai bar Abaye asks why we should not say that one incurs a separate liability only for “his sister,” while for all the other forbidden relations one would bring only a single sin-offering. The Talmud reacts with astonishment: how can he dispute the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category”? As proof, it cites our derivation concerning eating sacred meat in impurity. Rav Beivai explains that the singled-out particular is not similar to the general category, since the particular — “his sister” — can never become permitted, whereas some members of the category can, such as a married woman, who becomes permitted by divorce. The medieval commentators add: likewise a menstruant, who becomes permitted upon purification. Therefore, they argue, one cannot learn from the particular to the general category.

At first glance, the Talmud’s astonishment suggests that this principle must indeed be universally accepted, as noted above. The Talmud is unwilling to countenance a view that rejects a derivation based on this principle. As we saw above, neither Rabbi Yose nor Rabbi Yitzhak rejects the principle itself, but perhaps only one of its two manifestations.

Nevertheless, it is not clear why the Talmud does not conclude here that we should indeed learn from “his sister” that among the other forbidden sexual relations too, only those that can never become permitted incur an independent sin-offering — as distinct from a married woman and a menstruant — just as peace-offerings teach that the law of excision exists only for offerings of the altar. At first glance, this suggests that Rav Beivai adopts the opposite stance from the one we described above. He accepts specifically the first manifestation of the principle, the generalizing one — “for division” — but not the second, the comparative one, in which the singled-out particular teaches a new feature about the other members of the category. On the contrary, if there is a difference between the particular and the rest of the category, he sees that as a refutation of any comparison between them. If so, it is possible that he really would not accept the derivation from peace-offerings to the other sacred offerings.¹¹

This may also help us understand Rav Huna son of Rabbi Yehoshua’s answer to Rav Beivai. At first glance, he merely repeats the familiar derivation of “a matter that was included in a general category,” and it is not clear what he adds. According to our explanation, however, his point may be that one cannot refute this derivation on the basis of differences between the singled-out particular and the other members of the category, because the very point of the principle is to establish a comparison between the particular and the rest of the category. If such a refutation were valid, one could never derive from peace-offerings to other sacrifices, or from the sprinkling of the blood to the other sacrificial acts. Rav Huna therefore disagrees with Rav Beivai precisely at this point: he sees the first manifestation of the principle as a legitimate application as well. Once that is so, Rav Beivai’s objection falls away.

Footnotes